JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition is against the award dated 9.8.1996 passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.8 of 1992 whereby and where under order of reinstatement has been passed in favour of the opposite party-workman. 2. Case of the opposite party-workmen is that he was originally recruited by the petitioner-management in the year 1983 as a Jeep Driver and started his duty efficiently and deligently, promoted to the post of driver of the Jeep in the year 1986 and when posted at Lahunipada as a driver he was removed from service w.e.f. 17.5.1986 on the strength of the order communicated in order No.3939. According to the opposite party-workman being terminated, no charge-sheet in the enquiry and no procedure has been laid down under section 25-F of the I.D. Act has been followed. While on the other hand, case of the petitioner-management is that the petitioner is neither employer nor the opposite party-workman is a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. He was never recruited as Jeep Driver in the year 1973 and as such there is no question of issuance of any charge sheet or following the procedure under section 25-F of the I.D. Act. 3. The opposite party-workman after termination of service has raised dispute and the following reference has been made by the appropriate government for its adjudication by the Labour Court, the term of reference is quoted hereunder:- “Whether action of the Special Officer, TDCCO Ltd., Bhubaneswar in terminating the services of Sri Manu Majhi, Ex-Jeep Driver, vide his order no.3939 dated 17.5.1986 is legal and/or justified? If not, to what relief Sri Manu Majhi is entitled ?” 4. The Labour Court, Bhubaneswar after appreciating rival submissions of the parties have formulated two issues; i.e. (i) “Whether the aforesaid service termination of the workman is legal and justified ? (ii) If not, to what relief the workman is entitled ? 5. If not, to what relief Sri Manu Majhi is entitled ?” 4. The Labour Court, Bhubaneswar after appreciating rival submissions of the parties have formulated two issues; i.e. (i) “Whether the aforesaid service termination of the workman is legal and justified ? (ii) If not, to what relief the workman is entitled ? 5. We have closely examined the award and found that the Labour Court has given specific finding to the effect that- “in my opinion, action of the employer terminating service of the workman under his order No.3939 dated 17.5.1986 is neither illegal nor unjustified and therefore issue no.1 is accordingly decided.” Issue no.(i) is “whether the aforesaid service termination of the workman is legal and justified and that is the main term of reference and the Labour Court has given a specific finding answering issue no.(i) against the opposite party no.1, but even thereafter the order of reemployment has been passed. 6. The Labour Court has formulated two issue and issue no.(i) being the main issue has been answered by answering reference that the termination is legal land justified, hence there is no question of passing of order by the Labour Court. According to our considered view, the Labour Court has error in passing the award by answering issue no.(i) against the opposite party-workman, but simultaneously has answered issue no.(ii) in favour of the workman which is error apparent on the face of the record. We are, however, conscious of the fact that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not interfere with the fact finding, save and except, if the order suffers from perversity or there is error apparent on the face of the record, the order is without any jurisdiction, in this regard, reference in this regard needs to be made of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 7. In view of the proposition of the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, since we have already given finding that there is apparent error on the face of the record, hence this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is inclined to interfere with the award and accordingly we have quashed the impugned award. 8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed.