JUDGMENT: This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack in R.F.A. No.34 of 2012 setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned 2nd Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Cuttack in T.M.S. No.747 of 1989 in part to the extent of the liability of the respondent no.1 (defendant no.6) in so far as the said respondent no.1 who had been made jointly and severally liable to pay the decreetal amount to the appellant-plaintiff. The appellant as the plaintiff had filed the suit for recovery of Rs.1,70,000/- with interest pendentilite and future at the rate of 18% from the respondent no.1 (defendant no.6) and others making them jointly and severally liable in such matter of payment. The suit having been decreed for recovery of Rs.1,70,000/- with 15% interest pendentilite and future and also with effect from last date of supply made by the appellant-plaintiff holding all the defendants jointly and severally liable in making the said payment, the respondent no.1 (defendant no.6) alone filed the first appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal having been allowed to the extent as stated above, the plaintiff as the appellant has filed this second appeal under section 100 of the Code. 2. For the sake of convenience, in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the trial court. 3. Plaintiff’s case is that in course of his activity as an electrical contractor and general order supplier, he had been engaged by the defendant nos.1 to 3 in the work of electrical installations in the Hotel under the defendant no.2-Company which had received financial assistance from the defendant nos.5 and 6., i.e., Orissa State Financial Corporation and Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Orissa Ltd. It is stated that one of the officers of defendant no.6 was then acting as the Financial Director of defendant no.1-Company and other officials of defendant nos.5 and 6 were also inspecting the electrical installation work of the hotel. It is stated that the outstanding dues of the plaintiff towards the above work undertaken stood admitted by the defendant no.1-Company and towards that the defendant no.6 had paid a sum of Rs.30,000/- whereas other defendant nos.1 to 3 had also paid some portions. It is stated that the outstanding dues of the plaintiff towards the above work undertaken stood admitted by the defendant no.1-Company and towards that the defendant no.6 had paid a sum of Rs.30,000/- whereas other defendant nos.1 to 3 had also paid some portions. Be that as it may, the dues of the plaintiff still remained outstanding. It is alleged that defendant nos.5 and 6 in connivance with other defendants allowed defendant no.4, another Company represented by defendant no.2 who was also a Director of defendant no.1-Company to run the hotel by altering its name. This arrangement is said to have been made to defraud the creditors. In view of the above, the plaintiff claimed the outstanding amount Rs.1,70,000/- together with interest from all the defendants as having the liability joint and severally. 4. In the present appeal, we are now concerned with the exoneration of the defendant no.6 from the liability of making any payment to the plaintiff towards his outstanding dues towards installation of electric work etc. in the said hotel. 5. This defendant no.6 in their written statement stated to have rendered financial assistance to the defendant no.1-Company at the beginning for the hotel project to come up and run and so also on subsequent occasion such financial assistance to have been rendered for the unit to tide over the financial crunch and to further flourish. The defendant no.6 claims to have no liability in the matter of payment of outstanding dues of the plaintiff towards the work said to have been undertaken by him in that hotel. It is explained that on the basis of resolution of the Board of Director of the Company, though there had been payment of Rs.30,000/- to the plaintiff, yet that is from out of the additional term loan sanctioned in favour of the defendant no.1-Company but not towards clearance of any financial liability of defendant no.6 owed to the plaintiff. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the followings are the substantial questions of law (1) Whether the learned lower appellate court has committed gross error of law in arriving at a conclusion that the defendant no.6 is only the supervisory authority in view of the fact that the evidence on record show that IPICOL was controlling the financial affair of the company? (2) Whether the learned lower appellate court committed gross error of law by holding that Ext.11 and 12 cannot be treated as an acknowledgment of the liability on the part of the defendant no.6 to clear the outstanding dues plaintiff. (3) Whether the learned lower appellate court committed gross error of law by not holding that the plaintiff being a creditor, by the resolution of the Board Directors, defendant no.6 is liable to pay the outstanding dues? 7. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 entering appearance submits that all those questions have been rightly addressed by the lower appellate court with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case as emerge out of the pleadings and evidence on record and those have been rightly answered in finally exonerating the defendant no.6 from the liability. 8. Admittedly, by August, 1983 the plaintiff had supplied electrical goods and done the electric installation work in the hotel and by then the official of this defendant no.6 was not the Director of Finance of the company running the hotel. Similarly, the payment said to have been made by this defendant no.6 is by virtue of a resolution of the Board of Directors passed on 18.10.1983 and that too the said amount has been paid from out of the additional term loan sanctioned to the company running the hotel. So, this cannot be taken to be an acknowledgment of the liability for payment of the outstanding dues of the plaintiff by defendant no.6, the financer. Facts remain that despite additional financial assistance given by the financier, hotel still remained sick and failed to discharge the debt of defendant nos.5 and 6. Therefore, action under section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act has been taken and ultimately there has been the sale of the unit. All the assets and materials of the unit having remained hypothecated in favour of defendant nos.5 and 6, the sale proceeds obtained by sale of the unit has been accordingly apportioned. There was no contract between the plaintiff and this defendant no.6 for supply of electrical goods and for entrustment of the work of electrical installation in the hotel. All the assets and materials of the unit having remained hypothecated in favour of defendant nos.5 and 6, the sale proceeds obtained by sale of the unit has been accordingly apportioned. There was no contract between the plaintiff and this defendant no.6 for supply of electrical goods and for entrustment of the work of electrical installation in the hotel. The position of this defendant no.6 being that of a financer, in my considered view, has nothing to do with the liability of the plaintiff in making payment of outstanding dues for supply of electrical goods and doing the electrical installations in the said hotel which was then being not run by it. 9. Thus, I find that the lower appellate court has addressed the questions raised in so far as the liability of the defendant no.6 is concerned in accordance with law in rightly holding that the defendant no.6 has no liability in the matter of payment of money to the plaintiff. The lower appellate court is thus found to have rightly allowed the appeal filed by this defendant no.6 and to the extent as aforesaid. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant in view of above discussion and reason is not accepted. This Court thus finds that there arises no substantial question of law in this appeal for being answered. The appeal thus does not merit admission. 10. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost.