ORDER : K. Vinod Chandran, J. 1. The challenge raised is to the election of the 1st respondent, to the Kerala Legislative Assembly, from the Vengara Assembly Constituency, in the election held on 16.05.2016 and declared on 19.05.2016; by a member of the electorate. The respondents 2 to 6 are the other candidates who contested against the 1st respondent returned candidate. 2. The matter is placed before me on the basis of the defects notified by the Registry, which are as hereunder: "1. CF Rs. 250/- is not paid as per Schedule II Article 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. 2. Section 80A which gives jurisdiction to the High Court to try an Election Petition is not shown in the petition. 3. The Affidavit filed by the petitioner as referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 83 is not sworn before a Magistrate of the First Class or a Notary or a Commissioner of Oaths as prescribed in R.94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961". The 1st respondent seeks for a hearing on whether the defects can be directed to be cured and I have heard Sri. D. Anilkumar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. S. Sreekumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent. 3. No dispute is raised on the first two defects; which are with respect to the non-payment of Court fees and the prevision, conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to try an Election Petition, having not been specifically mentioned in the memorandum. It is agreed that those are curable defects and no argument is addressed on those two counts. 4. The only issue sought to be considered at this stage is, whether the affirmation made in the affidavit, under Form 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 [for brevity "Election Rules"] is proper; the same having been affirmed by the Advocate of the petitioner, which the Registry has noticed to be not as prescribed under R.94A of the Elect on Rules and if found to be not proper, whether the defect can be directed to be cured. 5. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would first take this Court to Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 [for brevity "RP Act'] under Chapter 111, "Trial of Election Petitions", which speaks about the procedure to be followed, in trial of Election Petitions, before the High Court. The procedure, as per Section 87, as nearly as may be, should be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for brevity "CPC"] to the trial of suits. Section 139 of C.P.C. is pointed out to contend that, by clause (b) any officer or other person whom the High Court may appoint in this behalf can administer the oath to the deponent; which procedure has to be adopted in the trial of Election Petitions as per Section 87 of the R.P. Act The Oaths Act, 1969 [for brevity "Oaths Act"], is also referred to, wherein also Section 3 provides for power to administer oaths. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Oaths Act, without prejudice to the power conferred by sub-section (1), provides for any Court, Judge, Magistrate or a person to administer oaths and affirmations for the purpose of affidavits; if empowered in this behalf by the High Court, in respect of affidavits for the purpose of judicial proceedings by clause (a) and by the State Government with respect to all other affidavits by clause (b). Such empowerment had been made by the High Court under the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971; by R.76 which inter alia empowers an Advocate to make such affirmation and administer oath. R.46 of the Civil Rules of Practise is also referred to, which too inter alia, empowers a pleader so to do. 6. The contention raised is that going by the above provisions, an Advocate who is competent to administer oaths and affirmations is competent to administer such oath or affirmation through an affidavit executed and sworn before him; which had been done in the present Election Petition. It is pointed out that a "Commissioner of Oaths" has not been defined anywhere and in such circumstance, the empowerment made under Oaths Act has to be deemed to be one entitling the Advocate to act as a Commissioner of Oaths as provided under R.94-A of the Election Rules. It is pointed out that a "Commissioner of Oaths" has not been defined anywhere and in such circumstance, the empowerment made under Oaths Act has to be deemed to be one entitling the Advocate to act as a Commissioner of Oaths as provided under R.94-A of the Election Rules. The Rules of the High Court of Kerala have been made with the previous approval of the Government by virtue of the power conferred under Article 225 of the Constitution of India and Section 122 of the C.P C. and all other powers enabling in this behalf. Article 225 saves the laws, concerning the administration of justice in the High Courts, immediately prior to the Constitution and Section 122 of the C.P.C. is the power conferred on the High Courts to regulate their own procedure and the procedure of the Civil Courts. Rules have been made also under "all other powers enabling in this behalf, which would take within its ambit the Oaths Act also and, hence, the Election Petition has to be numbered and posted for trial, is the contention. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would refer to A. Mohammed v. Nalakath Soopy ( 1997 (1) KLT 697 ), which is against the petitioner; having held that an affidavit sworn to, before an Advocate is not sufficient. The petitioner however requests this Court not to follow the decision, since the learned Single Judge (as he then was) had departed considerably from the principle laid down by another learned Single Judge in P.R. Francis v. Raghavan Pozhakadavil ( AIR 1981 Ker. 64 ), which dealt with the above provisions, specifically R.76 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, and found that the affidavit sworn before an Advocate is in compliance of the mandaie in R.94-A of the Election Rules. 8. P.R. Francis considered an identical issue and found that the empowerment of an Advocate under R.76 of the High Court Rules enabled an Advocate to act as an Oath Commissioner as provided under R.94-A of the Election Rules. A. Mohammed, in which a different view was taken, despite noticing the earlier judgment, does not lay down the correct law and if at all this Court feels bound by the later precedent; since there are two conflicting decisions on the very same issue, the learned Counsel would commend this Court to refer the matter to a Larger Bench. A. Mohammed, in which a different view was taken, despite noticing the earlier judgment, does not lay down the correct law and if at all this Court feels bound by the later precedent; since there are two conflicting decisions on the very same issue, the learned Counsel would commend this Court to refer the matter to a Larger Bench. 9. A. Mohammed followed Dr. Shipra v. Shanti Lal Khoiwal, ( (1996) 5 SCC 181 ) to hold that an affidavit accompanying an Election Petition in cases involving allegations of corrupt practise is a mandatory requirement of Section 83 of the R.R. Act and it has to be in the prescribed form and as provided under R.94A of the Election Rules. It held that an Advocate cannot be said to be a person competent to authenticate an affidavit under R.94A. This was after noticing the binding precedent of P. R. Francis, which followed a Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamal Narain Sarma v. Dwarka Prasad Mishra & Ors. ( AIR 1966 SC 436 ). The learned Counsel would also place reliance on the decision in G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasannakumar( (2013) 4 SCC 776 ) to urge that an affidavit filed in compliance of the requirements of proviso to Section 83(1) of the R.R. Act was not an integral part of the Election Petition. Hence, if at all an Advocate is not competent to authenticate an affidavit in Form No. 25, then the petitioner ought to be given time to cure the defect, is the contention. 10. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent takes strong objection to the plea of reference and argues that this Court is bound by the precedent later decided in A. Mohammed, especially since the later decision noticed the earlier decision; both being Benches of co-ordinate strength. The learned Senior Counsel would distinguish both Kamal Narain Sarma and G.M. Siddeshwar and point out that an entire reading of the said judgments would reveal that it is not as if the Hon'ble Supreme Court has found that even an absence of an affidavit in Form No. 25, in case of corrupt practices being alleged, would not render the Election Petition liable for rejection. Without an affidavit as provided in the proviso to Section 83(1), there could be no Election Petition maintainable under Section 81 and a defect of such nature would entail rejection of the Election Petition at the threshold itself. In Kamal Narain Sarma, the learned Counsel points out that there was an appointment made as Commissioner of Oath, of a Clerk of the District Court, Jabalpur who had authenticated the affidavit accompanying the Election Petition on which ground the Election Petition was found to be maintainable. G.M. Siddeshwar has dealt with the issue of substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 83 and it is also held that if there is total and complete non-compliance of Section 83, then the petition cannot be described as an Election Petition and may be dismissed at the threshold. The statement made by the Hon'ble Judges towards the end of the decision is only on the facts of the said case and cannot be said to be a declaration of law especially when the declaration was to the contrary in paragraph 52 of the judgment. Dr. Shipra, it is pointed out, is explained in another Constitution Bench in T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose ( 1999 (2) KLT 260 (SC) = (1999) 4 SCC 274 ) T.M. Jacob would unequivocally declare that the absence of an affidavit or a substantial error in the same would render an Election Petition defective and liable for rejection, is the argument. 11. The learned Senior Counsel would also point out that R.76 of the High Court Rules can have application to the affidavits otherwise filed before the High Court and cannot enable an Advocate to authenticate an affidavit in an Election Petition, for which specific provision is available under the Election Rules. It is also pointed out that the High Court in framing the Rules under Section 122 of the C.P.C., had dedicated a chapter [Chapter XVI] to the Election Petitions, but has consciously not spoken of any appointment of Commissioner of Oaths and in such circumstance, the general provision applicable to other affidavits cannot be imported insofar as Election Petitions are concerned, especially when it is regulated by a statutory rule, being R.94A of the Election Rules. The reference to Section 87 of the R.R. Act and the applicability of the provisions under the C.P.C. cannot efface the statutory rule under the Election Rules, wherein authentication of an affidavit is directed to be made by a Notary, a Magistrate or a Commissioner of Oaths. When the substantive law provides for such authentication, no reliance can be placed on the procedural law to enable a person not specifically notified for authentication as per the substantive law. The right to file an Election Petition is a statutory right, which has to be exercised in the manner provided in the statute and there can be no deviation allowed on the ground of the procedural law permitting an authentication not provided under the Statute; from which the very right is sourced. 12. On the basis of the arguments addressed before this Court, two issues arise for consideration, with reference to the provisions in the substantive law, the procedural law and the precedents placed before this Court. The said issues are: (i) Whether an Advocate is competent to authenticate an affidavit under Form 25 as provided under R.94-A of the Election Rules, which affidavit is filed in compliance with the proviso to Section 83(1)of the R.R.Act. (ii) If the answer to issue (i) is in the negative: whether the defect in such an affidavit filed is a curable defect under the R.R. Act and the Election Rules. Issue No.