JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner is a Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and carrying on business in steel sector, mostly engaged in Cold rolled, galvanized and special steel producer having its producing plant located at Meramandali, Orissa required to import different items through Paradip Port. For the purpose of said import, an arrangement was made to utilize the plots allotted for a period of 11 months on charging of ground rent subject to renewal. The plots have been classified as siding plots and non-siding plots depending upon their proximity from the railway line. The petitioner having been allotted with the plots, the same were utilized as per the terms and conditions of such allotment, but all of a sudden on 06.04.2011 in Annexure-3, Paradip Port Trust introduced Minimum Guarantee Throughput (MGT) for siding and non-siding plots though subsequently by letter dated 03.01.2012 under Annexure-4, the same has been withdrawn. The period of which the petitioner was in possession of the siding and non-siding plots those were utilized to ensure the movement of Minimum Guarantee Quantum for which the petitioner had to execute a bank guarantee of Rs.12,63,64,500/- issued on 20.05.2011 and was valid up to 31.07.2012. But, the opposite party having raised illegal demand on 04.04.2012 for an amount of Rs.5,24,05,296/- vide Annexure-9 which was subsequently revised on 05.04.2012 amounting to Rs.4,73,09,637/- vide Annexure-10, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing this present writ petition. 2. Mr. R.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner along with Miss S. Ratho, advocate strenuously urged before this Court that Paradip Port Trust has no authority to fix MGT pursuant to letter under Annexure-3 dated 06.04.2011. Apart from the same, the petitioner being the “licencee”, the Land Policy for Major Ports issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India dated 13.01.2011 has no application in the present case, if at all same is applicable, would be applicable to the “lease” holder. As such, there is difference between “lease” and “licence”. The petitioner being the licence holder, the said principle is not applicable. Thereby any consequential demand raised cannot sustain in the eye of law. To substantiate his contentions, he has relied upon Purbanchal Cables and Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board and another, (2012) 7 SCC 462 , Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. The petitioner being the licence holder, the said principle is not applicable. Thereby any consequential demand raised cannot sustain in the eye of law. To substantiate his contentions, he has relied upon Purbanchal Cables and Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board and another, (2012) 7 SCC 462 , Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. V. Status Spinning Mills Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 2838 , Union of India and Ors. v. B.V. Gopinath, AIR 2014 SC 88 , M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair and another v. State of Kerala and others, (2005) 11 SCC 45 and Shehla Burney (DR.) and others v. Syed Ali Mossa Raza (dead) by Lrs. And Others, (2011) 6 SCC 529 along with other decisions. 3. Mr. G. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Paradip Port Trust argued with vehemence stating that the entire action has been taken by imposing MGT being a part of Land Policy for Major Ports, 2010 issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India dated 13.01.2011. Therefore, the claim made by the opposite party-Paradip Port Trust is wholly and fully justified. Apart from the same, it is urged that when MGT has been fixed, the petitioner has not objected the same. Rather having acted upon on the basis of such MGT, subsequently demand was raised, he could not have assailed the same before this Court by filing the present writ petition. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon State of Haryana and others v. Lal Chand and others, AIR 1984 SC 1326 and Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar and others, (2010) 12 SCC 576 . 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter has been decided finally at the stage of admission. 5. The thrust of the contention is that Paradip Port Trust has no authority to issue office order dated 06.04.2011 in Annexure-3 by imposing MGT on the petitioner. Section 2(aa) of the Major Port Trusts Act defines “Authority”, which is quoted below: “2(aa):- “Authority” means the Tariff Authority for Major Ports constituted under Section 47A.” The meaning attached to the authority mainly indicates that it is the Tariff Authority for Major Trust constituted under Section 47 (A) can fix the MGT. Section 49 of the Major Trusts Act reads as follows: “49. Section 49 of the Major Trusts Act reads as follows: “49. Scale of rates and statement of conditions for use of property belonging to Board- (1) The Authority shall from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, also frame a scale of rates on payment of which, and a statement of conditions under which, any property belonging to, or in the possession or occupation of, the Board, or any place within the limits of the port or the port approaches may be used for the purposes specified hereunder: (a) approaching or lying at or alongside any buoy, mooring, wharf, quay, pier, dock, land, building or place as aforesaid by vessels; (b) entering upon or plying for hire at or on any wharf, quay, pier, dock, land, building, road, bridge or place as aforesaid by animals or vehicles carrying passengers or goods; (c) leasing of land or sheds by owners of goods imported or intended for export or by steamer agents; (d) any other use of any land, building, works, vessels or appliances belonging to or provided by the Board. (2) Different scales and conditions may be framed for different classes of goods and vessels. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Board may, by auction or by inviting tenders, lease any land or shed belonging to it or in its possession or occupation at a rate higher than that provided under subsection (1).” 6. On perusal of the above provision it indicates if the authority imposes MGT that can only be prospective one and as such the Act does not authorize any rate or fee retrospectively. Much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the opposite parties on Land Policy Guideline, 2010 under Annexure A/1 issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India dated 13.01.2011. Clause 6.2.2.3 of the said Land Policy, 2010 clearly states that it applies to the existing and new leases. In Clause 6.2.2.3 (2)(i) states as follows: “The port is at liberty to prescribe MGT/MGR (Minimum Guaranteed Revenue) conditions for fresh leases, if deemed fit”. Therefore, the Land Policy Guideline, 2010 issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India under Annexure- A/1 is applicable in case of “lease” not in case of “licence”. Annexure-1, the allotment of plot was issued by opposite party- Paradip Port Trust on 24.03.2011. Clause (i) clearly indicates as follows: “(i). Therefore, the Land Policy Guideline, 2010 issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India under Annexure- A/1 is applicable in case of “lease” not in case of “licence”. Annexure-1, the allotment of plot was issued by opposite party- Paradip Port Trust on 24.03.2011. Clause (i) clearly indicates as follows: “(i). You are requested to deposit the licence fees @ Rs.1200/- per 100 Sqm. Per month plus 10% surcharge plus 10.3% service tax as per scale of rates for the plot immediately.” 7. The stand of the petitioner is that it has been granted “licence” which has been fortified in paragraphs-6 and 26 of the counter affidavit filed by opposite party no.1. Paragraphs 6 and 26 are quoted below: “6. That the allotment of land on licence basis in Paradip Port Trust is governed by the Paradip Port Trust Immovable Properties (Land and Houses) Leasing and Licensing Regulations, 1975. In addition to the aforesaid regulations land allotment is also governed by the guidelines issued by the Ministry from time to time. The latest guidelines are formulated under the “Land Policy for Major Ports, 2010.” A copy of the Land Policy for Major Ports, 2010 is annexed herewith as Annexure-A/1.” Xxx xxx xxx “26. That with regard to averments made in paragraph-11 of the writ petition, it is humbly submitted that the port realizes license fee for allotment of plots inside port prohibited area. As per Govt. guidelines, the license fee which is towards ground rent, electricity, road facilities etc has been fixed by the TAMP on the lower side enabling the importers including the petitioner to coverage cargo instead of using the Port’s storage plots into their own ware houses. To counter this menace, the Board of Trustees decided to introduce MGT so that the limited facilities/infrastructure inside the port can be put to optimal use. Subsequently the Board was constrained to drop the system as importers diverted cargo from PPT to other ports.” 8. On the basis of the materials available on record, since opposite party no.1 has admitted “licence” has been granted to the petitioner, the Land Policy Guideline, 2010 issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India has no application to the present context. 9. There is a distinction between “licence” and “lease”. On the basis of the materials available on record, since opposite party no.1 has admitted “licence” has been granted to the petitioner, the Land Policy Guideline, 2010 issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India has no application to the present context. 9. There is a distinction between “licence” and “lease”. Licence has been defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act, whereas lease has been defined under Section 105 of the Transfer of Properties Act. In Mangal Amusement Park (P) Ltd. & Anr. V. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 3325 , Paragraph 16 reads as follows: “16. Consideration of the rival submissions The principle question to be considered is as to whether the document of allotment of land dated 6.5.1994 was in any way a lease or a license. As far as a lease is concerned, Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, defines it as follows: "105. Lease defined.- A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined.- The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent." As far as a license is concerned, the same is defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, as follows:- "52. "License" defined.- Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license." From these two definitions it is clear that a lease is not a mere contract but envisages and transfers an interest in the demised property creating a right in favour of the lessee in rem. As against that a license only makes an action lawful which without it would be unlawful, but does not transfer any interest in favour of the licensee in respect of the property.” 