JUDGMENT : K.R. Mohapatra, J. The Defendant No.1 as appellant has filed this appeal assailing the judgment and decree dated 15.11.2006 and 29.11.2006 respectively passed by the learned 2nd Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack in C.S.(I) No.322 of 2004. 2. Case of the plaintiff (respondent No.1 herein) in brief is that one Abhina Chandra Sahoo died leaving behind his widow, three sons and four daughters (genealogy given below). Late Abhina Sahoo (1981) Late Annapurna (D-3) Chittaranjan (D-1) Sudarsan (D-2) Niranjan (plaintiff) Sabitri (D-4) Tilottoma (D-5) Manorama (D-6) Priyatama (D-7) Said Abhina was the recorded tenant in respect of suit properties out of which Schedule ‘A’ property was his self-acquired property and Schedule ‘B’ property was his ancestral property. During his life time, Abhina had decided to divide the suit property by giving 1/4th share to each of his sons namely, plaintiff as well as defendant Nos.1 and 2. The daughters of Abhina, namely, defendants 4 to 7 had relinquished their share in the suit property. Defendants 1 and 2 were managing the business of Abhina. After death of Abhina in the year 1981, the plaintiff on 16.08.2004 requested defendants for an amicable partition of the suit property to which they denied. Hence, the suit was filed for partition. 3. Defendant Nos.5 and 7 were set ex parte vide order dated 25.02.2005. Defendant No.1-appellant filed his written statement challenging the maintainability of the suit. He contended that there was an amicable partition in the family in the year 1977 during the life time of Abhina. As per the said partition, defendant No.3 (widow of Abhina) was only entitled to right of residence till her death. Defendant No.1 separated himself from the joint family and was residing over ‘B’ schedule property by constructing a house thereon. Defendant No.1, however, denied that daughters of Abhina, i.e., defendants 4 to 7, had relinquished their share in the suit property. He also denied that the plaintiff had ever approached him for partition. As there was prior partition in the year 1977, the plaintiff had no cause of action to file the suit. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the same. The defendant No.2 though admitted in his written statement that schedule ‘A’ property is self-acquired property of Abhina, he denied that his sisters (defendants 5 to 7) had ever relinquished their share in the suit property. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the same. The defendant No.2 though admitted in his written statement that schedule ‘A’ property is self-acquired property of Abhina, he denied that his sisters (defendants 5 to 7) had ever relinquished their share in the suit property. Defendant No.2 in his written statement contended that as per the partition, the defendant No.8 is entitled Ac.0.023 decimals of land as recorded in the Settlement ROR. He also claimed to have renovated the house in which he has been residing with his family members. He denied all other allegations made in the plaint and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The defendants 3 and 4 adopted the written statement filed by defendant No.2. 5. Defendant No.6 (one of the daughters of Abhina) filed her written statement challenging the maintainability of the suit. She contended that her brothers misappropriated all the movables and immovables left by her father. The suit properties were the undivided joint family properties of the family. There were some houses existing over ‘B’ schedule property let out to different tenants and the defendant No.1 was appropriating rent therefrom. She further denied that there was any amicable partition during life time of said Abhina and she along with her sisters relinquished their shares in respect of the suit properties. Thus, she prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. Defendant No.8, the son of late Rama Chandra Sahoo, (brother of Abhina), filed his written statement claiming Ac.0.023 decimals over Plot No.720 under Khata No.386, which was recorded in the name of his father in the Settlement ROR and he claimed to have been in possession over the same. Defendant No.8 claimed to allot said plot in his name along with his legitimate share in the rest of the suit schedule property. He in his written statement denied that the daughters of Abhina had ever relinquished their share over the suit property and the plaintiff had approached them for partition. Thus, he prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. Taking into consideration the rival contentions of the parties, learned Trial Court framed as many as nine issues, which are as follows:- (i) Whether the suit is maintainable? (ii) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (iii) Whether there was an amicable partition of the suit property between the parties during the life time of Abhina Sahoo? 7. Taking into consideration the rival contentions of the parties, learned Trial Court framed as many as nine issues, which are as follows:- (i) Whether the suit is maintainable? (ii) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (iii) Whether there was an amicable partition of the suit property between the parties during the life time of Abhina Sahoo? (iv) Whether the daughters (Defendants Nos.4 to 7) have relinquished their share in the suit property? (v) Whether the Defendant No.1 has constructed house over the ‘B’ schedule property out of his own income and has been enjoying it exclusively? (vi) Whether the Defendant No.2 has renovated the suit house under his occupation by his own expenditure? (vii) Whether the properties as mentioned in the suit are liable to be partitioned; and if so, to what share each party is entitled to the suit schedule property? (viii) Whether Braj Sahu, the defendant No.8 is entitled to Ac.0.023 decimal of land out of the Khata No.386? (ix) To what other reliefs the plaintiff is entitled? 8. In order to substantiate their case, the plaintiff examined two witnesses including himself as P.W.1 and exhibited two documents, i.e., certified copy of R.O.R. in respect of Khata No.386 (Ext.1) and certified copy of R.O.R. in respect of Khata No.206 (Ext.2). The defendant No.1 examined himself as D.W.1. He also examined D.Ws. 2 and 3 in support of his case. Defendant No.2 examined himself as D.W.4 and defendant No.6 examined herself as D.W.5 in support of their respective cases. They exhibited certain documents in support of their respective cases. 9. Learned Trial Court while answering Issue Nos. (iii) and (iv), came to a finding that there was no amicable partition between the parties and the daughters of Abhina had never relinquished their share in respect of suit properties. While answering Issue Nos. (v) and (vi), learned trial Court came to a finding that the house over the ‘B’ schedule property in which Chitta (defendant No.1) was residing had been constructed by his father, Abhina, but the 1st and 2nd floor of the said building have been constructed by defendant No.1. Defendant No.2-Sudarsan had made some renovation of the said house. Thus, he concluded that defendants 1 and 2 had made substantial improvement of the parental house at their own expenses. While answering Issue Nos. Defendant No.2-Sudarsan had made some renovation of the said house. Thus, he concluded that defendants 1 and 2 had made substantial improvement of the parental house at their own expenses. While answering Issue Nos. (vii) and (viii), learned trial Court held that the widow, sons and the daughters of late Abhina are entitled to 1/8th share each in the schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties. It was further directed that while effecting partition, the improvements made by Chitta (defendant No.1) and Sudarsan (defendant No.2) in ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties should not be included in the partition of the suit properties. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. The defendant No.1 being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree has filed this appeal. 10. Heard Mr.Pramod Kumar Routray, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.B.Muduli, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr.B.Bhuyan, learned counsel for respondent No.6. At the initial stage of the suit, though there was some dispute as to whether ‘A’ or ‘B’ schedule properties were the ancestral properties, the finding of learned Civil Judge to the effect that ‘A’ schedule property is the ancestral property and ‘B’ schedule property is the self-acquired property of Abhina, was not challenged by any of the parties to this appeal. Hence, it is held that ‘A’ schedule property is the ancestral property and ‘B’ schedule is the self-acquired property of Abhina. 11. There is no dispute with regard to partition of Schedule ‘B’ property as it was the self-acquired property of Abhina, who died in the year 1981 after coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act’). The dispute is with regard to allotment of share in Schedule ‘A’ property, which was the ancestral property. 