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2016 DIGILAW 77 (JHR)

Jharna Sao v. Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao

2016-01-08

D.N.PATEL

body2016
ORDER : Arbitration Application No. 27 of 2008 1. This application has been preferred under Sub-section 6 of Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter to be referred to as the “Act, 1996”) for the appointment of an Arbitrator. 2. Factual Matrix: In the year 1955, partnership was entered into between Thakur Prasad Sao, Lakshmi Prasad Sao and Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao. This partnership deed is dated 1st April, 1995. Clause 16 and Clause 20 thereof reads as under: “16. That the firm will not be dissolved on the death of any of the partners, if any partner dies his heirs or other legal representatives will be considered to be taken in as a partner in his place or give the benefit of the partnership if a minor. In case his heirs or other legal representative do not agree to continue as partner of the deceased partner will be considered to have retired from the partnership as from the date of his death and the partnership will continue with only the surviving partner. Provided always that in such event or in the even of the partnership being determined by any of the provisions hereinbefore contained or under any provision of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, then and in any such cases other Partner shall subject to the terms hereinafter mentioned purchase at their option the shares of deceased, insolvent or retiring partner or partners, as the case may be, in the business and property of the Firm and the Firm and the Partnership constituted under these presents shall continue with the necessary alteration in the shares and capital of the remaining partners. 20. Any difference which may arise between the partner or their representatives regarding interpretation of these presents or regarding the rights and liabilities of any partner arising hereunder or any other matter or thing concerning the Firm or the affairs thereof shall be referred to arbitration under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.” Lakshmi Prasad Sao expired in the year 1982 and Thakur Prasad Sao expired in the year 1983 and, therefore, partnership was reconstituted and all the legal heirs of Lakshmi Prasad Sao (three in number), Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao and Sandeep Kumar Sao, S/o Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao were the partners of fresh partnership firm in the year 2004. Thereafter, Sheo Shankar Prasad Prasad Sao expired in the year 2010 and again there was reconstitution of the partnership firm in the year 2010. From the aforesaid partnership firm of the year 2004, Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao was dropped and rests of the partners i.e. all the legal heirs of Lakshmi Prasad Sao (three in number) and Sandeep Kumar Sao were the partners of reconstituted partnership firm in the year 2010. Revenue notices were issued upon the partnership firm viz. M/s Thakur Prasad Sao and upon their partners for the payment of the revenues. The notices were issued by the State Government. The legal heirs of Thakur Prasad Sao who are the applicants in this Arbitration Application have denied their liability for the payment of the revenues to the State Government on the ground that they were never inducted as partners in the partnership firm viz. M/s Thakur Prasad Sao, after the death of Thakur Prasad Sao in the year 1983. The partnership firm was run by Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao and others and, therefore, it has been stated on oath by the legal heirs of Thakur Prasad Sao (who are applicants in this case) that they are denying their liabilities. There are similar allegations by Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao about the liabilities of these applicants for the payment of the revenues to the State. The allegations and counter allegations are of the year 1993 to 1999 for the dues of the year 1977-78. Various annexures have been annexed with the memo of this application and various annexures have been annexed with the affidavits filed by the parties to this litigation. After the year 1983 i.e. after the death of Thakur Prasad Sao, for the first time in the year 2008 the legal heirs of Thakur Prasad Sao i.e. the present applicants had filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 2852 of 2008, wherein, following prayers were made in paragraph no. 1 of the said writ petition: “1. That in this writ application, the Petitioner prays for issuance of an appropriate writs/orders/ directions: (a) In the nature of Mandamus directing upon the respondent no. 1 of the said writ petition: “1. That in this writ application, the Petitioner prays for issuance of an appropriate writs/orders/ directions: (a) In the nature of Mandamus directing upon the respondent no. 2 to immediately and forthwith cancel the registration certificate issued by him on the basis of a purported reconstituted deed of partnership which has been re-registered under the statutory provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, which is barred and also without fulfilling the necessary pre-requisites/formalities which was to be completed for the purpose of entering change of reconstitution of firm in terms of the restrictions imposed under Section 63 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932; (b) In the nature of Mandamus directing upon the respondents to forthwith publish a newspaper report in order to bring it to the knowledge of the necessary statutory department as also the various departments of the State Government wherein, on the basis of the purported reconstituted deed of partnership, various benefits from the State Government is being derived misleading the said Government departments on the basis of the purported re-registration of the partnership firm. (c) For a declaration that for the purpose of change in reconstitution of partnership firm, no fresh registration of the partnership firm can be granted and only the changes in the reconstitution can be recorded by way of the reconstituted deed of partnership, that too only after fulfilling the statutory restrictions/provisions of Section 63 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and any action taken without fulfillment of such prerequisites/legal formalities of Section 63 is null and void. (d) For a direction upon the Respondent No. 2 to initiate criminal prosecution in terms of Section 70 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 against the purported to be partners of the purported reconstituted firm for misleading the Respondent No. 2 and also for making misleading statements in the purported reconstituted deed of partnership dated 10.06.2004.” Thus for cancellation of the registration certificate, this writ petition was preferred challenging the reconstitution of the partnership firm registered in the year 2004. This writ petition is pending before this Court. Title Suit No. 5 of 2014 was preferred by the applicants of this Arbitration Application. This writ petition is pending before this Court. Title Suit No. 5 of 2014 was preferred by the applicants of this Arbitration Application. The suit is pending in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I at Chaibasa, wherein, mainly it is prayed that the plaintiffs are the partners and as such they are continue to be partners of the firm viz. M/s Thakur Prasad Sao under Clause 16 of the partnership deed dated 1st April, 1955. In this Title Suit, the defendants who are also respondents in this Arbitration Application, have not taken any plea of Section 8 of the Act, 1996. Ramesh Prasad Sao, who is petitioner no. 2 in this Arbitration Application, has preferred W.P. (C) No. 1680 of 2015 challenging the rejection of renewal of mining lease which was initially granted to Thakur Prasad Sao. Later on, it was granted to the partnership firm M/s Thakur Prasad Sao. Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 2008 was preferred by Bibhuti Bhushan Prasad Sao and Ramesh Prasad Sao under Section 9 of the Act, 1996. This application was dismissed mainly on the ground of territorial jurisdiction by the Sub-Judge-I, Chaibasa vide order dated 2nd May, 2008, against which, Arbitration Appeal No. 12 of 2008 has been preferred before this Court. Thus, mainly under Clause 16 to be read with Clause 20 of the partnership deed dated 1st April, 1955, this Arbitration Application has been preferred for appointment of an Arbitrator under Sub-section 6 of Section 11 of the Act, 1996 by the applicants, who are legal heirs of Thakur Prasad Sao, who was one of the partners in M/s Thakur Prasad Saopartnership firm. 3. Arguments canvassed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants: Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants mainly submitted that looking to Clause 16 to be read with Clause 20 of the partnership deed dated 1st April, 1955, the legal heirs of Thakur Prasad Sao are the partners and as the dispute has arisen between the partners, arising out of said partnership deed, notice was given to the rest of the partners for appointment of the Arbitrator. The said notice is dated 3rd September, 2008. The said notice is dated 3rd September, 2008. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants further submitted that even though subsequent partnership deed have been entered into in the year 2004 and 2010, they do not take away rights of these applicants under Clause 16 to be read with Clause 20 of the partnership deed of the year 1955. In view of the decision rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court reported in (2014) 5 SCC 1 , Clause 16 of the partnership deed of the year 1955 automatically makes these applicants and their legal heirs as partners. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants has taken this Court to various annexures of several affidavits, filed in this Arbitration Application as well as to the various annexures of Arbitration Appeal No. 12 of 2008 and has submitted that in revenue proceedings, both the parties have tried to point out that they are not solely responsible for payment of revenue to the State Government. These applicants have stated that they are partners in the partnership firm, whereas, the respondents have stated that these applicants are not partners and, therefore, evidence is to be taken by the learned Arbitrator instead of the same is to be decided by this Court. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants has also pointed out from the memo of Title Suit No. 5 of 2014 that the suit was filed on the last date of limitation, otherwise, they have already mentioned in paragraph no. 43 that the suit was filed without prejudice to the rights and contentions in other litigations including this Arbitration Application No. 27 of 2008. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants has relied upon several decisions to fortify their contentions which are as under: (2008) 13 SCC 667 ; (2009) 1 SCC 267 ; (2014) 5 SCC 1 ; (2014) 5 SCC 68 ; (2015) 8 SCC 193 and other decisions. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants that the effect of the original partnership deed cannot be taken away by subsequent partnership deeds of the year 2004 and 2010. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants that the effect of the original partnership deed cannot be taken away by subsequent partnership deeds of the year 2004 and 2010. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants has also relied upon Section 40 of the Act, 1996 and has submitted that the arbitration agreement shall not be discharged by the death of any party and the same is enforceable by or against, the legal representative of the deceased party to the arbitration agreement and, hence, notice was given by these applicants on 3rd September, 2008 for appointment of the Arbitrator and as the respondents have not agreed for the same, let this Court appoint an Arbitrator who may be a retired Hon'ble Judge of this High Court. 4. Arguments canvassed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents: It is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that these applicants were neither partners in the partnership deed of the year 1955 nor of the year 2004 nor of the year 2010 and, hence, this application under Sub-section 6 of Section 11 of the Act, 1996 is not tenable at law. It is further submitted by learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that these applicants are yet to be joined as partners in the partnership firm. They are claiming their rights as partners in various Courts, as stated hereinabove and these matters are pending in the court of Chaibasa as well as in this Court. The right of these applicants as partners is yet to be established. Unless they are parties to the partnership deed of the year 1955, the same is not applicable to these applicants. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has relied upon the decision rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court reported in (2008) 2 SCC 602 . The right of these applicants as partners is yet to be established. Unless they are parties to the partnership deed of the year 1955, the same is not applicable to these applicants. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has relied upon the decision rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court reported in (2008) 2 SCC 602 . It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that legal heirs of the original partners can claim right of their predecessor as partners, if there is any claim vested in them as partners, but, these applicants are claiming independent rights as partners though they are not partners in the partnership deed as mentioned in the partnership deed and, therefore also, this Arbitration Application preferred under Sub-section 6 of Section 11 of the Act, 1996 is not tenable at law. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that looking to Clause 16 of the partnership deed of the year 1955, there is no automatic induction of the legal heirs as partners. Learned senior counsel has also relied upon the affidavit filed by these applicants in the revenue matters, wherein, these applicants have denied their liabilities for the payment of revenues to the State Government mainly on the ground that they were not partners in the partnership firm. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel that these applicants are “chance taking applicants.” For the liabilities, they have denied their existence as partners and for getting some benefits, they are vehemently claiming as partners. This is the conduct of these applicants. At length, this conduct has been pointed out by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents with the help of various annexures from the affidavits, filed in this Arbitration Application. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has also relied upon the decisions reported in (1982) 2 SCC 499 , 2011 SCC Online Cal 1890 (Calcutta High Court), (2008) 13 SCC 667 and 2004 (118) Company Cases 341 (Punjab and Haryana High Court). Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has also relied upon the decisions reported in (1982) 2 SCC 499 , 2011 SCC Online Cal 1890 (Calcutta High Court), (2008) 13 SCC 667 and 2004 (118) Company Cases 341 (Punjab and Haryana High Court). On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that these applicants are not partners looking to the partnership deed of the year 1955 nor of the year 2004 and nor of the year 2010 and, hence, they cannot invoke arbitration Clause 20 from the partnership deed of the year 1955. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that once the Title Suit is filed by these applicants claiming their rights as partners in the partnership firm, they have waived their rights for the appointment of the Arbitrator and, hence, this application may not be entertained by this Court. REASONS: 5. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no reason to entertain this Arbitration Application mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) Originally, Thakur Prasad Sao was given mining lease and license for Iron ore and Manganese ore for 20 years from the year 1954 and, thereafter, partnership was entered into between Thakur Prasad Sao, Lakshmi Prasad Sao and Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao and the partnership deed was executed on 1st April, 1955. Clause 16 and Clause 20 have been read and re-read by the learned senior counsels for both the sides, which have been incorporated hereinabove. Looking to Clause 16 of the partnership deed, there is no automatic induction of legal heirs as partners in the partnership. (ii) Lakshmi Prasad Sao expired in the year 1982 and Thakur Prasad Sao expired in the year 1983. Various notices were issued by the Revenue Department of the State Government. Bibhuti Bhushan Prasad Sao and Ramesh Prasad Sao (legal heirs of Thakur Prasad Sao) have also given reply in the Certificate Case being C.C. No. 2 (OS) 1984-85, wherein, it has been stated by them on 20th September, 1995 that after the death of Thakur Prasad Sao, these applicants had never been partners nor they have any thing to do with the assets and liabilities of the said partnership firm. These facts have been stated in paragraph 11 of the reply given by these applicants. This document is annexed at Annexure-A to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 1. (iii) Similarly, in another Certificate Case No. 15 (Ex) 1978-79, it has been stated by Bibhuti Bhushan Prasad Sao and Ramesh Prasad Sao that after the death of Thakur Prasad Sao, only surviving partner is Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao because later on Lakshmi Prasad Sao has also expired and, therefore, they are not liable at all for payment of the revenue to the Government. This aspect of the matter has been highlighted in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the reply filed in Certificate Case No. 15 (Ex) 1978-79, which is at Annexure-C to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 1. (iv) It is submitted by learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants that similar is the allegation by the respondents also that these applicants are liable to make the payment of revenue and even after the death of Thakur Prasad Sao, his legal heirs are partners in the partnership firm. Thus, there are allegations and counter allegations, so far as payment of revenue to the State Government is concerned, but, the fact remains that after the death of Thakur Prasad Sao in the year 1983, these applicants have never shown their inclination to continue as partners in the partnership firm, on the contrary, they were resisting the contention of other side that they are partners in the partnership firm. (v) These applicants have also preferred W.P. (C) No. 2852 of 2008, which is pending before this Court, challenging the registration of reconstituted partnership firm in the year 2004. Similarly, Title Suit No. 5 of 2014 is also pending before the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I, Chaibasa, wherein, these applicants have claimed themselves partners in the partnership firm and the deed of the year 2010 is under challenge. One writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1680 of 2015 has been preferred by applicant no. 2 of this Arbitration Application challenging the action of the State Government of rejection of renewal of mining lease. Applicant no. 2 is also claiming himself to be a partner from the aforesaid litigations. One writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1680 of 2015 has been preferred by applicant no. 2 of this Arbitration Application challenging the action of the State Government of rejection of renewal of mining lease. Applicant no. 2 is also claiming himself to be a partner from the aforesaid litigations. Looking to the aforesaid litigations, it appears that consistently these applicants are claiming themselves to be the partners in the partnership firm and they are also challenging the subsequent partnership deeds of the year 2004 and 2010. These litigations are pending in various Courts as stated hereinabove. Looking to Clause 16 of the partnership deed dated 1st April, 1955, there is no automatic induction of the legal heirs as partners. Not a single document has been presented by these applicants which reveals that they were inducted as partners in the partnership firm viz. M/s Thakur Prasad Sao and once they are not the partners in the partnership firm, their application under Sub-section 6 of Section 11 of the Act, 1996 is not tenable at law. Their rights as partners in the partnership firm are in belligerent stage. Their rights as partners are yet to be established. The claims of these applicants as partners have not been established by the judgment and decree of any competent civil court and this Court while deciding this application, will not decide whether these applicants are partners or not. This fact has to be established before the lowest available Court as per the Code of Civil Procedure, especially under Section 15 thereof. (vi) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 267 in paragraph nos. 22, 22.1, 22.2 and 22.3 as under: “22. Where the intervention of the court is sought for appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11, the duty of the Chief Justice or his designate is defined in SBP & Co. This Court identified and segregated the preliminary issues that may arise for consideration in an application under Section 11 of the Act into three categories, that is, (i) issues which the Chief Justice or his designate is bound to decide; (ii) issues which he can also decide, that is, issues which he may choose to decide and (iii) issues which should be left to the Arbitral Tribunal to decide. 