(i) 13. True, there are conflicting decisions in P. R. Francis and A. Mohammed. If P.R. Francis was not referred to in A. Mohammed, in the teeth of two conflicting decisions, this Court would have been compelled to refer the matter to a Division Bench. However, A. Mohammed having noticed the earlier decision of a co-ordinate bench and having differed from what is stated therein, based on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to therein; as of now this Court is bound by the precedent in A. Mohammed, being the later decision. If this Court had a grain of doubt about the principles stated therein, then necessarily there should be a reference to a Division Bench. If this Court had a grain of doubt about the principles stated therein, then necessarily there should be a reference to a Division Bench. After reading the decision in A. Mohammed, this Court has to respectfully concede to the declaration in the aforesaid case; as to an Advocate not being a Commissioner of Oath and hence, not being competent to authenticate an affidavit under Form 25, R.94-A of the Election Rules. Considerable arguments having been addressed by both sides on this aspect, it is only fair that this Court record its independent reasons for having agreed with A. Mohammed. 14. Section 87 of the R.P. Act makes the procedure applicable under the C.P.C., to the trial of every Election Petition; "subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder"(sic). The provisions of the procedural law, being the C.P.C., can be made applicable; only when there is no specific provision in the Act and the Rules and in the event of such a provision, the applicability is subject to such provision. The Election Rules framed under the R.R. Act, specifically by R.94A provide for the affidavit under Section 83(1) to be sworn before a Magistrate of the First Class, Notary or a Commissioner of Oaths, that too in Form No.25. The defect projected from the affidavit filed herein, is that, it is authenticated by an Advocate, who, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is to be deemed a Commissioner of Oaths. Commissioner of Oaths, as had been admitted by the petitioner too is not defined anywhere. The Oaths Act also does not speak of a Commissioner of Oaths and Section 3(2) provides for any Court, Judge, Magistrate or person to he empowered to administer oath and affirmations for the purpose of affidavits. Kamal Narain Sarma also found that the Oaths Act is only of general application. The High Court Rules have been made invoking the powers under Article 225 of the Constitution, Section 122 of the C.P.C. and all other powers enabling in this behalf. Section 122 of the C.P.C. enables the High Courts to regulate their own procedure and the procedure of the Civil Court and R.76 of the High Court Rules regulates such procedure insofar as authentication of affidavits. Section 122 of the C.P.C. enables the High Courts to regulate their own procedure and the procedure of the Civil Court and R.76 of the High Court Rules regulates such procedure insofar as authentication of affidavits. Section 139 of the C.P.C. also provides for a Court or Magistrate, a Notary or any officer or other person whom a High Court may appoint in this behalf or any officer appointed by any other Court which the State Government has generally or specially empowered in this behalf, to administer the oath to a deponent in the case of an affidavit under the C.P.C. 15. The empowerment under R.76 of the High Court Rules can be found to be either under Section 122 or under Section 139 of the C.P.C. and would apply to the procedure adopted by the High Court and the procedure of the Civil Courts without any doubt. But insofar as the Election Petitions are concerned, Chapter XVI of the High Court Rules specifically dedicate itself to Election Petitions, where the High Court could have nominated, generally an Advocate or particularly any other officer as Commissioner of Oaths, to act under R 94-A of the Election Rules. This Court is unable to countenance the argument that the absence of such appointment, should be interpreted as making the general rule applicable to Election Petitions; especially when the Election Rules provide for authentication of affidavits in Form No. 25 by three specified designates. A Commissioner of Oaths having not been specifically designated in the High Court Rules, no adoption of the general rule can be made especially when the procedural law applicable had been made subject to the provisions of the R.R.Act and the Rules framed thereunder by Section 87 of the R.R.Act. 16. In this context the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamal Narain Sarma referred to in both the decisions of this Court, is also to be examined. A reading of the decision would indicate that the Rules framed by the High Court therein, relating to the C.P.C., empowered a Clerk of a Court or other ministerial officer to be appointed as a Commissioner for administering oath or affidavits, who would discharge that function at the time specified by the District Judge. A reading of the decision would indicate that the Rules framed by the High Court therein, relating to the C.P.C., empowered a Clerk of a Court or other ministerial officer to be appointed as a Commissioner for administering oath or affidavits, who would discharge that function at the time specified by the District Judge. The Government of Madhya Pradesh had issued a notification, under which the District Judges were empowered under Section 139(c) of the C.P.C. to appoint Commissioners to administer oaths on affidavits made under the Code. The District Judge, Jabalpur, in exercise of the powers, had appointed, among others, the Clerk attached to his office to be Commissioner for administration of oaths. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also specifically noticed that the notification, empowered the District Judges to appoint "Commissioner to administer oaths on affidavits", which was later amended as "to appoint officers to administer oaths". It was specifically noticed that the change would not affect the present matter (sic), since the appointment which was the subject matter, was as per the earlier notification, which was as "a Commissioner to administer oaths". It was in such circumstance that it was held that R.94-A should be read as including all Commissioners of Oaths duly appointed and the Clerk appointed as a Commissioner of Oaths under Section 139(c) would be a Commissioner of Oaths under R.94-A also, since R.94-A does not make any condition or specify any particular kind of a Commissioner of Oaths. 