JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. M.H. Laskar, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. T.C. Chutia, learned State counsel, appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 5, Mr. K.H. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent No.6 and Mr. S.K. Muktar, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 9. Despite service of notice, the other respondents have not entered appearance. 2. As agreed to by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for disposal at the admission stage itself. 3. Challenge in this writ petition is to a resolution adopted in a special meeting held on 02.06.2014 expressing no confidence against the petitioner, who was the President of 59 No. Mukalmua Narayanpur Gaon Panchayat. 6(six) members of the Gaon Panchayat submitted a requisition to the petitioner on 20.02.2014 requesting the petitioner to convene a special meeting for the purpose of consideration of the no confidence motion. There is no dispute that the petitioner received the requisition. 4. Having regard to the arguments advanced by Mr. Laskar, this Court does not consider it necessary to burden this order with details of the events that had occurred culminating in the no confidence motion being passed against the petitioner. Suffice it to say that the Gaon Panchayat and the Anchalik Panchayat did not hold the special meeting for considering the no confidence motion as enjoined by Section 15 of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 (for short, “the Act”). On the failure of the Anchalik Panchayat, the Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat referred the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Nalbari vide his letter dated 28.03.2014. Till this point of time, the parties are not in issue. 5. Mr. Laskar has submitted that once the matter is referred to the Deputy Commissioner by the Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat, the Deputy Commissioner/Sub-Divisional Officer has to convene a special meeting within 7(seven) days from the date of receipt of the information, as mandated by Section 15(1) of the Act. Not only that, the Deputy Commissioner and/or the Sub-Divisional Officer are the only persons who have been authorized under the Act to convene the special meeting. It is submitted by him that in the instant case, special meeting was convened by the Additional Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, the very convening of the special meeting is illegal. Not only that, the Deputy Commissioner and/or the Sub-Divisional Officer are the only persons who have been authorized under the Act to convene the special meeting. It is submitted by him that in the instant case, special meeting was convened by the Additional Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, the very convening of the special meeting is illegal. That apart, notice was issued after a long hibernation of more than 2(two) months on 29.05.2014 fixing the date of meeting on 02.06.2014. Therefore, he contends that on the aforesaid 2(two) counts, the resolution adopted in the meeting held on 02.06.2014 expressing no confidence against the petitioner cannot receive judicial imprimatur and has to be annulled as non-est in law. To buttress his contention, Mr. Laskar has placed before this Court a judgment of this Court dated 07.12.2015 (Anowara Begum -Vs- State of Assam & Ors.) as well as a Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in the case of Forhana Begum Laskar -Vs- State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2009 (3) GLT 575. 6. Countering the submission of Mr. Laskar, Mr. Choudhury has submitted that because of general elections there was some delay on the part of the Deputy Commissioner to hold the special meeting. He has submitted that fixation of time under the Act is directory in nature as had been held by this Court in Mosira Bibi -Vs- State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2006 (4) GLT 460. Further submission of Mr. Choudhury is that the Additional Deputy Commissioner is a superior authority than the Sub-Divisional Officer and, therefore, the expression ‘Deputy Commissioner’ would take within its fold the post of Additional Deputy Commissioner because it cannot be comprehended that while permitting a lower authority to convene a special meeting, legislature had intended that a superior authority should not exercise that power. In support of his submission, he has relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ammini & Ors. -Vs- State of Kerala, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 301. 7. Mr. Chutia and Mr. Mukhtar have endorsed the submissions advanced by Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.6. 8. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 9. -Vs- State of Kerala, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 301. 7. Mr. Chutia and Mr. Mukhtar have endorsed the submissions advanced by Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.6. 8. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 9. In Mosira Bibi (supra), the Division Bench had held that the time schedule under the Act to be adhered to by different authorities in convening such meeting is procedural in nature and such provision prescribing time schedule cannot be held to be as mandatory as it would defeat the very purpose and object of enacting such provision, because in a given case, the concerned authority may, with a view to defeat the subject of such enactment, delay initiation of such proceeding and may not adhere to such time schedule, thereby frustrating the very purpose for which such enactment is made. 10. In Forhana Begum Laskar (supra), the Full Bench had observed that each and every departure from the procedure and the time schedule contained therein would not impair the exercise so as to decisively annihilate the same. It also noted the observation of a Division Bench judgment in Mumtaz Rana Laskar & Ors. -Vs- State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2006 (1) GLT 46, that it is impermissible to lay down any general rule for determining as to whether a provision is mandatory or directory. 