22.1. 22.1. The issues (first category) which the Chief Justice/his designate will have to decide are: (a) Whether the party making the application has approached the appropriate High Court. (b) Whether there is an arbitration agreement and whether the party who has applied under Section 11 of the Act, is a party to such an agreement. 22.2. The issues (second category) which the Chief Justice/his designate may choose to decide (or leave them to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal) are: (a) Whether the claim is a dead (long barred) claim or a live claim. (b) Whether the parties have concluded the contract/transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligation or by receiving the final payment without objection. 22.3. The issues (third category) which the Chief Justice/his designate should leave exclusively to the Arbitral Tribunal are: (i) Whether a claim made falls within the arbitration clause (as for example, a matter which is reserved for final decision of a departmental authority and excepted or excluded from arbitration). (ii) Merits or any claim involved in the arbitration.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, the issue which is bound to be decided by the designate of Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appointment of Arbitrator under Subsection 6 of Section 11 of the Act, 1996 is whether these applicants are parties to the arbitration agreement. This issue has to be decided by this Court. Looking to Clause 16 of the partnership deed dated 1st April, 1955, these applicants are legal heirs of deceased Thakur Prasad Sao and there is no automatic induction of these legal heirs. There is no document established by these applicants that they have inducted as partners in the partnership firm. Similarly, these applicants are also not the partners, looking to the partnership deed of the year 2004 (Annexure-D to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 1 in this Arbitration Application) and, therefore also, these applicants cannot prefer an application for the appointment of an Arbitrator. Similarly, these applicants are also not the partners, looking to the reconstituted deed of the partnership of the year 2010, which is at Annexure-E to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 1 and, therefore also, these applicants cannot prefer an application for appointment of an Arbitrator. Similarly, these applicants are also not the partners, looking to the reconstituted deed of the partnership of the year 2010, which is at Annexure-E to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 1 and, therefore also, these applicants cannot prefer an application for appointment of an Arbitrator. In fact, these applicants are claiming themselves to be the partners and their rights as partners are yet to be established. These rights can be settled by the competent trial court and at least not by this Court in this Arbitration Application, as a designate of Hon’ble the Chief Justice. (vii) Looking to the revenue proceedings and the affidavits filed by these applicants, as stated hereinabove, it appears that these applicants were not interested in becoming the partners in the partnership firm. The respondents have insisted the liabilities of these applicants for the payment of the revenue, but, these applicants have consistently denied their liabilities for payment of the revenue because they were never partners in the partnership firm. This reflects that these applicants have no respect for partnership deed and they were not inclined to become partners in the partnership firm and, therefore also, these applicants cannot prefer an application for the appointment of an Arbitrator. (viii) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Atul Singh vs. Sunil Kumar Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 602 in paragraph nos. 16 and 17 as under: “16. It is an admitted fact that neither Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh nor are the plaintiffs parties to the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992. There is no document as defined in Section 7 of the 1996 Act which may contain the signature of either Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh or the plaintiffs. Similarly, there is no document as contemplated by Clauses (b) or (c) of sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the 1996 Act from which it may be spelled out that either Rajendra Prasad Singh or the plaintiffs were parties to clause relating to arbitration contained in the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992. It is also an admitted fact that Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh was alive when the said partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 was executed. Therefore, on the face of it Section 8 of the 1996 Act would not apply to any dispute concerning the said partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 and the matter cannot be referred to arbitration. 