17. What is absent in the instant case is, such an appointment of a Commissioner of Oaths. Again it has to be reiterated that the High Court dedicated a specific chapter for Election Petitions, in the Rules framed; which was silent about any such appointment. The silence has to be taken to be deliberate and intended at only Magistrates of the First Class and Notary being competent to authenticate an affidavit in Form No. 25 under R.94-A and there can be no adoption of the general empowerment made. Further, at the risk of repetition, Section 87 makes applicable the C.P.C.; subject to R.P. Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It is, hence, this Court at the outset agreed with the decision in A. Mohammed, which is also binding on this Court. 18. To that end is also Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram ( AIR 1974 SC 1185 ), a passage of which is extracted in A. Mohammed. It is, hence, this Court at the outset agreed with the decision in A. Mohammed, which is also binding on this Court. 18. To that end is also Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram ( AIR 1974 SC 1185 ), a passage of which is extracted in A. Mohammed. "It is well settled that it is a special right conferred under a self contained special law and the court will have to seek answer to the questions raised within the four corners of the Act and the powers of the court are circumscribed by its provisions. It is not a common law right and an Election Petition cannot be equated with a plaint in a civil suit". The provisions in the Oaths Act in Kamal Narain Sarma, had been held to be a general provision, which gives authority to all Courts and persons having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence. It is also noticed in Kamal Narain Sarma that the Clerk of a Court may not be good for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure and vice versa; which is for reason of the restriction in Section 139 of the C.P.C. and Section 539 (as it was then) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. R.94-A does not specify the appointment to be of a particular kind or prescribe any condition. It was in such circumstance that it was held that any Commissioner of Oaths appointed by that name or designation could attest an affidavit under Form No.25 as provided under R.94-A. The absence of such a named or designated appointment is what is glaring in the present case. Neither under Section 139(c) of C.P.C. or under the Cr.P.C. or under the High Court Rules was an appointment of a 'Commissioner of Oath' made. 19. The empowerment made under R.76 though is under Section 122 of the C.P.C. read with Section 139 regulating the procedure of the High Court and the Civil Courts, it does not empower any person referred therein to act as a Commissioner of Oaths and merely provides for authentication of affidavits by persons mentioned therein. Neither is an Advocate, by virtue only of R.76; nor the other persons mentioned in that rule, competent to act as 'Commissioner of Oaths'. Neither is an Advocate, by virtue only of R.76; nor the other persons mentioned in that rule, competent to act as 'Commissioner of Oaths'. The invocation of all enabling powers to make the High Court Rules though would take in the power conferred under the Oaths Act also, again the Oaths Act also does not speak of appointment or empowerment as Commissioner of Oaths. The power to make such appointment being available to both the Government and the High Court, in the State of Kerala, such power having not been invoked to make such an appointment; the authentication under Rule 94-A of the Election Rules has to be by the other designated officers referred to therein. 20. This Court is further fortified in taking that view by Dr. Vijaya Lakshmi Sadho v. Jagdish ( (2001) 2 SCC 247 ). There, one of the questions raised was whether the Election Petition drawn up In Hindi was liable to be rejected since the High Court Rules provided that every Election Petition shall be in English. The Government of Madhya Pradesh had issued a notification, in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (2) of Article 348 of the Constitution, authorising the use of Hindi in all proceedings of the High Court except for drawing up decrees, orders and judgements of the High Court. It was held that the rules framed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 225 are only rules of procedure and do not constitute substantive law, the primacy being on the latter. R.76 of the High Court Rules hence pales into insignificance, due to the rigour of R.94-A of the Election Rules, and the words employed 'subject to' in Section 87 of the R.P. Act. The first issue is answered against the Election Petitioner. Issue No.(ii) 21. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied heavily on G.M. Siddeshwar to contend that the defect if at all, in not having filed a proper affidavit is curable especially since the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the affidavit does not form an integral part of the election petition. The learned Senior Counsel would however contend that with respect to the affidavit, under the proviso to Section 83 though it had been held that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 is a curable effect, yet there must be substantial compliance with the provisions thereof. The learned Senior Counsel would however contend that with respect to the affidavit, under the proviso to Section 83 though it had been held that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 is a curable effect, yet there must be substantial compliance with the provisions thereof. "If there is a total and complete non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act then the petition cannot be described as an election petition and may be dismissed at the threshold (sic-para 52)" is the binding declaration of the decision, according to the returned candidate. Paragraph 62, relied on by the petitioner states as follows: "62. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it seems quite clear that the affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in compliance with the requirements of the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was not an integral part of the election petition, and no such case was set up. It also seems quite clear that the affidavit was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Therefore, the High Court was quite right in coming to the conclusion that the affidavit not being in the prescribed format of Form 25 and with a defective verification were curable defects and that an opportunity ought to be granted to Prasanna Kumar to cure the defects". 22. G.M. Siddeshwar was a case in which two contentions were taken, to urge dismissal of an election petition; one, the election petition not containing an affidavit in terms of Order 6, Rule 15 (4)of the C.P.C. and the other, the affidavit filed under the proviso to Section 83(1) being not in compliance of Form 25 as prescribed in R.94-A of the Election Rules. It was found that there was no mandate in the R.P. Act that, in a case where resort to corrupt practices have been alleged, it is imperative that an election petitioner file an affidavit in terms of Order 6, Rule 15 (4) of the C.P.C., in support of the averments made in the election petition, in addition to an affidavit filed under the proviso to Section 83(1) of the R.P. Act; especially since Section 83(1)(c) only specifies a verification in the manner laid down in the C.P.C. It was the affidavit as prescribed in Order 6, Rule 15 (4) which was found to be a stand-alone document; which was brought in by an amendment to the C.P.C. and held to be not possible of being read in as a requirement under Section 83(1)(c) of the R.P. Act. As is specifically pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel the binding declaration in paragraph 52 is that there should be substantial compliance and in the context of there being total and complete non-compliance, the election petition has to be dismissed at the threshold. In the present case it has to be emphasised that the situation emerging; on the finding that an affidavit under the proviso to Section 83(1) cannot be authenticated by an Advocate, is that there is no affidavit at all filed. In the context of the Hon'ble Supreme Court having over the years, considerably relaxed the rigour attached to the maintainability of election petitions, to maintain the purity of the election process, the various decisions referred to in the cited decision has to be examined minutely. 23. The issue of summary dismissal under Section 86 had been dealt with from para 39 of G.M. Siddeshwar Hardwari Lal v. Kunwal Singh ( (1972) 1 SCC 214 ) was referred to, for the proposition that an election petition could be dismissed if it did not disclose a cause of action; i.e.,: the specific allegation of the corrupt practise resorted to and the manner in which it was resorted to. This was so, despite the summary dismissal provided under Section 86 not referring to Section 83; since the procedure adopted is of the C.P.C. and "A suit which did not furnish cause of action could be dismissed" (sic-para 23 of Hardwari Lal). Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (1986 Supp. This was so, despite the summary dismissal provided under Section 86 not referring to Section 83; since the procedure adopted is of the C.P.C. and "A suit which did not furnish cause of action could be dismissed" (sic-para 23 of Hardwari Lal). Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (1986 Supp. SCC 315) also held that "appropriate orders in exercise of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can be passed if the mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the Act to incorporate the material facts in the election petition are not complied with" (sic-para 11). In G. Mallikarjunappa v. Shamanur Shivasankarappa ( (2001) 4 SCC 428 ) one of the issues arising was that the affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practise, with the election petition, did not comply with the requirements of the format as prescribed in Form 25. It was found that the format was not a relevant consideration following F.A. Sapa v. Singora ( (1991) 3 SCC 375 ). 24. In F.A. Sapa, the two questions raised, which are relevant for the present case; were (i) the consequence of a defective or incomplete verification and (ii) the consequence of a defective affidavit. The contention taken to urge the dismissal of the election petition was that the verification did not include many crucial paragraphs of the election petition which resulted in the allegations being not verified as required. It was also alleged that the election petitioner had omitted to mention in the verification, as to the various facts leading to the allegation of corrupt practices being within his knowledge and otherwise if on information received, the source of such information. There was merely a verification as to the various pleadings being within the knowledge of the election petitioner and on information received, without specifying as which of the facts were within his personal knowledge and which others on information received. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that (i) a defect in verification can be cured, (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause disclose the various grounds and the source of information, (iii) if more particulars are required it could be called for and (iv) that the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured, unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition. It was also held that the Court would also have to decide as to whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the Election Petition. 