JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. There has been some delay in filing the Special Appeal Nos. 291 of 2016, 283 of 2016, 284 of 2016, 290 of 2016, 287 of 2016, 288 of 2016, 289 of 2016 and 286 of 2016. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The delay is not opposed. Accordingly, we condone the delay. The Delay Condonation Applications will stand allowed. 2. Appellants are the writ petitioners, who before the learned Single Judge called in question the Awards passed by the Ombudsman, who acted under Section 42(7) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The learned Single Judge declined the relief and hence the appeals. 3. When the matter was taken up, a contention was taken by the respondents that the appeals are not maintainable. Rule 5 contained in Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules controls the issue. Since much turns on the said Rule, we extract the same as under: “5. Special appeal. – An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.” 4. From a perusal of the said Rule, it is clear that when a writ petition is maintained under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India against an order passed by a Tribunal constituted by a Central Act or a State Act relating to Concurrent List or the State List, further appeal will not lie from the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the short question which arises is whether the order passed by the Ombudsman or the decision of the Ombudsman under Section 42(7) of the Act is one passed by a Tribunal. There is no dispute that the Act is enacted in relation to the field of legislation coming under the Concurrent List. 5. We have heard Mr. Navneet Kaushik, Mr. Shobhit Saharia and Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants; Mr. A. S. Rawat, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. D.S.Patni and Mr. Naresh Pant, Advocates for the Uttaranchal Power Corporation; and Mr. Rajiv Singh Bisht, learned Brief Holder, appearing for the State. 6. Before we proceed to consider the issue, it is necessary to set out the statuary framework. Section 42 of the Act reads as follows: “42. Duties of distribution licensees and open access. – (1) It shall be the duty of a distribution licensee to develop and maintain an efficient co-ordinated and economical distribution system in his area of supply and to supply electricity in accordance with the provisions contained in this Act. (2) The State Commission shall introduce open access in such phases and subject to such conditions, (including the cross subsidies, and other operational constraints) as may be specified within one year of the appointed date by it and in specifying the extent of open access in successive phases and in determini9ng in charges for wheeling, it shall have due regard to all relevant factors including such cross subsidies, and other operational constraints: Provided that [Subs. By Act 26 of 2007, sec. 7 (i), for the words “such open access may be allowed before the cross subsidies are eliminated, on payment of a surcharge” (w.e.f. 15.06.2007). By Act 26 of 2007, sec. 7 (i), for the words “such open access may be allowed before the cross subsidies are eliminated, on payment of a surcharge” (w.e.f. 15.06.2007). in addition to the charges for wheeling as may be determined by the State Commission: Provided further that such surcharge shall be utilized to meet the requirements of current level of cross subsidy within the area of supply of the distribution licensee: Provided also that such surcharge and cross subsidies shall be progressively reduced [Subs. By Act 26 of 2007, sec. 8 (i), for “every distribution” (w.e.f. 15-6-2007] in the manner as may be specified by the State commission: Provided also that such surcharge shall not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use; Ins. By Act 57 of 2003, sec. 3 (w.e.f. 27.01.2004) [Provided also that the State Commission shall, not later than five years from the date of commencement of the electricity (Amendment) Act, 2003 (57 of 2003) by regulations, provide such open access to all consumers who require a supply of electricity where the maximum power to be made available at any time exceeds one megawatt.] (3) Where any person, whose premises are situated within the area of supply of a distribution licensee, (not being a local authority engaged in the business of distribution of electricity before the appointed date) requires a supply of electricity from a generating company or any licensee other than such distribution licensee, such person may, by notice, require the distribution licensee for wheeling such electricity in accordance with regulations made by the State Commission and the duties of the distribution licensee with respect to such supply shall be of a common carrier providing non-discriminatory open access. (4) Where the State Commission permits a consumer or class of consumers to receive supply of electricity from a person other than the distribution licensee of his area of supply, such consumer shall be liable to pay an additional surcharge on the charges of wheeling, as may be specified by the State Commission, to meet the fixed cost of such distribution licensee arising out of his obligation to supply. (5) Every distribution licensee shall, within six months from the appointed date or date of grant of licence, whichever is earlier, establish a forum for redressal of grievances of the consumers in accordance with the guidelines as may be specified by the State Commission. (6) Any consumer, who is aggrieved by non-redressal of his grievances under sub-section (5), may make a representation for the redressal of his grievance to an authority to be known as Ombudsman to be appointed or designated by the State Commission. (7) The Ombudsman shall settle the grievance of the consumer within such time and in such manner as may be specified by the State Commission. (8) The provisions of sub-sections (5),(6) and (7) shall be without prejudice to right which the consumer may have apart from the rights conferred upon him by those sub-sections.” 7. The scanning of the relevant provisions of Section 42 would show that every distribution licensee shall, within six months from the appointed date or date of grant of license, establish a forum for redressal of grievances of the consumers in accordance with the guidelines to be prescribed by the State Commission. Any consumer, who is aggrieved by non redressal of his grievances by the forum, can represent before the authority to be called the Ombudsman. Sub-section (7) provides for settling of the grievances within such time and in such manner as may be specified by the State Commission. On our query, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents made available the Regulations, which have been framed acting under Sections 42 and 181 of the Act, which latter Section inter alia provides as follows: “The State Commission may, by notification, make Regulations consistent with the Act and the Rules generally to carry out the provisions of the Act.” 8. Clauses (r) & (s) of sub-section (2) of Section 181 are the specific instances, where the power to make regulations can be exercised and they read as follows: “(r) guidelines under sub-section (5) of Section 42. (s) the time and manner for settlement of grievances under sub-section (7) of Section 42.” 9. Acting thereunder, apparently, the Commission has framed Regulations by Notification dated 14.05.2004. It is relevant to notice certain provisions. (s) the time and manner for settlement of grievances under sub-section (7) of Section 42.” 9. Acting thereunder, apparently, the Commission has framed Regulations by Notification dated 14.05.2004. It is relevant to notice certain provisions. Regulation 2 (1) (o) of the Regulations reads as follows: “2(1)(o)- ‘Representation’ shall mean the representation made to the Ombudsman by or on behalf of a Complainant who is aggrieved by the order of the Forum (including the dismissal order), or non-redressal of his Grievances by the Forum within the specified time and in accordance with the Guidelines. Provided that the representation does not pertain to the same subject matter for which any proceedings before any court, tribunal, arbitrator or any other authority is pending or a decree or award or a final order has already been passed by any competent court, tribunal, arbitrator or authority.” 10. The Ombudsman is to be deemed to be a public servant. Regulation 3(5) deals with the qualifications of the person to be an Ombudsman. It has been subsequently amended and the amended Sub-Regulation (5) reads as follows: “The Ombudsman shall be a person of ability, impeccable integrity and standing who has adequate knowledge of and has shown capacity in dealing with problems relating to engineering, finance, commerce, economics, law, consumer affairs or management and has held strategic positions in the said fields at the level not below that of the functional Director of any electricity utility or a retired civil servant not below the rank of Secretary to the State Government. Provided that a person who had been in service of an electricity utility (in the State) shall not be eligible for appointment as Ombudsman within two yeas of his retirement.” 11. Next, it is necessary to notice Regulation 4(1)(a) with which we are concerned. It reads as follows: “4 (1) (a)-To receive the representations against any order of the Forum or non-redressal of Grievance by the Forum and consider such representation and pass appropriate awards in accordance with the Act and Rules or Regulations made thereunder.” 12. The other functions may not have a bearing on the issue to be decided by us. Regulation 5 being material, we extract the same as under: “5. The other functions may not have a bearing on the issue to be decided by us. Regulation 5 being material, we extract the same as under: “5. Representation to Ombudsman:(1) Any complainant who is aggrieved by the order of the Forum or non-redressal of his grievance within the specified time by the Forum, may himself or through his authorized representative make a representation to the Ombudsman within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the decision of the Forum or within thirty days from the date of the expiry of the period within which the Forum was required to take decision, whichever is earlier. Provided further that the Ombudsman may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if the Ombudsman is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within this period. (2) The representation shall be in writing, duly signed by the complainant or his authorized representative submitted either personally or through post/courier including facsimile, and shall clearly state the name and address of the complainant, details of grievances along with the details of complaint made to any other authority/court of law supported by documents, if any, that are desired to be relied upon by the complainant and the relief sought from the Ombudsman. (3) The office of the Ombudsman shall acknowledge the receipt of the Representation to the complainant within three (3) working days of the receipt of such representation. (4) As soon as it may be practicable to do so but not later than one week from the date of receipt of the Representation, the Ombudsman shall cause a notice of the receipt of any representation along with a copy of the representation to the concerned licensee. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Act and these Regulations, the Ombudsman’s decision whether the representation is fit and proper for being considered by it or not, shall be final and binding upon the complainant and the Distribution Licensee. (6) The detailed procedure for hearing and consideration of such representations will be drawn up by the Ombudsman and approved by the Commission.” 13. Equally significant is Regulation 6 as it provides for the Award. It reads as follows: “6. (6) The detailed procedure for hearing and consideration of such representations will be drawn up by the Ombudsman and approved by the Commission.” 13. Equally significant is Regulation 6 as it provides for the Award. It reads as follows: “6. Award: (1) After considering the representations and hearing the parties to the representation, the Ombudsman shall pass a speaking order giving the award with detailed reasoning that he thinks fair in the facts and circumstances of a case. While making an award, the Ombudsman shall be guided by the evidence placed before it by the parties, the principles of applicable law and practice, directions, instructions, guidelines and regulations issued by the Commission from time to time, and such other factors which it its opinion are necessary in the interest of justice. (2) The award passed by the Ombudsman shall set out:- (a) Summary of the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) Issue-wise decision; (c) Reasons for passing the award; and (d) Directions, if any, to the Licensee or complainant or any other person. (3) As far as possible, the Ombudsman shall pass an award within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the complaint. In case of any delay beyond this period, the Ombudsman shall give the reasons for the same in the award. (4) A copy of the award shall be sent to the complainant and the licensee named in the complaint or to any person as may be deemed fit by the Ombudsman for compliance in accordance with the directions contained therein.” 14. Regulation 7 reads as follows: “7. Powers to Call Information: (1) The Ombudsman shall have the power to summon and enforce the attendance of any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case to give evidence or produce any document, which may be useful for or relevant to the subject matter of the complaint before the Ombudsman. (2) For the purpose of carrying out his duties, an Ombudsman may require the licensee named in the complaint to furnish certified copy of any document related to the subject matter of the complaint, which is or is alleged to be in its possession, within 15 days. (2) For the purpose of carrying out his duties, an Ombudsman may require the licensee named in the complaint to furnish certified copy of any document related to the subject matter of the complaint, which is or is alleged to be in its possession, within 15 days. Provided that in the event of failure of a licensee to comply with the requisition without any sufficient cause, the Ombudsman may, draw such inference, as he deems fit and proceed to settle the case on that basis. (3) The Ombudsman shall maintain confidentiality of any information or document coming into his knowledge or possession in the course of discharging his duties and shall not disclose such information or document to any person except with the consent of the person furnishing such information or document. Provided that nothing in this Sub-regulation shall prevent the Ombudsman from disclosing information or document furnished by a party in a complaint to other party or parties, to the extent considered by him to be reasonably required to comply with the principles of natural justice and fair play in the proceedings.” 