JUDGMENT : Arijit Banerjee, J. 1. In the present writ petition, the petitioner seeks a direction commanding the respondents to execute the formal Agreement and issue work order in terms of Clause 11 of the Tender dated 13.01.2014 and also prays for refund of Earnest Money Deposit which according to the petitioner, the respondents have wrongfully withheld. Case of the Petitioner:- 2. For the purpose of setting up of a Crash Barrier Unit at Kaisergang (UP), the respondent no. 1 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SAIL’) desired to appoint a Conversion Agent. On 13.01.2014 SAIL published notice inviting tender. SAIL had guaranteed that it would utilize 75 per cent of the entire production and that the appointment of Conversion Agent would be initially for five-years and extendable up to a period of eight years. The Conversion Agent was required to pay Rs. 30 lacs as Earnest Money Deposit and Rs. 40 lacs as Security Deposit. SAIL was required to issue a Letter of Intent in favour of the successful tenderer within sixty days and the Conversion Agent was required to procure the land for setting up of the unit within thirty days thereafter. The Conversion Agent had to put up the unit within a period of 18 months. The Agreement was required to be signed and work order was required to be issued by SAIL thereafter. Clause 26 of the Tender document is an arbitration clause for resolution of possible disputes between the parties through the process of arbitration. 3. The petitioner participated in the tender process and became the successful bidder. It deposited earnest money of Rs. 30 lacs and also furnished the Bank guarantee of Rs. 40 lacs towards security deposit as required by SAIL. It also complied with all other requisite formalities. 4. SAIL issued the Letter of Intent dated 06.02.2014 in favour of the petitioner. The Letter of Intent stated, inter-alia, that the petitioner was required to procure the land for the project as per the tender terms within thirty days from the date of Letter of Intent and that the petitioner was required to put up a new unit/plant for production of crash barriers out of input material supplied by SAIL and the unit should be ready within a maximum period of 18 months from the date of Letter of Intent. It also stated that on compliance of the aforesaid within the time prescribed, SAIL shall issue a work order enabling the petitioner to commence conversion work envisaged under the contract awarded to the petitioner. 5. The petitioner procured the requisite land for setting up the unit within the stipulated period of thirty days and submitted the deed of agreement as also the revenue records to SAIL. 6. On 19 July, 2014 SAIL sought some clarification from the petitioner as regards the title and the total land area. This was followed by another letter dated 28 July, 2014 wherein SAIL stated that on receiving the clarification it would complete other formalities. The petitioner furnished the required clarifications on 6 August, 2014. 7. In spite of the petitioner having completed all the formalities and having discharged all its obligations, no work order has been issued by SAIL in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner through its lawyer’s notice dated 28 October, 2014 called upon SAIL to sign the requisite Agreement forthwith and to refund the Earnest Money Deposit. However, there was no response to the said notice nor did SAIL sign the Agreement or issue work order. 8. After fulfilling all its obligations, the petitioner legitimately expected that being a well-known Government of India Enterprises, SAIL would act fairly and execute the Agreement followed by the issuance of work order. After the petitioner furnished the clarifications sought for by SAIL, there was no further query from SAIL. The Letter of Intent was never revoked by SAIL. Since the petitioner was under an obligation to set up the unit within 18 months from the date of the Letter of Intent, it started developing the land, engaged architects, consultants, technicians and engineers. In short, the petitioner set up all infrastructural facilities and placed orders for the requisite machinery, equipment and plant at huge cost. In the aforesaid factual matrix, the petitioner has approached this court by way of the present writ petition for a direction on SAIL to execute the Agreement with the petitioner and issue work order. 9. Primarily three submissions have been made on behalf of the petitioner. Firstly, it was submitted that in appropriate cases even in contractual matters, the Writ Court may interfere. Ld. 9. Primarily three submissions have been made on behalf of the petitioner. Firstly, it was submitted that in appropriate cases even in contractual matters, the Writ Court may interfere. Ld. Counsel submitted that this is a case where a Government of India enterprise which is an ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution has treated the petitioner so unfairly that the Writ Court should grant appropriate relief. Secondly, it was submitted that even if the Agreement between the parties contains an arbitration clause, the same would not affect the maintainability of a writ petition to enforce a right arising out of the contract since an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. This submission was made without prejudice to the submission of the petitioner that since there is no formal Agreement between the parties, no arbitration clause exists either. Thirdly, it was submitted that the judicial principles of legitimate expectation, a duty to act fairly on the part of SAIL and promissory estoppel, all apply in the facts of the case and all three principles warrant that relief be granted to the petitioner as prayed for. 10. Mr. Lahoti, Ld. Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner referred to and relied upon the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:- (a) Gujarat State Financial Corporation vs. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1983) 3 SCC 379 . Reliance was placed on paragraphs 7, 9, 12 and 13 of the judgment in support of the contention that if an instrumentality of the State which would be ‘other authority’ under Article 12 of the Constitution commits breach of a solemn undertaking on which the other side has acted violating its promise resulting in breach of contract, the aggrieved party not only may sue for damages but can also compel specific performance of the contract. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “Now if the appellant entered into a solemn contract in discharge and performance of its statutory duty and the respondent acted upon it, the statutory corporation cannot be allowed to act arbitrarily so as to cause harm and injury, flowing from its unreasonable conduct to the respondent. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “Now if the appellant entered into a solemn contract in discharge and performance of its statutory duty and the respondent acted upon it, the statutory corporation cannot be allowed to act arbitrarily so as to cause harm and injury, flowing from its unreasonable conduct to the respondent. In such a situation, the court is not powerless from holding the appellant to its promise and it can be enforced by a writ of mandamus directing it to perform its statutory duty. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would certainly lie to direct performance of a statutory duty by ‘other authority’ as envisaged by Article 12.” (b) ABL International Ltd. vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 553 . This decision was relied upon in support of the contention that in an appropriate case, a writ petition is maintainable against a State or an instrumentality of a State to enforce a contractual obligation. At paragraphs 27 and 28 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition:- (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of facts arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable. 28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. [See: Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks] And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” (c) Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Devi Ispat Ltd. (2010) 11 SCC 186 . This decision was relied upon in support of the contention that even if there is an arbitration clause in a contract, in certain cases, writ petitions will be maintainable to enforce rights arising out of such contract notwithstanding availability of an alternative remedy in the form of arbitration. At paragraph 28 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “28. It is clear that, (a) in the contract if there is a clause for arbitration, normally, writ court should not invoke its jurisdiction; (b) the existence of effective alternative remedy provided in the contract itself is a good ground to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and (c) if the instrumentality of the State acts contrary to the public good, public interest, unfairly, unjustly, unreasonably discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in its contractual or statutory obligation, writ petition would be maintainable. However, a legal right must exist and corresponding legal duty on the part of the State and if any action on the part of the State is wholly unfair or arbitrary, writ courts can exercise their power. In the light of the legal position, writ petition is maintainable even in contractual matters, in the circumstances mentioned in the earlier paragraphs.” (d) Union of India vs. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 5 SCC 697 . In the light of the legal position, writ petition is maintainable even in contractual matters, in the circumstances mentioned in the earlier paragraphs.” (d) Union of India vs. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 5 SCC 697 . At paragraph 33 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that on the question of maintainability of a writ petition on account of there being an arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties, it is well-established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court. The constitutional powers vested in the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be fettered by any alternative remedy available to the authorities. Injustice, whenever and wherever it takes place, has to be struck down as an anathema to the Rule of Law and the provisions of the Constitution. (e) Managing Director, Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation vs. Hari Om Enterprises, (2009) 16 SCC 208 . At paragraph 31 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it may be true that ordinarily in a matter of enforcement of a contract, qua contract, a Writ Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But, it is also trite that where the action of a State is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as being wholly unfair and unreasonable, the Writ Court would not hesitate to grant relief in favour of the person, where both law and equity demand that such relief should be granted. (f) Coal India Ltd. vs. Alok Fuels Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 157 . At paragraph 25 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is settled by a