25. The reference to the affidavit and the schedule or annexure being an integral part, is insofar as a consideration of whether the disclosure of material facts have been made in such documents and not in the election petition as such. A mere look at Form 25 would indicate that there is no requirement for the entire material facts to be stated in the affidavit and it only intends a solemn affirmation on oath as to the material facts contained in the election petition, to be in the knowledge of the petitioner and true to his information; which is the proposition reiterated and expounded in G.M. Siddeshwar also. The said declaration cannot be read as a finding that an affidavit, in the context of an allegation of corrupt practise, would not be an essential requirement; especially when the statute specifically provides for such a requirement. The affidavit as required under the proviso to Section 81 (3), if suffering from a defect as to the form or content, not going to the root of the matter, could always be cured is the binding declaration, which is evident from the facts on which the various decisions considered therein revolved, as is noticed hereinafter. 26. In Murarka Radhe Shyam Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore (1964) 3 SCR 573 ) one of the defects on which the maintainability was questioned was that the verification as to certain averments being made on advice and information received by the petitioner from legal and other sources, were not specifically stated as believed by the petitioner to be true. It was held that on a reading of Part VI of the R.P. Act, the said defect in verification, in the manner provided in the C.P.C. cannot be said to be fatal to the maintainability of the election petition. The verification of the affidavit though apparently not in the prescribed form a reading of the same conveyed the same sense, as intended by the words used in the prescribed form, was the specific finding. The verification of the affidavit though apparently not in the prescribed form a reading of the same conveyed the same sense, as intended by the words used in the prescribed form, was the specific finding. Krishan Chander v. Ram Lal ( (1973) 2 SCC 759 ), urged a similar defect, as to the non disclosure of the source of information, to dismiss the election petition at the threshold; which was found to be not an essential requisite under R.94-A of the Election Rules. In Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra ( (1976) 2 SCC 17 ) the contention that the affidavit under R.94-A was not in the proper form was repelled holding that an election petition can be dismissed only for a substantial defect. M. Kamalam v. V.A. Syed Mohammed ( (1978) 2 SCC 659 ) found that the absence of an authentication of the petitioner, on the copy of the election petition served on the respondent is not fatal when such an authentication was available in the affidavit accompanying the petition. The election petition was found to be in truth and reality one document with two parts, one the election petition and the other the affidavit, the latter of which constituted the end portion of the election petition. An authentication in that end portion was found to be referable to the entire copy. 27. Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darsan Singh (2004) 11 SCC 196 ) raised two questions, whether the pleadings disclosed material facts to disclose a cause of action and whether the defective affidavit could be considered as a valid one. Drawing a clear distinction between material facts and material particulars, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the Election Judge laboured unnecessarily to minutely examine the pleadings to find that sufficient materials were not pleaded; when sub-section (5) of Section 86 permitted such particulars to be amended or amplified, with the permission of the Court. On the question of the defective affidavit, it was held that the same could be cured. Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy (2012 (3) KLT SN 58 (C. No. 57) SC = (2012) 7 SCC 788 ) reiterated the caution in so far as not lightly interfering with an election result but at the same time maintaining the purity of elections so as to strengthen the democratic values. Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy (2012 (3) KLT SN 58 (C. No. 57) SC = (2012) 7 SCC 788 ) reiterated the caution in so far as not lightly interfering with an election result but at the same time maintaining the purity of elections so as to strengthen the democratic values. The dispute with respect to the defective affidavit filed under R.94-A, in that case, was raised for the first time before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. While deprecating the effort so made, without raising the dispute before the High Court, it was held on the basis of various precedents referred to, that the non-compliance of the requirement under Section 83 is not so fatal as to result in the rejection of the election petition at the threshold. The format of the affidavit was held to be not of substance and the thrust should be, in finding whether the election petitioner has made averments which are testified on oath, no matter the same having been done in a different format from that stipulated in the rules. 28. Dr. Shipra considered a batch of appeals wherein the identical issue that arose for consideration was "whether the copy of the election petition accompanied by supporting affidavit served on the respective respondents along with Form 25 and prescribed under R. 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 without attestation part duly verified by the District Magistrate/Notary/Oath Commissioner can be said to be "true and correct copy" of the election petition as a is attached in Section 81 (3) of the Act?" (sic-para 6). It was held that the attestation of the affidavit by the prescribed authority is an integral part of the election petition. The wealth of precedents submitted before the Court was found to have not considered the specific question of omission of the material facts, which becomes an integral part of the election petition or of the pleadings. The defect insofar as the absence of authentication in the copy of the affidavit was found to have the effect of misleading the candidate/respondent that the affidavit under Form 25 itself was not duly verified. The defect insofar as the absence of authentication in the copy of the affidavit was found to have the effect of misleading the candidate/respondent that the affidavit under Form 25 itself was not duly verified. The said decision was sought to be relied on in another case wherein a similar issue regarding the copy served on the 1st respondent, i.e.,: the copy of the affidavit in Form 25 as per R.94-A of the Election Rules having not shown the verification of the Notary Public, was raised as a preliminary objection. A bench of co-ordinate strength referred the matter to a larger bench which decision is reported in T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose ( 1999 (2) KLT 260 (SC) = (1999) 4 SCC 274 ). 