JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri P.N.Saxena, senior Advocate on behalf of appellant, Sri Prashant Mathur on behalf of the Cantonment Board, Meerut is present. 2. The facts leading to the present contempt appeal are: 3. The contemnor-appellant as power of attorney holder of one Smt. Pushpa Devi filed Original Suit No. 581 of 1994 seeking a permanent injunction only for restraining the Cantonment Board from demolishing the bungalow, which had been constructed over the property more appropriately described as bungalow No. 210-B, West End Road, Meerut Cantt, Meerut. No other relief was prayed in the said suit. A temporary injunction application was also filed and this application came to be rejected by the Trial Court vide order dated 6.4.1995. Not being satisfied the contemnor-appellant filed First Appeal From Order before the High Court being FAFO No. 298 of 1995, Smt. Pushpa Devi and others v. Cantonment Board, Meerut through its Executive Officer and another. In the said appeal, the appellant described himsef to be the power of attorney of one Smt. Pushpa Devi. In the First Appeal From order, an interim order was granted by the Division Bench of this Court on 13.4.1995, which reads as follows: “Sri A K Sinha has accepted the notices on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2. he prays for and is granted three weeks time to file counter affidavit. Appellant will have one week thereafter to file rejoinder affidavit. List this appeal immedaitely after expiry of aforesaid period. meanwhile, parties are directed to maintain status quo with regard to bungalow No. 210-B, West End Road, Meerut Cantt. Appellants shall also not raise any further construction nor respondents shall demolish any construction.” 4. On the strength of the interim order, the contemnor-appellant executed as many as 58 sale deeds in favour of different persons after dividing the bungalow into plots. The details of the persons in whose favour, such sale deeds have been executed has already been reproduced by Hon’ble Single Judge in his judgment under appeal and, therefore, may not be repeated again. 5. It is also admitted on record that constructions have been raised over the plots so carved out from the bungalow in question to a very large extent including the construction of a mall. These facts are not in dispute. 6. Cantonment Board, thereafter filed Contempt Application No. 380 of 2001 alleging violation of the order dated 13.4.1995. 7. 5. It is also admitted on record that constructions have been raised over the plots so carved out from the bungalow in question to a very large extent including the construction of a mall. These facts are not in dispute. 6. Cantonment Board, thereafter filed Contempt Application No. 380 of 2001 alleging violation of the order dated 13.4.1995. 7. Notices were issued to the contemnors mentioned therein and after hearing the counsel for the parties, the Contempt Court has recorded that this was one of the cases where disobedience of the order of the High Court was manifested and that the contemnor has taken the orders of the High Court so lightly. Learned Single Judge in answer to the plea raised on behalf of the appellant qua the proper remedy available to the Cantonment Board was to initiate proceeding under order 39, Rule 2A C.P.C., has held that the Cantonment Board had the option to opt for the proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act or to pursue the remedy under Section 39, Rule 2A. If it has chosen to opt for the proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act, they have committed no error. The learned Single Judge after noticing the judgments of the Apex Court applicable on the subject, has held that all the constructions, which have been raised were completely unauthorised and otherwise in violation of injunction. There has been no sanction of the map by the Cantonment Board at any point of time. The Contempt Court has gone on to issue directions for punishing the appellant with imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs. 2000/- to be deposited within 15 days. A further direction was issued that the constructions which have been raised unauthorisedly without any sanction of map and in violation of injuction order shall be demolished and the status as was prevailing on the date of injunction would be maintained. 8. Sri Anand Prakash Agarwal, the contemnor-appellant has filed this appeal against the said judgment of the Contempt Court. 9. We may notice that the same plaintiff with the contemnor-appellant as power of attorney holder filed another Original Suit No. 836 of 1999, Smt. Pushpa Devi and others v. Union of India and another against the Union of India and the Estate Officer without impleading the Cantonment Board for a declaration that they were the owner of the bungalow in question. The suit is stated to have been decreed on 18.4.2000. The Union of India filed First Appeal No. 151 of 2000 before the District Judge, which was dismissed on 30.11.2000. Against the said order of the District Judge, Second Appeal No. 276 of 2001 has been filed by Union of India wehrein on 28.3.2006 an interim order has been passed restraining the transfer of the property in dispute as well as for demolitions of the properties. 