JUDGMENT : Tapash Mookherjee, J. The judgment of conviction dated 30.01.2014 and the order of sentence dated 01.02.2014 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Malda, in Sessions Case No.176 of 2011 (S.T. No.51 of 2011) are in challenge in this Criminal Appeal. By the aforesaid judgment and order the Trial Court convicted the accused Md. Irfan Habib in the case, of the offence punishable under Section 498 A/306 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, I.P.C.) and sentenced him to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000.00 (rupees five thousand only) in default to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 6 months more, for the offence under Section 498 a I.P.C. and also sentenced the said accused Md. Irfan Habib to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000.00 (rupees five thousand only) in default to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 6 months more, for the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. The other accused persons in the case were found not guilty of the charges and accordingly acquitted. Being aggrieved by such judgment and order the accused Md. Irfan Habib preferred the present appeal. 2. The facts leading to the appeal as narrated in the F.I.R. may be summarised, in short, in the following way. The Appellant Md. Irfan Habib married Habiba Pervin according to Muslim law and rituals and after such marriage Habiba Pervin went to her matrimonial home at village Chamagram under P. S. Kaliachak, Dist. Malda. Within a short period after the marriage, the Appellant as well as his family members started torture upon Habiba physically as well as mentally in different ways and Habiba disclosed the facts to her parents and other members of her parental home. In the morning of 14.05.2009 one Biraj Ahemad of Appellant's village informed the uncle of Habiba over telephone that Habiba died by hanging in her matrimonial home. After receiving such information Habiba's uncle along with others rushed to the house of the Appellant and found Habiba's dead body lying in the floor of the Appellant's house. Habiba's uncle Md. Kahalilur Rahaman thereafter submitted a written complaint at Kaliachak Police Station and narrated therein the aforesaid facts. On the basis of such complaint Kaliachak Police Station Case No. 283 of 2009, dated 14.05.2009 was started against the Appellant and his family members, named in the aforesaid complaint. Habiba's uncle Md. Kahalilur Rahaman thereafter submitted a written complaint at Kaliachak Police Station and narrated therein the aforesaid facts. On the basis of such complaint Kaliachak Police Station Case No. 283 of 2009, dated 14.05.2009 was started against the Appellant and his family members, named in the aforesaid complaint. Investigation started and after its completion, charge sheet under Sections 498 A/ 306 I.P.C. was submitted against all the accused persons. Thereafter cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Malda in usual course from where the case was transferred to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court at Malda, for disposal. 3. Considering the materials collected during investigation charges under Sections 498 A /34 and 306/ 34 I.P.C. were framed against the Appellant and other accused persons. The Appellant and other accused persons denied the charges and pleaded their innocence. 4. Prosecution examined as many as eighteen witnesses in the case and proved some documents as well. Defence tendered no evidence whatsoever. Considering the evidence thus produced by the prosecution the Trial Court found the Appellant guilty of the offences under Section 498 A/ 306 I.P.C. and passed sentence as mentioned earlier. Hence, the appeal. 5. 18 witnesses were examined by the prosecution in the case. Out of them P.W.- 1, P.W.-4, P.W.-5, P.W.-8, P.W.-9 AND P.W.-10 are close relations of the deceased. P.W.- 2, P.W.-3, P.W.-6 and P.W.-11 are the co-villagers of the Appellant and all of them were declared 'hostile' by the Prosecution. P.W.- 7 was the scribe of the F.I.R. The remaining witnesses, i.e., P.W.- 12 to P.W.-18 were the official witnesses who had taken part in the investigation of the case. 6. Mr. Mondal, learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant emphatically argued that the demand of dowry alleged by the witnesses against the Appellant is not there in the F. I. R. and as such it was afterthought. So, the entire case of the Prosecution under Section 498 A /306 I.P.C. is bound to fail on such ground alone. 7. On the other hand, Mr. So, the entire case of the Prosecution under Section 498 A /306 I.P.C. is bound to fail on such ground alone. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Ali, learned Advocate appearing for the State explained the situation in which the F.I.R. was lodged and argued that the omission is very natural especially when the complainant was the uncle of the deceased having no detail knowledge about the demand of dowry by the Appellant and his family members from the family of the deceased. 8. It is true that although in the F. I. R. it has been alleged that few days after the marriage the Appellant and his family members started physical as well as mental torture upon the deceased, Mst. Habiba Pervin, but it has not been stated therein that non-fulfilment of the demand of dowry was cause of such tortures. Habiba's father was in a different district at the relevant time for the purpose of his job. Habiba committed suicide in the night of 13.05.2009 and the fact was reported over the telephone to Habiba's uncle Md. Kahalilur Rahaman by a co-villager of the Appellant. Kahalilur received the information in the morning of 14.05.2009 and thereafter rushed to the house of the Appellant along with others where they found the dead body of Habiba lying in the floor of the house and within a very short period thereafter the said Kahalilur went to the local Police Station and submitted the written F.I.R. The condition of mind of the F.I.R. maker in such a situation is quite understandable and it is not always possible for a man in such a situation to describe all details in the F.I.R. The demand of dowry was made before the parents of the deceased and the F.I.R. maker (P.W.-1) had no detail knowledge of it, as admitted by him (P.W.- 1). Needless to mention that the law do not demand that F.I.R. in each and every case must be exhaustive containing all necessary details. So, the contention of Mr. Mondal mentioned above is not acceptable and the omission is not fatal for the Prosecution in this case. 9. Mr. Mondal has pointed out some other omissions and contradictions as well, which according to him, disproved the Prosecution's case as a whole. The points thus raised by Mr. Mondal is being discussed hereinafter. 10. Mr. So, the contention of Mr. Mondal mentioned above is not acceptable and the omission is not fatal for the Prosecution in this case. 9. Mr. Mondal has pointed out some other omissions and contradictions as well, which according to him, disproved the Prosecution's case as a whole. The points thus raised by Mr. Mondal is being discussed hereinafter. 10. Mr. Ali submitted, inter alia, that the close relations of the deceased especially the parents, are the best witnesses to testify as to how the deceased was treated in her matrimonial home and as such the Prosecution's case is based on the oral testimonies of them who are P.W.-4, P.W.- 8, P.W.- 9 and P.W.- 10 in the case. 11. Admittedly Appellant's wife Habiba committed suicide by hanging in the Appellant's house. The Post Mortem report, i.e., exhibit- 4 also says so. 12. The complainant Md. Kahalilur Rahaman (P.W.- 1) in his evidence stated that he heard from his niece when she was alive that she was being physically and mentally tortured by the Appellant at the instigation of the Appellant's family members. He further stated that the Appellant demanded money from his niece but as his niece failed to satisfy such demand she was tortured by the Appellant. However, at the concluding part of his cross-examination, on asking by the Court, he admitted that he had no knowledge regarding the amount of the money demanded by the Appellant. As mentioned earlier P.W.- 1 in his F. I. R. did not mention also such demand of money from his niece by the Appellant. 13. Habibur Rahaman (P.W.- 4) is the father of the deceased. At the beginning of his examination, he stated that his daughter Habiba Pervin was strangulated to death. However, it was not the Prosecution's case and it was simply an exaggeration which is not unusual. So, his evidence should not be discarded as a whole, just for such reason only. 14. P.W.- 4 stated that four/five months after marriage, his daughter came to his house for the first time and divulged before him that his son-in law, i.e., the Appellant had been demanding Rs. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) from her. So, his evidence should not be discarded as a whole, just for such reason only. 14. P.W.- 4 stated that four/five months after marriage, his daughter came to his house for the first time and divulged before him that his son-in law, i.e., the Appellant had been demanding Rs. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) from her. P.W.- 4 stated further that after knowing about such demand from his daughter, he assured his daughter that he would try his best to arrange for the money and with such assurance he sent her daughter back to her matrimonial home. But about one/ one and half month thereafter his daughter came to his house and again told him about the demand of the money by her Husband and at that time his daughter added further that she was being assaulted by the Appellant as she failed to satisfy such demand and she also showed marks of violence on her body. P.W.- 4 added further that he talked to his son-in-law over telephone and asked for some time for payment of the money and after such talk he again persuaded his daughter to go back to her matrimonial home. P.W.- 4 further stated that when his daughter came to his house for the third time then also he noticed marks of violence on the body of his daughter and he again persuaded his daughter to go back to her matrimonial home which his daughter obeyed and two months thereafter, they got the news of death of his daughter. 15. The sum and substance of the evidence of P.W.- 4 during his examination-in-chief was that his daughter came to his house on three occasions after marriage and during all those visits his daughter narrated to him that as her Husband's demand of Rs. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) in cash was not satisfied she was being assaulted physically by her Husband in her matrimonial house and that on such second and third visit marks of violence on the body of his daughter were also noticed by him. No serious contradiction or inconstancy is found in his statement. 16. Renu Khatun (P.W.- 8) is the aunt of the deceased. She stated that her niece Habiba was well in her matrimonial home for some months after marriage and thereafter her Husband, i.e., the Appellant started demanding a sum of Rs. No serious contradiction or inconstancy is found in his statement. 16. Renu Khatun (P.W.