11. If actions as contemplated under Section 15(1) is sought to be taken before the time schedule prescribed under the Act and a special meeting is sought to be convened before the period as specified under Section 15 of the Act, the same may be held to be running counter to the mandate of the Act and in that context, the time prescribed may be construed to be held to be mandatory. However, in the context of a special meeting held beyond the period prescribed under the Act, time schedule has to be construed to be directory and, therefore, there are 2(two) facets inherent in the prescription of time schedule under the Act. Furthermore, there is also a reasonable explanation given as to why the Deputy Commissioner could not convene the special meeting. 12. Furthermore, there is also a reasonable explanation given as to why the Deputy Commissioner could not convene the special meeting. 12. In Ammini (supra), the Apex Court was seized with interpretation of Section 293(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, with reference to the expression ‘Director’ of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory. 13. Section 293(4) of the Code applies to certain Government Scientific Experts as indicated therein which include the Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory. In the said case, report was submitted by the Joint Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory and the documents were under his signature. The report was not found to be admissible by the learned trial Court. However, the said view was not accepted by the High Court. Matter being carried to the Apex Court, the Apex Court, while holding that the Director includes Joint Director, stated as follows:- “11. …… The trial court was also wrong in holding that the report given by the Forensic Science Laboratory with respect to the contents of MO 44 are not admissible in evidence as it was signed by its Joint Director and not by the Director. On a true construction of Section 293 (4) CrPC it has to be held that Joint Director is comprehended by the expression ‘Director’. The amendment made in clause (e) of Section 293(4) now indicates that clearly. If the Joint Director was not comprehended within the expression Director then the legislature would have certainly named him while amending the clause and providing that Section 293 applies to the Deputy Director or Assistant Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory. A Joint Director is a higher officer than a Deputy Director or an Assistant Director and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to hold that a report signed by Joint Director is not admissible in evidence though a report signed by the Deputy Director or Assistant Director is now admissible. In our opinion the High Court was right in holding that the report made by the Joint Director was admissible in evidence and that it deserved to be relied upon.” 14. It is not in dispute that the post of Sub-Divisional Officer is an authority subordinate to the Additional Deputy Commissioner. In our opinion the High Court was right in holding that the report made by the Joint Director was admissible in evidence and that it deserved to be relied upon.” 14. It is not in dispute that the post of Sub-Divisional Officer is an authority subordinate to the Additional Deputy Commissioner. If the Legislature had intended to exclude Additional Deputy Commissioner, it is reasonable to hold that the Legislature would have excluded him. It will also lead to a very anomalous situation if it is held that a subordinate authority is empowered to convene a special meeting but the superior authority is not. In legislation such as the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, it is provided that the Deputy Commissioner includes and shall be deemed always to have included the Additional Deputy Commissioner. In view of the above, the term ‘Deputy Commissioner’ occurring in Section 15(1) of the Act must be held to include the Office of the Additional Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, the ground of attack with regard to convening of the special meeting is also found to be without any merit. In Anowara Begum (supra), resolution passed in a special meeting convened to discuss a no confidence motion was rejected on the ground that the notice for the special meeting was issued by the Executive Officer of the Anchalik Parishad instead of the President of the Anchalik Parishad. The ratio of the said case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. There is another facet in this case. It is on record that the petitioner had avoided his obligation under Section 15 of the Act in refusing to approve holding of a special meeting to consider the no confidence motion against him after the Secretary had requested him to do so. This Court exercises equity jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether it should be exercised to facilitate the President of a Gaon Panchayat, who deliberately and voluntarily avoids to comply with the requirements under Section 15 of the Act to contend that procedural irregularities were committed by other authorities under Section 15 of the Act, is left open to be decided in future in a more appropriate case. 16. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is dismissed.