JUDGMENT : J.P. Das, J. - Assailed herein is the order dated 25.05.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Cuttack in CRLA No.26 of 2016 confirming the interim order passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Cuttack on 21.01.2016 in D.V. Misc. Case No.309 of 2015 under Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ("D.V.Act", in short) directing the present petitioner to provide a specific residence to the present opposite party in a proceeding under the D.V.Act filed by the present opposite party. 2. The proceeding under the D.V.Act was initiated by the present opposite party with the submissions that she married the present petitioner on 26.06.1991 and was blessed with two daughters: one in the year 1993 and the other in the year 2000. She alleged that from the day one of her marriage, she was ill-treated by the present petitioner and was physically and mentally tortured by the petitioner as well as by her in-laws. Narrating different instances of torture and assault, she alleged that on 13th March, 2014 she was driven out of the official quarters at Bhubaneswar by the present petitioner after being assaulted mercilessly and she came back to Cuttack to stay with her parents with her younger daughter. Again she visited her husband, the present petitioner at his official residence to see the well being of the elder daughter who was staying with the petitioner, but the alleged humiliation and torture continued. Ultimately, on 23.09.2015 since she was again assaulted and abused by the present petitioner-husband, she came back to her father's house at Cuttack and is residing there since then with her younger daughter. 3. The petitioner-husband filed objection denying the allegation of torture and assault with the further submission that the opposite party-wife is a quarrelsome female and did not want to stay with her in-laws for which in the year 1996, he has to take a government quarters since he was posted at Bhubaneswar by then to stay separately with his wife, the opposite party, and since last twenty years, the petitioner and opposite party were not staying with the joint family which falsified the allegation that she was tortured and humiliated by her in-laws. The present petitioner-husband denying the allegations submitted certain instances of the arrogancy of the opposite-party wife and contended that the allegations of domestic violence were absolutely false. 4. The present petitioner-husband denying the allegations submitted certain instances of the arrogancy of the opposite-party wife and contended that the allegations of domestic violence were absolutely false. 4. Subsequent thereto the present opposite party-wife filed a petition under Section 19(1)(f) read with Section 23 of the D.V.Act submitting that the husband was residing in a government quarters at OUAT Colony, Bhubaneswar, but has his own house at C-126, HIG Housing Board Colony Barmunda, Bhubaneswar where she along with her husband and other in-laws lived for a period of six years after their marriage in the year 1991 where after she resided along with her husband in the allotted Government quarters. She submitted that since the said house of her husband at Housing Board Colony at Barmunda is lying vacant and she was driven out of the company of her husband, she prayed for an interim order to reside in the said house, having no other alternate accommodation for herself. She also filed another petition claiming interim maintenance. The opposite party-husband therein filed counters to both the applications. He pleaded that although the house at Barmunda belonged to him, still it is presently occupied by some of his relations as because he along with his wife have been staying in government quarters since last twenty years and his parents are staying separately with his younger brother in Laxmisagar area of Bhubaneswar. He also pleaded that their younger daughter was reading in a school at Bhubaneswar but the petitioner-wife got her transferred to D.A.V. School, Cuttack without his knowledge and only to satisfy her ego she was asking for an order to stay in the specific house at Baramunda. Learned trial court by a common order dated 21.01.2016 allowed the prayers of the petitioner-wife directing the opposite party-husband to pay a monthly sum of Rs.20,000/- towards the maintenance of his wife and her minor daughter including medical expenses and the school fees. In the same order, the learned Magistrate also allowed the prayer of the petitioner-wife directing the respondent-husband to provide separate accommodation to the wife and minor daughter in their shared household at Housing Board Colony, Barmunda, Bhubaneswar. In the same order, the learned Magistrate also allowed the prayer of the petitioner-wife directing the respondent-husband to provide separate accommodation to the wife and minor daughter in their shared household at Housing Board Colony, Barmunda, Bhubaneswar. The said order was challenged before the learned Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Appeal No.21 of 2016 and by order dated 20th May, 2016, the learned Sessions Judge confirmed the order passed by the learned S.D.J.M., both in respect of the interim maintenances and residence order. 5. Submitting that the present petitioner-husband has been paying the interim monthly maintenance of Rs.20,000/- as directed, the present revision has been filed assailing the order of learned Sessions Judge, passed in respect of the residence confirming the direction of the learned S.D.J.M., Without going to the factual aspects of the case, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a residence order as has been passed by the learned S.D.J.M., could not have been passed as an interim measure under Section 23 of the D.V.Act. It was submitted that the provision under Section 23 of the D.V.Act empowers the learned Magistrate to pass such interim order taking into consideration the urgency of the situation and a residence order can only be passed under Section 19(1) of the D.V.Act while finally disposing of an application under Sub-Section 1 of Section 12 of D.V.Act and not before that. It was submitted that the learned trial court erred in law by passing a final order as an interim relief under Section 23 of the D.V.Act, more so in absence of any emergent situation in the given circumstances. 6. Per contra, it was submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that Section 23(1) of the D.V.Act empowers the Magistrate to pass any interim order as it deems just and proper and in the given circumstances of the present case there was absolutely no illegality in the impugned order so as to be interfered with in this revisional forum. 7. The factual matrix not being much in dispute, the only point raised to be considered is as to whether the direction for specific residence could have been given as an interim measure in the proceeding, as has been done by the learned trial court and confirmed by the learned appellate court. 