- 8) is the aunt of the deceased. She stated that her niece Habiba was well in her matrimonial home for some months after marriage and thereafter her Husband, i.e., the Appellant started demanding a sum of Rs. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) for his business but due to poverty the demand could not be satisfied by the Parental family of her niece. During her cross-examination P.W.- 8 further explained that her niece Habiba was physically tortured by her Husband as she could not meet the demand of her Husband. Nothing transpires from the cross-examination of P.W.- 8, which discredits her. 17. Md. Habibur Rahaman (P.W.- 9) is the grandfather of the deceased. He stated in his evidence that his granddaughter Habiba was happy in her matrimonial home for seven/eight months only after her marriage with the Appellant, but thereafter the Appellant started demanding a sum of Rs. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) for business from the father of Habiba. He stated further that as his granddaughter refused to ask for money from her parent she was physically tortured by the Appellant. P.W.- 9 also added that his granddaughter reported to him about tortures on her by the Appellant for money whenever she visited their house. From the evidence of the I.O. (P.W.- 18) it appears that P.W.- 9 had not stated before him from whom he came to know about the torture. The omission is of no serious consequence because the deceased was the granddaughter of P.W.- 9 and hence it was very natural for the deceased to narrate all her miseries in her matrimonial home before P.W.- 9. No other contradiction is there in the evidence of P.W.- 9. 18. Firdousi Bibi (P.W.- 10) is the mother of the deceased. She stated in her evidence that her daughter was well in matrimonial home only for six/seven months after marriage but thereafter all troubles developed as they failed to meet the demand of her son-in-law for Rs. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) for his business. She added further that as they failed to meet such demand of the Appellant her daughter had been tortured physically as well as mentally by the Appellant and other family members of the Appellant. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) for his business. She added further that as they failed to meet such demand of the Appellant her daughter had been tortured physically as well as mentally by the Appellant and other family members of the Appellant. So, her evidence is also in the same tune of the evidence of the other witnesses discussed above. 19. According to Mr. Mondal the allegation of demand of cash and the alleged tortures on the deceased by the Appellant for non-fulfilment of such demand are baseless due to which the parents of the deceased had not submitted any complaint against the Appellant either before the Police or before the local Panchayat authority. Mr Ali's contention on the point was that the parents of the deceased had the expectation that the situation would improve in future and hence instead of rushing with complaints before any authority they preferred to watch the situation for some times more. 20. The matrimonial relation is always very delicate. A simple mistake on either side may spoil the entire relation. In our society, in particular, the parents of a daughter always try their best to prevent the break up of marriage till last. There cannot be any denial of the fact that if a matrimonial dispute is taken before Police or any other authority, there is every chance of the rift being widened instead of solution. In the present case, the marriage of the Appellant with Habiba survived for 15/16 months only. The relation between the Appellant and the deceased was initially good for five/six months as stated by the witnesses and the troubles started thereafter. So, if the parents of Habiba decided to wait for some times for good days to come, either by satisfying the demand of the Appellant or otherwise, they cannot be blamed for it and their evidence should not be outright rejected just because they had not submitted any complaint anywhere before the death of their daughter. 21. It was also a point raised by Mr. Mondal that no date of the alleged demand of money or torture had been mentioned by any of the witnesses and as such the allegations are not true. 21. It was also a point raised by Mr. Mondal that no date of the alleged demand of money or torture had been mentioned by any of the witnesses and as such the allegations are not true. It is not usual that whenever a married woman is tortured for dowry in her matrimonial home, such a woman or the members of her parental home would note the dates of such demand or torture. So, the aforesaid contention of Mr. Mondal is not at all acceptable in logic. 22. So, from the evidence of P.W.- 4, P.W.- 8, P.W.- 9 and P.W.- 10 discussed above, it is firmly proved beyond all doubts that the Appellant subjected his Wife to mental as well as physical tortures with a view to realise his illegal demand of money from the parents of his Wife. In the case reported in (2010) 2 C Cr LR (SC) 75 (Bhaskar Lal Sharma & Anr. v. Monica) cited by Mr. Mondal, the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 498 a I.P.C. were not there. But in the present case sufficient material has been produced to show that the Appellant inflicted tortures upon his Wife to realise his illegal demand of Rs. 60,000.00 (Rupees sixty thousand only) for business from his matrimonial home. So, the decision has no application in the present case. The charge under Section 498A I. P. C. has, therefore, been proved in the case against the Appellant. 