10. In view of clear distinction made between the “licence” and “lease” as mentioned above and on perusal of the provisions contained in the Land Policy on which reliance has been placed by the opposite party, it is made clear that the same is only applicable in case of “lease” not in case of “licence”. More so, if at all the imposition of any rate, it should be prospectively applied and it cannot have any retrospective effect. 11. In view of the provisions contained in Section 49 of the Major Port Trusts Act, the letter dated 06.04.2011 is an office order on the basis of the resolution passed by Board of Trustees of the Paradip Port Trust in the meeting held on 25.03.2011 which has been issued by the Traffic Manager on approval of the said Board. On perusal of the provisions contained in Section 2(aa), the “Authority” has been defined, the notification in question ought to have been issued by the said authority. The Land Policy under Annexure A/1 has been issued on 13.01.2011, but the authority as has been defined under Section 2(aa), namely, Tariff Authority has approved it in exercise of power under Section 49 of the Act only on 04.08.2011, which is apparent from the document under Annexure-D/1 filed by opposite party no.1 by which under Clause-2 it has been provided as follows: “2. In order to ensure that the provisions in the existing scale of Rates/Schedule of the License Fee/Lease Rentals of the Major port trusts are in consonance with the provisions prescribed in the Land Policy for Major Ports-2010, the following conditionality is prescribed for common application at all the Major Port Trusts (except Mumbai Port Trust): “All the conditions/notes prescribed in the existing Scale of Rates/Schedule of License Fees and Lease Rentals shall apply to the extent they are not inconsistent with the conditions prescribed in the Land Policy for Major Ports-2010 announced by the Government on 13th January 2011. In case of disagreement, the conditions prescribed by the Government in the Land Policy for Major Ports-2010 shall prevail.” 12. In case of disagreement, the conditions prescribed by the Government in the Land Policy for Major Ports-2010 shall prevail.” 12. From the sequence of events, it appears that the Land Policy of Major Port Trust 2010 was issued on 13.01.2011 vide Annexure A/1, but the Board of Trustee of Paradip Port Trust issued office order fixing MGT on the petitioner being a “licensee” on 06.04.2011, but the Tariff Authority for the Major Ports which is defined under Section 2(aa) of the Major Port Trusts Act issued notification on 04.08.2011 under Annexure D/1. Therefore, the “authority” as defined under Section 2(aa) having issued notification in exercise of power under Section 49 of the Major Port Trusts Act on 04.08.2011 under Annexure-D/1, the Board of Trustees of Paradip Port Trust could not have issued office order in Annexure-3 on 06.04.2011. As such the Port is not empowered to issue any notification imposing anything, which is covered under Section 49 of the Act itself. 13. In view of Clause-3 of the notification dated 04.08.2011 under Annexure D/1 issued by the Tariff Authority amendment to the scale of rates shall take retrospective effect from 13.01.2011, i.e., from the date of announcement of the Land Policy, 2010. On the basis of applicability of the Land Policy in Annexure-A/1 dated 13.01.2011 demand has been raised retrospectively, which is not permissible under law. It is the well settled principle of law laid down by the apex Court time and again that demand cannot be raised or enhanced retrospectively. In other words, liability cannot be created retrospectively. In Purbanchal Cables and Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board and another, (2012) 7 SCC 462 , the apex Court held in paragraphs 50, 51 and 52 as follows: “50. In State of Punjab v. Bhajan Kaur this Court held: (SCC p. 116, para 9) “9. A statute is presumed to be prospective unless held to be retrospective, either expressly or by necessary implication. A substantive law is presumed to be prospective. It is one of the facets of the rule of law.” 51. There is no doubt about the fact that the Act is a substantive law as vested rights of entitlement to a higher rate of interest in case of delayed payment accrues in favour of the supplier and a corresponding liability is imposed on the buyer. It is one of the facets of the rule of law.” 51. There is no doubt about the fact that the Act is a substantive law as vested rights of entitlement to a higher rate of interest in case of delayed payment accrues in favour of the supplier and a corresponding liability is imposed on the buyer. This Court, time and again, has observed that any substantive law shall operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is clearly made out in the language of the statute. Only a procedural or declaratory law operates retrospectively as there is no vested right in procedure. 52. In the absence of any express legislative intendment of the retrospective application of the Act, and by virtue of the fact that the Act creates a new liability of a high rate of interest against the buyer, the Act cannot be construed to have retrospective effect. Since the Act envisages that the supplier has an accrued right to claim a higher rate of interest in terms of the Act, the same can only be said to accrue for sale agreements after the date of commencement of the Act i.e. 23-9-1992 and not any time prior.” The above view is a reiteration of the view in Assam Small Scale Industries Development Corporation Ltd. v. J.D. Pharmaceuticals, (2005) 13 SCC 19 . 14. In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. V. Status Spinning Mills Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 2838 , the apex Court in paragraphs 37 and 38 held as follows: 37. A statute, even a subordinate legislation, may have to be construed reasonably. A subordinate legislation ordinarily would not be given a retrospective effect. Retrospective effect can be granted only if there exists any power in that behalf. There is nothing to show that such a power has been conferred upon the State in terms of the Act. While saying so, we are not oblivious of the situation that the State has a statutory power to fix the tariff. It may also be true that when a statutory power is conferred, the State would have power to amend, alter, modify or rescind the same. The Court must also bear in mind that it may not cause undue hardship. While saying so, we are not oblivious of the situation that the State has a statutory power to fix the tariff. It may also be true that when a statutory power is conferred, the State would have power to amend, alter, modify or rescind the same. The Court must also bear in mind that it may not cause undue hardship. What we mean to say that if construction of a statute is possible as a result of hardship is avoided, vis-a-vis, an undue hardship would be created, the Court will prefer the former interpretation. The proviso is an exception to the main clause whereas all industries which were set up on or after 15th February become wholly ineligible for any tariff concession but those who had set up prior thereto shall continue to avail themselves of the said tariff concession. Legally, those who had not become consumer of electrical energy; but were the potential consumers, they had not only applied for it but they were and, in fact, some of them has also been gone into commercial production. Once they have set up the high tension industries and who had gone up for commercial production must be held to have set up the high tension industries. Once they have set up the high tension industries after 31st March, 1995, they became entitled to the benefit of concessional tariff for a period of three years. Such concession was to be availed by them from the date of grant of service connection. If they had already been granted service connection, they would continue to avail themselves of the said tariff concession. However, the difficulty arises only in cases where despite applying for grant of electrical communication, actual service connection had not been granted. If a literal interpretation of the proviso is taken recourse to, the same may result in an anomaly in the sense that in one case, connection may be granted in one day and in another case, connection may not be granted for a long time. Because of the acts of discrimination on the part of the officers of the Board or the State, the entrepreneurs would suffer. It is in the aforementioned limited sense, the doctrine of promissory estoppel will have application. If doctrine of promissory estoppel applies, the right accrued in terms thereof cannot be withdrawn with a retrospective effect. Because of the acts of discrimination on the part of the officers of the Board or the State, the entrepreneurs would suffer. It is in the aforementioned limited sense, the doctrine of promissory estoppel will have application. If doctrine of promissory estoppel applies, the right accrued in terms thereof cannot be withdrawn with a retrospective effect. (See Mahabir Vegetable Oils (P) Ltd. (supra); Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. (supra)) 38. In MRF Ltd., Kottayam v. Asstt. Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and others, ( (2006) 8 SCC 702 ), this Court held: "In any event, the appeal preferred by the State of Kerala was dismissed and the judgment of the High Court has therefore become final. Accordingly, it was held that Section 10(3) does not confer the power to withdraw an exemption with retrospective effect. Effect of this is that the amendment Notification SRO No. 38/98 has to be read so as not to take away or disturb any manufacturer's pre-existing accrued right of exemption for a period of 7 years. If SRO No. 38/98 is construed as now contended by the respondent, then the inevitable consequence would be that SRO No. 38/08 would itself be rendered ultravires Section 10(3) of the Act, and therefore, illegal, bad in law and null and void ." On perusal of the provisions contained in Section 49 of the Major Port Trusts Act and the law discussed above, it does not authorize to issue notification retrospectively. Therefore, the notification issued in Annexure-D/1 dated 04.08.2011 giving retrospective effect is contrary to the provisions contained in Section 49 of the Act itself. 