29. In T.M. Jacob, a Constitution Bench, explained but did not overrule Dr. Shipra. The fact situation as existing in Dr. Shipra was considered elaborately from the three separate opinions authored by the three learned Judges of the bench. It was found that from two opinions, it was not possible to ascertain whether there was complete absence of attestation and verification in accordance with law, even in the original affidavit filed along with the election petition or whether the defect was only in such verification and attestation being absent in the copy supplied to the returned candidate. The third opinion was referred to and it was held so in paragraph 16: "16. Thus, from the "facts" noted by Bharucha, J., it transpires that in Dr. Shipra case the "true copy" of the election petition furnished to the respondent gave an impression that the election petitioner's affidavit supporting his allegations of corrupt practise had not been duly sworn and verified by the election petitioner before the Notary, who also had not attested the same thereby rendering that document as "no affidavit" at all in the eye of the law. The defect found in the "true copy" of the affidavit, was thus, not merely the absence of the name of the Notary or his seal and stamp but a complete absence of "notarial endorsement" of the verification as well as absence of an "affirmation" or "oath" by the election petitioner. It was in that context that the Bench had found in Dr. It was in that context that the Bench had found in Dr. Shipra case that the returned candidate would have got the impression, on a perusal of the "true copy" of the affidavit, that there was no duly sworn and verified affidavit fried in support of the allegations of corrupt practise by the election petitioner. It was precisely an account of this "fatal" defect that K. Ramaswamy.J. opined that "the principle of substantial compliance cannot be accepted in the fact situation". (emphasis supplied) 30. Dr. Shipra was distinguished and the decision was held to be one rendered on the fact situation existing there. The facts in T.M. Jacob and the objection raised was found to be quite distinctive, where the defect was only in the copy of the affidavit supplied to the returned candidate. The copy though contained the endorsement that the affidavit had been duly affirmed, signed and verified by the election petitioner before a Notary, what was missing was the name and address of the Notary as well as the stamp and seal of the Notary before whom the affidavit had been so affirmed and who had attested the affidavit (para 21). The principle indicated in Dr. Shipra was held to be confined to the facts and circumstances of that case and not capable of general application divorced from the fact situation of a given case (para 25). However, even the Constitution Bench held the principle to be applicable in the facts of that case; which was the absence of a proper attestation in the original affidavit accompanying the election petition. Herein also an identical fact situation arise; for reason of the affidavit under R.94-A, in Form 25 not being attested by either a Magistrate of the First Class or a Notary or a Commissioner of Oath. There was hence no affidavit in the eye of law as noticed in the above extract. 31. This Court is not convinced that in the present case the defect noticed by the Registry and on which considerable arguments were addressed, is a curable defect. The affidavit in Form 25, under R.94-A of the Election Rules, in original, was attested by an Advocate; which attestation is found to be not proper in the earlier part of this judgement. This Court is not convinced that in the present case the defect noticed by the Registry and on which considerable arguments were addressed, is a curable defect. The affidavit in Form 25, under R.94-A of the Election Rules, in original, was attested by an Advocate; which attestation is found to be not proper in the earlier part of this judgement. The defect so pointed out, is not a defect as noticed in the various binding precedents, referred to herein before, which were not so material as to warrant the dismissal of an election petition at the threshold itself. From the facts of the various decisions noticed above it is clear that the defects which were found to be curable, were in the nature of insufficiency of material particulars, the words in the verification not being the same as indicated in Form 25 of the Election Rules, the copies of the election petition not indicating the person who authenticated the affidavits and generally the form in which the affidavit was prepared not being literally and in verbatim consonance with Form 25. The defect here noticed, is not merely in the form or content and is a total absence of an affidavit, attested as provided in R.94 A of the Election Rules. It cannot be said that there is substantial compliance with the requirement under S .83 of the R.P. Act, which is the mandate and declaration in G.M. Siddeshwar also. 32. G.M. Siddeshwar 'in the concluding portion found that "the affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in compliance with the requirements of the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was not an integral part of the election petition", which is on the facts of the said case as is evident from the affidavit, which was extracted in the decision itself. As was noticed earlier in accordance with Form 25, no material facts were narrated in the affidavit and it merely, stated the petitioners status of an elector of the constituency, the election from which was challenged and also quoted the various paragraphs as being within his knowledge and partly on information. As had been already found, the present case brings forth a different situation where there is