JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. This revisional application is directed against an order No. 47 dated April 21, 2015 passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Baruipur, 24 Parganas South in Title Suit No. 55 of 2009 by which an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is rejected. 2. It would be relevant to record the salient facts allegedly constituting the cause of action narrated in the plaint before proceeding to deal with the points urged by the defendant in an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs claimed the following reliefs in the plaint : "(a) a decree of declaration that deed being No. 206 for the year 1942 is a collusive document and by the said document Akchhed Ali Mondal's one-third share is not affected and the plaintiffs and proforma-defendants are the joint owners of his share; (b) a preliminary decree for partition declaring one third share of the plaintiffs in the suit property; (c) Certain time to be given to the plaintiffs for making amicable partition of the suit property in terms of the preliminary decree and on the failure of the parties, a survey passed Advocate Commissioner be appointed for effecting partition of the property in terms of the preliminary decree and on the basis of his report final decree be passed; (d) for a decree of declaration that the defendants have no right, title and interest and possession over one third share left by Akchhed Ali Mondal of the property and Deed No. 206 of 1942 in respect of the suit property is not binding upon the plaintiffs; (e) for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering or disturbing in respect of one third share of the plaintiffs in the suit property; (f) for a decree of all costs of the suit; (g) for a decree of any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiffs are entitled under law and equity." 3. The plaint case proceeds with one Lutfar @ Notai Mondal was the owner of the subject property and had five sons, namely, Beni Mondal, Babu Mondal, Sabu Mandal, Katil Mondal and Sahebjan Mondal. Two of his sons, namely, Babu Mondal and Sabu Mondal died during the lifetime of Lutfar Mondal. The plaint case proceeds with one Lutfar @ Notai Mondal was the owner of the subject property and had five sons, namely, Beni Mondal, Babu Mondal, Sabu Mandal, Katil Mondal and Sahebjan Mondal. Two of his sons, namely, Babu Mondal and Sabu Mondal died during the lifetime of Lutfar Mondal. Beni Mondal had one son, namely, Akchhed Mondal who had no issue except two wives, who were alive at the time of his death. The other son, namely, Katil Mondal had one son, Amjad Ali Mondal whose sons are the plaintiffs in the instant suit. Saheb Chand Mondal had a son, namely, Fakir Md. Mondal, who is also arrained as proforma defendant in the instant suit. According to the plaintiffs the two sons who died during the lifetime of Lutfar Mondal did not inherit any shares in the estate left by him in view of Hanafi Law of inheritance and, therefore, his share devolved upon the three sons, namely, Beni Mondal, Katil Mondal and Saheb Chand Mondal who had undivided 1/3rd share therein. Upon the death of the aforesid three sons the properties devolved upon Akchhed Mondal, Amjad Mondal and Fakir Mondal having 1/3rd each therein and the C.S. record of right was prepared in their names. 4. It is further alleged that Akchhed died in the year 1939 and his two wives subsequently died and, therefore, his share would devolve upon the surviving nephews in equal shares. 5. The challenge is further made to a deed no. 206 of 1942 executed by the father of the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants whereby he transferred and conveyed his right in favour of a third party who in turn sold the properties to the defendant companies. The challenge is also made to the said deed on the premise that the father of the plaintiffs, namely, Amjad Ali Mondal was minor at the time of execution and registration of the said alleged deed and in absence of any guardian being appointed on his behalf, the entire transfer is illegal and cannot convey the valid title in favour of the ultimate predecessors. The knowledge of the said deed is imputed in the first week of April, 2006 and the suit appears to have been filed in the month of March, 2009 within three years from the date of the knowledge and according to the plaintiffs such claim is not barred by limitation. The knowledge of the said deed is imputed in the first week of April, 2006 and the suit appears to have been filed in the month of March, 2009 within three years from the date of the knowledge and according to the plaintiffs such claim is not barred by limitation. It is further averred in the plaint that when the defendants attempted to raise a boundary wall at the road side of their own land covering the plaintiff's plot of land being Plot No. 946, the Title Suit No. 21 of 2007 was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), 2nd Court, Baruipur, for declaration of title wherein an application for injunction was moved and the Court passed ad interim order of status-quo on contested hearing. 