15. Section 49 power cannot be delegated by the authority as the said provision does not empower such delegation or sub-delegation. The well settled principle of law is that the essential function cannot be delegated or sub-delegated. In Union of India and Ors. v. B.V. Gopinath, AIR 2014 SC 88 , the apex Court in paragraphs-43 and 44 held as follows: “43. Accepting the submission of Ms. Indira Jaising would run counter to the well known maxim delegatus non protest delegare (or delegari). The principle is summed up in "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" De Smith, Woolf and Jowell (Fifth Edition) as follows:- "The rule against delegation A discretionary power must, in general, be exercised only by the authority to which it has been committed. Indira Jaising would run counter to the well known maxim delegatus non protest delegare (or delegari). The principle is summed up in "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" De Smith, Woolf and Jowell (Fifth Edition) as follows:- "The rule against delegation A discretionary power must, in general, be exercised only by the authority to which it has been committed. It is a well-known principle of law that when a power has been confided to a person in circumstances indicating that trust is being placed in his individual judgment and discretion, he must exercise that power personally unless he has been expressly empowered to delegate it to another." The same principle has been described in "Administrative Law" H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth (Ninth Edition), Chapter 10, as follows:- "Inalienable discretionary power An element which is essential to the lawful exercise of power is that it should be exercised by the authority upon whom it is conferred, and by no one else. The principle is strictly applied, even where it causes administrative inconvenience, except in cases where it may reasonably be inferred that the power was intended to be delegable. Normally the courts are rigorous in requiring the power to be exercised by the precise person or body stated in the statute, and in condemning as ultra vires action taken by agents, sub-committees or delegates, however expressly authorized by the authority endowed with the power." 44. This principle has been given recognition in Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (1994 AIR SCW 3832) (supra), wherein it was held as under: "6. By now it is almost settled that the legislature can permit any statutory authority to delegate its power to any other authority, of course, after the policy has been indicated in the statute itself within the framework of which such delegate (sic) is to exercise the power. The real problem or the controversy arises when there is a sub delegation. It is said that when Parliament has specifically appointed authority to discharge a function, it cannot be readily presumed that it had intended that its delegate should be free to empower another person or body to act in its place." Similar view has also been taken by the apex Court in The Marathwada University Vrs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, AIR 1989 SC 1582 (para 19), Director General E.S.I and another Vrs. T. Abdul Razak, AIR 1996 SC 2292 (para 14), NGEF Ltd. Vrs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, AIR 1989 SC 1582 (para 19), Director General E.S.I and another Vrs. T. Abdul Razak, AIR 1996 SC 2292 (para 14), NGEF Ltd. Vrs. Chandra Developers (P) Ltd. and another, (2005) 8 SCC 219 (para 69) and Rahul Builders Vrs. Arihant Fertilizer & Chemicals and another, (2008) 2 SCC 321 (para 28). The inevitable conclusion is that on 06.04.2011 when Annexure-3 was issued, the Land Policy dated 13.01.2011 had not come into force. It came into force only when Annexure- D/1 was issued by virtue of notification issued on 04.08.2011. “Authority” as defined under Section 2(aa) has not notified any rate in official gazette by the time Annexure-3 was issued on 06.04.2011. Even after issuance of notice under Annexure A/1 dated 13.01.2011, the “Authority” as defined under Section 2(aa) has not notified any rate there under. Therefore, any demand raised on the basis of the Land Policy in Annexure-D/1 giving retrospective effect is contrary to the provisions contained under Section 49 of the Act itself. Therefore, the demand so raised giving retrospective effect cannot sustain in the eye of law. 16. The petitioner under compelling circumstances had paid the demand so raised giving retrospective effect otherwise it would have been thrown out of the Port area. As such, Paradip Port Trust has monopoly in respect of aforesaid situation. After realizing own mistake, the office order dated 06.04.2011 under Annexure-3 has been withdrawn on 03.01.2012 in Annexure-4. As it is well settled principle of law laid down by the apex Court time and again, that every demand by the State or State owned organizations must be backed by law. The State or its instrumentality cannot collect any amount without authority of law. In M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair and another v. State of Kerala and others, (2005) 11 SCC 45 , the apex Court in paragraphs 51, 52 & 53 observed as follows: “51. In P. Nallammal v. State, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 562-63, para 7) “7. … The volte-face of the Union of India cannot be frowned at, for, it is open to the State or Union of India or even a private party to retrace or even resile from a concession once made in the court on a legal proposition. Firstly, because the party concerned, on a reconsideration of the proposition could comprehend a different construction as more appropriate. Firstly, because the party concerned, on a reconsideration of the proposition could comprehend a different construction as more appropriate. Secondly, the construction of statutory provision cannot rest entirely on the stand adopted by any party in the lis. Thirdly, the parties must be left free to aid the court in reaching the correct construction to be placed on a statutory provision. They cannot be nailed to a position on the legal interpretation which they adopted at a particular point of time because saner thoughts can throw more light on the same subject at a later stage.” 52. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, did not commit any error whatsoever in allowing the State to file a supplementary affidavit resiling from such concession made in the earlier case as had been noticed in para 5 of the impugned judgment. 53. A wrong concession of law cannot bind the parties, particularly when the constitutionality of a statute is in question.” Similar view has also been taken by the apex Court in M/s. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others Vrs. The State of Haryana and another, AIR 1980 SC 1285 (Para 9), Chhaganlal Keshavlal Mehta Vrs. Patel Narandas Haribhai, AIR 1982 SC 121 (Para 22) and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur Vrs. State of Maharashtra & another, (2009) 7 SCC 104 (Para 49). 17. The objection was raised by the learned counsel for opposite party no.1 stating that after issuance of office order under Annexure-3 dated 06.04.2011, the petitioner has not filed any objection rather carried out the same and he is estopped to make any objection to the same at subsequent stage by turning around that he is not liable to pay. 18. Reliance has been placed on paragraph-8 in State of Haryana and others (supra) and further it is urged that the petitioner having carried out the obligation in Annexure-3, the same cannot be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of estoppel/waiver/acquisance in view of judgment of the apex Court in Manish Kumar Shahi (supra). Both the judgments have been decided on their own facts and circumstances of the cases. The State of Haryana and others (supra), the apex Court held that the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. Both the judgments have been decided on their own facts and circumstances of the cases. The State of Haryana and others (supra), the apex Court held that the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. Here is a case, where the obligation has not been voluntarily incurred rather it is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner is a licencee who was granted licence by opposite party no.1, in due discharge of conditions stipulated in Annexure-3, the petitioner under compelling circumstances was discharging obligation when there is no Port other than the Paradip Port to facilitate the transportation of materials for its industrial unit. 19. Opposite party no.1 has exercised its monopoly over the area granted on licence to the petitioner. The basis for which the demand was raised being contrary to the provisions of law, the petitioner has got every right to assail the same at any point of time. In view of law laid down by the apex Court in various judgments it has been held that pure question of law can be raised at any point of time. In Shehla Burney (DR.) and others v. Syed Ali Mossa Raza (dead) by Lrs. And Others, (2011) 6 SCC 529 , paragraph-23 reads as follows: “23. The aforesaid propositions have been quoted with approval by this Court in Badri Prasad v. Nagarmal, AIR at p. 562, para 7. Similar views have been expressed by this Court again in Tarini Kamal Pandit v. Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee. After considering several decisions, including the one rendered in Badri Prasad this Court held as follows: (Tarini Kamal Pandit case, SCC p. 288, para 14).” “14. … As the point raised is a pure question of law not involving any investigation of the facts, we permitted the learned counsel to raise the question.” (AIR para 15 at p.1172) Similar view has also been taken by the apex Court in Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & others vrs. Manju Jain & others, (2010) 9 SCC 157 . Thereby, the contention raised by learned counsel for the opposite party relying upon State of Haryana and others (supra) and Manish Kumar Shahi (supra) may not have any assistance to the present context. 20. Manju Jain & others, (2010) 9 SCC 157 . Thereby, the contention raised by learned counsel for the opposite party relying upon State of Haryana and others (supra) and Manish Kumar Shahi (supra) may not have any assistance to the present context. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion held in foregoing paragraphs, this Court is of the considered view that the notification issued on 06.04.2011 under Annexure-3 is without any authority of law thereby any demand made retrospectively directing to deposit the short fall amount towards MGT in Annexure-11 dated 19.04.2012 for an amount of Rs.4,73,09,637/- pursuant to said notification cannot sustain. Accordingly, the same is hereby quashed. However, liberty is granted to opposite party no.1 to recalculate the amount due to pay pursuant to the licence as per the conditions stipulated in the order dated 24.03.2011 under Annexure-1 and the same shall be worked out as expeditiously as possible within a period of two months from the date of judgment. 21. The writ petition is allowed to the extent as indicated above. No order as to cost.