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2016 DIGILAW 786 (GAU)

Jayshree Khersa v. All Assam Forest Protection Force Employees Association

2016-08-18

HRISHIKESH ROY, M.R.PATHAK

body2016
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER : Hrishikesh Roy, J. Heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. A. Ganguly, learned counsel representing the respondent Nos.1 & 2, who filed the WP(C) No. 1071/2013. The standing counsel for the Forest Department Mr. L.N. Dihingia, appears for the respondent Nos.4, 5 & 9. The Govt. Advocate Mr. C.K.S. Baruah appears for the respondent Nos.3, 6, 7, 8 & 11. The Accountant General (respondent No. 10) is represented by the learned Advocate Mr. R. K. Talukdar. 2. The appellant at the relevant time was posted as the Commandant of the First Assam Forest Protection Force (in short, APPF) and during February, 2011, she was the officer responsible for training of the newly recruited constables to the 2nd APPF. However, when the 685 recruited constables reported for training before the Commandant, it was found that uniforms were not available to be issued to the recruits to commence the basic training. 3. This is how the appellant in her letter dated 21.02.2011 (Annexure 3), requested the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest (PCCF), who is the head of the Forest Forces, to provide the listed clothing items to facilitate the trainees to undergo the basic training. This was followed by the 2nd letter dated 25.02.2011, where the Commandant specifically informed that it is difficult to bring discipline and impart training to the new recruits, without providing uniform to them. 4. But when clothing items could not be provided officially and the training of the new recruits was thus effected, a written request was received from the trainees to supply them the needed uniforms and articles from a common source and the trainees agreed to pay for the items by cash or by deduction from monthly salary. In the letter addressed to the Commandant, it was specifically mentioned that if the uniforms and equipments are purchased individually by the recruits, they are unlikely to be of same colour and design. 5. The request of the recruits was intimated in writing by the Commandant thorough her communication dated 02.03.2011 and 08.03.2011 and Mr. K.N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel submits that verbal approval was received by the Commandant from the PCCF to procure the articles, as was suggested by the recruited constables of the 2nd APPF. 6. 5. The request of the recruits was intimated in writing by the Commandant thorough her communication dated 02.03.2011 and 08.03.2011 and Mr. K.N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel submits that verbal approval was received by the Commandant from the PCCF to procure the articles, as was suggested by the recruited constables of the 2nd APPF. 6. The WP(C) No.1071/2013 was filed by the association of the APPF constables, where they prayed for refund of the amount deducted from their salary for supplying uniforms and articles to them and enquiry was also demanded on how the new recruits were made to pay for the uniforms which should be provided by the employer. 7. In the counter affidavit filed by the Chief Conservator of Forest (CCF) on 04.10.2013 in the WP(C) No.1071/2013, it was averred that the Government has sanctioned Rs. 42.70 lakhs for providing clothing and shoes of the 2nd APPF recruits but the procurement could not be done during 2009-10. But the same was procured subsequently by the DFO, Nagaon and was handed over on 15.05.2013 to the 2nd APPF. In a separate counter affidavit filed by the Accountant General (Audit) on 21.08.2013, the sanction of Rs. 42.70 lakhs for purchase of clothes and shoes for new recruits of the 2nd APPF was mentioned but it was reflected that the Commandant of the 2nd APPF had not received any such clothes and shoes, from the DFO, Nagaon Division. 8. Since the purchase of uniforms and articles for the new recruits is not disputed and was found to be established in a preliminary enquiry, a show cause notice has been issued to the Commandant to facilitate a Departmental Proceeding against her under the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. 9. We may note here that the appellant was in charge of the 2nd APPF during the training period until she was transferred to another post on 12.03.2012 but procurement of the uniforms is not denied by her. But Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel submits that the compelling circumstances under which the uniforms had to be procured by the Commandant to commence the training for the new recruits, was overlooked and the learned Single Judge under his impugned order of 11.07.2016, has directed consideration of initiation of criminal proceeding against the Commandant. 10. But Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel submits that the compelling circumstances under which the uniforms had to be procured by the Commandant to commence the training for the new recruits, was overlooked and the learned Single Judge under his impugned order of 11.07.2016, has directed consideration of initiation of criminal proceeding against the Commandant. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Commandant had no criminal intent when she facilitated the purchase of uniforms for the new recruits to commence the training and in fact the money for the purchase was paid directly to the supplier and there is no allegation whatsoever that any of that amount, was usurped by the Commandant. 11. On account of the direction issued by the writ court, the appellant is likely to face criminal proceeding which has its own serious implications. Therefore Mr. Choudhury refers to Divine Retreat Centre vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 542 to contend that before any criminal process is set in motion, the High Court should consider the material on record and reach a conclusion that such material does disclose a prima facie case, calling for criminal action. In other words, the Court must be satisfied that prima facie case is made out on commission of a cognizable offence since setting the criminal law in motion is fraught with serious consequences, which should not be undertaken without proper justification. 12. What we find here is that the appellant was deputed as Commandant of the 2nd APPF, w.e.f. 25.04.2012 and she was relieved of her assignment on 12.03.2012. Whether training of new recruits could commence, without uniform is an important factor to be considered in our mind to assess the conduct of the Commandant. Furthermore, while supply of uniforms by the Department is itself a matter of controversy, the averred position is that the supplies were made only on 15.05.2013, whereas the training commenced in February, 2011 itself. These facts disclose that departmental supplies were made (if actually made) long after the appellant was relieved from the 2nd APPF and yet it was her responsibility during her tenure, to provide training for the 685 newly recruited constables. 13. These facts disclose that departmental supplies were made (if actually made) long after the appellant was relieved from the 2nd APPF and yet it was her responsibility during her tenure, to provide training for the 685 newly recruited constables. 13. It is simple to comprehend that without the trainees being in uniform for the armed force, maintenance of discipline and providing training to the new recruits would be a practical impossibility and this appears to have prompted the Commandant to accede to the request of the new recruits to arrange for their uniform for which money was deducted from their respective salaries. The entire circumstances were disclosed by the commandant to her superiors as can be seen from the two communications sent by her on 02.03.2011 and on 08.03.2011 and therefore in the context of these letters, we are of the considered view that attributing criminal motive to the Commandant of the 2nd APPF will require something more substantial, to establish her criminal intent. 14. In the order impugned before us, the writ court directed consideration of initiation of criminal proceeding and while this may reflect an element of discretion for the departmental authorities, it cannot entirely be ruled out that the Court’s direction may be considered to be sacrosanct and there may not be independent application of mind to the material available against the Commandant, on the aspect of criminality of her conduct. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion and particularly bearing in mind the ratio of Divine Retreat Centre (supra), we feel that when the court itself didn’t reach a prima facie conclusion on commission of cognizable offence on the basis of materials available in the case, requiring the authority to consider criminal action against the appellant was not proper. We are conscious that the WP(C) No.1071/2013 is still pending and this aspect is capable of consideration even at a later stage, if appropriate materials are brought forth for consideration of the learned Judge. 16. In the above backdrop and after hearing the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, we deem it appropriate to make limited intervention only in respect of initiation of criminal proceeding against the appellant, who was arrayed as the 5th respondent in the WP(C) No.1071/2013. Thus the challenge to that part of the impugned order dated 11.7.2016 is allowed. Thus the challenge to that part of the impugned order dated 11.7.2016 is allowed. But we make it clear that since the disciplinary action against the appellant has not been challenged, this Bench makes no comment on the merit of that proceeding. 17. With the above order the appeal stands disposed of. No cost.