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2016 DIGILAW 748 (JHR)

Tulsi Mahto son of Jailal Mahto v. State of Jharkhand

2016-04-29

PRAMATH PATNAIK

body2016
JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. - Aggrieved by the impugned order of punishment of dismissal from services vide order dated 30.04.2014 passed by the S.P., Giridih being confirmed by the appellate authority i.e. Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribag vide order dated 28.07.2014, the petitioner filed this writ application for quashing of the aforesaid order and for direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in services. 2. The facts, as disclosed in the writ application, in nut shell, is that when the petitioner was posted in town Police Station, Giridih, a charge sheet was submitted against him with the allegations of misconduct and dereliction of duty. The petitioner was placed under suspension and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. After following the procedure inquiry officer submitted his report finding the petitioner guilty of charges. In pursuance to the findings of the inquiry officer, the S.P., Giridih, (respondent no.4) issued show cause notice vide letter dated 30.12.2013 on the proposed punishment of dismissal from services, in difference thereto the petitioner submitted his show cause reply. Thereafter, the impugned order of dismissal was passed vide order dated 30.04.2014, vide Annexure-4 to the writ application. Against the order of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeal which been rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 28.07.2014 vide Annexure-6 to the writ application. Hence, the writ application. 3. Heard Dr. S.N. Pathak, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Deepak Kr. Dubey, J.C. to S.C.I, appearing for the respondents. 4. Dr. S.N. Pathak, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted with vehemence that the impugned order of punishment of dismissal dated 30.04.2014 being affirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 28.07.2014 are harsh, excessive and disproportionate because of the fact that the occurrence was incidental and no intentional, therefore, the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charges. Learned senior counsel further submits that the appellate authority not considered all the points raised in the appeal and passed a mechanical, non-reasoned and non-speaking order. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner during course of argument referred to Rule 826 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, which inter alia envisages: "Rule 826. Discrimination necessary in awarding punishments.- The punishment awarded should be in conformity with the gravity of offence with which the officer is charged and offences involving moral turpitude shall be carefully discriminated from smaller wrong doings. Discrimination necessary in awarding punishments.- The punishment awarded should be in conformity with the gravity of offence with which the officer is charged and offences involving moral turpitude shall be carefully discriminated from smaller wrong doings. It should also be borne in mind that the previous record of service of the officer concerned, if it is not already included in the charge of the proceeding shall not be taken into account for determining the quantum of punishment. The objective of awarding punishment is firstly to keep a record of the wrong doings of the officer and secondly as a measure of correction to alert him to improve his work and conduct. Several punishments awarded in one lot such as during inspections which do not provide an opportunity to the delinquent officer to improve himself are not likely to be helpful. In any case, the punishment cannot be awarded without carefully considering the defence of the delinquent officer. Before issuing orders of minor punishment, it is necessary to apprise the delinquent of the charges against him and he should be given adequate opportunity for defence. After this been ensured, the punishment can be awarded. However in the case of major punishments (see Rule 828) formal proceedings in P.M. Form no.178 will have to be drawn up." 5. Mr. Deepak Kr. Dubey, J.C. to S.C.I appearing for the respondents reiterated the stand taken in the counter affidavit and submitted that the petitioner was deputed in Panther Mobile in Giridih (T) P.S. and Government pistol with Butt No.23, Arsenal No. 15334317 along with one Magazine along with 35 cartridges were allotted to him from the Giridih Armory, Police Line. The petitioner was deputed on 01.06.2013 on Prisoner Van Escort Party from Giridih Jail to Civil Court, Giridih and again from Civil Court to Giridih Jail. On 01.06.2013 when the prisoner van returned to Giridih Jail all constables deposited their weapons and cartridges in Police Line Armory, but the petitioner Tulsi Mahto did not do so and illegally handed over his pistol Butt No. 23 to Constable 623, Satyanarayan Paswan and without permission or any information petitioner, Tulsi Mahto fled away. A.S.I., Parsuram Sah sustained bullet injury from Pistol Butt No.23 which was allotted to Tulsi Mahto and on the way to Hospital A.S.I., Parsuram Sah died. A.S.I., Parsuram Sah sustained bullet injury from Pistol Butt No.23 which was allotted to Tulsi Mahto and on the way to Hospital A.S.I., Parsuram Sah died. It is pertinent to mention here that the pistol and cartridges allotted to petitioner Tulsi Mahto were seized from constable 623, Satyanarayan Paswan. Upon search the petitioner was found absconding without permission. Since the pistol allotted to the petitioner was used in committing the murder of A.S.I., Parsuram Sah, therefore, the petitioner shown extreme indiscipline and negligence for which he been rightly dismissed from services. 6. After hearing learned counsels for the respective parties at length and on perusal of the records, I am of the considered view that the impugned orders do not call for any interference for the reasons stated herein below: (I) It is a settled law that only the departmental authorities are the best judges who can decide the quantum of punishment and it is not for the High Court to substitute its opinion in so far as the quantum of punishment is concerned. Moreover, the departmental authorities are the fact finding authorities and once a fact been found proved this Court under Article 226 cannot exercise its judicial review. (II) Admittedly, in the instant case a full dressed inquiry been conducted and all procedural formalities have been adhered to and opportunity of being heard been given to the petitioner. Therefore, there is absolutely no ground on which the power of judicial review can be applied. Moreover, the fact finding given by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority based upon the materials on record cannot be interfered with as per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2009) 8 SCC 310 and (2011) 4 SCC 584 . (III) In "Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors." reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision-making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." (IV) In "Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra", reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: ".... Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable.... Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty...." 7. In that view of the matter, I find no reasons to interfere with the impugned order. Applying the aforesaid principles of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as indicated herein above, the impugned order of punishment dated 30.04.2014 passed by the respondent no.4 being confirmed by appellate authority pertaining to dismissal from service do not warrant any interference by this Court. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition sans merit is dismissed. Petition dismissed