JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. - This First Appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 dated 17th October, 2012, whereby an application preferred by the respondent for quashing and setting aside ex-prate decree, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi dated 24th August, 2007, was allowed, without there being any application for condoning the delay, preferred by the respondent and without condoning the delay of two years. This is an error apparent on the face of the record which is pointed out by the counsel for the appellant for allowing this First Appeal. It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that after the order passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi in Matrimonial Title Suit No. 218 of 2006 dated 24th August, 2007, in fact, after 17 months thereafter, this appellant has remarried with another fair lady. Moreover, it is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal Judge Family Court, Ranchi in Matrimonial Title Suit No. 218 of 2006 was never ex-parte, because at the relevant time service of notice was already executed upon the respondent-wife and there was a paper publication notice also, but, the respondent-wife did not appear before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi. Thus, if any party after service of the notice by the competent trial Court, is avoiding his/her presence in the Court and if a decree is passed by the trial Court, it cannot be said that it was an ex-parte decree. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also argued out the case, on merits, and submitted that without any delay condonation application, preferred by the respondent-wife, which was of approximately two years, her application for quashing and setting aside the so called ex-parte decree was allowed by the trial Court and hence, this First Appeal has been preferred by the original respondent in Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that, in fact, in a divorce application preferred by this appellant in M.T.S. No. 218 of 2006, ex-parte decree was passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi on 24th August, 2007. This fact was pointed out by the respondent-wife in Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that, in fact, in a divorce application preferred by this appellant in M.T.S. No. 218 of 2006, ex-parte decree was passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi on 24th August, 2007. This fact was pointed out by the respondent-wife in Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 and hence, the said ex-parte decree has been quashed and set aside by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi vide order dated 17th October, 2012 and thus, no error has been committed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi in quashing and setting aside the ex-parte decree passed in M.T.S. No. 218 of 2006 dated 24th August, 2007. Hence, this First Appeal should not be entertained by this Court. It is also submitted by the counsel for the respondent that in Maintenance Suit No. 115 of 2003, an order was passed in the year 2006 to make payment of Rs. 3000/- per month as interim maintenance and the final order has also been passed in the year, 2011, against which an appeal has been preferred by this appellant before the Patna High Court which has also been dismissed and despite this fact, this appellant has not paid the amount towards maintenance. 3. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnized on 19.5.1997 according to Hindu Rites and Custom. There are also allegations that both the parties are residing separately since 19.02.1998. It appears that thereafter, Matrimonial Title Suit No. 47 of 2000 was preferred by this appellant for restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court, Ranchi and in matching thereto, respondent-wife preferred a suit for divorce being M.T.S. No.195 of 2001 in the Court of learned Principal Judge Family Court, Patna. 4. Thereafter, wife had withdrawn the Divorce Suit on 20.01.2004 and husband has also withdrawn his application for restitution of conjugal rights on 25.07.2006. 5. Now, second round of litigation has started between the parties to the First Appeal. On 04.12.2006, Divorce Suit was filed by this appellant being Matrimonial Title Suit No. 218 of 2006 before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi in which notice was issued upon the respondent-wife and served upon her. 5. Now, second round of litigation has started between the parties to the First Appeal. On 04.12.2006, Divorce Suit was filed by this appellant being Matrimonial Title Suit No. 218 of 2006 before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi in which notice was issued upon the respondent-wife and served upon her. Thereafter, there was a paper publication of notice also, upon the respondent wife and ultimately divorce decree was passed by the learned Principal Judge Family Court, Ranchi in Matrimonial Title Suit No. 218 of 2006 dated 24th August, 2007. 6. It further appears from the facts and circumstances of the case that after approximately 17 months from the date of decree of divorce, this appellant has married with another fair lady on 21st February, 2009. 7. On 18th May, 2009 the respondent preferred an application for quashing and setting aside the ex-parte decree passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court in Matrimonial Title Suit No. 218 of 2006 being Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009. 8. It appears from the facts of the present case that the application preferred by the respondent being Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 was beyond the period of limitation of 30 days for setting aside the ex-parte decree passed in Matrimonial Title Suit No. 218 of 2006 dated 24th August, 2007, and there was a delay of approximately two years. There was no delay condonation application preferred by the respondent along with Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi, without there being any application for condoning the delay and without passing any order for condoning the delay, has allowed Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009, preferred by the respondent, whereby he quashed and set aside the ex-parte decree passed by Misc. Case No. 218 of 2006 dated 24th August, 2007. This is an error apparent on the face of the record Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 could not have been allowed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court without any there being any delay condonation application and without condoning the delay. 9. In view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the application being Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 could not have been allowed by the learned court below. Case No. 57 of 2009 could not have been allowed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court without any there being any delay condonation application and without condoning the delay. 9. In view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the application being Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 could not have been allowed by the learned court below. For ready reference, Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is being reproduced here under:- “(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” 10. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Pradeep Kumar, reported in (2000)7 SCC 372 , especially paragraph nos. 17, 18 and 19 thereof, as under: “17. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has subsequently overruled the dictum laid down by the Single Judge in the above case (vide Maya Devi v. M.K. Krishna Bhattathiri.) The same fate had fallen on the view adopted by the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Madhukar case when a Division Bench had subsequently overruled it (State of Karnataka v. Nagappa). N. Venkatachaliah and S.A. Hakeem, JJ. (as they then were) dealt with the background of introducing Rule 3-A in Order 41 of the Code and after discussion held that sub-rule (1) of Rule 3-A is mandatory. However, learned Judges pointed out that sub-rules (2) and (3) have been employed by the legislature for highlighting the purpose of introducing such a new Rule. The following passage from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court can usefully be quoted in this context: “A combined reading of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3-A makes it manifest that the purpose of requiring the filing of an application for condonation of delay under sub-rule (1) along with a time-barred appeal, is mandatory, in the sense that the appellant cannot, without such application being decided, insist upon the Court to hear his time-barred appeal. That was the very purpose sought to be achieved by insertion of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3-A, becomes clear from the legislative history of new Rule 3-A to which we have already adverted.” 18. That was the very purpose sought to be achieved by insertion of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3-A, becomes clear from the legislative history of new Rule 3-A to which we have already adverted.” 18. We may also point out that a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has adopted the same view even earlier in State of Bihar v. Ray Chandi Nath Sahay. The object of enacting Rule 3-A in Order 41 of the Code seems to be twofold. First is, to inform the appellant himself who filed a time-barred appeal that it would not be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application explaining the delay. Second is, to communicate to the respondent a message that it may not be necessary for him to get ready to meet the grounds taken up in the memorandum of appeal because the court has to deal with application for condonation of delay as a condition precedent. Barring the above objects, we cannot find out from the Rule that it is intended to operate as unremediably or irredeemably fatal against the appellant if the memorandum is not accompanied by any such application at the first instance. In our view, the deficiency is a curable defect, and if the required application is filed subsequently the appeal can be treated as presented in accordance with the requirement contained in Rule 3-A Order 41 of the Code. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, along with Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009, there ought to have been an application for condonation of delay, which was approximately two years and without condoning delay, Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 could not have been decided, on merits. 11. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we hereby quash and set aside the order passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 57 of 2009 dated 17th October, 2012. 12. This First Appeal stands allowed and disposed of. Appeal allowed.