JUDGMENT D.N. Patel, J. - This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 2888 of 2004 dated 22nd June, 2010, whereby, the petition preferred by respondent no.2 was allowed by the learned Single Judge and the order passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in B.S. Case No. 09 of 1989 dated 10th December, 2003 was quashed and set aside, mainly on the ground that, if an employee resigns from the services and accepts the retirement benefits, including gratuity, as per Annexure-1 to the memo of writ petition, the Labour Court, Jamshedpur should not have passed an order of reinstatement along with back wages. Against this judgment and order passed by the Learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of the respondents, the workmen has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Arguments Canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant:- Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that this appellant was an employee of respondent no.2 having been appointed on 18th August, 1965 as Sales Assistant. Thereafter, he was suspended on 27th January, 1974 for misconduct in store which was challenged by this appellant before the Assistant Registrar (Bihar & Orrisa Co-operative Societies) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), who passed an order of reinstatement with back-wages on 31st May, 1981. However, only 70% of the back-wages were paid and thereafter, this appellant worked with respondent no. 2 and had gone on leave for some period which was extended by this appellant because of the sickness and when he came to resume his duties, he was not allowed to resume the duties by respondent no.2 and hence, this action was challenged by this appellant before the Assistant Registrar (Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies) Act, 1948. Respondent no.2 pleaded before the Assistant Registrar that this appellant had given resignation on 10th November, 1983 and after full and final settlement of the claim, the amount was also received by this appellant on 25th December, 1983. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the Assistant Registrar rejected the application preferred by this appellant, vide order dated 27th May,1987, against which an appeal was preferred under Section 48 of the Act, 1948 before the Additional Registrar being Miscellaneous Appeal no. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the Assistant Registrar rejected the application preferred by this appellant, vide order dated 27th May,1987, against which an appeal was preferred under Section 48 of the Act, 1948 before the Additional Registrar being Miscellaneous Appeal no. 4/S/1988 which was also rejected by the Additional Registrar vide order dated 23rd September, 1989 and while rejecting the appeal, preferred by this appellant, the Additional Registrar has also stated in his order that the said appeal was not tenable at law as the Additional Registrar has no power, jurisdiction and authority under Section 48(6) of the Act, 1948 to decide the dispute. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that now under Section 26 of the (Bihar Shops and Establishment) Act, 1953 an application was preferred by the appellant before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur and ultimately an order was passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur dated 10th December, 2003, in favour of this appellant and the order was passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur for reinstatement with full back-wages, which was challenged by respondent no.2 before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2888 of 2004, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 22th June, 2010 without appreciating the fact that no letter of rejection was produced before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. The so called rejection letter has never been brought on record. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2888 of 2004 preferred by the respondent no.2. It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the observations made by Assistant Registrar in his order dated 27th May,1987 has got no value in the eye of law, in view of the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrabhai K. Bhori & Ors. v. Krishna Arjun Bhoir & Ors. as reported in A.I.R. 2009 SC 1645, especially paragraph nos. 20 and 21 thereof, and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may kindly be allowed by setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge. v. Krishna Arjun Bhoir & Ors. as reported in A.I.R. 2009 SC 1645, especially paragraph nos. 20 and 21 thereof, and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may kindly be allowed by setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge. It is further submitted that previously also this appellant was suspended and ultimately though order of reinstatement with full back-wages was passed, but, instead of full back-wages, only 70% was paid and as such, the so called amount received by this appellant does not cover the full and final settlement. 3. Arguments Canvassed by learned counsel for the respondent no.2:- Learned counsel appearing for respondent no.2 submitted that once the resignation has been tendered by respondent no.2 on 10th November, 1983 and the amount has also been received which covers full and final settlement as per Annexure-1 to the memo of the writ petition, which is signed by this appellant, Labour Court, should not have passed an order of reinstatement with full back-wages. Moreover, there is also an evidence given by the witness before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur and the witness examined by the management has clearly stated that this appellant had tendered resignation and full and final settlement of the amount was also received by him. So far as the letter of resignation is concerned, the same has been removed by the appellant from the records. Nonetheless, beyond the receipt of the amount which covers full and final settlement, there is a signature of this appellant as per Ext-D, presented before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur which is proved by the management witness. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent no.2. Moreover, there are observations made by Assistant Registrar while passing an order dated 27th May, 1987 that this appellant had tendered resignation. The conclusion arrived at by the Assistant Registrar may not be binding, but, so far as the facts noted in the order passed by the Assistant Registrar reveals that the resignation was tendered by this appellant. Thus, after tendering the resignation and accepting the amount of full and final settlement including gratuity, the order passed by the Labour Court dated 10th December, 2003 was not tenable at law. Thus, after tendering the resignation and accepting the amount of full and final settlement including gratuity, the order passed by the Labour Court dated 10th December, 2003 was not tenable at law. More particularly there is an evidence by the management witness supported by the documentary evidence Ext-D. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. 4. Reasons: Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal, mainly for the following facts and reasons:- (i) This appellant was an employee of respondent no.2 from 18th August, 1965 as a Sales Assistant, who was suspended on 27th January, 1974 which was challenged before the Assistant Registrar under the (Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies) Act, 1948, who passed an order on 31st May, 1981 for reinstatement with back-wages. (ii) Thereafter, this appellant proceeded on leave in the year, 1983 up to 9th November, 1983 and thereafter, he tendered his resignation on 10th November, 1983 which is the bone of contention in the whole matter. (iii) Repeatedly counsel for respondent no.2 has argued out the case about the resignation of the appellant, which has been denied consistently by the counsel for the appellant. (iv) It also appears from the facts of the case, especially from Annexure-1 of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 2888 of 2004 that the amount towards full and final settlement has been received by this appellant and the said document has been signed by this appellant, which was marked as Ext-D in the proceeding before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur under Section 26 of the Bihar (Shops and Establishment) Act, 1953. (v) It appears that this appellant was not allowed to resume the duties and the said action of the management was challenged before the Assistant Registrar by this appellant under the Bihar & Orissa (Co-operative Societies) Act, 1948 who ultimately rejected the application preferred by this appellant vide order dated 27th May, 1987 and observed that as this appellant has tendered resignation from services on 10th November, 1983, his application under the (Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies) Act, 1948 was not tenable at law. (vi) This order was challenged by way of an appeal being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4/S/1988 before the Additional Registrar under Section 48 of the Act, 1948. Additional Registrar passed an order on 23.09.1989 and stated that the said appeal was not tenable at law and he has no power, jurisdiction and authority under Section 48(6) of the Act, 1948 to decide the dispute. (vii) Thereafter, this appellant preferred an application under Section 26 of the (Bihar Shops & Establishment) Act, 1953 before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. It appears from the deposition given by the management witness, namely, Bhola Prasad that this appellant had tendered his resignation on 10th November, 1983 and has received the amount towards full and final settlement, for which he has also signed which was stamped. The said document is at Ext.D before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur which was also before the Learned Single Judge at Annexure-1 to the memo of this writ petition. (viii) On the basis, of this evidence of the management witness corroborated by the documentary evidence Ext-D before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, it appears that the resignation was tendered by this appellant and the amount which covers full and final settlement was also received by this appellant for which he put his signature upon the stamp. Neither this signature has been controverted by this appellant before the Labour Court nor he has controverted his signature on the document at Ext-D before the learned Single Judge. Thus, even in absence of the letter of resignation, the fact of tendering resignation and accepting full and final settlement has been proved. (ix) Looking to the evidence before the Labour Court that the letter of resignation has been removed by this appellant from the records, no question of production of the said document before any authority whatsoever arises. Nonetheless the fact remains that in cross-examination also this witness has stated that there was a resignation given by this appellant. Moreover, the deposition of the management witness supported by the documentary evidence, which is signed by this appellant and the signature of the appellant was never controverted by this appellant. At this stage learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the signature on document Ext-D was accepted by this appellant. Moreover, the deposition of the management witness supported by the documentary evidence, which is signed by this appellant and the signature of the appellant was never controverted by this appellant. At this stage learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the signature on document Ext-D was accepted by this appellant. (x) Thus, once the appellant is accepting an amount of full and final settlement including for gratuity, the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in his order dated 10th December, 2003 is absolutely not tenable at law. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No. 2888 of 2004 vide order dated 22nd June, 2010 which was preferred by the respondent-Management. (xi) It further appears from the order passed by the Assistant Registrar dated 27th May, 1987 that the resignation was tendered by this appellant. (xii) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the order passed by any authority for want of jurisdiction is null and void, on the basis of the decision as cited herein above. (xiii) So far as the proposition of law is concerned, there is no doubt that the order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Though, we are not accepting the conclusion arrived at by the Assistant Registrar, so far as narration of facts are concerned, but, there is an observations in the order passed by the Assistant Registrar dated 27th May, 1987, about the resignation tendered by this appellant. Thus, there was a cogent and convincing evidence before the Labour Court supported by documentary evidence at Ext-D. This establishes the fact of resignation tendered by this appellant and accepting the amount of full and final settlement makes the order of Labour Court dated 10th December, 2013 regarding full back-wages and reinstatement against the provisions of law and this aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and thus, we see no reason to take any other view then what is taken by the Learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 2888 of 2004 vide judgment and order dated 22nd June, 2010. (xiv) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manubhai Chhaganbhai Thakore v. Union Bank of India and 2 others, as reported in (2008) (2) LLJ, 226 (Guj), especially at paragraph no. (xiv) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manubhai Chhaganbhai Thakore v. Union Bank of India and 2 others, as reported in (2008) (2) LLJ, 226 (Guj), especially at paragraph no. 11 thereof, has held as under; “11. As far as the issue involved in the Letters Patent Appeal is concerned, the appellant has filed the petition before the learned single Judge of this Court challenging the action of relieving the petitioner from service pursuant to acceptance of this resignation and requiring the respondent Bank to treat him as having continued in service. The appellant by his letter dated December 11, 2001 submitted his resignation on the ground of health and requested for settlement of his dues. When the appellant has submitted his resignation he was not reported on his duty on account of ill health. After submitting his resignation on December 11, 2001, the appellant, by his letter dated December 26, 2001 requested for accepting the resignation with immediate effect and released hims from the service immediately, since he was not keeping good health. The appellant has deliberately not produced the copy of the letter dated December 26, 2001 and his suppressed this fact. On the contrary he has suggested in the petition that the resignation was to come into effect after three months from the date of submission of his resignation, which again is factually incorrect. The letter of resignation dated December 11, 2001 did not specific any date from which the appellant wanted to leave the service. The appellant being award staff, notice period required is one month and not 3 months as suggested by the appellant. The appellant having resigned by his letter dated December 11, 2001, requested the bank to accept resignation immediately and release him as per the letter dated December 26, 2001. Acting on the request of the appellant the respondent Bank accepted his resignation and communicated acceptance of resignation as per the letter dated January 5, 2002. The notice period of 30 days would have expired on January 10, 2002, whereas the appellant was relieved on January 9, 2002 pursuant to the memorandum dated January 5, 2002 accepting his resignation. There was no withdrawal of resignation before January 10, 2002. As per the request of the appellant, the resignation was accepted with immediate effect vide memorandum dated January 5, 2002 and balance notice period was waived. There was no withdrawal of resignation before January 10, 2002. As per the request of the appellant, the resignation was accepted with immediate effect vide memorandum dated January 5, 2002 and balance notice period was waived. It is only after the appellant was communicated acceptance of his resignation and was relieved from his services, he purported to seek withdrawal of his resignation by communication dated January 31, 2002. The respondent Bank is, therefore, justified in taking the stand that it was not open for the appellant to request for withdrawal of resignation after the same was accepted and communicated to him. The reliance was rightly placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of North Zone Cultural Centre and Another v. Vedpathi Dindeshkumar, 2003-II-LLJ-839 (SC) and P. Lal v. Union of India and Another, 2003-II-LLJ- 164 (SC), wherein it is held that the resignation becomes effective from the date of acceptance and the same cannot be withdrawn after it is accepted. Even non-communication of acceptance does not make the resignation inoperative. After the appellant was communicated the acceptance of his resignation and he was relieved from the service, the appellant has accepted his retirement dues without any demur or protest. The appellant was communicated acceptance of resignation with immediate effect as per letter dated January 5, 2002 of the Bank. The appellant applied for payment of P.F. And gratuity admissible to him. A gross amount of Rs. 4,23,497.34 ps was admissible and payable to the appellant towards his P.F. Gratuity and other legal dues. However, there were different loans outstanding and payable by the appellant such as clean loan, P.F. Loan, advance against LFC, credit society loan, salary advance, personal loan, house repairing loan etc. The total amount recoverable from the appellant was Rs.4,05,311.34 ps. After adjusting the outstanding loan, balance amount has been paid to the appellant which he has accepted without any demur or protest. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant has voluntarily submitted his resignation and his resignation having been accepted and communicated was not entitled to withdrawn the same subsequently. After adjusting the outstanding loan, balance amount has been paid to the appellant which he has accepted without any demur or protest. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant has voluntarily submitted his resignation and his resignation having been accepted and communicated was not entitled to withdrawn the same subsequently. Moreover, he having accepted the legal dues unconditionally even after his letter dated January 31, 2002 purporting to withdraw his resignation, cannot now challenge the action of the Bank of acceptance of his resignation and seek directions that he be continued in service of the respondent Bank.” (emphasis supplied) (xv) Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of M/s. J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Company Ltd. v. State of U.P and others, as reported in A.I.R (1990) SC 1808, especially paragraphs no. 4 and 8 thereof, has held as under:- “4. The first question which we must consider is whether in the backdrop of facts stated earlier it can be said that the services of the employee were terminated by way of 'retrenchment' as understood by Section 2(s) and, if yes, whether the employer was required to comply with the provisions of Section 6N of the State Act. It becomes clear on a plain reading of the definition of the term 'retrenchment' that it comprises of two parts; the first part is the inclusive part which defines retrenchment whereas the second part is in the nature of an exception and excludes two types of cases from the scope and ambit of the said definition. Under the first part termination of an employee's service by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than by way of punishment inflicted as a disciplinary measure, amounts to retrenchment. Under the second part cases of (i) voluntary retirement, and (ii) retirement on superannuation are excluded from purview of the first part of the definition. Termination of service can be brought about in diverse ways by an employer but every termination is not retrenchment, as for example, termination of service by way of punishment for proved misconduct. The words 'for any reason whatsoever' are undoubtedly words of wide import and hence termination of service by the employer will attract the definition of retrenchment unless it is shown to be penal in nature brought about by way of disciplinary action or as falling within one of the two exclusion clauses extracted earlier. The words 'for any reason whatsoever' are undoubtedly words of wide import and hence termination of service by the employer will attract the definition of retrenchment unless it is shown to be penal in nature brought about by way of disciplinary action or as falling within one of the two exclusion clauses extracted earlier. In order to counter the employee's contention that he was retrenched from service on the employer having communicated the acceptance of his resignation, the employer has placed reliance on the first clause, namely, that the workman had voluntarily retired from service. The letter dated 1st November, 1970 written by the employee to the Manager of the appellant-company expressing his desire to resign his job shows that it was a voluntary act on the part of the employee. This was followed by another letter of 3rd November, 1970 whereby the workman requested the company to depute someone to take charge of the Bradma office so that he gets acquainted with the work to ensure a smooth take over. It was on this request of the employee that the appellant-company accepted his resignation by the letter of 4th November, 1970 with effect from 16th November, 1970., From this correspondence it is crystal clear that the employee desired to sever his relations with the appellant company on account of his family circumstances. But for this request made by the employee there was no reason for the appellant-company to terminate the contract of service on its own. Just as an employer has a right to terminate the service of an employee, an employee too has a right to put an end to the contract of employment by informing his employer of his intention to give up the job. This right is specifically conferred by Clause 21 of the Standing Orders certified