JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. The award passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.11 of 1989 dated 20.2.1997 is under challenge in this writ petition. 2. Case of the workmen is that they are employees of the Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited (for short “the FCI Ltd.”) and they belong to ministerial cadre. The management was paying overtime at single rate to the ministerial staff for the work done between normal working hours between 39 hours to 48 hours a week and 9 hours per day. They raised demand on 3.10.1975 that they should be paid overtime at one and half times of the ordinary wages for the work done between normal working hours between 39 hours to 48 hours per week and 9 hours per day. One tripartite settlement was signed between the representative of the workmen and the management on 4.12.1975 to regulate the payment of overtime to ministerial staff where it was agreed that the ministerial staff working between the normal working hours are to get at the rate of one and half times the ordinary rate of wages instead of single the ordinary rate of wages with effect from March, 1974. According to them the settlement dated 4.12.1975 covers all the ministerial staff employed under the management and does not differentiate between the ministerial staff doing general shift duty and the second party workmen. Hence they have raised their demand to get overtime as per the list enclosed from the date mentioned each as per the settlement dated 4.12.1975. While on the other hand, case of the management is that the tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1975 was to cover those ministerial staff who were not getting the plant allowances because of working for 48 hours in terms of Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1973. The ministerial staffs who are doing overtime between 39 hours to 48 hours are paid overtime wages at the rate of one and half time of their ordinary rate of wages as per the aforesaid tripartite settlement. The tripartite settlement covers the ministerial staff whose normal duty is 39 hours in a week and does not cover the ministerial staff who are always required to work for 48 hours and therefore given compensation of plant allowance. The tripartite settlement covers the ministerial staff whose normal duty is 39 hours in a week and does not cover the ministerial staff who are always required to work for 48 hours and therefore given compensation of plant allowance. The management has asserted that it is evident and manifestly clear from the minutes of the union and management meeting held on 12.10.1982, 28.1.1983 and 20.5.1983 that the tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1975 covers ministerial staff whose normal duty hours is 39 hours in a week and further in the meeting dated 12.10.1982 it was decided to make an early enquiry from the other units of the Fertilizer Corporation of India whether overtime is payable or plant allowance is payable to non-technical staff who performs 48 hours duty would be allowed plant allowance depending upon their designation. In the meeting dated 25.5.1983 it was agreed that the ministerial staff performing 48 hours duty instead of 39 hours duty in a week are entitled to plant allowance in terms of Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1973. The management has alleged that the union having accepted the principle of the management in sanctioning plant allowance to ministerial staff performing 48 hours instead of 39 hours duty in a week are estopped under law to take any advantage of the settlement dated 4.12.1975. On these disputes, the following reference has been made:- “Whether the ministerial staff of F.I.C. Ltd., Talcher Unit engaged in shift duty as per list enclosed in the schedule of reference are entitled to overtime allowance at the rate of 1-1/2 (one and half) times of ordinary rate of wages with effect from the date it was due at par with other ministerial staff ? If so what should be the details ?” The Labour Court, Bhubaneswar has formulated two issues, i.e.- (i) “Whether the ministerial staff of F.I.C. Ltd., Talcher Unit engaged in shift duty as per list enclosed in the schedule of reference are entitled to overtime allowance at the rate of 1½ (one and half) times of ordinary rate of wages with effect from the date it was due at part with other ministerial staff ? (ii) Is so what should be the details ? 3. In course of the proceeding the workmen has produced copy of the settlement vide Ext.1 dated 4.12.1975. (ii) Is so what should be the details ? 3. In course of the proceeding the workmen has produced copy of the settlement vide Ext.1 dated 4.12.1975. By putting reliance upon the settlement dated 4.12.1975 it has been submitted by the workmen that the management in the interest of the company and in exigency of job, posted the workmen in the plant in shift duty to do 48 hours duty in a week and such change if not compensated by overtime shall amount to change of condition of service and for the same no notice under section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was given to the concerned Union. While on the other hand, claim of the management is that the terms of settlement dated 4.12.1975 is very clear and unambiguous and according to the terms of settlement covers all the ministerial staff employed under the FCI Ltd., Talcher Unit and does not differentiate between the ministerial staff doing shift duty or other works. 4. The Labour Court after appreciating the rival submissions and after going through the terms of settlement has came to a finding that the claim of the management is based upon Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1973, while on the other hand the opposite party-workmen has relied upon the settlement dated 4.12.1975. According to the Labour Court since Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1983 is prior to the settlement dated 4.12.1973 and as such the settlement arrived in between the parties by the tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1973 will be applicable giving go by to the Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1973 and this is the main crux of dispute. As per the tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1975 the claim of the workmen found to be genuine and accordingly the reference has been answered in favour of the workmen. 5. As per the tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1975 the claim of the workmen found to be genuine and accordingly the reference has been answered in favour of the workmen. 5. In the backdrop of the factual aspects we have examined the fact in detail and after going into the finding of the Labour Court who has given finding basing upon the fact that the management is denying by way of Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1973 while the opposite party workmen is claiming the benefit in view of the tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1975 but according to us since Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1973 has been superseded by tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1975 and as such agreement arrived in between the parties by virtue of tripartite settlement dated 4.12.1975 will be applicable over and above the Central Office Circular dated 30.7.1973, otherwise there will be no meaning of coming to tripartite settlement between the parties. We have also examined provision of section18 of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 which dealt with binding effect of the settlement and since there is tripartite settlement having been arrived at on 4.12.1975, hence terms of settlement is binding upon the parties, for ready reference provision of Section18 of the I.D. Act is quoted hereunder:- “Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub- section (3), an arbitration award] which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration.] (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub- section (3A) of section 10A] or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable] shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.” 6. In view of the facts stated hereinabove and after going through the findings given by the Labour Court in the award impugned in this writ petition, we find no error apparent on the face of the record and hence we decline to interfere with the same. It is also settled that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as court of appeal to appreciate evidence rather High Court is only supposed to see perversity or error apparent on the face of the award, Reference in this regard needs to be made of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case:- It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 7. There is no dispute about the settled proposition that this court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as a court of appeal to differ with the finding given by the Tribunal which is based upon cogent evidence and the materials placed before it subject to exceptions that if there is perversity in finding or there is error apparent on the face of record or order is without jurisdiction, but we find that this case is not coming under these exception warranting interference with the award. Hence the writ petition is dismissed having no merit.