6. Subsequently, the parties amicably settled the disputes orally. The sum and substance of the said oral agreement are that the defendants would purchase 1/3rd share in the Plot. No. 1946 belonging to Akchhed Ali Mondal at a market price and the plaintiffs would be obliged to withdraw the said suit after execution and registration of the Deed of Conveyance. Under the said oral agreement, it was further agreed that the parties would amicably partitioned the 1/3rd share of the Akchhed Ali Mondal in Plot Nos. 1941, 1942 and 1947 which the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants inherited under the Hanafi School of Mohammedan Law to the extent of 36 decimals out of 107 decimals of land. Pursuant to the said oral agreement the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants executed and registered a Deed of Conveyance transferring their 1/3rd share in Plot No. 1946 and in terms of the said oral agreement. An application for withdrawal of the suit was filed. Since the defendants failed to amicably partitioned the property comprised in Plot Nos. 1941, 1942 and 1947, the present suit is filed for partition of the aforesaid plots. 7. The sum and substance of the case made out in the plaint, as appears from the meaningful reading thereof, is that the deed of 1942 executed by the father of the plaintiffs along with other persons is void inasmuch as the father of the plaintiff was a minor and oral settlement was arrived between the defendants and the plaintiffs for amicable partition of the property comprised in aforesaid three plots and having failed to do so the plaintiff seeks for partition. 8. 8. The defendants company filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for rejection of the plaint on two grounds. Firstly, the plaint does not disclose the cause of action and, secondly, the suit is barred by limitation. 9. The first plea is based on the assertion that the purported deed was executed by Amjad Ali Mondal after the death of Akchhed Ali Mondal and therefore all rights which he held at the time of execution and registration of the deed was intended to be transferred. Furthermore, the Amjad Ali Mondal during his lifetime more particularly after attaining majority, did not challenge the said deed. On the second plea, it is stated that the deed of 1942 is sought to be challenged in the year 2009 and therefore the relief is apparently barred by law of limitation. 10. Before the Trial Court a further plea was taken that Amjad Ali Mondal did not sale the share of Akchhed Ali Mondal which he inherited upon his death and therefore such deed cannot be construed to have transferred such share in favour of the defendant no. 2. Above all the plaintiffs maintained that the Amjad Ali Mondal being a minor and executed a deed in such capacity is void. At the time of an argument a further plea was taken that upon the death of two wives of the Akchhed Ali Mondal their shares reverted back to the plaintiffs being the nephews and therefore they acquired the right, title and interest in respect of the suit property and the suit for declaration is therefore maintainable. 11. The Trial Court proceeded to dismiss the said application as it found that those pleas assume a mixed question of fact and law and can only be decided after full fledged trial and it cannot be said that the plaint lacks material particulars and does not constitute cause of action. 12. The argument before this Court is basically founded on the right of inheritance through the said two wives by the plaintiffs which is highly disputed by the ld. Advocate representing the defendants. 13. 12. The argument before this Court is basically founded on the right of inheritance through the said two wives by the plaintiffs which is highly disputed by the ld. Advocate representing the defendants. 13. As per the plaintiffs' version, under the Hanafi School of Mohammedan Law though the wives of the deceased inherit the estate of the husband to specified extent of shares but upon their death it would revert back to the heirs of the husbands surviving at the time of their respective deaths and not upon any other person. 14. The stand of the defendants are diametrically opposite to the stand of plaintiffs as according to them, the estate of the respective widows inherited from their husbands shall not revert back to the heirs of the husbands but would devolve upon their parental side and therefore, it can be safely said that at least the plaintiffs do not inherit any share state and the claim based upon the Hanafi School of Mohammedan Law is unfounded and not legally sustainable. 