17. It is also an admitted fact that Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh was alive when the said partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 was executed. Therefore, on the face of it Section 8 of the 1996 Act would not apply to any dispute concerning the said partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 and the matter cannot be referred to arbitration. 17. The first relief claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit is a decree for declaration that the reconstituted partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 was illegal and void and there was no intention or desire of Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh to retire from the partnership and further that the plaintiffs being heirs of Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh will be deemed to be continuing as partners to the extent of his share. It is true that the plaintiffs have also sought rendition of accounts and their share of profits from the partnership as well as interest over the unsecured loan and the principal amount of unsecured loan on rendition of accounts. For getting this relief, the plaintiffs undoubtedly rely upon the partnership deed dated 13.1.1989. However, this deed of 1989 could be relied upon and form the basis of the claim of the plaintiffs only if the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 was declared as void. If the deed dated 17.2.1992 was not declared as void and remained valid and operative, the plaintiffs could not fall back upon the earlier partnership deed dated 13.1.1989 to claim rendition of accounts and their share of profits. Therefore, in order to get their share of profits from the partnership business, it was absolutely essential for the appellant-plaintiffs to have the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 declared as illegal, void and inoperative. The relief for such a declaration could only be granted by the civil court and not by an arbitrator as they or Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh through whom the plaintiffs derive title, are not party to the said deed. The trial court had, therefore, rightly held that the matter could not be referred to arbitration and the view to the contrary taken by the High Court is clearly illegal.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, as these applicants were not parties to the agreement they cannot invoke arbitration clause and there is no establishment of the fact that they were partners or not because litigations for this purpose is pending in Civil Court. Such relief/declaration can be granted only by the civil court. In the facts of the present case, after the partnership deed of the year 1955, there is reconstitution of the partnership firm twice, firstly in the year 2004 and secondly in the year 2010. Unless these partnership deeds of the year 2004 and 2010 declared as void, no effect can be given to the partnership deed dated 1st April, 1955. This declaration viz. subsequent reconstitution of the partnership firm vide partnership deed of the year 2004 and 2010 can be declared as void by the civil court and not by this Court i.e. the designate of Hon’ble the Chief Justice for deciding this application under the Act, 1996. (ix) Already a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 2852 of 2008 has been preferred challenging registration of reconstituted partnership deed of the year 2004 and similarly Title Suit No. 5 of 2014 has been preferred by these applicants in civil court at Chaibasa challenging reconstitution of the partnership deed of the year 2010 reveal that these applicants cannot now prefer or continue with their application under Sub-section 6 of Section 11 of the Act, 1996. This tantamounts to the waiver of their rights to go for arbitration. (x) It is rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that looking to Clause 16 of the partnership deed dated 1st April, 1955 to be read with Section 40 of the Act, 1996 entitles the legal heirs of the partners to claim “any right of the original partners” who have expired, but, the legal heirs cannot claim any right “as partners themselves” because legal heirs are not automatically inducted as partners in the partnership firm. The right/status of these applicants as partners is yet to be established, is yet to be finalized, is yet to be adjudicated upon and their right/status is in belligerent stage, for which, Title Suit is already pending in the court of Chaibasa and, hence, such applicants cannot prefer Arbitration Application under the partnership deed. 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this Arbitration Application for appointment of the Arbitrator and, hence, the same is, hereby, dismissed. 7. 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this Arbitration Application for appointment of the Arbitrator and, hence, the same is, hereby, dismissed. 7. Accordingly, I.A. No. 957 of 2011 and I.A. No. 2133 of 2010 are disposed of, in view of final order passed in the Arbitration Application No. 27 of 2008. Arbitration Appeal No. 12 of 2008 8. In view of the final order passed in the Arbitration Application No. 27 of 2008, this appeal is, hereby, also dismissed. 9. Accordingly, I.A. No. 958 of 2011 and I.A. No. 2132 of 2010 are disposed of.