ORDER : H.P. SINGH, J. 1. This is an application filed under Section 378(3) of Cr.P.C., seeking leave to present an appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 19.09.2015, passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Anuppur, District Anuppur (MP), in Special S.T. No. 115/2013, acquitting the accused/respondents for offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 304(B), in alternate 302, in further alternate under Section 302 read with Section 34, further in alternate under Section 306 and in further alternate 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code' for short) and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short). Briefly stated, the case of prosecution is that marriage of deceased was solemnized with Lakhanlal in the year 2010. The accused/respondents being grand father and grand mother of deceased, treated the deceased with cruelty by making demand of dowry and ousted the deceased as well as her husband from the house. Thereafter, they lived together at Chachai for two years to earn their livelihood. In January 2613, the accused/respondents had called them back, but thereafter the accused/respondents used to taunt for demand of dowry continuously, due to which the deceased was unhappy. It is alleged that when husband of the deceased was not present at home, the deceased burnt herself. Thereafter, her husband Lakhanlal reached home and taken her to the District hospital Anuppur for treatment. She was, thereafter taken to the hospital at Shahdol, where her dying declaration was recorded by Executive Magistrate/Naib Tehsildar Sohagpur. During admission in the hospital for treatment, she died on 28.3.2013. After doing all formalities and completing investigation charge sheet against the accused/respondents has been filed before the concerned Magistrate. 2. After committal of the case, on the basis of the charge-sheet, learned trial Court framed charges against the accused/respondents for aforesaid offences accused/respondents abjured the guilt. 3. The trial Court after considering the plea of the accused/respondents, disbelieved the testimony of various prosecution witnesses and acquitted the accused/respondents for all charges leveled against them. 4. Learned Panel Lawyer for the State submitted that impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is wholly erroneous in law as well as on facts. Learned trial Court committed grave error in holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the allegations without proper appreciation of the material available on record in its true perspective. 4. Learned Panel Lawyer for the State submitted that impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is wholly erroneous in law as well as on facts. Learned trial Court committed grave error in holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the allegations without proper appreciation of the material available on record in its true perspective. He further contended that if the prosecution evidence is analysed in right perspective, then prosecution case could have been proved. Therefore, it is a fit case for grant of leave to appeal against the impugned judgment. 5. Now the question that arises for consideration before this Court is, whether the evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from illegality, manifest error or perversity? 6. It is settled law that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence. There is no limitation, restriction or condition for the exercise of such powers and the appellate Court may draw its own conclusion on all questions of fact and law. However, the reversal of acquittal can be made only if the conclusions recorded by the trial Court did not reflect a possible view, that is to say a view which can reasonably be arrived at. In the case of acquittal, the judgment of the trial Court may be interfered with only where there is absolute assurance of guilt of the accused/respondents on the basis of evidence on record and not merely because the High Court can take another possible or a different view. 7. The prosecution has examined as many as 16 witnesses. Out of whom, uncle of the deceased Kamlesh Vishwakarma (PW/1), father of deceased Ramnath Vishwakarma (PW/2), her husband Lakhan Vishwakarma (PW/10) and her mother Krishna Bai (PW/15) are the witnesses of the incident. Other witnesses are related to the investigation. 8. On the basis of evidence adduced by the prosecution during trial, it becomes undisputed that on the relevant date i.e. 8.2.2013, deceased burnt and after that she was shifted to hospital at Anuppur. She was medically examined by Dr. N.P. Manjhi (PW/3). He found burn injuries at the face, chest, stomach, back, hands, legs on the body of deceased. She was found to be burnt about 68%. She was admitted for treatment at District Hospital Anuppur and thereafter referred to District Hospital Shahdol for treatment. She was medically examined by Dr. N.P. Manjhi (PW/3). He found burn injuries at the face, chest, stomach, back, hands, legs on the body of deceased. She was found to be burnt about 68%. She was admitted for treatment at District Hospital Anuppur and thereafter referred to District Hospital Shahdol for treatment. The deceased was then referred to Jabalpur and at Jabalpur during admission for treatment, she succumbed to the injuries on 28.3.2013. Inquest memo was prepared and autopsy of dead body of deceased was done by Dr. S.R. Patle (PW/12). On perusal of all these evidence, it is proved that deceased died on account of burn injuries sustained by her. 9. Now question arises for consideration, whether deceased had committed suicide or she has been murdered by accused/respondents? 