ORDER : Sujoy Paul J. In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner has called in question the legality, validity and propriety of disciplinary proceedings which ended with imposition of punishment of dismissal from service by order dated 07.06.2014. The petitioner has also challenged the appellate order and the revisional order by which his appeal and revision were dismissed. Petitioner has prayed for reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the petitioner at the relevant time was working as Assistant General Manager. He was posted as Principal Central Bank Officers Training College at Bhopal. It is submitted that during the training programme of newly recruited Probationary Officers, it was noticed that certain officers are not acting properly and their action shows lack of discipline and decorum. The petitioner, in the capacity of Principal of College issued notice dated 12.5.2010 (Annexure P/2). To wriggle out of the contemplated disciplinary action, one probationary trainee officer/complainant lodged the FIR against the petitioner on 16.05.2010. On the strength of that FIR, the charge-sheet dated 04.09.2010 (Annexure P/4) was issued against the petitioner. On the basis of said FIR, the trial was conducted which was registered as RT No.764/10. The trial court by judgment dated 06.02.2012 convicted the petitioner for commission of offence under section 354 of the IPC and sentenced him for imprisonment for a period of 18 months. 3. Shri Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that because of aforesaid conviction, the petitioner was dismissed from service. However, the judgment of the trial court dated 06.02.2012 was called in question in Cr.A.No.167/12 by the petitioner. The appellate court by judgment dated 23.01.2013, acquitted the petitioner. Shri Agarwal by taking this court to paragraphs 24 to 27 of the said judgment contends that acquittal of the petitioner was on merits and amounts to ‘honourable acquittal'. The case of the petitioner is that the allegations/ factual foundation in the disciplinary proceedings and in criminal case, are exactly same. There is no iota of deference in the factual matrix of both the cases. In that event, once the petitioner is acquitted by the criminal court, there was no occasion for the employer to conduct a disciplinary proceedings. 4. There is no iota of deference in the factual matrix of both the cases. In that event, once the petitioner is acquitted by the criminal court, there was no occasion for the employer to conduct a disciplinary proceedings. 4. Shri Agarwal fairly submits that although in the earlier round of litigation, the disciplinary proceeding was stayed but subsequently the petition was withdrawn by the petitioner when the prosecution had recorded its evidence before the trial court. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a representation against initiation of the disciplinary proceedings on the strength of judgment of Supreme Court in Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.- (1999) 3 SCC 679 . 5. Shri Agarwal further submits that in the disciplinary proceedings, the fair opportunity of defense was not provided to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred representations for grant of adjournment in the inquiry on the ground of his own illness. Despite request that the petitioner is hospitalized, the Inquiry Officer proceeded ex parte and prepared an erroneous report. In the report, the Inquiry Officer has merely reproduced the statement of witnesses and then reached to a conclusion. The said report is bad in law. 6. Shri Agarwal further contends that against the Inquiry Officer's report, petitioner submitted a detailed representation before the disciplinary authority. The said authority after dealing with the said representation, passed the non-speaking punishment order which is bad in law. He submits that the appellate and revisional orders suffer from similar illegality. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in nutshell, raised following contentions to assail the disciplinary proceedings. Firstly, it is submitted that once the petitioner is honorably acquitted by judgment dated 23.1.2013, the departmental inquiry was not permissible. Secondly, it is submitted that Inquiry Officer has erred in proceeding with the inquiry ex-parte. Thirdly, it is urged that the Inquiry Officer himself cross - examined certain prosecution witnesses which vitiated the inquiry. The fourth point raised by Shri Agarwal is that Inquiry Officer has not considered the judgment of the appellate court whereby petitioner was acquitted. Lastly, it is submitted that on the basis of same evidence, petitioner cannot be held guilty by the Inquiry Officer and disciplinary authority. The fourth point raised by Shri Agarwal is that Inquiry Officer has not considered the judgment of the appellate court whereby petitioner was acquitted. Lastly, it is submitted that on the basis of same evidence, petitioner cannot be held guilty by the Inquiry Officer and disciplinary authority. In support of his contentions, he relied on the judgments of Supreme Court in the case of Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.- (1999) 3 SCC 679 , G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others- (2006) 5 SCC 446 and S. Bhaskar Reddy and another v. Superintendent of Police and another- (2015) 2 SCC 365 . By placing heavy reliance on para 34 and 35 of the judgment of Captain M. Poul Anthony (supra), it is submitted that once the criminal court came to hold that the allegations against the petitioner are not proved and the statement of prosecutrix is not trustworthy, it was not open to the Inquiry Officer to rely on the same witnesses and hold the petitioner as guilty. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that although the prosecution witnesses made efforts to improve their version in the departmental inquiry, the fact remains that the witnesses are same and such later improvement will not make their statements as trustworthy. Shri Agarwal further submits that acquittal is acquittal whether it is on the basis of benefit of doubt or on merits. 8. Shri A.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the Bank, on the other hand, supported the disciplinary proceedings and the orders impugned. He submits that FIR was lodged against the petitioner because the conduct of the petitioner amounts to an offence under the provisions of IPC whereas, the disciplinary action is founded upon the Regulation 24-A of the Conduct Regulation of 1976. In the inquiry, on various occasions, on the request of the petitioner, adjournment was granted. By taking this court to various proceedings it is urged that when petitioner's mother died, adjournment was granted. On the ground of sickness also ample adjournments were granted to the petitioner. However, the record shows that petitioner was having regular attendance during employment and was not in the habit of taking leave. In order to avoid proceedings of the inquiry, he started taking leave. On the ground of sickness also ample adjournments were granted to the petitioner. However, the record shows that petitioner was having regular attendance during employment and was not in the habit of taking leave. In order to avoid proceedings of the inquiry, he started taking leave. After giving sufficient opportunities to defend himself, when petitioner did not participate in the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer proceeded ex-parte which is in consonance with the Central Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline And Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (here in after referred to as a "D & A Regulations"). He further submits that degree of proof required in the departmental inquiry and in the criminal cases are totally different. In the departmental inquiry the principle of ‘preponderance of probability' is applicable whereas in criminal cases prosecution needs to prove the case "beyond reasonable doubt". He further submits that it is well settled that there is no bar for conducting the departmental inquiry simultaneously. The allegations against the petitioner were serious but there was no complicated question of fact and law involved. The trial court acquitted the petitioner on the basis of benefit of doubt. He placed reliance in Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao- (2012) 1 SCC 442 to contend that the judgment of Captain M. Paul Anthony (supra) relied upon by the petitioner was considered by the subsequent Benches of the Supreme Court. In view of these subsequent judgments, the said judgment of Captain M. Paul Anthony (supra) and G.M. Tank (supra), cannot be pressed into service. He further submits that earlier judgments of Supreme Court on this point were not considered in Captain M. Paul Anthony (supra) and, therefore, the said judgment is per incuriam. 9. Learned counsel for the employer further submits that the complainant has already filed Cri.A.No.986/13 against the judgment of acquittal dated 23.1.2013. The said criminal appeal is still pending before this court. In nutshell, learned counsel for the Bank contends that there is no procedural impropriety in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. The findings of the Inquiry Officer are not perverse. He further submits that the Regulation permits the Inquiry Officer to ask certain questions as he may deem fit and in exercise of that power, he asked certain clarificatory questions which has not polluted the disciplinary proceeding. The findings of the Inquiry Officer are not perverse. He further submits that the Regulation permits the Inquiry Officer to ask certain questions as he may deem fit and in exercise of that power, he asked certain clarificatory questions which has not polluted the disciplinary proceeding. He submits that disciplinary authority, appellate authority and the revisional authority passed speaking orders on the basis of well reasoned Inquiry Officer's report and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this court. 10. Shri Agarwal in his rejoinder submissions contended that in the representation against the inquiry report, petitioner has specifically stated that there were acts of indiscipline by the Probationary Officers. Petitioner issued a notice (Annexure P/2) and was about to issue separate/independent show-cause notices to the Probationary Officers but with a view to defeat such disciplinary action, the Probationary Officers joined together and filed the FIR against the petitioner. 11. No other point is raised by learned counsel for the parties. 12. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. The first point raised by counsel for the petitioner is that after acquittal of the petitioner from criminal case, the disciplinary action was impermissible. In Captain M. Paul Anthony (supra) on which heavy reliance is placed by the petitioner, it is held that disciplinary proceedings and criminal case can run simultaneously. Only in cases where disciplinary action and criminal case are founded upon same facts and there are complicated question of fact and law involved, it is desirable that disciplinary proceedings should be stayed. It is not the case of the petitioner that any complicated question of fact and law is involved in the present case. A plain reading of FIR and the charge sheet makes it clear that the allegation is simple in nature which did not involve any complicated question of fact and law. Considering the aforesaid, I am unable to hold that disciplinary action could not have been initiated/proceeded against the petitioner after his acquittal by the criminal court. 14. The ancillary question is whether after acquittal on the basis of similar/same evidence, the respondents were justified in proceeding with the disciplinary action ? Considering the aforesaid, I am unable to hold that disciplinary action could not have been initiated/proceeded against the petitioner after his acquittal by the criminal court. 14. The ancillary question is whether after acquittal on the basis of similar/same evidence, the respondents were justified in proceeding with the disciplinary action ? In Captain M.Paul Anthony (supra) the Supreme Court opined that trial court on a consideration of entire evidence came to conclusion that no search was conducted nor any recovery was made from the residence of employee. ‘In this situation' the Apex Court interfered with the matter whereas following findings of the court will show that court has given the ‘benefit of doubt' to petitioner by applying the degree of proof applicable to criminal trial. There is no finding that no such incident as alleged had taken place at all. ‘In this situation' the Apex Court interfered with the matter whereas following findings of the court will show that court has given the ‘benefit of doubt' to petitioner by applying the degree of proof applicable to criminal trial. There is no finding that no such incident as alleged had taken place at all. The relevant portion of judgment of the appellate court reads as under :- 24- ySafxd vijk/kksa esa ?kVuk ds i'pkr dk vfHk;ksD=h dk vkpj.k Hkh cgqr egRo j[krk gSA vfHk;ksD=h vŒlkŒ 2 ds dFkukuqlkj fizafliy] vkWfQl ds Åij gh izf'k{kq vf/kdkfj;ksa dk gksLVy gksuk Li"V gS] vuqHkk vŒlkŒ 3 us Hkh vius dFku dh df.Mdk 2 esa izf'k{k.k gsrq yxHkx 85 izf'k{kqvksa dk vkuk izdV fd;k gS] rFkk vfHk;ksD=h ds dFkukuqlkj gh ?kVuk ds le; jf'e vŒlkŒ1 vuqHkk vŒlkŒ3 ,oa nhiekyk vŒlkŒ5 dk gksLVy esa gh gksuk Li"V gksrk gS ysfdu vfHk;ksD=h vŒlkŒ2 }kjk ?kVuk ds rRdky i'pkr bu yksxksa esa ls fdlh dks Hkh ?kVuk ugha crkbZ xbZ A ;gka rd fd lUuh ,oa mlds ifr dk mlds fj'rsnkj gksus ds ckotwn Hkh mudks Hkh ?kVuk ds ckjs esa ugha crkuk ,oa jkf= es 9%00 cts rd vius ifjokj ds yksxksa dks Hkh eksckbZy ds }kjk ?kVuk dh tkudkjh ugha fd;s tkus dk vfHk;ksD=h dk tks ;g vkpj.k jgk gS] bl vkpj.k ls Hkh mldh fo'oluh;rk [kf.Mr gksrh gSA vr% mDr of.kZr ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa vfHk;ksD=h vŒlkŒ2 ds dFku fo'okl izsfjr djus ;ksX; ugha gSA 25- vfHk;qDr dh vksj ls vius cpko esa 'kf'k/kju uk;j cŒlkŒ2 ds dFku Hkh djk;s x;s gS] blus vius dFku esa ;g izdV fd;k gS fd og Vªsfuax lsUVj esa bysfDVªf'k;u dh gSfl;r ls dke djrk gSA ?kVuk fnukad 16-05-2010 dks mlus vfHk;qDr ds ?kj dk dke fd;k FkkA mlus muds Vh-oh- ds bysfDVªd ikb.V Bhd fd;s Fks rFkk lqcg 8-45 cts ls lsok ns jgs Fks A 26- vfHk;qDr us vius cpko esa ;g Hkh izdV fd;k gS fd ;g izf'k{kq vf/kdkfj;ksa dks l[r vuq'kklu esa j[kuk pkgrk Fkk] ftlds dkj.k izf'k{kq vf/kdkjh mlls ukjkt o fpwBk Qalk;k x;k gSA vfHk;qDr us vius bl cpko dh iqf"V esa izn'kZ Mh 4, yxk;r izn'kZ Mh 20 , ds nLrkost izLrqr fd;s gS] ftlesa izn'kZ Mh 4, ,oa izn'kZ Mh 5 dk nLrkost izf'k{kq vf/kdkfj;ksa dks vuq'kklu esa jgus ds laca/k esa fn;s x;s lwpuk dk i= gS rFkk izn'kZ Mh 6] Mh 8] Mh 9] Mh 11] Mh 13] Mh 15] Mh 17] Mh 19 fnukad 15 ebZ 2010 dks vfHk;qDr }kjk mDr nLrkost esa of.kZr izf'k{kqvksa dks M~;wVh ls vuqifLFkr jgus ds laca/k esa fn;s x;s dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i= gSaA vfHk;qDRk }kjk izLrqr fd;s x;s mDr nLrkostksa dks cpko lk{kh ,-ds- ik.Ms cŒlkŒ1] tks fd Vªsfuax dkyst esa LVsuks vkWfQlj ds in ij dk;Zjr gS] mu nLrkostksa ij , ls , ds gLrk{kj vfHk;qDr ds gh gksuk vius dFku ls izekf.kr fd;k gSA vr% vfHk;qDr }kjk izLrqr fd;s x;s mDr nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij Hkh vfHk;qDr }kjk izdV fd;s x;s mijksDr cpko ij vfo'okl ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA ,slh lwjr esa Hkh vfHk;kstu dk ekeyk lansgkLin gks tkrk gSA 27- bl izdkj mijksDr foospuk ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;kstu viuk ekeyk lansg ls ijs izekf.kr djus esa vlQy jgk gS vr% vihykFkhZ }kjk izLrqr vihy Lohdkj dh tkrh gS vkSj v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; ,o n.Mkns'k fujLr fd;k tkrk gS ,oa vihykFkhZ@vfHk;qDr jfoUnz dqekj lksyadh dks vUrxZr /kkjk 354 Hkknfo ds vijk/k ls nks"keqDr fd;k tkrk gSA mlds tekur eqpyds HkkjeqDr fd;s tkrs gSA vihykFkhZ }kjk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk vf/kjksfir izfrdj dh jkf'k tek dh xbZ gks rks mls fof/k vuqlkj vihykFkhZ dks okfil dh tkosA (Emphasis supplied) 15. I find force in the arguments of Shri Pandey that degree of proof required in the departmental inquiry is totally different and the evidence of complainant cannot be discarded by applying the same parameters which were applicable in the criminal case. A conjoint reading of paragraphs 24 to 27 of this judgment makes it clear that the petitioner was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and the said judgment, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be a judgment of acquittal on merits. Interestingly, in G.M. Tank (supra) the officer was honourably acquitted by the Court {See para 20 and 31}. Same is the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy (supra) {See para 21}. In SBI v. R. Periyasamy- (2015) 3 SCC 101 {See page 108}, it was held as under :- "An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merits after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. The longstanding view on this subject was settled by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India whereby it was held that a departmental proceeding can proceed even though a person is acquitted when t h e acquittal is other than honourable. (Emphasis supplied) 16. The judgment of Captain M. Paul Anthony and G.M. Tank (supra) were again considered by the Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao- (2012) 1 SCC 442 . In para-24, the Apex Court considered the judgment of Captain M. Paul Anthony (supra), and opined that this judgment is not of universal application. The judgment of G.M. Tank (supra) was considered in para-23 of the judgment. After considering this judgment and after taking note of the basic judgment of R.P. Kapoor (supra), the Apex Court held that the departmental inquiry and criminal case can run simultaneously despite the fact that the same are founded upon the same factual matrix. It was held that facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry. This view is followed by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and other v. Sankar Ghosh- (2014)3 SCC 610 . It was held that facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry. This view is followed by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and other v. Sankar Ghosh- (2014)3 SCC 610 . In this case also, the Apex Court explained the judgment of Captain M. Paul Anthony and G.M. Tank (supra). In para, 16, 17 and 18 of this judgment, the Apex Court held that the proof required in the departmental inquiry is different than the proof required in a criminal case. In Indian Overseas Bank, Annasalai and another v. P. Ganesan and others- (2008) 1 SCC 650 , the Apex Court reiterated the same principle. In Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. - (2005) 7 SCC 764 , it was held as under:- "...The two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with service Rules" (Emphasis supplied) In the light of aforesaid, I am unable to hold that after acquittal of the petitioner, the respondents were not justified in conducting the inquiry. 17. The proceedings of departmental inquiry shows that the petitioner's request for grant of adjournment was considered by the Inquiry Officer on various dates i.e. 23.07.2013, 16.01.2014, 28.01.2014, 30.01.2014, 18.02.2014 and 06.03.2014. In these dates, the inquiry was adjourned on the request of the petitioner. Despite giving several adjournments on the request of the petitioner, when petitioner did not participate in the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer proceeded ex-parte against the petitioner. Such action of the Inquiry Officer is in consonance with the Discipline and Appeal Regulations of 1976. The Apex Court considered this aspect in SBI v. Narendra Kumar Pandey- (2013) 2 SCC 740 , it was held as under :- "24. In Bank of India v. Apurba Kumar Saha ; (1994) 2 SCC 615 , this court held: "4... Such action of the Inquiry Officer is in consonance with the Discipline and Appeal Regulations of 1976. The Apex Court considered this aspect in SBI v. Narendra Kumar Pandey- (2013) 2 SCC 740 , it was held as under :- "24. In Bank of India v. Apurba Kumar Saha ; (1994) 2 SCC 615 , this court held: "4... A bank employee who had refused to avail of the opportunities provided to him in a disciplinary proceeding of defending himself against the charges of misconduct involving his integrity and honesty, cannot be permitted to complain later that he had been denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself of the charges levelled against him and the disciplinary proceeding conducted against him by the bank employer had resulted in violation of principles of natural justice of fair hearing". This Court in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup; AIR 1957 SC 82 held where a workman intentionally refuses to participate in the inquiry, cannot complain that the dismissal is against the principles of natural justice. Once the inquiry proceed ex parte, it is not necessary for the Inquiring Authority to again ask the charged officer to state his defence orally or in writing. We cannot appreciate the conduct of the charged officer in this case, who did not appear before the Inquiring, (Approached The) Authority and feed any explanation to the charges levelled against him but approached the High Court stating that the principles of natural justice had been violated. Same view is taken in Bank of India v. Bhimsen Gochhayat- (2009) 17 SCC 648 . A plain reading of said judgments make it clear that if an employee remains absent after getting several opportunities, the employer is justified in conducting the inquiry ex-parte. Thus, no fault can be found in the action of the Inquiry Officer in proceeding with the inquiry ex-parte. 18. Another allegation of the petitioner is relating to cross-examination of the witnesses by the Inquiry Officer. The Regulation 13 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulation reads as under :- "(13) On the date fixed for the enquiry the oral and documentary evidence by which the Articles of Charges are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. The Regulation 13 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulation reads as under :- "(13) On the date fixed for the enquiry the oral and documentary evidence by which the Articles of Charges are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. The witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer or by another officer duly nominated by the Disciplinary Authority to act on behalf of Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer or by the officer nominated by the Disciplinary Authority to act on behalf of the officer employee. The Presenting Officer or the officer nominated to act on his behalf shall be entitled to reexamine his witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on a new matter without the leave of the Enquiring Authority. The Enquiry Authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit". (Emphasis supplied) 19. A bare reading of the said Regulation makes it clear that the Inquiry Officer can ask certain questions as he may deem fit. The questions which were asked by the Inquiry Officer shows that he asked clarificatory questions from the management witnesses. He did not ask the question as a prosecutor nor he asked any leading question. Thus, for this reason also, it cannot be held that the inquiry is vitiated. 20. The ancillary question raised by the petitioner is that on the basis of same evidence, the petitioner cannot be held guilty when he stood acquitted by the appellate court. 21. So far the defense of Shri Agarwal regarding issuance of notice to the Probationary Officers is concerned, there was no individual notice issued to the complainant. General notice Annexure P/2 or P/3 were affixed which do not reflect anybody's name. Thus, I am unable to hold that the action of the complainant was action to take revenge. 22. In my opinion, this point to the great extent is dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs. Yet, at the cost of repetition, in my opinion, the degree of proof required in disciplinary inquiry is based on preponderance of probability. The complainant and other prosecution witnesses have entered the witness box and proved the charge before the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer's report shows that he has marshalled the entire evidence and gave adequate reasons. Yet, at the cost of repetition, in my opinion, the degree of proof required in disciplinary inquiry is based on preponderance of probability. The complainant and other prosecution witnesses have entered the witness box and proved the charge before the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer's report shows that he has marshalled the entire evidence and gave adequate reasons. Since the petitioner did not participate in the inquiry and failed to put-forth the evidence, he cannot be permitted to turn around and say that the said statements were not trustworthy. The statements shows that there is sufficient evidence in the Inquiry against the petitioner. The petitioner could not show any perversity of findings. The petitioner could have cross examined those witnesses in the departmental inquiry to put-forth his defense. There is no procedural infirmity in the disciplinary proceedings. The Inquiry Officer's report shows that he has taken note of the judgments of criminal court whereby petitioner is acquitted. The Inquiry officer report is based on the evidence so led in the departmental inquiry. 23. This is settled in law that this court in cases of departmental inquiry cannot sit as an appellate court. The scope of judicial review is regarding decision making process and not on the decision itself. {See : Apparel Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra- (1999) 1 SCC 759 }. In the decision making process, the respondents have followed the principles of natural justice and mandate of Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976. The prosecution witnesses have led credible evidence which was duly discussed in the report of Inquiry Officer. Since the inquiry report is a detailed report. it was not necessary for the disciplinary authority while concurring with it to again pass detailed order{See : National Fertilizer Ltd. and another v. P.K. Khanna- (2005) 7 SCC 597 }. The appellate order and the revisional order, for the same reason cannot be disturbed. 24. In view of the serious misconduct of the petitioner, it cannot be said that punishment order is unwarranted or excessive in nature. 25. In the result, I find no illegality on which interference can be made. Petition is bereft of merits and is hereby dismissed. No cost.