15. Both the ld. Advocates representing the parties relied upon various documents including the text of the Holly Quran and the comments of the scholar of the Mohammedan Law and the Faraidge Nama issued by Muslim Marriage Register and Kazi appointed by Govt. of West Bengal. At the very outset, this Court must record that the Faraidge Nama issued by one Mozaffar Ahmed relied upon by both the parties depicts contradictory stands on the same set of facts. The Faraidge Nama issued to the petitioner by the said Kazi indicates that upon the death of the two widows her right in the property of the husband would revert back to the heirs of the husbands surviving at the time of their deaths. Curiously enough, the same Kazi issued another Faraidge Nama to the opposite parties declaring that under the Hanafi School of Mohammedan Law the property held by the widows by inheritance from their husband would devolve upon the heirs of their respective parental side. It is really astonishing that the same Kazi has two sides of the story, which are diametrically opposite to each other. It would not be safe to rely upon the Faraidge Nama issued by a person holding a responsible post touching the inheritance under the Muslim Law. It is really astonishing that the same Kazi has two sides of the story, which are diametrically opposite to each other. It would not be safe to rely upon the Faraidge Nama issued by a person holding a responsible post touching the inheritance under the Muslim Law. A person holding such responsible position having appointed by the State should be more cautious and vigilant in interpreting the rights of the parties under the personal law and should not issue such document carelessly or in other words to please any person on approach. Such attitude gives a sense in my mind that those Faraidge Nama are issued to please the person approaching him obviously upon receiving some gratification. The State has to rise to an occasion and should be more circumspect and cautious in appointing the person to such responsible post. Though the Faraidge Nama has no sanctity in the eyes of law as the Courts are not bound by it, yet it sometimes have persuasive value in the mind of the Judge as it has come from the person having knowledge of the personal law. 16. Reverting back to the core issue, the point which is harped heavily by both the ld. Advocates on the devolution of the interest of the respective widows on the death, is required to be addressed first. It is undisputed that the Akchhed Mondal died in the year 1939 when Amjad Ali and the Fakir Mohammad were alive. It is also not in dispute that the three brothers namely Akchhed, Amjad and Fakir were holding undivided 1/3rd share in respect of the entire property. The plaintiffs' claim that upon the death of Akchhed and his two wives, his entire 1/3rd share would devolve upon the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants which was never sold by their respective fathers by executing the Deed of Sale in the year of 1942. 17. Both the parties are ad idem on the fact that at least in the year 1942, the two widows of the Akchhed were alive. It is no longer res integra that if a male dies without any issues but left behind him surviving widow or widows, the widows do not inherit the whole of the estate but inherit shares along with the male heirs. It is no longer res integra that if a male dies without any issues but left behind him surviving widow or widows, the widows do not inherit the whole of the estate but inherit shares along with the male heirs. Even if the stand of both the parties are taken as per the Hanafi School of Mohammedan Law the undivided 1/3rd share of Akchhed would devolve upon the surviving brothers and his two wives and in that event the male heirs will have twice the share of the female. It is, therefore, apparent that the widows have some semblance of right, title and interest in the state left by their husband and admittedly at the time of the execution of the purported deed in the year 1942, their shares were not divested and/or transferred as they were alive at that point of time and were also not parties to the said deed. 18. The question hinges on the devolution of their interest after their death. The passage of the Holy Quran translated by an eminent Imam of the Sunni set, Imam Ahmed Raza Khan would be relevant and profitable to quote:- "12. And for you is one-half of what is left by your wives, if they have no issue; but if they have issue, then you have one fourth of what they leave after (paying) any bequest made by them and the debts. And for the women is one fourth of what you leave if you have no issue; but if you have issue, then for them is one-eighth of what you leave after (paying) any bequest made by you and the debts. And if the heritage of any such male or female who leave behind nothing, neither parents nor children is to be divided and form mother side he or she has brother or sister, then for each one of them is one-sixth. Then if the sister and brother be more than one, then all are sharer in one-third, after (payment of the bequest of the deceased and debts in which the deceased would not have caused any harm. This is an injunction from Allah and Allah is All-Knowing, Gentle." 19. In the words of another Imam of Sunni set, Abdulla Yusuf Ali, the same text from Holy Quran is interpreted in the following:- "12. This is an injunction from Allah and Allah is All-Knowing, Gentle." 19. In the words of another Imam of Sunni set, Abdulla Yusuf Ali, the same text from Holy Quran is interpreted in the following:- "12. In what your wives leave, your share is a half, if they leave no child, but if they leave a child, ye get a fourth; after payment of legacies and debts. In what ye leave; their share is a fourth, if ye leave no child; but if ye leave a child, they get an eighth; after payment of legacies and debts. If the man or woman whose inheritance is in question, has lest neither ascendents nor descendants, but has left a brother or a sister, each one of the two gets a sixth; but if more than two, they share in a third; after payment of legacies and debts; so that no loss is caused (to any one). Thus is it ordained by Allah; and Allah is Allknowing, Most Forbearing." 20. It is thus manifest from the translation of the text from the Holy Quran of both the eminent scholars that upon the death of widow who inherited the estate of the husband their shares would devolve upon their parental side and not upon the heirs of the husband. 21. The reference in this regard can also be made to a judgment of the Patna High Court in case of Ashok Kumar Agarwal & Ors. v. B.B. Zohra & Anr. (Appeal from Original Decree No. 2012 of 1976) where nephews of the husband laid their claim in respect of the estate of the uncle by virtue of devolution. The issue involved therein was whether the nephews would inherit the estate upon the death of the widow or it would revert back to the husband'' side or the estate of the widow would be inherit by the heirs on her parental side. In the backdrop of the above it is held:- "27. Furthermore, since the said property became the exclusive property of Bibi Hamidan, it will devolve only upon the heirs of Bibi Hamidan and according to the provisions of inheritance in the Mohammedan Law, the nephew of the husband of a widow cannot, in any manner, be the heir of the widow. Furthermore, since the said property became the exclusive property of Bibi Hamidan, it will devolve only upon the heirs of Bibi Hamidan and according to the provisions of inheritance in the Mohammedan Law, the nephew of the husband of a widow cannot, in any manner, be the heir of the widow. In the said circumstances, the vendors of the plaintiffs, namely, Faiyaz Ahmad and Neyaz Ahmad had no right, title, interest or share in the suit property and hence when they had no right, title, interest or share in the suit property they cannot legally transfer it to the plaintiffs and hence the plaintiffs cannot be legally deemed to have acquired acquire any right, title, interest or share in the suit property by virtue of sale-deed dated 17.07.1971 (Ext.1) executed by the aforesaid Faiyaz Ahmad and Neyaz Ahmad." 22. Since the point assumes a great importance, in deciding the same this Court appointed Mr. Sudipto Sarkar, learned Senior Advocate to act as an Amicus Curiae to assist the Court in arriving the decision. According to the Amicus Curiae, Section 61 of the Mohammedan Law recognises three class of heirs namely (1) Sharers, (2) Residuaries and (3) Kindred. According to him, the plaintiffs being the nephew of the Akchhed Mondal does not come within any of such category and shares of the widows shall not devolve upon him but devolve upon the heirs on their respective parental side. 23. The plaintiff, however, relies upon a judgment of the Patna High Court rendered in case of Abdur Rahaman v. Sheikh Wali Mohamad reported in AIR 1923 Patna 72 in support of the contention that the heirs of the husband would have a title in the estate of a widow if she died issueless. I am unable to find any such ratio having decided in the said report by the Division Bench. The question that involved in the said report was whether the widow who had the title to the state of the husband not only by way of an inheritance but also in lieu of a dower debt have an alienable right and can put the purchaser in possession. To understand the ratio laid down therein, it would be relevant to notice the facts involved in the said report. To understand the ratio laid down therein, it would be relevant to notice the facts involved in the said report. A suit for possession was filed claiming six anna shares in the estate of Sazad Hossain as the heirs of the deceased brothers subject to the widow's right to retain possession and security for her unpaid doner. The said Sazad Hossain died leaving behind him his surviving widow and two brothers. The widow being one of the heir was entitled to quarter share by way of inheritance and was also possessing the same in lieu of the dower debt. The widow intended to transfer and/or give away all her properties in favour of a donee therein subject to the right of maintenance during her lifetime without reserving any right of cancellation thereof. The dispute arose on the interpretation of the said document whether the widow intended merely to transfer her own interest in the property that is the quarter share which she acquired by inheritance or whether she was intended to transfer the whole of the interest of her husband of which she was then in possession. In the above backdrop, it is held - "…but whatever her intention may have been, it is clear and cannot be disputed that she had no power of disposition over the property beyond the quarter share to which she was entitled by inheritance and to this extent alone could the transfer of property be valid." 24. Admittedly, it is not a case where the two widows have divested their right, title and interest during her lifetime but the question boils down to whether the estate held by her by virtue of inheritance would devolve upon the nephews that is the husband's side or to her parental side. 25. In view of the version of the Holy Quran and the judgment rendered in case of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (Supra) there is no hesitation in my mind that the law is clear that the estate of a widow/widows shall go to her or their parental sides and not on the husband's heir. On the conspectus of the enunciation of law as indicated above, there is no hesitation in my mind that the right claimed through two widows of Akchhed Mondal is not legally sustainable and therefore the plaintiffs do not have a clear right to sue on the basis thereof. 26. On the conspectus of the enunciation of law as indicated above, there is no hesitation in my mind that the right claimed through two widows of Akchhed Mondal is not legally sustainable and therefore the plaintiffs do not have a clear right to sue on the basis thereof. 26. On the plea of limitation, none of the respective Counsels have seriously argued except the feeble murmur that the deed executed and registered in the year 1942 is sought to be challenged in 2009. According to the defendants, the challenge cannot be founded on incapacity of one of the vendors being minor at that point of time when such vendor during his life time never challenged it. On the other hand, the plaintiff says that their predecessor simply divested their right which they had in the property and never divested the right, title and interest which they inherited upon the death of Akchd Mondal. The challenge to the said deed is also based upon the categorical assertions that the Amjad Ali Mondal was minor at the time of execution. The reliance appears to have been based upon the age recorded in the Death Certificate issued by the authority and an inference is drawn to the date of birth of the said vendor. It cannot be said with certainty at this stage based on such piece of evidence whether the Amjad Ali Mondal was minor or not. Secondly, the interpretation of the document is also required to be gone into whether the entire right which the Amjad had at one point of time was transferred and conveyed or it was limited to his right alone and not the right which he inherited upon the death of Akchhed Mondal. It is a settled law that the Court shall confine its scrutiny on the averments made in the plaint at the stage of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code. If the issues are required to be decided on evidence, it would not be proper to reject the plaint either that it is apparently barred by law or it disclose no cause of action. The vital facts which is omitted by the Court and also not urged before this Court, cannot be overlooked. If the issues are required to be decided on evidence, it would not be proper to reject the plaint either that it is apparently barred by law or it disclose no cause of action. The vital facts which is omitted by the Court and also not urged before this Court, cannot be overlooked. Apart from the declaration that the deed is void and is cancelled the plaintiff has also based his right on the strength of oral agreement alleged to have been entered between the plaintiffs and the defendants recognizing their rights in respect of certain plots. Precisely, on the basis thereof the reliefs in the form of partition and separate possession are also claimed. It is essentially a matter of evidence whether the parties ever entered into an oral agreement crystalizing their right, title and interest in respect of some of the plots. The Court should not reject the plaint simply that some of the rights claimed in the plaint appears to be barred under the law. 27. To conclude, this Court does not find that there is any infirmity and illegality in the order of the Trial Court rejecting an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code. 28. The Revisional Application is thus dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Revisional application dismissed.