10. The main prosecution witnesses, namely, Ramnath Vishwakarma (PW/2) father of the deceased, Suit. Krishna Bai (PW/13) mother of the deceased and uncle Kamlesh Vishwakarma (PW/1) have not deposed anything about presence of any witness at the time of incident. As per deposition of Lakhan Vishwakarma (PW/10) husband of the deceased, it reveals that he and his wife (deceased) were living with accused/respondents, being his grand father & grand mother. He has stated that at the time of incident, except deceased none was present at home. He further stated that after the incident, he reached at home and then took her to the hospital. It is pertinent to note here that soon after reaching the deceased at District Hospital Anuppur, her dying declaration was recorded by Executive Magistrate, but the same had not been produced and proved by the prosecution. During the cross-examination, the Executive Magistrate, Smt. Bhawna Dahariya (PW/4), who had also prepared the inquest memo of the dead body of the deceased and has been examined by prosecution to prove that inquest memo Ex. P/2, has admitted that she had recorded the dying declaration of the deceased on 8.2.2013 in the presence of Dr. N.P. Manjhi (PW/3). She has further stated that after recording of dying declaration, she had taken the thumb impression of the deceased. During recording of dying declaration, she was in conscious condition and was able to give the statement. Dr. N.P. Manjhi (PW/3) has also stated in his cross-examination that in his presence dying declaration of deceased was recorded by Executive Magistrate. She has further stated that after recording of dying declaration, she had taken the thumb impression of the deceased. During recording of dying declaration, she was in conscious condition and was able to give the statement. Dr. N.P. Manjhi (PW/3) has also stated in his cross-examination that in his presence dying declaration of deceased was recorded by Executive Magistrate. He further deposed that at that time of recording of dying declaration, deceased was fully conscious and he certified the dying declaration is Ex. D/1, mentioning that during recording of dying declaration deceased was conscious. The dying declaration reads thus:- ^^e`R;qiwoZ dFku LFkku & ftyk vLirky] vuwiiwj fnukad & 8-2-2013 le; & 2%39 ihŒ,eŒ uke & nsodh firk@ifr dk uke & y[ku fo'odekZ fuoklh & vuwiiwj mez & 25 o"kZ O;olk; & ?kjsyw dkedkt ejht c;ku nsus ;ksX; gS %& le; & 2%40 ihŒ,eŒ gLrk{kj Á'u % D;k gqvk gS rqedks \ mRrj % ty xbZ gawA dSls gks x;k \ [kkuk cuk jgh Fkh nky pwYgs ls mrkjrs le; vkWpy fxj x;k rks mlesa vkx yx xbZA dc dh ckr gS \ vkt lqcg 11%00 cts yxHkxA fQj D;k gqvk \ ckn esa lc yksx eq>s vLirky ys vk,A vkSj dkSu Fkk ogka \ ?kj ij vkSj dksbZ ugha FkkA fdlh ls >xM+k rks ugha gqvk Fkk \ ugha gqvk FkkA vkSj dqN dguk gS \ ughaA vHkh rqe dgk ij gks \ vuwiiwj vLirky esaA c;ku esjs }kj fy, x,A nsodh nk,a gkFk dk vaxwBk fu'kkuh gLrk{kj 2%49 ihŒ,eŒ D;k nsrs le; ejht iwjh rjg gks'k gokl esa FkhA gLrk{kj 2%50 ihŒ,eŒA** Thus, there is no reason to disbelieve the above dying declaration of the deceased. The principle on which the dying declarations are admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim:- Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire" i.e. a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth." 11. Accordingly, deceased in her dying declaration has not stated that she has been subjected to cruelty or set fire on her by accused/respondents, or she set fire on herself. But, when she was putting off the pulse from the furnace, her Aanchal (the corner piece of San) fell down and caught fire. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital. She has further stated that no one was present at home and there was no scuffle from anyone. But, when she was putting off the pulse from the furnace, her Aanchal (the corner piece of San) fell down and caught fire. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital. She has further stated that no one was present at home and there was no scuffle from anyone. Thus, as per her dying declaration, her death was neither homicidal nor suicidal, but it was accidental. Consequently, no one is liable for causing her death. 12. So far as the fact regarding cruel treatment to the deceased is concerned, her mother Krishna Bai (PW/15), her father Ramnath Vishwakarma (PW/2) have stated that accused/respondents subjected her to cruelty for demand of dowry, but no complaint whatsoever was made before the incident. They have not specifically stated that when and where the alleged demand of dowry was made by them. Her uncle Kamlesh Vishwakarma (PW/1), has deposed that deceased when came to her paternal uncle stated that accused/respondents made demand of dowry and subjected her to cruelty, but in the cross-examination, he has stated that he had not told about the cruel treatment to anyone and had not seen that the accused/respondents subjected her to cruelty. As discussed above, the deceased herself has not stated about cruel treatment by accused/respondents in her dying declaration. Thus, it is not proved that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused/respondents or they had made any demand of dowry. 13. In the aforesaid circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, trial Court has considered the entire material evidence on record against accused/respondents in its entirety and on a proper appreciation of evidence and after assigning detailed and cogent reasons, has acquitted the respondents. Unless the judgment of acquittal is palpably wrong and grossly unreasonable, interference in a case against acquittal is not called for in view of the law settled by the Supreme Court in the catena of decisions. Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that if the evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court does not suffer from illegality, manifest error or perversity and the main grounds on which it has based its order are reasonable and plausible the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal even if another view is possible. Therefore, no interference by this Court with impugned judgment is warranted. 14. In view of aforesaid, learned trial Court has committed no error in acquitting the accused/respondents. Therefore, no interference by this Court with impugned judgment is warranted. 14. In view of aforesaid, learned trial Court has committed no error in acquitting the accused/respondents. Thus, the charges levelled against the accused/respondents for offence punishable under Sections 498(A), 304(B), in alternate 302, in further alternate under Section 302 read with Section 34, further in alternate under Section 306 and in further alternate 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Code and under Section 4 of Act, have not been proved and rightly held so by the trial Court. 15. The application for leave to appeal against acquittal of the accused/respondents has no merit and substance and accordingly is hereby dismissed in limine at the stage of admission itself. Let record of the trial Court be sent back with a copy of this order without delay.