no affidavit filed along with the election petition. As had been already found, the present case brings forth a different situation where there is no affidavit filed along with the election petition. An election petition, as had been found in M. Kamalam, is one document comprising of two parts, one the petition itself and the other the affidavit under Form 25; in cases where there is an allegation of corrupt practise. On such interpretation it is to be found that the election petition was not accompanied with an affidavit and is not an election petition as required under Section 81 read with Section 83 of the R.P. Act. 33. In this context it is also to be noticed that if in the present petition the defect is held to be curable, then the petitioner would be required to file a fresh affidavit with a proper attestation made by either a Magistrate of the First Class ora Notary. In that circumstance definitely it could be executed only after an order directing such curative exercise, is made. The result of the election was declared on 19.05.2016 and the election petition was filed on 2.6.2016, i.e.,: the 45th day from the declaration, being the last day of limitation. An affidavit if directed to be filed, by an order of this Court, could only be executed and authenticated after the expiry of limitation. If such a situation arose within the period of limitation; definitely different considerations would reign. 34. Further reliance for the proposition can be usefully garnered from Ajai Arjun Singh v. Sharadendu Tiwari( (2016) 6 SCC 576 ) in which G.M. Siddeshwar was also referred to. There a preliminary objection was raised with respect to the affidavit filed being not in conformity with Form 25 of the Election Rules and the election petition not disclosing any cause of action. The High Court relying on G.M. Siddeshwar held that substantial compliance with the format is sufficient and that the defect would be curable. The learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held on facts that, the reference to G.M. Siddeshwar was irrelevant. The High Court relying on G.M. Siddeshwar held that substantial compliance with the format is sufficient and that the defect would be curable. The learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held on facts that, the reference to G.M. Siddeshwar was irrelevant. It was noticed that in response to the application filed to dismiss the election petition at the threshold, the election petitioner filed a reply in which it was specifically stated that the affidavit in Form 25 was attached at pages 394 and 395 of the election petition and it also found mention in SI.No.47-A at the index of the Election Petition. 35. Two affidavits were stated to have been filed, one in compliance with Section 83(1)(c) of the R.P. Act read with 06 R.15(4) of the C.P.C. and the other under the proviso to the aforesaid section, i.e.,: in Form 25. The second affidavit in Form 25 was stated to be available at pages 394 and 395. The direction of the High Court to file a fresh affidavit, which was filed by the election petitioner, was found to be improper especially in the context of the High Court having not examined whether in fact an affidavit under Form 25 was filed along with the election petition or not. A clarification regarding the true state of facts was called for from the High Court and it was clarified that both affidavits, under 06 R.15 and under the proviso to Section 83, were filed on the date on which the election petition was filed. There was also a contention raised that the second affidavit in Form 25 did not disclose the full signature of the Registrar as was required under the High Court Rules. The Court held so in paragraph 44.4 and 44.5: "44.4. If the existence of the second affidavit at pp.394-395 of the election petitioner is not in dispute but the question is whether the non-compliance with the rule by the Registrar is fatal to the election petition, perhaps the answer would be that "it is not". Because it is the settled proposition of law that the act or omission of the Court shall not harm any party. 44.5. But when the question is whether such an affidavit was filed along with the election petition on 20.1.2014, different considerations arise. The question whether the election petitioner filed the second affidavit is a pure question of fact. Because it is the settled proposition of law that the act or omission of the Court shall not harm any party. 44.5. But when the question is whether such an affidavit was filed along with the election petition on 20.1.2014, different considerations arise. The question whether the election petitioner filed the second affidavit is a pure question of fact. The burden of proving such a fact in law is on the election petitioner if such a question is really in issue. Because if he failed, the allegations of the commission of corrupt practices by the returned candidate cannot be adjudicated in the absence of an affidavit in Form 25. However, such a question was never in issue in Order 7 R.11 petition". (emphasis supplied) 36. In the absence of an affidavit, hence there can be no adjudication on the allegations regarding the commission of corrupt practices by the returned candidate. To direct a fresh affidavit to be filed, in the facts disclosed here; would be one sworn to and authenticated, beyond the period of limitation, which according to this Court would not be a permissible exercise. On the above conclusions arrived at by this Court; having answered both the issues raised, against the election petitioner the election petition has to be rejected at the threshold. The first two defects, noticed by the Registry are found to be curable and the petitioner is directed to pay the Court Fees of Rs. 250/- [Rupees two hundred and fifty], within two weeks from today, and the Registry shall incorporate the provision applicable to election petitions (S.80A) in the memorandum. The third defect noticed of the affidavit under Form 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, not being as prescribed under R.94 A is upheld and the election petition would stand rejected for the defect being not one curable. The amounts paid under Annexure A, as costs shall stand forfeited.