ORDER : Mr. S.C. Sharma, J. 1. The petitioner before this Court, serving on the post of Asstt. Sub Inspector of Police, has filed this present writ petition being aggrieved by the order dated 19/2/2016 passed by the respondent No. 2 dismissing the petitioner from service. 2. The contention of the petitioner is that a Show Cause Notice was issued by the respondent on 19/2/2016 directing the petitioner to file a reply as to why action should not be initiated against him. Petitioner has further stated that he appeared before the Competent Authority and based upon the Show Cause Notice a final order has been passed dismissing him from service. 3. Petitioner’s grievance is that without holding Departmental Enquiry and without issuing a charge sheet the impugned order is bad in law. 4. On the other hand, reply has been filed by the respondent State and it has been stated that the petitioner was caught red handed accepting a sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant and a crime was registered at Crime No. 16/2016 for offence u/S. 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The criminal case is pending. The respondents have also stated that keeping in view the Rule 64 of the M.P. General Conditions of Service a Police Officers has to work with honesty and sincerity and as there is a violation of Rule 64, they have got every right to proceed ahead against the petitioner and keeping in view the Section 69 of the Police Act, 1861 they have issued Show Cause Notice and service of the petitioner have been put to an end. Their contention is that no Departmental Enquiry is required in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 5. This Court has carefully gone through the impugned order. The impugned order reveals that the petitioner has been dismissed from service and the fact remains that no charge sheet of any kind was issued, no Departmental Enquiry was held and after issuing a Show Cause Notice and after recording statement of the petitioner, some report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority has dismissed the petitioner. 6. The impugned order reveals that the disciplinary authority in exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 311 has exercised its power to remove the petitioner without holding Departmental Enquiry. 6. The impugned order reveals that the disciplinary authority in exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 311 has exercised its power to remove the petitioner without holding Departmental Enquiry. Proviso to Article 311(2)(b) provides that where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by the authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry, the disciplinary authority can dismiss a person, remove a person or reduce a person in rank. The impugned order dated 19/2/2016 does not reveal any such reason recorded by the disciplinary authority and the order is not in consonance with Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Not only this, criminal case is also pending against the petitioner. He has not been convicted in the criminal case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of Risal Singh v. State of Haryana reported in ( AIR 2014 SC 2922 ) and his contention is that in similar circumstances, the apex Court has set aside the impugned order passed in the aforesaid case. 7. This Court has carefully gone through the judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of Risal Singh (supra) and paragraph 4 to 8 of the aforesaid reads as under: 4. Mr. Manjit Singh, learned counsel for the State submitted that regard being had to the nature of allegations, the Superintendent of Police, who is the competent authority, thought it appropriate to dispense with the inquiry and, hence, the order of dismissal cannot be flawed. We have already reproduced the order passed by the competent authority. On a bare perusal of the same, it is clear as day that it is bereft of reason. Non-ascribing of reason while passing an order dispensing with enquiry, which otherwise is a must, definitely invalidates such an action. In this context, reference to the authority in Union of India and anr. v. Tulsiram Patel is apposite. In the said case the Constitution Bench, while dealing with the exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b), has ruled thus: “130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. v. Tulsiram Patel is apposite. In the said case the Constitution Bench, while dealing with the exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b), has ruled thus: “130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are “not reasonably practicable” and not “impracticable”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary “practicable” means “Capable of being put into practise, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “practicable” inter alia as meaning “possible to practise or perform : capable of being put into practise, done or accomplished: feasible”. Further, the words used are not “not practicable” but “not reasonably practicable”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation.” 5. In Jaswant Sing v. State of Punjab and others the Court, while dealing with the exercise of power as conferred by way of exception under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, opined as follows: “Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram case: (SCC p.504, para 130) “A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail.” The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer.” 6. After so stating, the two-Judge Bench quashed the order of dismissal and directed the appellant to be reinstated in service forthwith with the monetary benefits. Be it noted, it was also observed therein that it would be open to the employer, if so advised, notwithstanding the lapse of time, to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. Recently, in Reena Rani v. State of Haryana, after referring to the various authorities in the field, the Court ruled that when reasons are not ascribed, the order is vitiated and accordingly set aside the order of dismissal which had been concurred with by the Single Judge and directed for reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. It has also been observed therein that the order passed by this Court would not preclude the competent authority from taking action against the Appellant in accordance with law. 7. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid authorities, the irresistible conclusion is that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police dispensing with the inquiry is totally unsustainable and is hereby annulled. As the foundation founders, the order of the High Court giving the stamp of approval to the ultimate order without addressing the lis from a proper perspective is also indefensible and resultantly, the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority has to pave the path of extinction. 8. Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and that of the disciplinary authority. The appellant shall be deemed to be in service till the date of superannuation. As he has attained the age of superannuation in the meantime, he shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. The arrears shall be computed and paid to the appellant within a period of three months hence. Needless to say, the respondents are not precluded from initiating any disciplinary proceedings, if advised in law. As the lis has been pending before the Court, the period that has been spent in Court shall be excluded for the purpose of limitation for initiating the disciplinary proceedings as per rules. Needless to say, the respondents are not precluded from initiating any disciplinary proceedings, if advised in law. As the lis has been pending before the Court, the period that has been spent in Court shall be excluded for the purpose of limitation for initiating the disciplinary proceedings as per rules. However, we may hasten to clarify that our observations herein should not be construed as a mandate to the authorities to initiate the proceeding against the appellant. We may further proceed to add that the State Government shall conduct itself as a model employer and act with the objectivity which is expected from it. There shall be no order as to costs. 8. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, the impugned order is hereby set aside. Respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. However, the respondents shall be free to take appropriate action in accordance with law. 9. With the aforesaid, the Writ Petition stands allowed and disposed of.