JUDGMENT : R.P. Dholaria, J. 1. The present appeal, under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 20/01/2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Palanpur in Sessions Case No. 43 of 2005, whereby, the learned trial Judge acquitted the original accused-the respondent herein, of the charges for the offences punishable under Section 498(A) and 306 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that the complainant-Fatesinh Khatrabhai Parghi was residing at Motishero, Ta. Fatehpur, Dist. Dahod with his family and was living retired life. Pushpaben was one of daughters of the complainant and was married with accused before about eight years as per customs. Out of said wedlock, they got two children. The accused and Pushpaben were serving in police department and were residing at Deesa. As per the complaint, the accused did not like Pushpaben and he wanted to perform another marriage which was reason of disputes between Pushpaben and the accused. The accused used to beat Pushpaben. As and when Pushpaben came to her parental house, she complained about the same narrating such facts. Even in phone, she used to inform about the same. She was complaining that she was asked to leave the house and thereby the accused was torturing her physically and mentally. One month prior to filing of complaint, Vinod, son of the complainant went to Pushpaben's house. However, in presence of Vinod, the accused beat Pushpaben. It is further the case of the prosecution that on 05/11/2004, real brother of the complainant informed the complainant the his daughter Pushpa was subjected to burn injuries and was admitted to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. Therefore, on the same day, the complainant reached the Civil Hospital and met Pushpa. The complainant found his daughter in burnt condition. At that time, the accused and his relatives were also present there. At that time Pushpa was in fit state of mind and could speak. The complainant asked her about the incident and Pushpa informed the complainant about the disputes between her and her husband and informed that the accused pore kerosene upon her and set her on fire. Thereafter, other persons brought her first to Community Health Center, Amirgadh from where she was referred to Ahmedabad Civil Hospital. The complainant asked her about the incident and Pushpa informed the complainant about the disputes between her and her husband and informed that the accused pore kerosene upon her and set her on fire. Thereafter, other persons brought her first to Community Health Center, Amirgadh from where she was referred to Ahmedabad Civil Hospital. Dying declaration of Pushpaben was recorded wherein wish of the accused to marry with another lady was narrated. It was also narrated in the dying declaration that she was asked to leave the house. Therefore, the complainant had filed the complaint. Necessary investigation was carried out and statements of several witnesses were recorded. During the course of investigation, respondent was arrested and, ultimately, charge-sheet was filed against him and submitted the same before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palanpur where the case was registered as Criminal Case No. 748 of 2005 and later on the same was transferred to learned 3rd Joint Civil Judge (S.D.) Judicial Magistrate First Class, Palanpur. However, as the case being exclusively sessions triable, the same was committed before the Sessions Court, Palanpur as per Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where the case was registered as Sessions Case No. 43 of 2005. The trial was initiated against the respondent. 3. To prove the case against the present accused, the prosecution has examined several witnesses and also produced several documentary evidence. 4. At the end of trial, after recording the statement of the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned trial Judge acquitted the respondent of all the charges leveled against him by judgment and order dated 20/01/2006. 5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the trial Court, the appellant State has preferred the present appeal. 6. This Court has heard Mr. Rashesh Rindani, learned APP and Mr. Y.M. Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent-original accused. 7. It was contended by learned APP that the judgment and order of the trial Court is against the provisions of law as the trial Court has not properly considered the evidence led by the prosecution and looking to the provisions of law itself, it is established that the prosecution has proved all the ingredients of alleged charges against the present respondent. Learned APP has also taken this court through the oral as well as the entire documentary evidence. It is further submitted by learned APP that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge is based on inferences not warranted by facts of the case and also on presumption not permitted by law. It is also submitted by him that the learned Judge has not properly appreciated oral as well as documentary evidence and thereby committed error by acquitting respondent for the alleged offence under Section 498(A) and 306 of the Indian Penal Code which requires to be reverted as such and the accused is required to be convicted. Therefore, learned APP submits that the present appeal deserves to be allowed. 8. Per contra, Mr. Y.M. Thakkar, learned Advocate has taken this Court through the entire evidence on record and submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Judge is just and proper. Mr. Thakkar, learned Advocate further submitted that in view of the evidence on record, it cannot be said that the learned Judge has committed any error in allowing the appeal and acquitting the accused, and therefore, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. The principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of an appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. NARAYANA MENON @ MANI VS. STATE OF KERALA & ANR, (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under; "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 10. Further, in the case of CHANDRAPPA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, reported in (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. Further, in the case of CHANDRAPPA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, reported in (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 11. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate powers, even if two reasonable views/conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 12. Even in the case of STATE OF GOA Vs. SANJAY THAKRAN & ANR., reported in (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; "16. 12. Even in the case of STATE OF GOA Vs. SANJAY THAKRAN & ANR., reported in (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 13. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in cases of STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS. RAM VEER SINGH & ORS., 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in GIRJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY L.Rs. VS. STATE OF M.P., 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589 . Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. 14. In the case of LUNA RAM VS. BHUPAT SINGH AND ORS., reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under; "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 15. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of MOOKKIAH AND ANR. VS. STATE, REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, TAMIL NADU, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]." 16. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. HEMAREDDY, AIR 1981, SC 1417 , wherein it is held as under; "...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary, (1967) 1 SCR 93 :( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 17. In a recent decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court in SHIVASHARANAPPA & ORS. VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA, JT 2013 (7) SC 66 has held as under; "That appellate Court is empowered to re-appreciate the entire evidence, though, certain other principles are also to be adhered to and it has to be kept in mind that acquittal results into double presumption of innocence." 18. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. 19. This Court has gone through the record and proceedings of learned trial court and perused the record. On 05/11/2004, the victim Pushpaben sustained burn injury and she was taken initially to the Community Health Center, Amirgadh where she came to be primarily treated and thereafter referred to General Hospital, Palanpur. On the same day, while examining, the Doctor found about 80% to 90%, first to second grade burns and on the same day, she was transferred to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. On the same day, while examining, the Doctor found about 80% to 90%, first to second grade burns and on the same day, she was transferred to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. While admitting before the Community Health Center, Amirgadh as well as General Hospital at Palanpur, she was conscious and she herself gave the history of burn injury caused to her while working in kitchen and due to which she got burn injury. Her dying declaration was also recorded on 05/11/2004 by the Executive Magistrate wherein also she has narrated the same story of accidental injury sustained by her. Not only that, but on the same day, her statement was also recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Deesa wherein also she has narrated that due to accident, she sustained burn injury through stove. Ultimately during treatment, she succumbed to the injury on 09/11/2004 at about 13:15 hours while undergoing treatment in the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. Thereafter, it appears that after her death, her dead body was handed over to her father namely Fatesinh and thereafter he lodged the complaint before the Police Sub Inspector, Shahibaug Police Station which in turn came to be transferred to the concerned police station. In the aforesaid complaint, the complainant has alleged that her younger daughter named Pushpaben got married with the respondent for about nine years ago. Her daughter as well as her son-in-law were serving in the police department and staying at Deesa Town and narrated all the facts of incident in the complaint. 20. This Court has minutely perused the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record and gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court. This Court has also perused the oral as well as documentary evidence led before the trial court and also considered the submissions made by learned APP for the appellant-State. From the evidence on record, it clearly emerges out that on the day of incident, in all four dying declarations of deceased came to recorded which are at Exhs. 24, 28, 55 and 77. From the evidence on record, it clearly emerges out that on the day of incident, in all four dying declarations of deceased came to recorded which are at Exhs. 24, 28, 55 and 77. Out of the said four dying declarations, two dying declarations are in the nature of history of burns injury recorded by the Doctor who was on duty as Medical Officer at the Community Health Center, Amirgadh as well as General Hospital, Palanpur where on inquiry by the doctor as regards history of burn injury, Pushpaben herself narrated that she got burns by stove at about 2:00 p.m. today i.e. on 05/11/2004. Both the doctors have been examined by the prosecution as prosecution witnesses and they have narrated the same facts before the learned trial court as regards burn injury sustained by Pushpaben. Third dying declaration came to be recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Palanpur at General Hospital, Palanpur on 05/11/2004 at about 5:25 p.m. whereupon she has narrated that as on today i.e. on 05/11/2014, while she was boiling water upon stove, at that time her sari got fired and due to which she sustained burn injury. She had no quarrel with her husband. At the time of incident, her husband was in the house and he was watching cricket match and he came to rescue her and thereafter her husband has taken her to the hospital. While recording her dying declaration, it clearly appears that the Executive Magistrate has also obtained certificate from the Medical Officer of General Hospital, Palanpur wherein he has endorsed that the patent is fully conscious and is able to give answer. Fourth dying declaration came to be recorded by the Deputy District Superintendent of Police, Deesa wherein Pushpaben has narrated that she was serving as lady constable for about seven years in District Banaskantha and she got married with respondent and he was also serving as Unarmed Police Constable and she has one son and one daughter. She further narrated that today while boiling water upon Ashok Stove, her sari got fired accidentally and due to which she sustained serious burn injury all over the body and her husband tried to douse and due to which her husband as also got burn injury over both the hands and he brought her to the hospital for the treatment. 20.1. 20.1. On going through complaint which came to be lodged by the father of the deceased Pushpaben, it appears that on 05/11/2004, on the date of incident, Fatesinh, father of deceased was intimated by his real brother through telephone that Pushpa has been burnt alive and she has been brought to the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. Upon receiving such information, he visited her. At that time Pushpa was able to speak and she informed him that the accused Jayendrabhai Damor asked her to leave the house and she narrated the incident that she was asked to go out of the home by her husband and thereafter kerosene was pored upon her by her husband and she sustained burn injuries due to which several persons gathered at her place and thereafter they have taken her to hospital at Amirgadh etc. 20.2. On going through the entire record and proceedings, it appears that the prosecution has not examined Chiman Khatrabhai Parghi who had informed the complainant that Pushpa has been burnt by her in-laws in the matrimonial house. Even on going through the deposition of other witnesses who have been examined by the prosecution, none of the witnesses involved the respondent-accused for burning deceased Pushpa. 20.3. On the contrary, concrete evidence in the nature of dying declaration came to be recorded by four different persons i.e. Medical Officer of Amirgadh in Community Health Center, Medical Officer of Palanpur General Hospital, Executive Magistrate of Palanpur as well as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Deesa which clearly mention that as per the say of Pushpaben herself, she got burn due to accident while boiling water on 05/11/2004. In this view of the matter even though some contrary evidence is forthcoming involving the accused which was given by other witnesses based upon the information received from other persons which is in the nature of hearsay. Thus it was no evidentiary value and in that view of the matter, learned trial court has elaborately dealt with the entire evidence in the nature of documentary as well as oral evidence in its proper perspective and properly appreciated the evidence on record and has clearly recorded the finding that the deceased was burned out due to an accident. In that view of the matter, no interference is called for. The appeal is devoid of any merits and the same is dismissed. 21. In that view of the matter, no interference is called for. The appeal is devoid of any merits and the same is dismissed. 21. In the above view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the trial court was completely justified in acquitting the respondent of the charges leveled against him. This Court find that the findings recorded by the trial court are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. This Court is, therefore, in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the court below and hence find no reasons to interfere with the same. 22. In the result, the present appeal is hereby dismissed. R & P to be sent back to the trial Court, forthwith. Bail bond and bail, if any, stands cancelled. Surety also, if any given, stands discharged.