12. Mr.Routray contended that Abhina died in the year 1981 leaving behind Class-1 female relatives, such as, widow and daughters. Thus, proviso to Section 6 of the Act is to be made applicable. At the time of death of Abhina, the coparcenary consisted of Abhina and his three sons. Thus, the coparceners were entitled to 1/4th share each. After the death of Abhina, his 1/4th share in the coparcenary is to be divided equally between his sons, daughters and the widow. Thus, each of them would get 1/32nd share from the share of Abhina. During pendency of the appeal, the widow of Abhina, namely, respondent No.3 died on 10.04.2007. Thus, the coparceners were entitled to 1/4th share each. After the death of Abhina, his 1/4th share in the coparcenary is to be divided equally between his sons, daughters and the widow. Thus, each of them would get 1/32nd share from the share of Abhina. During pendency of the appeal, the widow of Abhina, namely, respondent No.3 died on 10.04.2007. Accordingly, her name was deleted from the cause title as her legal heirs were already on record. However, upon death of the widow of Abhina, her 1/32nd interest in the coparcenary property should be equally divided among her sons and daughters, which comes to (1/32nd x 1/7th)=1/224th share each. Accordingly, the sons of Abhina, the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 2 would get (1/4th + 1/32nd + 1/224th equal to) 2/7th share each in the ancestral property. Likewise, the share of each of the daughters, namely, defendants 4, 5, 6 and 7 would be (1/32nd + 1/224th=) 1/28th share each in the ancestral property. Thus, he prayed for modification of the decree to the aforesaid extent. 13. Mr.Bhuyan, learned counsel for respondent No.6, namely, Manorama (defendant No.6) submitted that there is no confusion with regard to interpretation of Section 6 of the Act. Abhina having died leaving behind his widow (specified in Clause-1 of the schedule), the interest of deceased-Abhina in the Mitakshyara coparcenary property shall devolve by succession and not by survivorship. Further, Abhina shall be deemed to have a share in the coparcenary property that would have been allotted to him had partition of the property taken place immediately before his death. Thus, the words and language employed under Section 6 makes it abundantly clear that devolution of interest in the coparcenary property shall be determined by notional partition. In that view of the matter, Article-315 of Mullas Hindu Law shall have relevance in the case at hand, which reads as follows:- “315: Wife-(1) A wife cannot herself demand a partition, but if a partition does take place between her husband and his sons, she is entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her husband. Where at a partition between a father and his three sons, the wife was not allotted a share, it was held that she was entitled to reopen the partition, there being no waiver merely by her not asking for a share but that in the partition the value of the ornaments taken by her must be taken into account” So, while effecting a notional partition, the widow of Abhina has a share in the property; accordingly, Abhina, his widow and three sons would have 1/5th share each in the coparcenary. On the death of Abhina, his 1/5th share would devolve upon his widow and children and each of them would be entitled to (1/5th ÷ 8=) 1/40th share (See provisions under Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act). Thus, the widow and all the sons of Abhina shall be entitled to (1/40th +1/5th=) 9/40th share each in schedule ‘A’ property. Likewise, each of the daughters would be entitled to 1/40th share in the ‘A’ Schedule property. In the meantime, widow of Abhina has died; thus, her interest would devolve upon all her children equally which would be (9/40th ÷ 7=) 9/280th. In the process, each of the sons would be entitled to (9/40th + 9/280th =) 9/35th and each of the daughters would be entitled to (1/40th + 9/280th=) 2/35th. It is his submission that Section 4 of the Act will have no application to the case at hand for the reason that to give effect to a notional partition, Article -315 of Mulla’s Hindu Law has to be taken into consideration. In support of his case, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum vs Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and Ors., reported in AIR 1978 SC 1239 , wherein at paragraph-9, it has been held as under:- “9. The next step, equally important though not equally easy to work out, is to find out the share which the deceased had in the coparcenary property because after all, the plaintiff has a 1/6th interest in that share. The next step, equally important though not equally easy to work out, is to find out the share which the deceased had in the coparcenary property because after all, the plaintiff has a 1/6th interest in that share. Explanation 1 which contains the formula for determining the share of the deceased creates a fiction by providing that the interest of a Hindu Mistakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death. One must, therefore, imagine a state of affairs in which a little prior to Khandappa's death, a partition of the coparcenary property was effected between him and other members of the coparcenary. Though the plaintiff, not being a coparcener, was not entitled to demand partition yet, if a partition were to take place between her husband and his two sons, she would be entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son. (see Mulla's Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, para 315). In a partition between Khandappa and his two sons, there would be four sharers in the coparcenary property, the fourth being Khandappa's wife, the plaintiff. Khandappa would have therefore got a 1/4th share in the coparcenary property on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and, his sons.” Thus, he prayed for modification of the decree accordingly. 14. Mr. Muduli, learned counsel for respondent No.2 (defendant No.2) contended that under Mitakshyar School of Hindu Law, every coparcener has right to claim for partition. No female had the right to claim for partition, but a female in the Hindu coparcenary family is entitled to a share as per law, if partition takes place. He contended that after coming into force of the Act with effect from 17.06.1956 and by operation of Section 4 thereof, any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision has been made in this Act. According to him, Section 6 of the Act provides that when a male Hindu dies after commencement of the Act, having at the time of his death an interest in the coparcenary property, his interest shall devolve by survivorship upon surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Proviso to the said Section envisages, if the coparcener dies leaving behind a female relative of Class-1 heirs or a male relative specified in that class claiming his share through such female relative in the undivided interest of the deceased coparcener, it will not devolve by survivorship, but by succession. Mr.Muduli further submitted that thus in case of death of a coparcener leaving behind a female class-1 heir in the joint family, the interest of the members of the joint family in the coparcenary property shall be determined by notional partition, which is a fictional one. Explanation-1 to Section 6 of the Act further envisages that the interest in the coparcenary shall be determined by allotting a share to the coparcener assuming that he is alive irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Notional partition is not a real one. It does not effect severance of status. This theory is used only to determine the interest of the deceased coparcener in the coparcenary property on the date of his death. Subsequent fluctuation in the interest of the coparcenary does not affect the same. Thus, Mr. Muduli submitted that Abhina Sahoo had 1/4th share in the Mitakshyar coparcenary property, i.e., schedule-‘A’ property. Since no partition had taken place prior to commencement of Act, 1956, Section 4 of the Act will come into play which has an overriding effect over any text, rule or interpretation of any new law or usage which was in force immediately before commencement of the Act, 1956. It is his submission that Article 315 of Hindu Law has no application to the case at hand. Thus, Abhina had 1/4th share in the Coparcenary (Schedule-A) at the time of his death. After his death, his interest would be divided amongst his widow, three sons and four daughters each of whom will have 1/32nd share in the interest of Abhina. The widow of Abhina having died in the meantime, her 1/32nd interest in the suit property would devolve upon the children which would come to (1/32nd x 1/7th=) 1/224th. After his death, his interest would be divided amongst his widow, three sons and four daughters each of whom will have 1/32nd share in the interest of Abhina. The widow of Abhina having died in the meantime, her 1/32nd interest in the suit property would devolve upon the children which would come to (1/32nd x 1/7th=) 1/224th. Thus, each son will have 2/7th share and each daughter would be entitled to 1/28th share in ‘A’ schedule property. He further submitted that since common ancestor/Abhina died in the year 1981, amending provision of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 has no application to the suit. He, thus prayed for modification of the decree accordingly. 15. Let me analyze the contentions of learned counsel for the parties. The amended provision of Section 6 of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into effect on 5th September, 2016. In the case of Prakash and others Vs. Phulavati and others, reported in 2015 (II) OLR (SC) 1010, Hon’ble Supreme Court, on the applicability of amended provision of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, to the daughter of a coparcener, held as under:- “23. Accordingly, we hold that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Disposition or alienation including partitions which may have taken place before 20th December, 2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. Any transaction of partition effected thereafter will be governed by the Explanation.” (emphasis supplied) The succession of a property cannot be kept in abeyance. It opens on the death of a coparcener. Thus, succession in respect of Schedule-‘A’ property has already opened on the death of Abhina, the coparcener. In view of the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash (supra), amended provision of Section-6 has no application to the case at hand, wherein the daughters are treated to be the coparceners. Accordingly, Section-6, as it was prior to commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, shall be made applicable. Further, the provisions of Section-6, more particularly proviso to Explanation-1 of Section 6 and the ratio decided in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra), it can be safely said that Article 315 of Hindu Law has a relevance for determination of the interest and share of the children of Abhina. Further, the provisions of Section-6, more particularly proviso to Explanation-1 of Section 6 and the ratio decided in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra), it can be safely said that Article 315 of Hindu Law has a relevance for determination of the interest and share of the children of Abhina. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as it was before Amendment Act, 2005 came into force, reads as follows: “6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.-When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left surviving him a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2.-Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein.” Abhina had three sons, namely, plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2. All of them had equal share in the coparcenary (Schedule ‘A’). Abhina died in the year 1981, leaving behind his widow, Annapurna (defendant no.3), three sons and four daughters (defendant Nos. 4 to 7). As the Amendment Act, 2005 has no application to the case at hand, the daughter will only be entitled to the share of Abhina (their father) and that of the mother, if any, as an heir and not as a coparcener in the coparcenary (see proviso to Section 6). Interest of Abhina has to be determined taking into consideration the Explanation1 to Section 6. Interest of Abhina has to be determined taking into consideration the Explanation1 to Section 6. The interest would be as much as it would have been in the coparcenary, had a partition taken place immediately prior to his (coparcener’s) death. To determine the same, a notional partition has to be worked out, which is a fictional one. Article 315 of Hindu Law (quoted supra) makes it abundantly clear that Annapurna (the wife of Abhina, a coparcener) has a share equal to that of her son in the coparcenary. Thus, Abhina, Annapurna (Defendant No.3) and the sons (plaintiff as well as defendant Nos. 1 and 2) would have 1/5th share each the coparcenary (see Gurupad Khandappa’s case supra). On the death of Abhina his interest in the coparcenary will devolve upon plaintiff and defendants namely, the widow and 7 (seven) children equally. Thus, widow as well as sons would have 1/5th + (1/5th X 1/8th)=, i.e., 9/40th share each, whereas each of the daughters would have 1/5th ÷ 1/8th, i.e., 1/40th share in Schedule ‘A’ property. Again on the death of defendant No.3 (the widow), her share in Schedule ‘A’ property will be divided equally amongst her children. Thus, each of sons will get 9/40th + (9/40th x 1/7th), i.e., 9/35th share whereas, each of the daughters will receive 1/40th + (9th/40th x 1/7th), i.e., 2/35th share in the Schedule ‘A’ property. In view of the discussions made above, the argument advanced by Mr.Bhuyan is preferred than that of Mr.Routray and Mr.Muduli and the arguments and procedure adopted by Mr.Bhuyan for devolution of interest in the coparcenary (schedule-A) is accepted. 16. Learned Civil Judge while answering issue Nos. (v) and (vi), came to a conclusion that defendant No.1 had constructed 1st and 2nd floor of the house situated over Schedule-‘B’ property, where he is residing. Further, defendant No.2 had made some renovation of the house over the Schedule-‘A’ property. Thus, he directed not to include the improvements made by Chitta and Sudarsana, defendant Nos.1 and 2 respectively, while effecting partition. Defendant No.1, in his written statement, averred that in the year, 1978, he had constructed a house over Plot No.309 (Schedule-B) and has been residing with his family members therein. He was examined as DW-1. Thus, he directed not to include the improvements made by Chitta and Sudarsana, defendant Nos.1 and 2 respectively, while effecting partition. Defendant No.1, in his written statement, averred that in the year, 1978, he had constructed a house over Plot No.309 (Schedule-B) and has been residing with his family members therein. He was examined as DW-1. In his evidence, he has stated that he left the ancestral house situated over Schedule-‘A’ property since 1969 and had been residing in the house situated over ‘B’ schedule property on instruction of his father. The said statement is supported by statement of DW-4, who deposed that, Chitta after his marriage, had been residing over ‘B’ schedule property. PWs-1 and 5 also corroborated the same. It is also the evidence of DW-4 that at the time of occupation of house situated over Schedule-‘B’ property by Chitta, it was a single storied building. There is also ample evidence on record to show that at the time of his marriage, Chitta had no separate business; thus, the only conclusion that could be drawn in this case is that Chitta had not constructed the ground floor of the house standing over ‘B’ schedule property and the same was constructed by his father, Abhina. DWs-2, 3 and 4 stated in their evidence that Chitta had constructed the 1st and 2nd floor of the house standing over ‘B’ schedule property. Ext.A, i.e., approved building plan of Schedule-B property; Ext.A/1, permission letter; Ext.E, electricity connection estimate; Ext.F, receipt showing electricity connection; Ext.B series electric charges receipts; Ext.C series and Ext.D series, such as receipts of payment of water tax and municipal tax etc. go to show that defendant No.1 had constructed the 1st and 2nd floor of the house situated over ‘B’ schedule property. Ext.G, the sales tax registration certificate; Ext.H, the certificate for cement dealership and Ext.J, i.e., letter of appointment of defendant No.1 as retailer of essential commodities go to show that he has constructed the 1st and 2nd floor of the house with his own income. Thus, there can be no confusion that defendant No.1 had constructed the 1st and 2nd floor of the house standing over Schedule-B property. Similarly, Sudarsana (defendant No.2) claimed to have renovated the parental house situated over ‘A’ schedule property, and the same is also admitted by the plaintiff. Thus, there can be no confusion that defendant No.1 had constructed the 1st and 2nd floor of the house standing over Schedule-B property. Similarly, Sudarsana (defendant No.2) claimed to have renovated the parental house situated over ‘A’ schedule property, and the same is also admitted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in his evidence in clear term deposed that he had raised dispute when defendant No.2 took up renovation of the ancestral house situated over ‘A’ schedule property. It is trite to say that the renovation/improvements made over the ancestral property by a member of the Hindu joint family out of his own income can be claimed to be his separate property unless the same is shown to have been made from joint family nucleus. In the case at hand, there is no dispute to the fact that defendant Nos.1 and 2 made construction over Schedule-‘B’ and ‘A’ properties respectively with their own income. Mr. Bhuyan raised objection with regard to findings arrived at by the learned Trial Court while answering issue Nos. (v) and (vi). In view of the discussions made above, contention raised by Mr.Bhuyan has no substance. Apart from the above, no dispute was raised to the finding arrived at by learned Civil Judge with regard to any other issues. 17. In view of the above, this Court modify the finding arrived at by the learned Civil Judge with regard to issue Nos. (vii) and (viii) to the effect that the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to 9/35th share each and defendants 3, 4, 5 and 7 are entitled to 2/35th share each in schedule ‘A’ property. The conclusion of learned Civil Judge to the effect that pond and its ridge bearing plot Nos. 397 and 398 under Khata No.206 of Unit-12, Cuttack Sadar is not to be physically divided between the parties, is set aside, inasmuch as no evidence of either of the parties claimed to be a pond nor there is any evidence to that effect on record. The plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 as well as defendants 4 to 7 are entitled to 1/7th share each in ‘B’ schedule property, as the same is admittedly the self-acquired property of Abhina, the common ancestor and defendant No.3 has expired in the meantime. 18. This appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 as well as defendants 4 to 7 are entitled to 1/7th share each in ‘B’ schedule property, as the same is admittedly the self-acquired property of Abhina, the common ancestor and defendant No.3 has expired in the meantime. 18. This appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. Judgment and decree is modified accordingly, but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.