JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. All these three appeals and the Cross Objections are outcome of one motor vehicular accident, which was allegedly caused by the driver, namely Shri Anil Kumar, while driving jeep, bearing registration No. HP24 B3111, rashly and negligently, on 1st March, 2010, at about 1.15 P.M., at Village Chandpur, Bilaspur, in which Eash Sankhyan sustained injuries and succumbed to the injuries and Nishant Kapoor sustained injuries. 2. In view of the above, this common judgment shall govern all these three appeals and the cross objections. 3. Claimant-Sushma Sankhyan, mother of deceased-Eash Sankhyan filed claim petition, being MAC No. 75 of 2010, titled as Smt. Sushma Sankhyan versus M/s Lucky Shoes Store and others (subject matter of FAO No. 258 of 2014), for grant of compensation, as per the breakups given in the claim petition, which was determined by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur (H.P.) (for short “the Tribunal”) vide judgment and award, dated 17th June, 2014, whereby compensation to the tune of 4,86,000/- with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its deposition came to be awarded in favour of the claimant and against the owner-insured and driver of the offending vehicle (for short “the impugned award-I”). 4. Injured Nishant Kapoor filed claim petition being MAC No. 33 of 2011, titled as Nishant Kapoor versus M/s Lucky Shoes Store and others, before the Tribunal for grant of compensation, as per the breakups given in the claim petition, (subject matter of FAO No. 259 & 357 of 2014), which was decided by the Tribunal vide judgment and award, dated 17th June, 2014, whereby compensation to the tune of 4,36,400/- with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its deposition came to be awarded in favour of the claimant-injured and against the owner-insured and driver of the offending vehicle (for short “the impugned award-II”). 5. Both the claim petitions were tried separately. The issues framed in both the claim petitions are similar except part of issue No. 1. Thus, I deem it proper to reproduce the issues framed in one of the claim petitions, i.e. MAC No. 75 of 2010 (subject matter of FAO No. 258 of 2014) herein: “1. 5. Both the claim petitions were tried separately. The issues framed in both the claim petitions are similar except part of issue No. 1. Thus, I deem it proper to reproduce the issues framed in one of the claim petitions, i.e. MAC No. 75 of 2010 (subject matter of FAO No. 258 of 2014) herein: “1. Whether the deceased Eash Sankhyan died in a motor accident which took place on 1.3.2010 at about 1.15 p.m. near village Chandpur, District Bilaspur, H.P. due to rash and negligent driving of Jeep No. HP24 B3111 by Abhinay Thakur, respondent No. 2, as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from which of the respondents, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the respondent No. 2 was not holding valid and effective driving licence to drive the offending vehicle at the relevant time, as alleged? OPR3 4. Whether the offending vehicle was being plied without valid documents, as alleged? OPR3 5. Whether the deceased was traveling in the offending vehicle as an unauthorised/gratuitous passenger at the time of accident, as alleged? OPR3 6. Relief.” 6. The Tribunal, after concluding the trial, held that the claimants became the victims of the motor vehicular accident, awarded compensation in favour of the claimants in terms of the impugned awards. 7. The Tribunal, while determining issues No. 2 and 3, held that the offending vehicle was being driven by minor, namely Abhinay Thakur, respondent No. 2 in the claim petitions, who was not having a valid and effective driving licence, the owner-insured has committed a willful breach and saddled the owner-insured and the driver-Abhinay Thakur with liability. 8. Issues No. 4 and 5 in both the claim petitions came to be decided against the insurer. The insurer has not questioned the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 4 and 5, thus, the same are upheld. 9. The following questions are to be determined in the lis: (i) Whether Abhinay Thakur or Anil Kumar was driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident? and (ii) Whether the amount awarded in both the claim petitions is adequate or otherwise? Question No. (i): 10. 9. The following questions are to be determined in the lis: (i) Whether Abhinay Thakur or Anil Kumar was driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident? and (ii) Whether the amount awarded in both the claim petitions is adequate or otherwise? Question No. (i): 10. It has specifically been pleaded that lis was pending before the District Consumer Redressal Forum, Bilaspur, H.P. (for short “the District Consumer Forum”) whereby the owner-insured had filed a consumer complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short “the CP Act”). The District Consumer Forum, after examining the pleadings, held that Anil Kumar was driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident, allowed the complaint and directed the insurer to pay 27,111/- with interest @ 9% per annum. 11. The said order was questioned by the medium of respective appeals by the owner-insured and the insurer before the H.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla (for short “the State Commission”). The owner-insured questioned the same on the ground of adequacy of compensation and the insurer questioned the finding so far it relates to holding it liable to pay. The appeal filed by the owner-insured was allowed and that of the insurer was dismissed vide order, dated 4th April, 2014. It was also held that Anil Kumar was driving the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time and the findings returned by the District Consumer Forum were upheld. 12. It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the order, dated 4th April, 2014, made by the State Commission herein: “10. The above stated position apart, no evidence has been adduced by the opposite party in support of the plea that vehicle was being driven by Abhinav Thakur. An Investigator appointed by the opposite party itself, namely Iqbal Singh, vide report, Annexure A6 & A7, on the basis of statements of person, examined by him, reported that vehicle was being driven by Anil Kumar. Therefore, no fault can be found with the finding of learned District Forum that the vehicle was being driven by Anil Kumar. It is not in dispute that Anil Kumar possessed a valid licence to drive the vehicle, in question.” 13. The insurer has not questioned the said findings and the same have attained finality. 14. Therefore, no fault can be found with the finding of learned District Forum that the vehicle was being driven by Anil Kumar. It is not in dispute that Anil Kumar possessed a valid licence to drive the vehicle, in question.” 13. The insurer has not questioned the said findings and the same have attained finality. 14. The question is – Can the Tribunal in summary proceedings return a finding contrary to the finding returned by two Fora, that too, when the said finding has attained finality? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons: 15. The remedies provided under the CP Act and Chapters X, XI and XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”) are for the benefits of the claimants. The aim and object of the said Acts is to provide immediate relief to the claimants and the proceedings are summary in nature. 16. The same view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case titled as Lucknow Development Authority versus M.K. Gupta, reported in AIR 1994 Supreme Court 787. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 2 of the judgment herein: “2. …............. It has been approved by this Court in Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Highland Coffee Works of P. F. X. Saldanha and Sons, (1991) 3 SCC 617 : (1991 AIR SCW 2821); C. I. T., Andhra Pradesh v. M/s. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad (1971) 3 SCC 550 : ( AIR 1972 SC 168 ) and State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 . The provisions of the Act thus have to be construed in favour of the consumer to achieve the purpose of enactment as it is a social benefit oriented legislation. The primary duty of the Court while construing the provisions of such an Act is to adopt a constructive approach subject to that it should not do violence to the language of the provisions and is not contrary to attempted objective of the enactment.” 17. Section 24 of the CP Act reads as under: “24. Finality of orders. Every order of a District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall, if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of this Act, be final.” 18. Section 24 of the CP Act reads as under: “24. Finality of orders. Every order of a District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall, if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of this Act, be final.” 18. It mandates that if appeal has not been preferred against the order of a District Forum, State Commission or National Commission, the said order attains finality. 19. The bone of contention between the parties before both the Fora was whether Anil Kumar or Abhinay Thakur was the driver of the offending vehicle. It is a question of fact, has attained finality in terms of the proceedings conducted under the CP Act. Thus, it cannot now lie in the mouth of the insurer that Anil Kumar was not driving the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time. 20. All the proceedings conducted before a Commission under the CP Act or a Tribunal under the MV Act are in the nature of a suit. 21. My this view is fortified by the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case titled as M/s. Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. And another versus N.K. Modi, reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 533. It is apt to reproduce para 15 of the judgment herein: “15. It would, therefore, be clear that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy in addition to the consentient arbitration which could be enforced under the Arbitration Act or the civil action in a suit under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereby, as seen, Section 34 of the Act does not confer an automatic right nor create an automatic embargo on the exercise of the power by the judicial authority under the Act. It is a matter of discretion. Considered from this perspective, we hold that though the District Forums, State Commission and National Commission are judicial authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the object of the Act and by operation of Section 3 thereof, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate that these forums created under the Act are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered into between the parties. The reason is that the Act intends to relieve the consumers of the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless the forums on their own and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case, some to the conclusion that the appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise those given in the Act.” 22. In the case titled as Patel Roadways Ltd. versus Birla Yamaha Ltd., reported in AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1461, the Apex Court has discussed the aim and object and the relevant provisions of the CP Act right from paras 20 to 25 and in para 49 of the judgment, it has specifically been held that the proceedings before the Consumer Forum fall within the definition of 'suit'. It is apt to reproduce para 49 of the judgment herein: “49. From the above it is clear that the term "suit" is a generic term taking within its sweep all proceedings initiated by a party for realisation of a right vested in him under law. The meaning of the term "suit" also depends on the context of its user which in turn, amongst other things, depends on the Act or the Rule in which it is used. No doubt the proceeding before a National Commission is ordinarily a summary proceeding and in an appropriate case where the Commission feels that the issues raised by the parties are too contentious to be decided in a summary proceeding it may refer the parties to a civil Court. That does not mean that the proceeding before the Commission is to be decided ignoring the express statutory provisions of the Carriers Act (S. 9) in a proceeding in which a claim is made against a common carrier as defined in the said Act. Accepting such a contention would defeat the object and purpose for which the Consumers Protection Act was enacted. A proceeding before the National Commission, in our considered view, comes within the term "suit". Accordingly we reject the contention raised by Shri Ashok Desai in this regard.” 23. Thus, virtually the proceedings before both the Fora were just in the nature of 'suit' and the question determined in the said proceedings cannot be reopened in the other proceedings or similar proceedings. Otherwise, it will amount to sit in judgment over the orders passed by the District Consumer Forum and State Commission. 24. Thus, virtually the proceedings before both the Fora were just in the nature of 'suit' and the question determined in the said proceedings cannot be reopened in the other proceedings or similar proceedings. Otherwise, it will amount to sit in judgment over the orders passed by the District Consumer Forum and State Commission. 24. The Tribunal has virtually upset the findings of both the Fora, which is not permissible, rather, it amounts to judicial indiscipline. 25. It is apt to record herein that the Tribunal has held that the findings returned by the District Consumer Forum and the State Commission are not binding, is totally misconceived, illegal and erroneous. The claims under the CP Act and the MV Act are not to be tried as a civil or criminal case, are to be decided on prima facie proof. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC”) are not applicable to the proceedings under MV Act and CP Act in toto. Some of the provisions of the CPC have been made applicable in order to take the claim petitions and the complaints to its logical end. 26. The Calcutta High Court in the case titled as Krishna Chandra Mukherjee versus Manik Lal Mukherjee and others, reported in AIR 1939 Calcutta 169, held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to proceedings which are in themselves final in the sense that they are conclusive between the parties even though the decisions in such proceedings may not be susceptible of appeals. Hence, question of res judicata can arise even in consequence of antecedent summary proceedings. 27. The findings returned by the competent authority, which have attained finality, cannot be set aside by any other authority exercising the powers under the MV Act or any other summary proceedings and it cannot be held by the Tribunal that the findings returned by that Forum are not binding on it. 28. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case titled as Basant Kumar versus The United India Insurance Company Limited and others, reported in AIR 2003 Madhya Pradesh 203, held that the order passed under Consumer Protection Act is final and Arbitrator cannot sit over the order passed by Consumer Forum. It is apt to reproduce paras 9 and 10 of the judgment herein: “9. It is apt to reproduce paras 9 and 10 of the judgment herein: “9. Section 24 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, attaches finality to the orders of District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission if no appeal has been preferred against such an order under the provisions of this Act. It is not a case where lack of jurisdiction is alleged; petitioner has been benefited by the award made by the Consumer Forum; by enacting Section 23 any person if aggrieved by an order made by National Commission in exercise of its power conferred by Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 21, may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the order. The intention of the Act is to make the order final as provided in Section 24 of the Act. Section 24 of the Act reads as under: "24. Finality of orders. - Every order of a District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission shall, if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of this Act, be final." 10. An Arbitrator cannot be allowed to sit over the order of the District Forum and State Commission particularly when the matter has been adjudicated on merits. In my opinion, considering the scheme of the Consumer Protection Act, petitioner cannot now avail the benefit of arbitration proceedings though initially it was open for him to choose the remedy before the Arbitrator. Once the matter has been entertained and decided by the District Forum; award has been passed, it is not open for the petitioner to claim further amount by having recourse to the arbitration clause in the agreement. The order passed under Consumer Protection Act is final.” 29. It has come on record that the final report in terms of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”) was filed against Abhinay Thakur respondent No. 2 in the claim petitions and perhaps that has weighed with the Tribunal. The final report is just a report of the investigating agency, has to go through trial. Mere filing of report by investigating agency cannot be made a ground for upsetting the judgments made by the Fora, that too, which has attained finality. 30. The final report is just a report of the investigating agency, has to go through trial. Mere filing of report by investigating agency cannot be made a ground for upsetting the judgments made by the Fora, that too, which has attained finality. 30. Having said so, the Tribunal has fallen in an error in holding that Abhinay Thakur was driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. Accordingly, it is held that the offending vehicle was being driven by Anil Kumar at the time of the accident, who was having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the same. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 3 are set aside. 31. Thus, it can be safely held that the owner-insured has not committed any willful breach, in view of the findings recorded hereinabove, read with the findings of the Tribunal on issues No. 4 and 5. 32. The factum of insurance is not in dispute. The offending vehicle was duly insured with the insurer. Therefore, the insurer has to satisfy the liability. Question No. (i) is answered accordingly. Question No. (ii): 33. I have examined the impugned award and the record. The amount awarded in both the claim petitions is adequate, cannot be said to be meagre in any way. 34. However, the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal in both the claim petitions, i.e. 9% per annum, is on the higher side, was to be awarded as per the prevailing rates. 35. It is a beaten law of the land that the rate of interest should be awarded as per the prevailing rates, in view of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in cases titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others versus Patricia Jean Mahajan and others, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 281 ; Santosh Devi versus National Insurance Company Ltd. and others, reported in 2012 AIR SCW 2892; Amrit Bhanu Shali and others versus National Insurance Company Limited and others, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 738 ; Smt. Savita versus Binder Singh & others, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 2053; Kalpanaraj & others versus Tamil Nadu State Transport Corpn., reported in 2014 AIR SCW 2982; Amresh Kumari versus Niranjan Lal Jagdish Pd. Jain and others, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 433 ; and Mohinder Kaur and others versus Hira Nand Sindhi (Ghoriwala) and another, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 434 , and discussed by this Court in a batch of FAOs, FAO No. 256 of 2010, titled as Oriental Insurance Company versus Smt. Indiro and others, being the lead case, decided on 19.06.2015. 36. Having said so, I deem it proper to reduce the rate of interest from 9% per annum to 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petitions till its realization in both the claim petitions. Question No. (ii) is determined accordingly. 37. Having glance of the above discussions, both the impugned awards are modified, as indicated hereinabove, FAOs No. 258 & 259 of 2014 are allowed and FAO No. 357 of 2014 & Cross Objection No. 59 of 2014 are dismissed. 38. The insurer is directed to deposit the awarded amount in both the claim petitions before the Registry within eight weeks. On deposition, the same be released in favour of the claimants as per the terms and conditions contained in the respective impugned awards. 39. The statutory amount deposited by the owner-insured in FAOs No. 258 and 259 of 2014 be released as costs in favour of the respective claimants, i.e. 25,000/- each. 40. Send down the records after placing copy of the judgment on each of the Tribunal's file.