series of decisions of that court starting from Shrilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212 , that even in the domain of contractual matters, the High Court can entertain a writ petition on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution when the impugned act of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable or in breach of obligations under public law. (g) State of Karnataka vs. All India Manufacturers Organizations, AIR 2006 SC 1846 . (g) State of Karnataka vs. All India Manufacturers Organizations, AIR 2006 SC 1846 . This decision was relied upon in support of the contention that in appropriate cases the Writ Court can issue a mandamus directing the State or ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution to implement a project. At paragraph 57 of the judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows:- “57. Mr. Divan strongly urged that the relief granted was wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it would amount to granting a decree for specific performance in writ jurisdiction. A reading of the relief granted by the High Court does not persuade us that it is so. The High Court merely directed that the Project and the FWA, as conceived originally and upheld by the High Court in Somashekar Reddy (supra), should be implemented "in letter and spirit." In other words, the High Court said that there is no scope for raising frivolous and mala-fide objections for ulterior purposes. This, the High Court was fully entitled to do. It is trite law that when one of the contracting parties is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, it does not cease to enjoy the character of "State" and, therefore, it is subjected to all the obligations that "State" has under the Constitution. When the State's acts of omission or commission are tainted with extreme arbitrariness and with mala-fides, it is certainly subject to interference by the Constitutional Courts in this country.” (h) The D.F.O. South Kheri vs. Ram Sanehi Singh, (1971) 3 SCC 864 . This decision was relied upon in support of the submission that even in contractual matters, in appropriate cases, the Writ Court may interfere. At paragraph 4 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “4. Counsel for the appellants contends that since the dispute arose out of the terms of the contract and the Divisional Forest Officer under the terms of the contract had authority to modify any action taken by a subordinate forest authority, the remedy of the respondent, was to institute an action in the civil Court and that the writ petition was not maintainable. But in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest authority. But in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest authority. By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially in a contract, for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court in K.N. Guruswamy's case there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power.” 11. Relying on the aforesaid authorities, Mr. Lahoti submitted that this is a fit and proper case where this Court should grant relief to the petitioner in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Respondent’s Contention:- 12. The LOI was issued on 6 February, 2014 which contained certain specific conditions. Clause 4 of the LOI stated that on failure of the writ petitioner to submit the documents mentioned in the LOI within the time prescribed, the acceptance of the tender shall be withdrawn and the writ petitioner would be held responsible for all consequences. Paragraph 5 of the LOI provided that on compliance of the conditions specified in the LOI within the prescribed time the work order would be issued to the writ petitioner. Clause 6 of the LOI stated that for non-compliance/non-submission of any of the documents indicated in the LOI within the prescribed date, the Earnest Money Deposit would be forfeited by SAIL. 13. As per the LOI the petitioner was required to procure the land for the project within thirty days from the date of LOI. The petitioner failed to comply with such requirement within the time prescribed as the petitioner claims to have acquired the land by way of a sale deed dated 14/03/2014, admittedly, beyond a period of thirty days from the date of LOI. 14. By its letter dated 25.07.2014, the petitioner demanded refund of the Earnest Money Deposit of Rs. 30,00,000/-. The petitioner failed to comply with such requirement within the time prescribed as the petitioner claims to have acquired the land by way of a sale deed dated 14/03/2014, admittedly, beyond a period of thirty days from the date of LOI. 14. By its letter dated 25.07.2014, the petitioner demanded refund of the Earnest Money Deposit of Rs. 30,00,000/-. By its reply dated 28.07.2014 SAIL intimated the petitioner that as per clause 4(b) of the Instructions to Tenderers, the question of refund of such deposit would arise only on signing of the agreement. 15. As the Earnest Money Deposit stood forfeited due to noncompliance of the LOI conditions by the petitioner, there was no question of refunding the same. By operation of paragraph 4 of the LOI, the acceptance of the tender submitted by the petitioner also stood automatically withdrawn. As such, there could be no question of cancelling the LOI since the LOI also became ineffective. 16. A policy decision has been taken by SAIL to cancel the said tender and SAIL has decided to undertake the conversion process itself. In view of such policy decision SAIL cannot be forced to award the contract to the petitioner. 