15. We are not concerned with the rest of the Regulations as they may not be relevant for resolving the issue. 16. It is in the context of this statutory framework that we have to consider the question as to whether the Ombudsman is a Tribunal. 17. Before we refer to the specific contentions and deal with them, it is necessary to have a prefatory overview of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the context of the question as to what body constitutes a Tribunal. In the case of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and another vs. Hind Cycles Ltd. reported in AIR 1963 SC 874 , a Bench of five Judges sat to decide the question as to whether an Arbitrator constituted under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be a Tribunal. Therein, no doubt, the question arose in the context of whether it is a Tribunal within Article 136 (1) of the Constitution. We deem it appropriate to refer to and extract the following paragraphs from the said judgment: “5. The distinction between purely administrative or executive acts and judicial or quasi-judicial acts has been considered by this Court on several occasions. We deem it appropriate to refer to and extract the following paragraphs from the said judgment: “5. The distinction between purely administrative or executive acts and judicial or quasi-judicial acts has been considered by this Court on several occasions. In the case of Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas s. Advani, (1) Mahajan, J., observed that the question whether an act is a judicial or a quasijudicial one or a purely executive act depends on the terms of the particular rule and the nature, scope and effect of the particular power in exercise of which the act may be done and would, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Courts of law established by the State decide cases brought before them judicially and the decisions thus recorded by them fall obviously under the category of judicial decisions. Administrative or executive bodies, on the other hand, are often called upon to reach decisions in several matters in a purely administrative or executive mariner and these decisions fall clearly under the category of administrative or executive orders. Even judges have, in certain matters, to act administratively, while administrative or executive authorities may have to act quasi-judicially in dealing with some matters entrusted to their jurisdiction. Where an authority is required to act judicially either by an express provision of the statute under which it acts or by necessary implication of the said statute, the decisions of such an authority generally amount to quasijudicial decisions. Where, however, the executive or administrative bodies are not required to act judicially and are competent to deal with issues referred to them administratively, their conclusions cannot be treated as quasi-judicial conclusions. No doubt, even while acting administratively, the authorities must act bonafide; but that is different from saying that they must act judicially. Bearing in mind this broad distinction between acts or orders which are judicial or quasi-judicial on the one hand and administrative or executive acts on the other, there is no difficulty in holding that the decisions of the arbitrators to whom industrial disputes are voluntarily referred under s. 10A of the Act are quasi judicial decisions and they amount to a determination or order under Art. 136 (1). This position is not seriously disputed before us. This position is not seriously disputed before us. What is in dispute between the parties is not the character of the decisions against which the appeals have been filed, but it is the character of the authority which decided the disputes. The respondents contend that the arbitrators whose awards are challenged, are not Tribunals, whereas the appellants contend that they are. 6. Article 136(1) refers to a Tribunal in contradistinction to a Court. The expression "a Court" in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State’s inherent judicial powers. The Tribunal as distinguished from the Court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially, but it does not constitute a court in the technical sense. The Tribunal, according to the dictionary meaning, is a seat of justice; and in the discharge of its functions, it shares some of the characteristics of the court. A domestic Tribunal appointed in departmental proceedings, for instance, or instituted by an industrial employer cannot claim to be a Tribunal under Art. 136(1). Purely administrative Tribunals are also outside the scope of the said Article. The Tribunals which are contemplated by Art. 136(1) are clothed with some of the powers of the courts. They can compel witnesses to appear, they can administer oath, they are required to follow certain rules of procedure; the proceedings before them are required to comply with rules of natural justice, they may not be bound by the strict and technical rules of evidence, but, nevertheless, they must decide on evidence adduced before them; they may not be bound by other technical rules of law, but their decisions must, nevertheless, be consistent with the general principles of law. In other words, they have to act judicially and reach their decisions in an objective manner and they cannot proceed purely administratively or base their conclusions on subjective tests or inclinations. In other words, they have to act judicially and reach their decisions in an objective manner and they cannot proceed purely administratively or base their conclusions on subjective tests or inclinations. The procedural rules which regulate the proceedings before the Tribunals and the powers conferred on them in dealing with matters brought before them, are sometimes described as the "trappings of a court’ and in determining the question as to whether a particular body or authority is a Tribunal or not, sometimes a rough and ready test is applied by enquiring whether the said body or authority is clothed with the trappings of a court. 