under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. This clause reads as under: "Any permanent clerk desirous of leaving the coming company's service shall give one month's notice in writing to the Manager unless he has a specific agreement providing for a longer or shorter notice. It any permanent clerk leaves the service of the company without giving notice, he shall be liable to be sued for damages." Similar clause with reduced notice period is also to be found in the certified Standing Orders for operatives. It any permanent clerk leaves the service of the company without giving notice, he shall be liable to be sued for damages." Similar clause with reduced notice period is also to be found in the certified Standing Orders for operatives. Therefore, one of the ways of terminating the contract of employment is resignation. If an employee makes his intention to resign his job known to the employer and the latter accepts the resignation, the contract of employment comes to an end and with it stands severed the employer-employee relationship. Under the common law the resignation is not complete until it is accepted by the proper authority and before such acceptance an employee can change his mind and withdraw the resignation but once the resignation is accepted the contract comes to an end and the relationship of master and servant stands snapped. Merely because the employer is expected to accept the employee's resignation it cannot be said that the employer has brought about an end to the contract of employment so as to bring the case within the first part of the definition of retrenchment. A contract of service can be determined by either party to the contract. If it is determined at the behest of the employer it may amount to retrenchment unless it is by way of punishment for proved misconduct. But if an employee takes the initiative and exercises his right to put an end to the contract of service and the employer merely assents to it, it cannot be said that the employer has terminated the employment. In such cases the employer is merely acceding to the employee's request, may be even reluctantly. Here the employee's role is active while the employer's role is passive and formal. The employer cannot force an unwilling employee to work for him. Under Clause 21 of the certified Standing Orders all that the employee is required to do is to give the employer a notice to quit and on the expiry of the notice period his service would come to an end. A formal acceptance of the employee's desire by the employer cannot mean that it is the employer who is putting an end to the contract of employment. It would be unfair to saddle the employer with the liability to pay compensation even where the service is terminated on the specific request of the employee. A formal acceptance of the employee's desire by the employer cannot mean that it is the employer who is putting an end to the contract of employment. It would be unfair to saddle the employer with the liability to pay compensation even where the service is terminated on the specific request of the employee. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the legislature. We are, therefore, of the opinion that where a contract of service is determined on the employee exercising his right to quit, such termination cannot be said to be at the instance of the employer to fall within the first part of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(s) of the State Act. xx xx xx xx 8. In the present case the employee's request contained in the letter of resignation was accepted by the employer and that brought an end to the contract of service. The meaning of term 'resign' as found in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary includes 'retirement'. Therefore, when an employee voluntarily tenders his resignation it is an act by which he voluntarily gives up his job. We are, therefore, of the opinion that such a situation would be covered by the expression 'voluntary retirement' within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 2(s) of the State Act. In Santosh Gupta's case ( AIR 1980 SC 1219 ), Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed as under (at p. 1220 of AIR): "Voluntary retrenchment of a workman or the retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation can hardly be described as termination, by the employer, of the service of a workman." (Here the word 'retrenchment' has reference to 'retirement'.) The above observation clearly supports the view which commends to us. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was not right in concluding that because the employer accepted the resignation offer voluntarily made by the employee, he terminated the service of the employee and such termination, therefore, fell within the expression 'retrenchment' rendering him liable to compensate the employee under Section 6N. We are also of the view that this was a case of 'voluntary retirement' within the meaning of the first exception to Section 2(s) and therefore the question of grant of compensation under Section 6N does not arise. We, therefore, cannot allow the view of the High Court to stand.” (emphasis supplied) 5. We are also of the view that this was a case of 'voluntary retirement' within the meaning of the first exception to Section 2(s) and therefore the question of grant of compensation under Section 6N does not arise. We, therefore, cannot allow the view of the High Court to stand.” (emphasis supplied) 5. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there being no substance, this Letters Patent Appeal is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.