23. The Appellant has been convicted of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. also for abatement of suicide of his Wife. 24. There is no dispute to the fact that the Appellant's Wife committed suicide in the house of the Appellant. So, the question comes up whether the Appellant by any act or omission abated the suicide of his Wife. 25. Mr. Mondal urged that there is no evidence on record to show in any way, any role of the Appellant behind the suicide of his Wife. 26. In the Inquest report (Exhibit -2) there is a note of two marks of injuries found in the legs of the dead body. In the P. M. report (Exhibit - 4) those injuries have been described in detail. 26. In the Inquest report (Exhibit -2) there is a note of two marks of injuries found in the legs of the dead body. In the P. M. report (Exhibit - 4) those injuries have been described in detail. It is stated therein that one such injury was a bruise, reddish in colour, 4" in to 1/2" at anterior aspect of right leg, antemortem in nature and more or less fresh. The other injury has been described as old scar, 3/4" into 1/2" at anterior upper part of left leg. According to the autopsy surgeon (P.W.- 12) the injury number one mentioned above, was most likely caused by assault with blunt object. However, during cross-examination he opined that bruise can be caused for collision with any hard substance also. Taking cue from such evidence Mr. Ali argued that the deceased was assaulted in the night of her hanging and because of such assaults the victim committed suicide. Mr. Mondal resisted the view and according to him, it is not proved as to who in particular inflicted the assault, if any. He further submitted that the nature of the injury is so trifle that nothing should be inferred from it. 27. P.W.- 8 during his evidence, introduced a fact that six/seven days prior to the death of the victim there was an incident in the house of the Appellant and the incident was that the Appellant's elder brother stacked some stone-chips in the roof of the Appellant and when Appellant's Wife protested, she was assaulted by the Appellant's elder brothers. She further stated that on inquiry from the co-villagers, they came to know that there was a quarrel and fight in the house of the Appellant on the night of suicide of the deceased. She herself stated that door in the house of the Appellant was closed during such incident. So, it is not understandable as to how the co-villagers knew about it. Be that as it may, P.W.- 8 did not say from whom in particular, she got the information. So, her evidence on the point is 'hearsay'. She herself stated that door in the house of the Appellant was closed during such incident. So, it is not understandable as to how the co-villagers knew about it. Be that as it may, P.W.- 8 did not say from whom in particular, she got the information. So, her evidence on the point is 'hearsay'. P.W.- 9 also stated that on the night of the suicide of the deceased, there was a dispute in the Appellant's family for gathering stone-chips on the roof and the Appellant was asked by the deceased to tell his brother to remove the stone-chips from the roof but the Appellant, instead of doing so, assaulted the victim. Similarly P.W.- 10 also stated that on the previous day there was a quarrel between her daughter and son-in-law for gathering stone-chips in the roof of their house and during such quarrel her daughter was assaulted by the Appellant. She further stated that she came to know about the incident from the villagers. But she had not also mentioned any name of any such villager from whom she came to know about the incident. So, her evidence on the point is also 'hearsay'. 28. As mentioned above, the incident of dispute for gathering stone-chips on the Appellant's roof took place six/seven days prior to the suicide of the Appellant's wife, as claimed by P.W.- 8. But according to P.W.- 9 and P.W.- 10 the incident took place on the very night of the suicide. Moreover, there is no legal evidence to prove the incident. 29. Mr. Ali submitted that torture upon the deceased by the Appellant for dowry prior to the suicide of the Appellant's Wife has been established. So, the Appellant is guilty of the offence of 306 I.P.C. also with the aid of the presumption under Section 113 A of the Evidence Act. 30. Section 113 A of the Evidence Act is reproduced herein below:- 113 A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. So, the Appellant is guilty of the offence of 306 I.P.C. also with the aid of the presumption under Section 113 A of the Evidence Act. 30. Section 113 A of the Evidence Act is reproduced herein below:- 113 A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. - When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) 31. The word 'may presume' itself suggests that the presumption is not mandatory, and it is a rebuttable presumption. From the Section, it further appears that three primary conditions have to be satisfied and all other facts and circumstances of the case should also be considered before drawing such presumption. 