7. In Shell Company of Australia, Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1), the Privy Council had to consider whether the Board of Review created by s. 41 of the (Federal) Income Tax Assessment Act, 1922-25, to review the decisions of the Commissioner of Taxation, was a court exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth within. the meaning of s. 71 of the Constitution of Australia; and it was held that it was not a court but was an administrative tribunal. Lord Sankey, L. C., examined the relevant provisions of the statute which created the said Board and came to the conclusion that the Board appeared to be in the nature of administrative machinery to which the taxpayer can resort at his option in order to have his contentions reconsidered. He then added that an administrative tribunal may Act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called. Mere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a court of judicial power (pp. 297-298). It is in this connection that Lord Sankey observed that the authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. In that connection, His Lordship enumerated some negative propositions. 297-298). It is in this connection that Lord Sankey observed that the authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. In that connection, His Lordship enumerated some negative propositions. He observed that a Tribunal does not become a Court because it gives a final decision, or because it hears witnesses on oath, or because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide, or because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects, or because there is an appeal to a Court, or because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body (pp. 296-297). These negative propositions indicate that the features to which they refer may constitute the trappings of a Court; but the presence of the said trappings does not necessarily make the Tribunal a Court. It is in this context that the picturesque phrase ’the trappings of a Court’ came to be used by the Privy Council. 8. This question was considered by this Court in The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi. (1) This decision is apposite for our purpose because the question which came to be determined was in regard to the character of the Industrial Tribunals constituted under the Act. The majority decision of this Court was that the functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions and so, though the Tribunal is not a Court, it is nevertheless a Tribunal for the purposes of Art. 136. In other words, the majority decision which, in a sense, was epoch making, held that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 can be invoked in proper cases against awards and other orders made by Industrial Tribunals under the Act. In discussing the question as to character of the Industrial Tribunal functioning under the Act, Mahajan, J., observed that the condition precedent for bringing a tribunal within the ambit of Art. 136, is that it should be constituted by the State; and he added that a Tribunal would be outside the ambit of Art. 136 if it is not invested with any part of the judicial functions of the State but discharges purely administrative or executive duties. In the opinion of the learned judge, Tribunals which are found invested with certain functions of a Court of justice and have some of its trappings also would fall within the ambit of Art. 136 and would be Subject to the appellate control of this Court whenever it is found necessary to exercise that control in the interests of justice. It would thus be noticed that apart from the importance of the trappings of a Court, the basic and essential condition which makes an authority or a body a tribunal under Art. 136, is that it should be constituted by the State and should be invested with the State’s inherent judicial power. Since this test was satisfied by the Industrial Tribunals under the Act, according to the majority decision, it was held that the awards made by the Industrial Tribunals are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136.” 18. It is contended before us by Mr. Shobhit Saharia that, under Section 42 of the Act, only a consumer can represent his grievances before the Ombudsman. Furthermore, it is contended with reference to Section 42(8) of the Act that it is open to the consumer also to take resort to the other remedies. It is further contended that it cannot be treated as a creation of the State, as the Ombudsman is to be appointed by the State Commission and not by the State as such. He drew our attention to the Banking Ombudsman Scheme. He would contend that the Ombudsman under the Act and the Banking Ombudsman are not dissimilar. In this context, he sought to buttress his argument with reference to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Durga Hotel Complex vs. Reserve Bank of India and others, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 120 . More on the said judgment will follow at the appropriate stage. He also drew our attention in regard to the Ombudsman under the Act being inferior to an Arbitrator and a Court having regard to what is provided in Regulation 2(1)(o), which we have already adverted to. That is to say, detracting from the concept of the Ombudsman being a Tribunal is the provision contained in Regulation 2 (1) (o) which provides that, if the matter is pending or decided by a Court or Arbitrator, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is ousted. 19. Mr. That is to say, detracting from the concept of the Ombudsman being a Tribunal is the provision contained in Regulation 2 (1) (o) which provides that, if the matter is pending or decided by a Court or Arbitrator, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is ousted. 19. Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel appearing for some of the appellants also made submissions on similar lines. In particular, he would submit that the forum provided by the Ombudsman under Section 42(7) is not an exclusive forum having regard to what is provided in Section 42(8). He would further submit that it is evident that it is only the consumer, who can approach the Ombudsman. He would also seek to support his submissions by contending that in a situation, where there is a domestic inquiry, a disciplinary authority may be appointed and the condition of the Ombudsman under the Act is sought to be likened to the person, who is appointed as an Inquiry Officer. He also sought to draw support from Rule 7 of the Electricity Rules 2005. It reads as follows: “7. Consumer Redressal Forum and Ombudsman.- (1) The distribution licensee shall establish a Forum for Redressal of Grievance of Consumers under sub-section (5) of section 42 which shall consist of officers of the licensee. The Appropriate Commission shall nominee one independent member who is familiar with the consumer affairs. Provided that the manner of appointment and the qualification and experience of the persons to be appointed as member of the Forum and the procedure of dealing with the grievances of the consumers by the Forum and other similar matters would be as per the guidelines specified by the State Commission. (2) The Ombudsman to be appointed or designed by the State Commission under sub-section (6) of Section 42 of the Act shall be such person as the State Commission may decide from time to time. (3) The Ombudsman shall consider the representations of the consumers consistent with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and Regulations made hereunder or general orders or directions given by the Appropriate Government or the Appropriate Commission in this regard before settling their grievance. (3) The Ombudsman shall consider the representations of the consumers consistent with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and Regulations made hereunder or general orders or directions given by the Appropriate Government or the Appropriate Commission in this regard before settling their grievance. (4) (a) The Ombudsman shall prepare a report on a six monthly basis giving details of the nature of the grievances of the consumer dealt by the Ombudsman, the response of the Licensees in the redressal of the grievances and the opinion of the Ombudsman on the Licensee’s compliance of the standards of performance a specified by the Commission under section 57 of the Act during the proceeding six months. (b) The report under sub-clause (a) above shall be forwarded to the State Commission and the State Government within 45 days after the end of the relevant period of six months.” 