ORDER : S.N. Satyanarayana, J. 1. Accused 2 and 3 in CC No. 480 of 2005, have come in this petition seeking to quash the order dated 5-6-2014 in rejecting their application filed under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In the said application they had sought for their discharge of the offences punishable under Sections 418, 464, 465 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 2. Brief facts leading to this petition are as under: Petitioners herein are accused 2 and 3 along with 2nd respondent herein who is accused 1 in the said proceedings. The proceedings in C.C. No. 480 of 2005 is commenced pursuant to a private complaint in PC No. 344 of 2005 filed on 14-3-2005 for the aforesaid offences alleged to have committed by them. The undisputed facts are that petitioners herein are practicing Chartered Accountant and Advocate in the City of Belgaum. The 1st accused and complainant along with others constituted three partnership firms namely: (a) Jaihind Engineering; (b) Progressive Engineering; and (c) Standard Engineering which are situated in the City of Belgaum it is stated the thatre were differences of opinion with reference to the running of the said partnership firm which was subject-matter of arbitration. Arbitral Tribunal was formed consisting of petitioners herein. The records would disclose that an arbitration agreement consisting of petitioners as Arbitrators was drawn in the year 2004 i.e., in the month of August 2004. 3. The primary dispute is whether arbitral agreement was drawn on 18-8-2004 or on 28-8-2004. According to the complainant, arbitration agreement was entered into between the parties on 18-8-2004 whereas the contention of accused 1 to 3 is, it was on 28-8-2004. When the Arbitration Tribunal started hearing the dispute between the parties i.e., the complainant and the first accused, after 7th hearing, certain disputes arose between the parties with reference to the arbitration proceedings. Thereafter, it is stated that letters were written to the Arbitrators not to proceed with the matter and to stop the proceedings and letters were also exchanged between the complainant and first accused for appointing fresh Arbitrators to proceed with the matter. 4. Thereafter, it is stated that letters were written to the Arbitrators not to proceed with the matter and to stop the proceedings and letters were also exchanged between the complainant and first accused for appointing fresh Arbitrators to proceed with the matter. 4. When the matter stood thus, it is seen the that Arbitrators proceeded with the hearing and decided the dispute between the parties by their award dated 20-1-2005 which was subject-matter of various proceedings in Civil Court which has reached the Apex Court in SLP No. 6555 of 2006 and has reached finality in the arbitral award being set aside. In the meanwhile, the present private complaint is lodged against accused 1 to 3 i.e., one of the partners of the aforesaid 3 firms and against the petitioners/Arbitrators who are appointed to adjudicate the dispute between the complainant and first accused. Admittedly, one of the Arbitrator is an Advocate practicing at Belgaum City and the another is a practicing Chartered Accountant. 5. The accusation against the petitioners herein is with reference to offence punishable under Sections 418, 464, 465 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the said complaint, based on the oral statement, cognizance was taken with reference to the offences alleged and criminal complaint was registered in CC No. 480 of 2005. In the said proceedings, before the charges were framed, an application is filed by accused 2 and 3 seeking their discharge. The said application was heard at length and was dismissed by order dated 5-6-2014 which is subject-matter of this criminal petition wherein the aforesaid order is sought to be quashed mainly on the ground the that petitioners herein who are appointed as Arbitrators in the said proceedings were discharging their duties in the capacity of quasi-judicial authority, as Judges as defined under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, there cannot be any criminal complaint launched against them, in the light of Section 77 of the IPC and Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. 6. P.C. 6. They would try to substantiate that under Section 77 of IPC, the act of petitioners herein in adjudicating the dispute between the parties in the Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to an agreement under dispute would empower them to act as judicial officials/as a Judge and therefore the act which is done by them would come under general exception where they are prevented from being prosecuted, for any act conducted by them. Further they try to substantiate their act by relying upon Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. that prior sanction is required before launching prosecution against them, they further contend that in one of the proceedings initiated by the parties in MFA No. 23953 of 2009 and connected matters disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court on 25-7-2012, in the operative portion of the aforesaid judgment, it is clearly observed that any observation made in paragraphs 262 and 263 by the learned District Judge against the two Arbitrators who are petitioners herein "should not be used against them in any proceedings either pending or intended to prosecute them in future". 7. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and as well as contesting respondent 1. So far as respondent 2 is concerned, who is one of the accused in the proceedings, there was no representation on his behalf. On going through the grounds raised, this Court is unable to accept the first ground which is urged the that Arbitrators who are appointed to preside the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the agreement entered into in the month of August 2004 are considered as Judge as defined under Section 197 of the Cr. P.C., they will not get the protection of seeking prior sanction before any criminal prosecution to be launched against them. To consider that, relevant Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. has to be looked into which is culled out as under: "197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants. P.C., they will not get the protection of seeking prior sanction before any criminal prosecution to be launched against them. To consider that, relevant Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. has to be looked into which is culled out as under: "197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants. - (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction." Here seeking prosecution of petitioners 1 and 2 for their alleged misconduct in conducting the Arbitral Tribunal does not call for any sanction from the Government. Their appointment is by virtue of an agreement entered into between the parties constituting them as members of the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. Therefore, the protection which is provided under Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. does not ensure to their benefit. Even assuming the thatre is protection, if the same is looked into in the light of the judgment rendered in the matter of Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 wherein the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has held as under: "Whether sanction is to be accorded or not is a matter for the Government to consider. The absolute power to accord or withhold sanction conferred on the Government is irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on the Court, which is the ascertainment of the true nature of the Act." 8. It would clearly indicate that even assuming that in the instant case sanction is required that would not prevent the Court from considering whether there is triable offence made out against the accused. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate has gone through the material available on record and having convinced himself the thatre is prima facie case made out for prosecution against accused 1 to 3 has rightly rejected the application filed by accused 2 and 3. Therefore, the said protection which they have sought under Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. also cannot be availed by them in the light of the aforesaid judgment. Therefore, the said protection which they have sought under Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. also cannot be availed by them in the light of the aforesaid judgment. In para 20 of the very same judgment, it is further observed as under: "It is not always necessary the that need for sanction under Section 197 is to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose the that act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." Therefore, the said ground which is urged by the Counsel does not ensure to their benefit. 9. Now coming to the observation made in the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in MFA No. 23953 of 2009 and connected matters with reference to the observation which is made with reference to paragraphs 262 and 263 of the learned District Judge deals with the conduct of petitioners 1 and 2. The same when understood in the context of the fact, it means the that said observation shall not be used against them in any proceedings which are now pending or intended to be filed in future. In any event, this Court is of the opinion that such observations cannot be treated as an observation protecting any person from any criminal prosecution, for the offence, if any committed by them while discharging their duties, if such act constitute an offence punishable under any of the provisions of IPC. If an offence is alleged against the parties, the same is required to be decided in the prosecution to be launched against them either in convicting them as guilty of the offences alleged or giving an honourable discharge. Certain observation which are made in civil dispute cannot be a basis to seek protection from prosecution itself which otherwise is alleged based on the material available on record. Certain observation which are made in civil dispute cannot be a basis to seek protection from prosecution itself which otherwise is alleged based on the material available on record. In that view of the matter, this Court feel, in the fact situation, when the learned Magistrate having gone through the materials available on record having felt that sufficient grounds are made out for prosecution of accused 1 to 3 of the offences alleged against them under the aforesaid provisions is accepted, question of interfering with the same and stalling the prosecution would not be justifiable in the interest of the complainant. 10. In the instant case, it is to be seen the that accusation is made against a practicing Advocate and a practicing Chartered Accountant who have successfully protracted the proceedings from the date of filing of the complaint in the year 2005 to this date. Admittedly, the accused are in the age group of 76 to 86. the that conduct of the parties clearly indicate the thaty do not wish to see this litigation to be completed in their lifetime and some how they want to see the that whole prosecution would collapse on technical grounds instead of there being adjudication on the material available on record. Such conduct should not be encouraged, by deprecating the same, this Court would dismiss this petition filed seeking quashing of the order dated 5-6-2014 direct the learned Magistrate to frame the charges immediately and commence the prosecution and to see the that prosecution which is launched shall see the logical end during the lifetime of the parties.