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2016 DIGILAW 759 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Bhagwandas

2016-04-06

BIREN VAISHNAV, K.S.JHAVERI

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. The present appeal, under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment and order dated 03.12.1993 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bhadra, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No. 24 of 1993 whereby the accused has been acquitted of the charges leveled against him under Sections 302 and 498(A) of IPC. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that the accused and the deceased were married to each other seven months prior to 19.09.1992 and were living together. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused was in a habit of consuming liquor and he used to inflict mental and physical torture upon the deceased. It is the case of the prosecution that whenever the deceased requested the accused to stop having liquor he used to assault her. On 19.09.1992 the accused returned home at around 09.30 pm in an inebriated state. The deceased asked him to stop consuming liquor and a quarrel ensued pursuant to which the accused in a fit of rage, took out a matchstick from his pocket and lighted the same and set the deceased ablaze. Hearing the cries of the deceased, one of the neighbours threw a quilt around her and she was taken to hospital for treatment. The deceased however succumbed to burn injuries on 25.09.1992. A complaint was therefore lodged against the accused. Pursuant to the complaint, investigation was carried out. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed and as the case was triable by the Court of Sessions, it was committed to the Court of Sessions. 2.1 The trial Court framed charge against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the prosecution produced oral as well as documentary evidence. To prove the case against the accused, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses: P.W. No. Name of Witness Exhibit No. 1 Pravin Limbachi 8 2 Dr. Shyamal Munshi 10 3 Hardevi Dolatram 12 4 Sunderben Lalchand 13 5 Kishan Sindhi 14 6 Ramkeval Dhunibhai 15 7 Shakrabhai Ogharbhai 16 8 Bachubhai Kanjibhai 17 9 Shaileshkumar soni 19 10 Ganpatsinh Balusinh 21 11 Khapabhai Parmar 27 12 Dr. Deven Desai 31 13 Faizumiyan Malek 35 14 Harnamsinh Dhaniramsinh 41 2.2 The prosecution has also relied upon certain documentary evidence such as intimation received from Shardaben Hospital at Ex. 23, complaint at Ex. Deven Desai 31 13 Faizumiyan Malek 35 14 Harnamsinh Dhaniramsinh 41 2.2 The prosecution has also relied upon certain documentary evidence such as intimation received from Shardaben Hospital at Ex. 23, complaint at Ex. 36, report under Section 357 of Cr.P.C. at Ex. 38, panchnama of place of incident at Ex. 18, inquest panchnama at Ex. 7, post mortem notes at Ex. 32, FSL report at Ex. 30, dying declaration at Ex. 9 etc. 2.3 At the end of the trial and after recording the statement of the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C. and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent - accused of all the charges leveled against him by impugned judgment and order. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court the appellant State has preferred the present appeal. 3. Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the appellant-State has submitted that the trial court committed an error in releasing the respondent-accused. It was contended by Ms. Shah, that the judgment and order of the Sessions Court is against the provisions of law; the Sessions Court has not properly considered the evidence led by the prosecution and looking to the provisions of law itself it is established that the prosecution has proved the whole ingredients of the evidence against the present respondent. Learned APP has also taken this court through the oral as well as the entire documentary evidence. 3.1 Ms. Shah has drawn the attention of this Court to the dying declaration given by the deceased and the complaint and submitted that considering the barbaric act committed by the respondent - accused, the trial court has committed an error in acquitting him. She also submitted that going by the contents in the dying declaration and the complaint, it is amply clear that the accused is guilty of the offence charged against him. She further submitted that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate is in accordance with law and in fact does not need any corroboration. 3.2 Ms. Shah submitted that the medical history recorded before the doctor clearly mentions that the accused is the perpetrator of the alleged offence. She further submitted that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate is in accordance with law and in fact does not need any corroboration. 3.2 Ms. Shah submitted that the medical history recorded before the doctor clearly mentions that the accused is the perpetrator of the alleged offence. She submitted that the vardhi sent also mentions the details of the alleged burns and clearly mentions the name of the accused and therefore the trial court overlooking such glaring evidence erred in acquitting the respondent - accused. 3.3 Ms. Shah has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Krishan v. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 3 SCC 280 , Maniben v. State of Gujarat reported in (2009) 8 SCC 796 and Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 . 4. Mr. Thakore, learned advocate appearing for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and order and submitted that the same having been passed in accordance with law does not call for any interference. He submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that the trial court after taking into account the evidence of witnesses has rightly acquitted the accused. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the reasonings adopted by the trial court in para 15 of the judgment and submitted that the same do not call for any interference by this Court. 5. At the outset it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below." 5.1 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007)4 SCC 415 the Apex Court laid down the following principles: "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 5.2 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 5.3 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. Reported in (2007) 3 SCC 75, the Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision the Court has observed as under: "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 5.4 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs. v. state of M.P., reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 5.5 In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors. reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in paras 10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so-called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in a running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 5.6 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookiah and Anr. v. State rep. By the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. By the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal file d against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to sc an through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 5.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 5.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under: "...This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary ( (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 5.8 Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary. 6. We have examined the matter carefully and gone through the evidence on record. We have appreciated, re-appreciated and re-evaluated the evidence on the touchstone of latest decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. It has neither been disputed before this Court or before the trial court that deceased had met with her death on account of septicemia following around 48% burn injuries sustained at the house of the accused. This even otherwise stands proved from her post-mortem report Ex. 32 which mentions the cause of death as shock and complications of burns. 6.1 Now the question that arises for consideration is whether the present accused - husband of the deceased was the perpetrator of the crime or it was an accidental or suicidal death. In the present case the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate is at Ex. 9 and the complaint is at Ex. 36. As far as the dying declaration Ex. 9 is concerned, the same was recorded by P.W. 1, Pravin Limbachi after due endorsement regarding fitness of the deceased by doctor. 6.2 The evidence of P.W. 1 is on record. 9 and the complaint is at Ex. 36. As far as the dying declaration Ex. 9 is concerned, the same was recorded by P.W. 1, Pravin Limbachi after due endorsement regarding fitness of the deceased by doctor. 6.2 The evidence of P.W. 1 is on record. P.W. 1, Shri Pravin Limbachi is the Executive Magistrate who had recorded the dying declaration of the victim on 20.09.1992 at around 03.40 am. He has deposed that pursuant to the yadi received by him from Shardaben Hospital he went to the Hospital to record the statement of the victim. He has deposed that after verifying the mental and physical fitness of the victim from the doctor, he started recording the dying declaration. He has stated that she had mentioned that the accused had come home in an inebriated state and therefore she had reprimanded him and asked him to stop consuming liquor. She has stated that a quarrel took place and in a fit of rage the deceased set her on fire with a match stick. 6.3 As far as the veracity of the dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate is concerned, it is required to be noted that the Executive Magistrate in his deposition has clearly mentioned that the deceased was conscious while recording the declaration and the endorsement of the doctor regarding the fitness of the patient was also taken before recording of the statement. He stated that the deceased answered his questions and also appended her signature after the procedure was over at around 04.10 am. 7. It shall not be out of place to mention that the courts have to be on guard to see that the dying declaration is not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination and that due care and caution must be exercised in considering weight to be given to the dying declaration. In the case of Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2009) 12 SCC 600 , the Apex Court in para 13 has observed as under: "13. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there is more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances." 7.1 In the case of Shudhakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 7 SCC 569 , the Apex Court has held that a "dying declaration" is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he is in serious apprehension of his death and expects no chances of his survival. At such time, it is expected that a person will speak the truth and only the truth and that normally in such situations, courts attach intrinsic value of truthfulness to such statement. It is also held that once such statement has been made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not an attempt by deceased to cover up truth or falsely implicate a person, then courts can safely rely on such dying declaration and it can form the basis of conviction, more so where version given by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for courts to doubt truthfulness of such dying declaration. 8. Now we shall take up the second dying declaration of the deceased which was recorded in the form of complaint, Ex. 36. Critical examination of the same also shows that deceased had stated that when the accused returned home at around 09.30 pm on 19.09.1992 she had a quarrel with him and asked him to stop consuming liquor. She has stated that the deceased set her on fire by throwing a lighted matchstick and she started shouting for help. 36. Critical examination of the same also shows that deceased had stated that when the accused returned home at around 09.30 pm on 19.09.1992 she had a quarrel with him and asked him to stop consuming liquor. She has stated that the deceased set her on fire by throwing a lighted matchstick and she started shouting for help. She has stated that no one came to help her other than a man who was sleeping outside. 8.1 Ex. 42 is the Vardhi recorded by P.W. 14 - Harnamsinh Dhaniramsinh and the said vardhi also corroborates the say of the deceased in her dying declaration and complaint. Even the history recorded before the doctor states that the deceased had sustained burns on 19.09.1992 at 11.00 pm as the clothes caught fire after her husband had thrown lighted bidi on her. 9. Considering the aforesaid discussion, more particularly the dying declaration recorded before the Executive Magistrate and the complaint coupled with the history recorded before the doctor at various stages and the vardhi, the role of the accused is clearly enunciated by the deceased. 10. P.W. 3, Hardevi Dolatram is the mother of the deceased. This witness has been declared hostile by the prosecution as she has not supported the case of the prosecution. However, from the cross examination of this witness, the fact that the deceased used to frequently consume liquor and the fact that the deceased used to quarrel with him in that regard and used to ask him to stop consuming liquor is corroborated. 10.1 P.W. 4- Sunderben Balchand is the neighbour of deceased and accused and this witness has been examined vide Ex. 13. This witness has stated that there used to be frequent quarrels between the accused and the deceased on the subject of the accused consuming liquor. This witness has stated that on the date of incident, while she was sleeping on a cot outside her house, she came running out of her house in flames. This witness has stated that the deceased went past her and that a person then put a quilt over her to extinguish fire. P.W. 4 has stated that the deceased had told her that the accused had set her ablaze. 10.2 Similarly, P.W. 5 - Kishan Sindhi is also one of the neighbours of the deceased and accused. This witness has stated that the deceased went past her and that a person then put a quilt over her to extinguish fire. P.W. 4 has stated that the deceased had told her that the accused had set her ablaze. 10.2 Similarly, P.W. 5 - Kishan Sindhi is also one of the neighbours of the deceased and accused. This witness has stated that he was in his house on the date of incident and that he was informed by Sunderben and Shakrabhai about the incident. He has stated that he immediately rushed to the house of deceased and took her to hospital in autorickshaw. This witness has stated that he was informed about the incident by the deceased in the autorickshaw that the accused was reprimanded by her as he had come home after consuming liquor and therefore in a fit of rage he had set her ablaze with a matchstick. 11. The accused in his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has denied that he used to return home in a drunken condition. He has however admitted that at the time of incident he was fast asleep in his house. In fact the accused has stated that he did not know when the deceased had received burn injuries and that the neighbours told him in the morning that his wife had been burnt. The statement of the accused does not seem to be plausible. In fact in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), the Apex Court has held in para 15 as under: "15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation." 11.1 In fact, in the case of Krishan v. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 3 SCC 280 , the Apex Court has held that it is not an absolute principle of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction of an accused. Where the dying declaration is true and correct, the attendant circumstances show it to be reliable and it has been recorded in accordance with law, the deceased made the dying declaration of her own accord and upon due certification by the doctor with regard to the state of mind and body, then it may not be necessary for the court to look for corroboration. In such cases, the dying declaration alone can form the basis for the conviction of the accused. But where the dying declaration itself is attended by suspicious circumstances, has not been recorded in accordance with law and settled procedures and practices, then, it may be necessary for the court to look for corroboration of the same. 12. However, the complaint given by the deceased and the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate is duly corroborated with the evidence of P.W. 4 & 5 and the medical reports as well as panchnama and it is clear that the deceased died a homicidal death due to the act of the accused setting her ablaze. We do find that the dying declaration is trust worthy. 13. However, we have also not lost sight of the fact that the deceased had sustained around 48% burns and that she had died after around 5 days of the incident. From the medical reports, it is clear that the deceased suffered from complications which happened due to burns. It is also pertinent to note that the deceased had survived for around 5 days after sustaining around 48-50% burns. 14. From the medical reports, it is clear that the deceased suffered from complications which happened due to burns. It is also pertinent to note that the deceased had survived for around 5 days after sustaining around 48-50% burns. 14. In the case of Maniben (supra), the Apex Court has observed as under: "18. The deceased was admitted in the hospital with about 60% burn injuries and during the course of treatment developed septicemia, which was the main cause of death of the deceased. It is, therefore, established that during the aforesaid period of 8 days the injuries aggravated and worsened to the extent that it led to ripening of the injuries and the deceased died due to poisonous effect of the injuries. 19. It is established from the dying declaration of the deceased that she was living separately from her mother-in-law, the appellant herein, for many years and that on the day in question she had a quarrel with the appellant at her house. It is also clear from the evidence on record that immediately after the quarrel she along with her daughter came to fetch water and when she was returning, the appellant came and threw a burning tonsil on the clothes of the deceased. Since the deceased was wearing a terylene cloth at that relevant point of time, it aggravated the fire which caused the burn injuries. 20. There is also evidence on record to prove and establish that the action of the appellant to throw the burning tonsil was preceded by a quarrel between the deceased and the appellant. From the aforesaid evidence on record it cannot be said that the appellant had the intention that such action on her part would cause the death or such bodily injury to the deceased, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the case cannot be said to be covered under clause (4) of Section 300 of IPC. We are, however, of the considered opinion that the case of the appellant is covered under Section 304 Part II of IPC." 15. In the present case, we have come to the irresistible conclusion that the role of the accused is clear from the dying declaration and other records. We are, however, of the considered opinion that the case of the appellant is covered under Section 304 Part II of IPC." 15. In the present case, we have come to the irresistible conclusion that the role of the accused is clear from the dying declaration and other records. However, the point which has also weighed with this court are that the deceased had survived for around 5 days in the hospital and that her condition worsened after around 5 days and ultimately died of complications following burns. In fact she had sustained about 48% burns. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the accused is guilty of the offence under Section 304 (Part II) of Indian Penal Code. 16. Accordingly, the accused is convicted under Section 304 (Part II) of Indian Penal Code and is ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and is directed to pay fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default, rigorous imprisonment for six months. The judgment and order dated 03.12.1993 is quashed and set aside. The period of sentence already undergone shall be considered for set off. The accused shall surrender before the concerned authorities on or before 08.07.2016. Appeal is allowed accordingly. R & P to be sent back to the trial court forthwith.