20. Therefore, he would submit that a Consumer Forum constituted under the Act in itself is not a Tribunal, and therefore, the remedy provided of approaching the Ombudsman is purely optional and, just as much as the option of going to the forum is an internal mechanism created by the distribution licensee, none of these things bar other remedies available to the parties in law. 21. It is contended by Mr. Navneet Kaushik, learned counsel for some of the appellants that the Court may notice that the word used in sub-section 6 of Section 42 of the Act is “consumer may” and therefore, the Ombudsman is not a revisional or appellate authority. 22. Mr. A. S. Rawat, learned senior counsel for the Power Corporation, on the other hand, would submit that all the elements required to be present to constitute the Ombudsman a Tribunal are indeed present. It is called upon to decide the representation, wherein a lis is adjudicated. The decision is binding on the parties. He would refer to the amendment of the Regulations, which we have already noted. The amended sub-regulation (5) of Regulation 6 provides that non-compliance of Ombudsman’s orders are treated in violation of the Regulations and liable for appropriate action by the Commission under Sections 142 and 146 read with Section 149 of the Act. It is contended that the Award is binding on the licensee as much as it is binding on the complainant, where any direction is given as is evident from Regulation 6. 23. It is contended that the Award is binding on the licensee as much as it is binding on the complainant, where any direction is given as is evident from Regulation 6. 23. We may indicate that we had an occasion to consider the scope of Rule 5 of the High Court Rules in the case of Intezar Hussain and another vs. State of Uttarakhand and others, reported in 2015 (2) UD 261, as to whether an appeal will lie in view of the provisions contained in Rule 5 against an order passed under the U. P. Public Premises Act. In the course of our judgment, we had referred to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, reported in 2010 (11) SCC 1 . In the course of the said judgment, we noticed that the Apex Court had inter alia held as follows: “32. With the growth of civilization and the problems of modern life, a large number of administrative Tribunals have come into existence. These Tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of “Courts” in Articles 136, 227, or 228 or in Articles 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of Civil Judicature but not Tribunals other than such Courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions in Articles 136 and 227. By “courts” is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by “Tribunals”, those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before Tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before Tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. … 33. In my opinion, a Court in the strict sense is a Tribunal which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts of Civil Judicature maintained by the State under its constitution to exercise the judicial power of the State. These Courts perform all the judicial functions of the State except those that are excluded by law from their jurisdiction. The word “judicial”, be it noted, is itself capable of two meanings. They were admirably stated by Lopes, L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 (CA), in these words: (QB p. 452) ‘… The word “judicial” has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a judge or by justices in court, or to administrative duties which need not be performed in court, but in respect of which it is necessary to being to bear a judicial mind - that is, a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration.’ That an officer is required to decide matters before him “judicially” in the second sense does not make him a Court or even a Tribunal, because that only establishes that he is following a standard of conduct, and is free from bias or interest. 34. Courts and tribunals act ‘judicially’ in both senses, and in the term ‘court’ are included the ordinary and permanent Tribunals and in the term ‘tribunal’ are included all others, which are not so included”.” 24. We had also noticed the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Arun Shourie, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 344 and noticed that the Commission appointed under the Commission of Inquiry Act had only recommendatory power and it did not have the power to adjudicate. 25. In the context of the said case law, we proceed to appreciate the contentions raised by the parties. 26. Every court is a Tribunal. 25. In the context of the said case law, we proceed to appreciate the contentions raised by the parties. 26. Every court is a Tribunal. The vice versa is not however, correct. A Tribunal discharges judicial power of the State. It does not have all the trappings of a court. The nomenclature by which it is called may not be decisive for the question as to whether it is a Tribunal or not. Undoubtedly, it is dubbed as Ombudsman. The word “Ombudsman” has various shades of meaning; but we are called upon to decide what it is in the context of the functions it performs. Under Sub-Section 5 of Section 42 of the Act, every distribution licensee is expected to constitute a forum. The Act is a departure from the earlier Electricity Act and transformatory changes were intended by the Parliament. The primary concern of the Parliament was to see that production of electricity is enhanced, in particular, by giving a greater role to private players, providing for commission which would fix the tariff; taking note of the fact that many States did not allow for the Electricity Boards to enhance the tariff, an independent Commission was contemplated. One of the roles assigned to the said Commission was appointment of Ombudsman. The Ombudsman was to decide the representations made by consumers only undoubtedly when they felt aggrieved by non-redressal of their grievances, which they sought to ventilate before the consumer forum, which was to be established by the distribution licensee under Sub Section (5). Here, we are not called upon to decide the question whether the consumer forum is a Tribunal. We say this for the reason that it is contended by Mr. Piyush Garg that the consumer forum is not a Tribunal. That is clearly besides the point. Here, we are to decide the question whether the Ombudsman is a Tribunal. 27. It is equally true that a consumer, who is aggrieved by the non-redressal of his grievances by the consumer forum, has a range of choices before him; in that, he may choose to represent his grievances before the Ombudsman under sub-section (6) of Section 42 or he may go elsewhere in search of relief. The law protects the right of choice. The law protects the right of choice. But we would think that it is not relevant that the Ombudsman is not an exclusive forum created under the law to deal with the grievances of the consumer arising from the disposal of his complaint by the consumer forum. The mere fact that the consumer may approach other forum seeking the relief will not deflect from the Ombudsman being a Tribunal, if it otherwise possess the attributes of a Tribunal. Therefore, we reject the argument that there is no exclusive power vested with the Ombudsman. 28. A perusal of the Regulations, which have been made under Section 42(6) read with Section 181 of the Act would undoubtedly reveal the following features: The Regulations contemplate appointment of an Ombudsman. He is to be a person of ability, impeccable integrity and standing who has adequate knowledge of and has shown capacity in dealing with the problems relating to engineering, finance, commerce, economics, law, consumer affairs or management and has held strategic positions in the said fields at the level not below that of the functional Director of any electricity utility or a retired civil servant not below the rank of Secretary to the State Government. It is pertinent to notice that a proviso has been added apparently in quest for attaining the quality of impartiality that a person, who had been in service of an electricity utility within the State, shall not be eligible for appointment as Ombudsman within two years of his retirement. 29. We may further notice the procedure, which has been prescribed by the State Commission, which is endowed indeed with the power to make procedures. There, a period of 30 days is prescribed for preferring the representation. The power to entertain an appeal (the word used is ‘appeal’ and not ‘representation’) beyond 30 days is also provided with the Ombudsman. The representation is to be in writing duly signed by the complainant giving all details of the complaint made to any other authority/court of law. The Ombudsman is to cause notice of the receipt of the representation to the concerned licensee. Sub-Regulation (5) of Regulation 5 contemplates power with the Ombudsman to decide whether the representation is fit and proper to be considered by it and such decision is rendered binding upon the complainant and the distribution licensee. The Ombudsman is to cause notice of the receipt of the representation to the concerned licensee. Sub-Regulation (5) of Regulation 5 contemplates power with the Ombudsman to decide whether the representation is fit and proper to be considered by it and such decision is rendered binding upon the complainant and the distribution licensee. Sub-Regulation (6) provides for detailed procedure for hearing and consideration of representations which is to be drawn up by the Ombudsman and approved by the Commission. In the matter of deciding the case, Regulation 7 endows power with the Ombudsman to summon and enforce the attendance of any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case to give evidence or produce any document, which may be useful or relevant. 30. We have noticed the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1963 SC 874 (supra), wherein the Apex Court dwelt upon the attributes of a Tribunal consisting of possessing the power to enforce attendance of witnesses or of taking evidence and also production of documents. We find that this attribute appears to be statutorily injuncted in the Regulation. The Ombudsman also may require the licensee named in the complaint to furnish copy of any document relating to the subject matter, which is or is alleged to be in his possession. Apparently, the Ombudsman is free to draw adverse inference in case of failure of the licensee to comply with the requisition without sufficient cause. 31. Thereafter, we pass on to Regulation 6, which proceeds to lay down that, after considering the representation and hearing the parties to the representation, the Ombudsman is to pass a speaking order; he is to give an Award; and the Award is to contain detailed reasoning. The Ombudsman, while making the Award, is to be guided by the evidence placed before it by the parties. The Ombudsman is also to consider the principles of applicable law and practice, directions, instructions, guidelines and regulations issued by the Commission from time to time, and such other factors which are, in his opinion, necessary in the interest of justice. Finally comes the Award. The law giver has provided that the Award should contain summary of the facts and circumstances of the case. The decisions are to be given issue-wise. It is also to contain reasons and, finally, comes the directions. Finally comes the Award. The law giver has provided that the Award should contain summary of the facts and circumstances of the case. The decisions are to be given issue-wise. It is also to contain reasons and, finally, comes the directions. The law injuncts that the direction may be issued not only to the licensee, but also to the complainant or to any other person. A copy of the Award is to be sent for compliance with the directions as provided in Sub-Regulation (4) of Regulation 6. By an amendment, which was brought about in 2008, sub-regulation (5) was added to Regulation 6, which allows invoking of Sections 142 and 146 read with Section 149 of the Act. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to Section 142 of the Act, which reads as follows: “142. Punishment for non-compliance of directions by Appropriate Commission.- In case any complaint is filed before the Appropriate Commission by any person or if that Commission is satisfied that any person has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations made there under, or any direction issued by the Commission, the Appropriate Commission may after giving such person an opportunity of being heard in the matter, by order in writing, direct that, without prejudice to any other penalty to which he may be liable under this Act, such person shall pay, by way of penalty, which shall not exceed one lakh rupee for each contravention and in case of a continuing failure with an additional penalty which may extend to six thousand rupees for every day during which the failure continues after contravention of the first such direction.” 32. A perusal of these provisions would leave us in no doubt that the Ombudsman is called upon to decide a lis raised by a consumer. The fact that it is not open to the distribution licensee to challenge the order of the consumer forum, as right to make representation is exclusively conferred only on the consumer, in our view, does not in the slightest manner detract from our holding that the Ombudsman is a Tribunal. The decision by which the consumer is aggrieved is rendered by the consumer forum, which is appointed by the distribution licensee. The decision by which the consumer is aggrieved is rendered by the consumer forum, which is appointed by the distribution licensee. Apparently, the Legislature thought that, in such circumstances, it is only the consumer who would have a ground to proceed against the decision of the forum. What is most relevant is whether the judicial power of the State is being exercised by the Ombudsman in the circumstances in which it does not have all the trappings of a court and, therefore, it is not a court, but becomes a Tribunal. As already noticed, a procedure has been laid down by the Commission through statutory Regulations which we have already adverted to. It encompasses the duty to comply with the principles of natural justice by way of affording an opportunity to the parties to represent and it endows power with the Ombudsman to take evidence, be it oral or documentary. The principles by which it is to be guided are specifically mentioned and which we have adverted to. It is clearly quasi-judicial in nature. Also, we cannot liken it to an executive body, which takes its decision based on considerations of policy. Unlike a domestic inquiry report, which is rendered by the person appointed by the disciplinary authority, which can be accepted or rejected by the appointing authority, the Award by the Ombudsman is binding on the parties. It terminates the lis as far as the parties are concerned, subject to their right to question it in the appropriate forum. They cannot ignore the decision, except upon peril of being proceeded with under Section 142 read with Section 146. 33. At this juncture, we must notice an argument, which is addressed before us, namely that the Tribunal by itself cannot enforce the award. That is to say, there is no power under the Act or the Rules with the Ombudsman to enforce its Award, and therefore, it cannot be treated as a Tribunal. 34. We are of the view that it may not matter much that the Tribunal by itself is not created as an executing body. It is for the Parliament to decide in which manner the decision is best enforced. By virtue of the Regulations being amended in the year 2008, an infraction of the direction or the Award is visited with consequences provided under Section 142. It is for the Parliament to decide in which manner the decision is best enforced. By virtue of the Regulations being amended in the year 2008, an infraction of the direction or the Award is visited with consequences provided under Section 142. A person contravening can be visited with penalty and also imprisonment up to three months. The argument of Shri Shobhit Saharia that this may not suffice as there may be situations where the Ombudsman may direct consequences far greater and it will be open to the distribution licensee to disregard it with impunity by only having to face the consequences provided under Section 142 and, therefore, the Ombudsman cannot be treated as a Tribunal, certainly does not appeal to us. What is significant is whether the decision of the Ombudsman is final. It brings the curtain down on the lis. In our view, it indeed brings about a termination of the lis, subject to the order being put in issue in a competent forum. Therefore, we would think that much may not turn upon the Ombudsman itself not being endowed with the power to execute its order. 35. We are equally unimpressed by the attempts to draw parallel between the Ombudsman under Banking Ombudsman Scheme and the Ombudsman under the Act. A perusal of the Banking Ombudsman Scheme, which was made available to us, would inter alia reveal the following features: The Banking Ombudsman, in the first place, attempts to promote settlement by following the procedure; thereafter, if it is not settled by agreement between the parties, the Ombudsman may make a recommendation and it is open to acceptance by the complainant only if he accepts all the terms of the recommendation (see clause 19 of the said Scheme). If the matter is not settled by agreement or recommendation as provided, the Ombudsman informs the parties of his intention to pass an Award. Thereafter, an Award is passed. It is most relevant, however, to notice clause (6) contained in Section 20 of the Scheme, which reads as follows: “(6). An award shall not be binding on a bank against which it is passed unless the complainant furnishes to it, within a period of one month from the date of the Award, a letter of acceptance of the award in full and final settlement of his claim in the matter. An award shall not be binding on a bank against which it is passed unless the complainant furnishes to it, within a period of one month from the date of the Award, a letter of acceptance of the award in full and final settlement of his claim in the matter. Within fifteen days from the date of receipt by it, of the acceptance in writing of the Award by the complainant the bank shall comply with the Award and intimate the compliance to the Banking Ombudsman.” 36. A perusal of the Scheme, in the first place, would reveal that the decision by the Banking Ombudsman is not binding per se. It is made dependent upon the volition of the consumer. If the consumer accepts it, then it becomes binding on the bank. Thus, the binding nature of the Award is contingent upon one of the parties to the Award accepting it, as only thereafter it becomes binding on the Bank. The statute, by itself, does not provide for the consequences such as are contained in Section 142 of the Act, read with the other provisions and also Regulation 6(5) of the Regulations. 37. We may notice in this regard the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2007) 5 SCC 120 (supra). There, the Apex Court was considering a case, where the consumer went to the Ombudsman; when the matter was pending before the Ombudsman, the respondent Bank approached the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Ignoring the said fact, the Ombudsman passed an Award. Two writ petitions were filed; one by the consumer for enforcing the Award under Article 226 and another writ petition was filed by the Bank challenging the Award. The writ petition filed by the Bank was allowed for the reason that the Scheme contemplated that, if the matter is pending before any other authority, tribunal or arbitrator, the Ombudsman would not have jurisdiction. This view of the High Court was upheld by the Apex Court. We deem it necessary to refer to paragraph 14 of the said judgment, which reads as follows: “14. There is a more fundamental aspect. The Ombudsman, at best, is an Authority or Tribunal of limited jurisdiction constituted under the Scheme. It is a jurisdiction conferred by the Scheme. This view of the High Court was upheld by the Apex Court. We deem it necessary to refer to paragraph 14 of the said judgment, which reads as follows: “14. There is a more fundamental aspect. The Ombudsman, at best, is an Authority or Tribunal of limited jurisdiction constituted under the Scheme. It is a jurisdiction conferred by the Scheme. The exercise of jurisdiction or power by the Ombudsman would depend on his having jurisdiction not only to entertain a claim but also to bring it to an end. The continued exercise of power by him would depend on his continuing to have jurisdiction. Once he is deprived of his jurisdiction or gets