JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. This petition has been filed against the judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Solan in case No. 1FTC/10 of 2008 dated 19.6.2008 vide which, the appellate Court has allowed the appeal filed by the present respondent against the order of conviction passed by the Court of learned JMIC, Kandaghat, Camp at Solan, HP in Criminal Case No. 5/3 of 2007/2004 dated 5.12.2007 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter to be referred as the ‘Act’). 2. Facts of the case in brief are that a complaint was filed by respondent alleging therein that he and accused were related to each other and accused deals in the business of timber and is also a forest contractor. The accused, who is also a forest contractor asked for money from the complainant for discharging his liabilities qua payments to be made to the labourers and also for the purpose of marriage of his daughter. On this count, the complainant on various dates advanced an amount of Rs. 2.50 lacs to the accused. Thereafter to discharge his liability, the accused issued a cheque dated 1.7.2003 in his favour for an amount of Rs. 2.50 lacs i.e. cheque No. 715854 drawn on State Bank of India, Solan Branch. When the complainant presented this cheque in bankers account, the same was dishonoured vide memo dated 8.9.2003 on the ground of ‘insufficient funds’. Accordingly, the complainant issued a legal notice to the accused dated 12.9.2003 vide registered post as well as UPC. Though this notice was received by the accused, but he did not make any payment to him. Therefore, as he had committed an offence punishable under the Act, a complaint was filed. 3. Notice of accusation under Section 138 of the Act was put to the accused but he denied the same. Trial was held and thereafter the learned trial court vide its judgment dated 5.12.2007 found the accused guilty of offence under Section 138 of the Act. 4. Feeling aggrieved against the conviction and sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was allowed by the learned appellate Court, vide its judgment dated 19.6.2008. Against the said judgment, the present petition has been preferred by the complainant. 5. 4. Feeling aggrieved against the conviction and sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was allowed by the learned appellate Court, vide its judgment dated 19.6.2008. Against the said judgment, the present petition has been preferred by the complainant. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 6. Before the learned trial Court, complainant produced three witnesses. He entered into the witness box as CW-1 and reiterated the contents as were mentioned in the complaint filed by him. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the accused was “JETH” of his “BHANJI”. He denied in his cross-examination that he and accused-Rajinder Singh used to do the work of extraction of ‘BIROJA’ in partnership with Forest Corporation. Further in his cross-examination, he has denied that there was a joint account of contractor-ship. However, he has stated that there was “LENDEN” between him and the accused. He has admitted existence of Pronote and receipt for Rs. 1.50 lacs dated 4.4.2001. He has denied that the cheque book of the accused was with him in good faith and the same had been misused by him. 7. CW-2 is an official witness of the Joginder Central Cooperative Bank, Solan. CW-3 is also an official witness of the State Bank of India. 8. Accused, Ravinder Singh, has appeared in the witness-box as DW-1. He has stated that in the year 2000-2001 he was engaged in business of extraction of Biroja from trees from the land of private owners Shyam Lal he was engaged in the extraction of Biroja from Government Forest land. In the above said work, there was partnership between him and the complainant and they used to do this work together. For the said purpose, they had engaged 6-7 persons, who belonged to district Kangra. The work was commenced in March, 2001 and continued till November, 2001. Thereafter, accounts of the persons engaged were settled and the final settlement was done at the house of Shyam Lal in November, 2001. Thereafter, the accounts between him and complainant were settled in 2002 because certain payments were still due from Forest Corporation. As per him, he never borrowed any money from Shyam Lal. Till the time the business was collective, his cheque book used to be with Shyam Lal and other documents also were with Shyam Lal. Thereafter, the accounts between him and complainant were settled in 2002 because certain payments were still due from Forest Corporation. As per him, he never borrowed any money from Shyam Lal. Till the time the business was collective, his cheque book used to be with Shyam Lal and other documents also were with Shyam Lal. Even after the settlement of the accounts, the cheque book which contained certain cheques, on which the signatures of the accused were there, remained with Shyam Lal. As per him, even at the time of his deposition the said cheque book was with Shyam Lal. He has further deposed that when the accounts were settled between them, nothing was due towards each other. He has further denied that he was liable to pay any money to the accused on any account. He further stated that a false case had been made against him because Shyam Lal wanted to extract money from him. Incidentally in his cross-examination, he has mentioned that “Yeh galat hai ki hum jo kaam karte the uski likha padhi hoti thi. Sanjhedari ka koi kagjaat na bana tha. Khud kaha Shymal Lal ne pehle kagaz banwane ko kaha tha.” The very fact that a suggestion was given to the accused by the complainant that there used to be “Likhapadhi” of the work that they used to do together belies the story of the complainant that there was no business relation between him and the accused. 9. Bikram Chand has appeared as DW-2 and he has mentioned that he was employed with the accused and the complainant in the year 2001-2002 in the work of extraction of Biroja. He has also stated that their final accounts were settled in the house of Shyam lal. He has denied the suggestion that in the year 2001-2002 he was engaged by accused-Ravinder Singh and has self stated that he was engaged both by accused and the complainant because they used to work in partnership. He has further denied the suggestion that he used to be paid by the accused and has self stated that payments were made by Shyam Lal. 10. He has further denied the suggestion that he used to be paid by the accused and has self stated that payments were made by Shyam Lal. 10. On the above facts and on the basis of the material on record, the learned trial Court concluded that all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act stood proved by the complainant by way of oral as well as documentary evidence and the accused had failed to rebut the presumption that no cheque was issued to discharge the liability. The learned trial Court further held that accused had admitted his debt or liability during the course of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. On these bases, the learned trial Court convicted the accused and also sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the Court under Section 138 of the Act and the accused was further directed under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. to grant compensation of Rs. 2.60 lacs to the complainant. 11. The learned appellate Court set aside the conviction and sentence by holding that presumption attached under Section 138 of the Act is a rebuttable one and in the present case defence evidence proved that there appeared to be a partnership business between the parties and further they were closely related to each other and that accused had not taken any loan from the complainant. On the basis of the said evidence, as per the learned appellate Court, it was incumbent upon the complainant to have led evidence to show positively that he had advanced an amount of Rs. 2.50 lacs from the complainant but this evidence was lacking. The learned appellate Court further held that the complainant had admitted that he was in possession of Pronote and receipt evidencing payment of Rs. 1.50 lacs. On these bases, the learned appellate Court concluded that an accused can be convicted only when a case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of legally admissible evidence and in the circumstances of the case the judgment passed by the learned trial Court convicting the accused under Section 138 of the Act cannot be justified and accordingly the same was ordered to be set aside. 12. Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the judgment passed by learned appellate Court is liable to be set aside because it has totally misread and misappreciated the provision of Section 139 of the Act. 12. Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the judgment passed by learned appellate Court is liable to be set aside because it has totally misread and misappreciated the provision of Section 139 of the Act. Mr. Verma has argued that under the provision of Section 139 of the Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to under Section 138 of the Act for the discharge wholly or part or any debt or other liability. According to him, the accused had not disputed his signature on the cheque in issue. Further as per him, the complainant had placed sufficient material on record to demonstrate that the cheque in fact was issued by the accused to him in discharge of his liability. He has further argued that the accused was not able to rebut the presumption as is contemplated in Section 139 of the Act. 13. On the other hand Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the learned appellate Court has rightly set aside the conviction and sentence imposed upon the respondent by the learned trial Court because no cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant in discharge of any alleged liability and in fact the complainant had misused the signed cheque book of the accused which was lying with the complainant. He has further argued that the complainant has not produced on record even an iota of evidence to suggest that at any stage any money was given by him to the accused in the discharge of his liability, the accused had in fact issued the cheque. Thus, he contended that the presumption of Section 139 of the Act has to be seen in totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and not in isolation, as is being urged by the complainant. 14. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients:- (a) that there is a legally and enforceable debt; (b) that the cheque was drawn from the account of bank for discharging of his liability in wholly or in part or any debt or any other liability which presupposes legally and enforceable debt; and (c) that the cheque so issued has been returned due to insufficiency of funds. 15. 15. The proviso which is appended with Section 138 of the Act further provides for compliance with legal requirements before a complaint can be acted upon by a Court of law. 16. Section 139 of the Act raises a presumption with regard to the second aspect of the matter. Existence of a legally recoverable debt is a matter of presumption under Section 139 of the Act, which raises a presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability. 17. But even then the prosecution must prove the guilt of accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It is settled law that the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of the accused is “preponderance of probabilities”. Inference of “preponderance of probabilities” can be drawn not only from the material brought on record by the party but also by reference to the circumstances upon which the accused relies. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 16 has held as under:- “22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the court “shall presume” the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, as noted in state of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer it is obligatory on the court to raise this presumption had been established. “It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused.” (Ibid. at p.65, para 14.) Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court “may presume” a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. 23. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. 23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, “after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.” Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonable probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the “prudent man”. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 Supreme Court Cases 441 has held as under:- “26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. 27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. 27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. 28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his own/her own.” 20. When the said principles of law are applied to the facts of the present case, then the reasonable conclusion which can be drawn is one, which has been arrived at by the learned appellate Court. 21. In my considered view, the complainant has miserably failed to produce even an iota of material on record to demonstrate and substantiate that there was any existing liability of the accused towards him and in lieu of discharge of the said liability, a cheque was indeed issued by the accused in his favour. 21. In my considered view, the complainant has miserably failed to produce even an iota of material on record to demonstrate and substantiate that there was any existing liability of the accused towards him and in lieu of discharge of the said liability, a cheque was indeed issued by the accused in his favour. On the other hand, material produced on record by the respondent gives rise to “preponderance of probability” to the effect that there were business relations between the complainant and the accused and in lieu of the said business relations, the complainant was in possession of signed cheque book of the accused. The factum of business relations between the complainant and the accused can also be borne out from the cross-examination of the accused himself, as has already been discussed by me in the above paras of the judgment. 22. Thus in my view there is no infirmity with the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court. It cannot be said that any material particular has been overlooked by the learned Appellate Court. There is no perversity in the findings arrived at by the learned appellate Court. 23. It is well settled law that the jurisdiction of High Court in revision is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon re–appreciation of evidence. The High Court in revision cannot in absence of error on a point of law, re-appreciate evidence and reverse a finding of law. 24. It is settled law that the object of the revisional jurisdiction was to confer power upon superior criminal Courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. 25. Thus, it can be safely inferred that this Court has to exercise its revisional powers sparingly. Though, this Court is not required to act as a Court of appeal, however, at the same time it is the duty of the Court to correct manifest illegality resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. However, I do not find any manifest illegality with the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court in the present case. 26. Though, this Court is not required to act as a Court of appeal, however, at the same time it is the duty of the Court to correct manifest illegality resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. However, I do not find any manifest illegality with the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court in the present case. 26. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that there is neither any infirmity nor any perversity with the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court, hence the present petition is accordingly dismissed.