32. In the present case, there is no dispute to the facts that the Appellant's wife committed suicide within 15/16 months from their marriage. So, the first two conditions are satisfied. It has been held above that the Appellant subjected his Wife to cruelty to realise money for his business, from the parental home of his Wife. So, the third condition is also satisfied in this case. Now comes a question whether fulfilment of the aforesaid three conditions is sufficient for presumption that the Appellant abetted the commission of suicide of his Wife. 33. At the very outset, it should be noted that there is no direct or indirect evidence in the case to prove that the Appellant in any way provoked his Wife to commit suicide or did any act to facilitate her suicide. As mentioned earlier, a fresh injury was found in the dead body of the victim as mentioned in the Post-mortem Report. As mentioned earlier, a fresh injury was found in the dead body of the victim as mentioned in the Post-mortem Report. Mr Ali submitted that the injury itself suggests that the victim was assaulted in the night of her suicide, which caused the injury, hence it should be presumed that the assault was the cause behind the suicide. But there is no evidence on record whatsoever, to suggests that it was the Appellant who had assaulted the victim in the night of her suicide. Such evidence is needed in the case, as the Appellant's family was a joint family and Appellant's brothers were also living in the same house at the relevant time. Moreover, the injury in question is so trivial that nothing can be inferred from it, especially when autopsy surgeon also opined that such an injury may be caused due to collision with a blunt substances. 34. P.W.- 8, P.W.- 9 and P.W.-10 tried to make out a case that in the night of the suicide there was a quarrel in the house of the Appellant in connection with gathering of stone-chips in the roof of the house of the Appellant. But there is no admissible legal evidence on this point also, as discussed earlier. 35. Prosecution has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2010) 10 SCC 353 (Thanu Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh). In para 21 in the judgment it has been stated that intention to instigate the suicide is an important factor to consider the point whether there was any wilful act or intention of the accused for instigation. Moreover, in that case the victim was six months' pregnant and it was held that a pregnant woman does not generally commit suicide unless compelled by any extreme circumstances. In the present case there is nothing on record to show that the Appellant had any intention to instigate the commission of suicide by his Wife. On the contrary, the Appellant was unemployed and his Wife was an earning lady. So, the Appellant did not stand to gain anything from the suicide of his Wife. Moreover, the Appellant's Wife was not pregnant. There is no such special circumstances like pregnancy of the victim or otherwise in the present case. The decision is not, therefore, of any help to the Prosecution. 36. So, the Appellant did not stand to gain anything from the suicide of his Wife. Moreover, the Appellant's Wife was not pregnant. There is no such special circumstances like pregnancy of the victim or otherwise in the present case. The decision is not, therefore, of any help to the Prosecution. 36. The offences under Section 498 a I.P.C. and under Section 306 I.P.C. are two independent offences. So, it is not logical to hold that when an accused is charged of both the offences under Section 498 a I.P.C. and 306 I.P.C. and the charge under Section 498A I.P.C. being proved, the charge under Section 306 I.P.C. stands automatically proved on the same evidence. To link the two offences with the aid of the presumption under Section 113 A of the Evidence Act, some extra circumstances has to be also proved and the prosecution has to prove in such a case that the cruelty induced the victim to commit suicide and that because of the cruelty meted out, no option was left to the victim but to end her life by suicide. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2001) 9 SCC 618 (Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh) and (2010) 1 SCC 707 (Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal), are relied on the point. 37. In the present case, there is no evidence to show that the Appellant had played any role directly or indirectly which ultimately resulted in the suicide of his Wife. P.W. – 4 stated that his daughter complained of tortures on her for the last time about two months before her death. What happened thereafter in the family is not known. So, the link between the torture and suicide of the Appellant's Wife is totally missing in this case. In fact, the Trial Court tried to find out the link on the basis of some presumptions which have no sanction in law. 38. Having thus regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case discussed above, I am of the view that the benefit of presumption under Section 113 A of the Evidence Act is not available to the Prosecution to prove the charge under Section 306 I.P.C. against the Appellant. 39. 38. Having thus regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case discussed above, I am of the view that the benefit of presumption under Section 113 A of the Evidence Act is not available to the Prosecution to prove the charge under Section 306 I.P.C. against the Appellant. 39. So, from what has been discussed and held above it is clear that although the charge under Section 498 a I.P.C. has been proved against the Appellant but the charge under Section 306 I.P.C. has not been proved in the case. So, the order of conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant under Section 306 I.P.C. should be set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed in part. The conviction and order of sentence under Section 306 I.P.C. passed against the Appellant are set aside and the Appellant is found not guilty of the said charge and the judgment and order of conviction and sentence under Section 498 a I.P.C. passed against the Appellant is hereby affirmed. 40. The Lower Court Records be sent back along with a copy of this judgment and order 41. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities. Appeal partly allowed.