17. The reliefs claimed in the writ petition are firstly, a direction on SAIL to sign the agreement and issue work order and secondly, to refund the Earnest Money Deposit to the petitioner. The first part of the relief is in the nature of specific performance which cannot be granted in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The same could only be the subject matter of a civil suit. The question of granting the second relief does not arise since the Earnest Money Deposit stood forfeited for non-compliance of the LOI conditions by the petitioner. 18. The subject contract is in the nature of a private contract between the parties. It is in the private domain. It is a non-statutory contract. No statutory obligations are involved. There is no infraction of any statutory right of the writ petitioner. In the matter of alleged breach of contractual obligations flowing from a private contract and/or a non-statutory contract, the extraordinary constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked. In this connection reliance was placed by the Ld. Counsel on the following six decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. (a) Har Shankar vs. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, AIR 1975 SC 1121 . In this connection reliance was placed by the Ld. Counsel on the following six decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. (a) Har Shankar vs. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, AIR 1975 SC 1121 . In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching validity of contractual obligations. (b) M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 . At paragraphs 11 and 23 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that where contracts do not contain any statutory terms or obligations which could attract the application of Article 14 of the Constitution, no writ petition would be maintainable to enforce such contract. It was further observed that when a contract is sought to be terminated by the officers of the State purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between the parties, such an action is not taken in purported exercise of any statutory power at all. (c) The Divisional Forest Officer vs. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 1368 . At paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that ordinarily where a breach of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if the contract is capable of being specifically performed, or the party may sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable by the Civil Court. The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not entertain a petition either for specific performance of contract of for recovery of damages. A right to relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a Civil Court where a suit for specific performance of contract or for damages could be filed. (d) Bareilly Development Authority vs. Ajai Pal Singh, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 116 . At paragraph 22 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that there is a line of decisions that where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. (e) State of U.P. vs. Bridge & Roof Co. (e) State of U.P. vs. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. reported in AIR 1996 SC 3515 . At paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that where a contract is in the realm of private law, even if it is governed by the provisions of the Contract Act or may be also by certain provisions of Sale of Goods Act any dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated in a writ petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the contract or for civil court as the case may be. Whether any amount is due to the aggrieved party from the State under the contract and if so, how much and the further question whether retention or refusal to pay any amount by the government is justified or not, are all matters which cannot be agitated in or adjudicated upon in a writ petition. (f) Noble Resources Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 2007 SC 119 . At paragraph 15 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is trite if an action on the part of the State is violative of the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution, a writ petition would be maintainable even in the contractual field. A distinction indisputably must be made between a matter which is at the threshold of a contract and a breach of contract. Whereas in the former the court’s scrutiny would be more intrusive in the latter the court may not ordinarily exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, unless it is found to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 19. In this connection Ld. Counsel for SAIL also relied on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of M/s. Lalloo Ji & Sons vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1995 ALL. 142 . The Allahabad High Court held that the writ petition that had been filed before it was for performance of a contract which contained an arbitration clause. It held that if there be any breach of the terms of the contract within the terms of the arbitration clause such dispute or difference would be referred to the arbitrator and his decision shall be final and binding on both the parties. It held that if there be any breach of the terms of the contract within the terms of the arbitration clause such dispute or difference would be referred to the arbitrator and his decision shall be final and binding on both the parties. The court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution shall not entertain a petition for granting relief for specific performance of a contract. 