deprived of his jurisdiction over the subject matter, he could no more proceed with a complaint which was earlier filed. In other words, to render an Award valid in terms of the Scheme, the Ombudsman must continue to retain jurisdiction over the subject matter of the concerned complaint. A complaint goes out of his purview when the subject matter of it is taken to a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or forum. The relief that can be granted by the Ombudsman are limited and confined to the matters coming within clause 13 of the Scheme. The intention behind incorporating clause 16(3)(d) appears to be to ensure that the relief an Ombudsman may give, may not conflict with a more comprehensive adjudication by a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or forum with wider powers. When there is conferment of a power on an authority or Tribunal with limited jurisdiction, that conferred power must continue to exist, when the decision is rendered by that authority or Tribunal. Once the conferred authority or power is taken away or impeded, the Authority or Tribunal can no more exercise it. This will be the position when one of the parties in a complaint before the Ombudsman takes the subject matter to a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or forum. In other words, when ultimately he is about to pronounce his Award, the Ombudsman finds that the subject matter of the dispute has been taken to the Debts Recovery Tribunal or a Civil Court or an Arbitrator or to any other competent forum, he gets divested of his jurisdiction, on a harmonious reading of clause 16(1) with clause 16(3)(d) of the Scheme. It is not, as if, a bar of jurisdiction can occur only at the stage of initially entertaining a claim. It could also occur at a subsequent stage either in view of the jurisdiction being taken away or in view of any other impediment created by the very Legislation, Rule or Scheme that conferred the initial jurisdiction. Thus, having lost his jurisdiction over the complaint in view of clause 16(3)(d) of the Scheme, the Ombudsman will have to decline jurisdiction to pass any order or award on the complaint. This, we think would be the proper way of understanding the bar created by clause 16(3)(d) of the Scheme.” 38. Therefore, we may notice that the Apex Court has observed that even under the said Scheme, the Ombudsman, at best, is an authority or tribunal of limited jurisdiction. We must notice that, far from detracting from the reasoning, which we have employed or the finding which we are arriving at, namely, that the Ombudsman under the Act is a Tribunal, we find re-enforcement for our view from the observations made by the Apex Court. Having regard to the scheme of the Act and the Regulations, we are of the clear view that a Tribunal, be it a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, remains a Tribunal, which is what is relevant for the purpose of deciding this case. 39. The fact that the Tribunal is constituted by the Commission and not by the State, itself, is made much of by the appellants. The power to appoint Ombudsman is vested with the Commission. The said power is lodged with the Commission by an Act of Parliament. Therefore, this is a case, where it is the parliamentary will that an Ombudsman be established. The State Commission, in our view, is an agency created by the Parliament with various functions, one of which is the establishment of the Ombudsman. Therefore, we cannot liken it to a situation, where an authority is created by a contract between the parties, as the Ombudsman is indeed the creation of the Parliamentary Legislation and, therefore, it is a creation of the State. We see nothing in the Rules, which are brought before us by Mr. Piyush Garg, which detracts from the view which we have taken. We see nothing in the Rules, which are brought before us by Mr. Piyush Garg, which detracts from the view which we have taken. In fact, sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 contemplates that the Ombudsman is to consider the representation of the consumer consistent with the Act, Rules and the Regulations made thereunder or general orders issued by the appropriate Government or the appropriate Commission before settling the grievances. A word on the expression “settling the grievances”: 40. The Regulations in this case do not contemplate any provision similar to the Banking Ombudsman Scheme, which provides for settlement between the parties being facilitated by the Ombudsman. The duty of the Ombudsman is to pass an Award after considering the contentions of the parties, examining any person and calling for documents. Therefore, the use of the words “settling the grievances” cannot be understood as anything else than adjudicating the matter and to give its decision in the form of an Award. The form of an Award also clearly re-enforces us in the view that the authority is expected to give decision issue-wise supported with reasons and, finally, with directions, which obviously postulate a decision before the directions are given. The directions are binding on the parties. The Award is enforceable as provided with all the faults it may contain; but, we are not to be detained by the imperfections that the law may contain. We are concerned with the issue whether there is a final decision to be arrived at by following the procedure, which, though not the same as obtained in the court, but fashioned to serve the purpose of it being a Tribunal. Therefore, we would take the view that the Ombudsman acting under the Act is a Tribunal and, therefore, no further appeal lies from the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 41. A contention was taken by Mr. Piyush Garg that direction can be issued only against the distribution licensee and, therefore, this detracts from the Ombudsman being treated as a Tribunal. We are of the view that this is a mistaken understanding of the powers of the Ombudsman as is clear from Regulation 6(5), which clearly indicates that directions may be issued to the distribution licensee and also to the complainant and any other person. We are of the view that this is a mistaken understanding of the powers of the Ombudsman as is clear from Regulation 6(5), which clearly indicates that directions may be issued to the distribution licensee and also to the complainant and any other person. This indicates the vastness of the powers available with the Ombudsman, read with Regulation 6(5) making available the power under Section 142 of the Act and enforceable in the said regard. 42. The upshot of the above discussion is that all the Appeals fail for the reason that they are not maintainable. We make it abundantly clear that we have not expressed any view regarding the merits of the case. Accordingly, the appeals will stand dismissed. No order as to costs. 43. Learned counsel for the appellants made a request for issuance of a certificate of appeal under Article 134A of the Constitution of India, as, according to them, substantial question of law of general importance is involved. We would think that the certificate is required to be given under Article 134A, read with Article 133 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Registry will issue such a certificate to the appellants.