10. The Cantonment Board also filed Original Suit No. 188 of 1995 for a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant to the suit including the contemnor-appellant before us, from raising any construction over the bungalow in question. This suit is stated to have been decreed on 12.11.2013. A decree of prohibitory injunction has been granted which has not been subjected to any further challenge. 11. The Court has been further informed today that Original Suit No. 581 of 1994 filed by appellant giving rise to the First Appeal From Order referred to above, was ultimately got dismissed as withdrawn on 30.11.2000 i.e. the date on which the first appeal filed by Union of India arising out of Suit No. 581 of 1994 was dismissed. The result of dismissal of the Suit No. 581 of 1994 is that the interim order passed therein including the order passed in First Appeal would merge in the final judgment and, therefore, it can be safely recorded that there ceases to be any injunction operative in the eye of law at any point of time (Ref : Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church Or South India Trust Assn., 1992 AIR 1439). 12. We have no hesitation to record that the temporary injunction proceedings cannot continue beyond the suit proceedings itself. The matter however does not end there because the contemnor-appellant before us has taken benefit of the interim injunction order, which he obtained. He has also breached the same injunction orders in so far it directed status quo to be maintained and constructions being not raised. Therefore, we proceed to examine the appeals on merits. 13. Sri P.N. Saxena, Senior Advocate on behalf of contemnor-appellant stated that the appellant can be punished only if the interim order dated 13.4.1995 is found to be operative on the date the act of Contempt is alleged. Therefore, we proceed to examine the appeals on merits. 13. Sri P.N. Saxena, Senior Advocate on behalf of contemnor-appellant stated that the appellant can be punished only if the interim order dated 13.4.1995 is found to be operative on the date the act of Contempt is alleged. He submits that the interim order as recorded above started with the word ‘in the meantime.’ Therefore, once the appeal was listed after expiry of the period mentioned in the order dated 13.4.1995, the order would come to an automatic end. According to him appeal was listed on 16.4.1996 and, therfore, interim order did not survive thereafter. For the proposition, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Dr. Luis Proto barbosa v. Union of India and others, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 644, relevant paragraph-12 whereof reads as follows: “12. The question as to what is the outer terminal point of the operation of the restraint, when the expression “in the meantime” is used is arguable. That expression takes its colour from the context. They are “words of relation and refer not only to a time that is to begin, but to a time which is also to end”. It is difficult to say the period of the restraint spilled over October 30, 1990 and the restraint on alterin the “status quo” continued. The order was not made either at the instance nor for the benefit of the appellant. In the facts of the case we do not think we are justified in construing the “status quo” order to continue to operate even after October 30, 1990 or even if did, it enured to the benefit of the appellant.” 14. On such a submission being made this Court required Sri P.N. Saxena, senior Advocate to inform the Court : (a) as to whether such a plea was ever raised before the Contempt Court in the reply filed to the notice issued for initiating contempt proceedings or not? (b) Whether such plea was pressed during oral submissions before the Contempt Court or not? (c) If it is the case of the appellant that the interim order did not survive after 16th April, 1996, whether the constructions raised under the same interim order after the said date were liable to be demolished for same reason that the interim protection did not survive. 15. (c) If it is the case of the appellant that the interim order did not survive after 16th April, 1996, whether the constructions raised under the same interim order after the said date were liable to be demolished for same reason that the interim protection did not survive. 15. So far as first and second query are concerned, it is admitted before this Court that no such plea was raised in the reply to the show cause notice nor it was orally pressed before the Single Judge. 16. So far as the third query raised by the Court is concerned, Sri Saxena made a statement that he cannot answer the query. We may record that the stand so taken by a senior Advocate of this Court does not appeal to us and we feel that the senior counsel has not been fair to the Court. We expect that the senior Advocates on being confronted with a query related to interpretation of an order would respond in all fairness. 17. In any view of the matter from paragraph-12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Luis Proto Barbosa (supra), it is apparent that the Apex Court itself has not expressed any final opinion on the interpretation of the word’ in the meantime.’ It has recorded that it is arguable as to what exact meaning is to be attached and that it takes colour from the context. In our opinion, there would be another factor, which would be determinative about the meaning to be attached to the words ‘in the meantime’ that is how the parties to the litigation understood the order. From the records it is established beyond reasonable doubt more sepecifically from the stand taken by the contemnor before the Contempt Court both in his written defence as well as at the time of oral arguments that they understood that the interim order was to remain operative till fresh orders are made. 18. Reference may be held to a Division Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Govinda Bhagoji Kamable and others v. Sadu bapu Kamble and others, 2005(1) Mh LJ 651 as under: “The phrase “in the meanwhile” is used in the order granting stay. The dictionary meaning of the word meanwhile is “till happening of a particular event” or “until something expected happens”. The dictionary meaning of the word meanwhile is “till happening of a particular event” or “until something expected happens”. When the stay was to be operative in the meanwhile, it was to operate upto happening of a particular event. The said event was hearing of the application after service of notice to the Respondents. Whenever this Court intends to grant ad-interim relief limited to a particular date, it is always mentioned in the order very specifically that the ad-interim relief will be operative till a particular date.........” “When this Court issued notice to the respondents and granted adinterim relief was to operate till the Court heard the parties on the basis of the notice issued or till order of stay was specifically vacated by this Court...........” The appellant proposes to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge, on pleas not raised or pressed before him. 19. Even otherwise, we are satisfied that in the facts of the case, the parties did understand that the order dated 13.4.1952 would continue till fresh orders are made or till the appeal is decided. 20. What is worse to note is that interim order was obtained by the contemnor-appellant himself and that he protected the constructions from demolition for decades only on the basis of the same interim order. Now when he is faced with contempt proceedings, the counsel stands up to say before this Court that interim order did not survive after 1996. 21. The facts of the case reflect that the contemnor obtained an interim injunction order from the first Appellate Court and finally withdrew the original suit only because in the meantime, he succeeded in transferring the suit property to 58 persons and huge constructions being raised over the property. 22. Such practice of misuse of the Court proceedings has to be dealt with firmly by this Court. The plaintiff cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the Court proceedings. 23. The plaintiff also filed a suit for declaration after more than four years of the earlier suit without impleading the Cantonment Board as a party when all along the Cantonment Board had been contesting the title over the property in dispute in the first suit. 24. 23. The plaintiff also filed a suit for declaration after more than four years of the earlier suit without impleading the Cantonment Board as a party when all along the Cantonment Board had been contesting the title over the property in dispute in the first suit. 24. We are also of the opinion that not only the sale deed, which have been executed are in defience to the interim order of this Court, they are also in teeth of Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act, which prohibits transfer of any property subject matter of the suit proceedings without permission of the Court concerned. Such transfer of suit property is prohibited under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore, would be contrary to the law of the land and void in view of Section 23 of the Contract Act which reads as follows: “The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless— It is forbidden by law; or is of such nature that, if permitted it would defeat the provision of any law or is fraudulent; or involves or implies, injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.” 25. We find that the contemnor had violated the injunction order dated 13.4.1995 with impugnity. The learned Single Judge is correct in punishing the appellant for contempt. 26. We approve the reasons recorded in the order of the learned Judge and see no reason to take any different view in the matter. 27. In view of what has been recorded above, we find no merit in the present appeal. The appeal is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands discharged. —————