20. Mr. Chatterjee, Ld. Sr. Counsel then submitted that the instant writ petition should not be entertained also because of the existence of an alternative remedy by way of arbitration. He pointed out that clause 26 of Annexure III to the invitation to tender is an arbitration clause providing for resolution of possible disputes and differences between the parties arising out of or in relation to the contract between the parties by way of arbitration. He submitted that the Letter of Intent issued by SAIL constituted a contract between the petitioner and the SAIL and the arbitration clause formed part of such contract by incorporation. In this connection he relied on the two following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. (a) M/s. Bisra Lime Stone Co. Ltd. vs. Orissa State Electricity Board, reported in (1976) 2 SCC 167 . At para 24 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “24. It is then submitted that this Court should not use its discretion in favour of arbitration in a matter where it is a pure question of law as to the power of the Board to levy a surcharge. This submission would have great force if the sole question involved were the scope and ambit of the power of the Board under Sections 49 and 59 of the Act to levy a surcharge, as it was sought to be initially argued. The question in that event may not have been within the content of clause 23 of the agreement. But all questions of law, one of which may be interpretation of the agreement, need not necessarily be withdrawn from the domestic forum because the court has discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the court is better posted to decide such questions. But all questions of law, one of which may be interpretation of the agreement, need not necessarily be withdrawn from the domestic forum because the court has discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the court is better posted to decide such questions. The arbitration clause 23 is a clause of wide amplitude taking in its sweep even interpretation of the agreement and necessarily, therefore, of clause 13 therein. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the submission that we should exercise our discretion to withhold the matter from arbitration and deal with it ourselves.” (b) Smt. Rukmanibai Gupta vs. Collector, Jabalpur, reported in (1980) 4 SCC 556 . At paragraph 10 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- “10. Arbitration Act, 1940, is a self-contained and exhaustive code. It provides for filing arbitration agreement to the jurisdiction of court, appointment and removal of arbitrator by court, making award a rule of Court, remitting or setting aside an award, etc. Where the arbitrator has made an award it can be questioned under section 33. Section 32 bars a suit on any ground whatsoever for contesting an award and further provides that no award shall be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in the Arbitration Act itself. Thus, Arbitration Act, 1940, is a self-contained exhaustive code. Relief sought by the appellant by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 could have been obtained by proceeding in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act. In this situation, if the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition, no exception can be taken to it. Further the indenture of lease constitutes a contract between the parties. Right to excavate lime stone from leased area and obligation to pay royalty under the relevant Minor Mineral Rules arise from the contract. The contract provided for resolution of dispute arising out of the carrying out of contract. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.” 21. Mr. Chatterjee then submitted that the petitioner has not been able to show how any of its legal rights has been infringed by SAIL wherefor a writ application can be filed by the petitioner. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.” 21. Mr. Chatterjee then submitted that the petitioner has not been able to show how any of its legal rights has been infringed by SAIL wherefor a writ application can be filed by the petitioner. No case of arbitrariness discrimination, inequality or illegality has been made out in the writ petition. Thus, factually no case of violation of Article 14 or Article 19 has been made out by the petitioner. 22. He further submitted that whether a contract is within the private law realm or public law domain should be decided on the touchstone of the principles mentioned by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC vs. Escort Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264 , para 102. The petitioner in reply:- 23. Mr. Lahoti, Ld. Sr. Counsel submitted that SAIL is a State controlled public sector company. Hence, it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The writ court can always mould the remedy to do complete justice between the parties. In the instant case, there is no agreement between the parties and, hence, there is no arbitration clause. The submissions of SAIL on the point of alternative remedy have no legs to stand on. 24. Even if the land was procured by the petitioner beyond the time stipulated in the LOI, this shortcoming was waived by SAIL when it asked for clarification regarding the land. Court’s View:- 25. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. 26. Having considered the pleadings on record and having heard the Ld. Counsel for the parties, in my opinion, the following two issues arise for determination in the present proceeding; (1) Whether the present writ application should be rejected on the ground that an alternative mechanism exists for redressal of the petitioner’s grievance in the form of arbitration? (2) If the first issue is answered in the negative, whether the writ petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the petition? 27. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition, it has been submitted by Ld. Counsel for SAIL that the LOI issued by SAIL in favour of the petitioner incorporates by reference the arbitration clause contained in the notice inviting tender. Thus, the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy and this court should not entertain the writ petition. 27. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition, it has been submitted by Ld. Counsel for SAIL that the LOI issued by SAIL in favour of the petitioner incorporates by reference the arbitration clause contained in the notice inviting tender. Thus, the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy and this court should not entertain the writ petition. 28. It settled law that existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. To encourage an aggrieved party to exhaust the avenue of an alternative remedy before the high prerogative writ jurisdiction is invoked, the courts have developed a rule that a writ petition shall not be entertained ordinarily if an alternative remedy exists. It is not a matter going to the jurisdiction of the Writ Court. It is a self-imposed restrain put by the Writ Court on itself. 29. Further, when the writ petition was first moved on 22.10.2014, the point of maintainability was raised by Ld. Counsel for SAIL. However, this court admitted the writ petition and passed an interim order thereby impliedly overruling the objection as regards the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. If a court admits a writ petition unconditionally in spite of it being pointed out that an alternative remedy exists and gives direction for final disposal of the matter after exchange of affidavits, in my opinion, it would not be proper for the court to reject the writ petition at the final hearing after exchange of affidavits only on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. If the respondent raises the question of maintainability of a writ petition at the time of admission on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy, then and in that event, the court should either reject the writ petition at the threshold if it is satisfied with the respondent’s submission or may admit the writ petition subject to or without prejudice to the question of maintainability raised by the respondent. In such an event, the question of maintainability may be revisited at the final hearing of the matter. In such an event, the question of maintainability may be revisited at the final hearing of the matter. However, in the event, the Court admits a writ petition unconditionally notwithstanding the respondent’s objection as regards the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy, the writ petition ought not to be rejected on the ground at the time of final hearing. For the reasons aforestated, the first issue is answered in the negative and is decided in favour of the petitioner. In my view, this writ petition should not be rejected at this final stage on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. 30. As regards the second issue, it is evident that the disputes between the parties are contractual in nature. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied on several authorities in support of his contention that the Writ Court shall not decline to interfere solely on the ground that the disputes between the parties are contractual in nature. In an appropriate case, a writ of mandamus may be issued to enforce a contractual right of a party against the State or ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The authorities cited on behalf of the petitioner have been noted above. Relying on the authorities, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that a writ petition is maintainable even in the contractual field and in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 31. If one carefully considers the decisions cited by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner, it would be clear that in all those cases the State or ‘other authority’ had entered into a contract with a private party in exercise of its statutory power or in discharge of statutory obligation. The contracts in those cases had a statutory flavour and a public element. The contracts were not of a private in nature as in the present case. That is why, in my opinion, the writ courts interfered in those cases. 32. In the present case, the petitioner is seeking to enforce a private right under a commercial contract. Primary relief sought in the writ petition is in the nature of specific performance of a contract. Such a relief is civil in nature and cannot be obtained through the mechanism of a writ petition. 32. In the present case, the petitioner is seeking to enforce a private right under a commercial contract. Primary relief sought in the writ petition is in the nature of specific performance of a contract. Such a relief is civil in nature and cannot be obtained through the mechanism of a writ petition. The remedy of the petitioner is to file a civil suit for specific performance of the contract. Unless the action challenged in the writ petition pertains to the discharge of a public function or public duty by an authority, the courts will not entertain a writ petition which does not involve the performance of such public function or public duty. As observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of UP vs. Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Ltd. (supra), the contract between the parties is a contract in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. Any dispute relating to the interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated in a writ petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the contract or for the civil court. It has been specifically stated on behalf of SAIL that a policy decision has been taken by SAIL to cancel the tender and to undertake the conversion process itself. It is not the case of the petitioner that SAIL has awarded the work to any other contractor. In the teeth of the submission that SAIL itself has decided to undertake the conversion process, it would not be proper to compel SAIL to have the work done through the petitioner. 33. In this connection, one may also refer to a Division Bench decision of this Court delivered on 23 February, 2015, in MAT No. 1937 of 2014 (Dr. Nagendra Rai vs. Howrah Improvement Trust & Others). In that case the writ petitioner prayed for primarily a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to accept the balance consideration amount and to execute and register the Deed of Conveyance in favour of the petitioner in respect of the concerned plot of land as also a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to rescind/withdraw the decision to cancel the bid of the petitioner and/or to cancel the tender process. In its judgment, the Division Bench held, inter-alia, as follows:- “On going through the prayers of the present writ petition as referred above, the writ petition is seeking reliefs what could be sought in a suit for specific performance. In the present case, when HIT offered to return the security deposit, appellant refused to accept the same. This was immediately after disposal of writ petition. He has not accepted the refund. Many factual issued have to be gone into in a suit for specific performance especially whether the parties were ready and willing to perform their respective part of the contract. The appellant is seeking to enforce a contractual obligation in public law domain. Whether there was a concluded contract between the parties is one aspect of the matter and even if there was a concluded contract between the parties whether this Court is bound to grant the reliefs sought in the writ petition is another aspect of the matter. Acceptance of bid amount will not amount to concluded contract as many other formalities have to be complied with especially remitting balance consideration of the land and other formalities like measurement of the land acceptable to the purchaser, etc. Appellant never came forward to tender balance consideration. According to him, he could not do so as at the instance of one Mr. Omprakash the matter was pending till it was disposed of by Apex Court. If the appellant had offered balance consideration and HIT refused to accept the same, it is altogether a different matter except saying that the appellant was always ready and willing to deposit the balance consideration. He has not come forward to deposit the money subsequently to the offer of refund of the security deposit by HIT till disposal of matter before Apex Court. Even otherwise whether there was concluded contract between the parties and whether discretionary relief of specific performance could be granted in favour of the appellant are all matters to be decided in a regular suit. In the absence of allegation of mala-fide or arbitrariness which is not pleaded in the present writ petition, we fail to understand how the writ petition is maintainable for grant of present reliefs which could be sought in a regular suit.” 34. In the absence of allegation of mala-fide or arbitrariness which is not pleaded in the present writ petition, we fail to understand how the writ petition is maintainable for grant of present reliefs which could be sought in a regular suit.” 34. The petitioner contends that it has made huge investment relying on the LOI to set up the unit for manufacturing crash barriers and all such investment will be wasted if SAIL does not get the work done through the petitioner. SAIL on the other hand contends that LOI stood automatically withdrawn and the tender stood automatically cancelled by reason of breach of the terms of the LOI on the part of the petitioner. This, as also whether or not SAIL could have forfeited the Earnest Money Deposit, are disputed questions of facts and law for the adjudication of which a Writ Court is not the proper or convenient forum. In my view, the remedy of the petitioner sounds in damages and the proper forum for the writ petitioner to ventilate its grievance is the civil court. 35. It may also be noted that in the case of LIC vs. Escorts Ltd. (supra), a Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that if the action of the State is political or sovereign in character, the Writ Court will stay away from it. The court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations, the court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the court will examine actions of state if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. In my opinion, the present case before this court does not fall in the public law domain and as such interference by a Writ Court is not warranted. 36. For the reasons aforestated, this writ application fails and is dismissed. The interim order that is subsisting stands vacated. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will, however, be no order as to costs. 37. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.