7. The factual matrix not being much in dispute, the only point raised to be considered is as to whether the direction for specific residence could have been given as an interim measure in the proceeding, as has been done by the learned trial court and confirmed by the learned appellate court. In order to consider the rival contentions on the issue, it would be convenient to bring on record the relevant provisions in the D.V Act. xxx xxx xxx Section 2 (p) "residence order" means an order granted in terms of sub-section(1) of section 19; xxx xxx xxx Section 2 (s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household; xxx xxx xxx Section 17 Right to reside in a shared household.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. xxx xxx xxx Section 19 Residence orders (1) while disposing of an application under sub-section(1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order- (a) Restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) Directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) Restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared house hold in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) Restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) Restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) Directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause(b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman. (2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person. (3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (4) An order under sub-section(3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with accordingly. (5) While passing an order under sub-section(1), sub-section(2) or sub-section(3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in-charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (5) While passing an order under sub-section(1), sub-section(2) or sub-section(3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in-charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (6) While making an order under sub-section(1), the Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties. (7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the protection order. (8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled to. xxx xxx xxx 23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders- (1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. (2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent. 8. It is the undisputed position that the petitioner and the opposite party had stayed in the specific house at Baramunda, Bhubaneswar for about six years after their marriage in the year 1991, where after they have continued staying in the government quarters allotted in favour of the present petitioner. It is also the admitted fact that the opposite party left the company of the petitioner either being forced to or out of her own in the year 2015 while staying with the petitioner in the government quarters at Bhubaneswar and is staying with her parents at Cuttack and has got her younger daughter admitted in a school at Cuttack. The opposite party filed an application for interim order under section 19 (1) (f) read with section 23 of the D.V Act. The opposite party filed an application for interim order under section 19 (1) (f) read with section 23 of the D.V Act. Section 19 (1) (f) provides for direction to the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require. But in her petition she claimed for specific residence at Baramunda submitting that the said house was lying vacant. On the contrary it was pleaded by the respondent husband that the said house was under occupation of his relations. It was oath against oath at the preliminary stage of the case, there being no evidence led on behalf of either side. 9. The impugned order was passed by the learned Magistrate under section 23 (1) of the D.V Act since it was not an ex parte order and was passed after hearing both the sides. Section 23 (1) empowers the Magistrate to pass such interim order as he deems just and proper in a proceeding before him under the D.V Act. Any Residence order can be passed under the provisions of section 19 of the D.V Act and section 19 (1) mandates that while disposing of an application under section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order. Thus it refers to the stage of final disposal of the application and not before that, as has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner. Of course the aggrieved person has a right to stay in the shared household as per the provisions of section 17 of the DV Act. But in my considered opinion, that can only be considered at the time of final disposal of the proceeding. 10. It would not be out of place to mention that the D.V Act is a social beneficial legislation to protect the aggrieved persons victimised by domestic violence to get their rights protected and for being saved from vagary and destitution. Like any civil or matrimonial proceeding, provisions for interim arrangements have been mandated in the D.V Act to save the victims of domestic violence from any imminent danger or sustaining irreparable loss till the final settlement of the disputes. Like any civil or matrimonial proceeding, provisions for interim arrangements have been mandated in the D.V Act to save the victims of domestic violence from any imminent danger or sustaining irreparable loss till the final settlement of the disputes. An interim arrangement is made to temporarily settle some allegedly unsettled situation, if found out prima facie or to maintain the status quo, but it cannot be for unsettling a presumably settled position. Thus, in the given circumstances of the positions of the parties, as detailed herein before, I am of the view that the order directing the present petitioner to provide a specific residence to the opposite party, where she shared the household 20 years back, as an interim measure was not correct, either legally or factually. Of course there is no doubt that any such order can be passed at the time of final disposal of the proceeding, if found just and proper, on appreciation of the materials placed before the court in course of hearing. 11. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of hearing that the petitioner is prepared to secure same level of alternate accommodation as enjoyed by the opposite party in the shared household, if so directed as per the provisions of section 19 (1) (f) of the D.V Act, but excepting the bare submission there is nothing on record in that regard. 12. However, in view of my aforesaid discussions and findings, while setting aside the impugned interim order dated 21.01.2016 passed by the learned SDJM, Cuttack in D.V Misc. Case no. 309 of 2015 and confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Cuttack in CRLA No. 26 of 2016 by his order dated 25.05.2016, the learned trial court is directed to pass any such other interim order, if so applied for, as deemed just and proper, after giving both the parties opportunity of fresh hearing. Learned trial court would do well to finally dispose of the matter complying the direction given in section 12 (5) of the D.V Act, which would be in the interest of both the parties. The Revision application is disposed of accordingly. Final Result : Disposed Of