JUDGMENT & ORDER : N. Chaudhury, J. Informant, as appellant, has preferred this appeal challenging the judgment and order of acquittal passed by learned Sessions Judge, Barpeta in Sessions Case No. 152 of 2010. By that judgment, the learned Sessions Judge held that prosecution failed to establish case against the accused persons for offence under Section 304 B read with Section 34 of the IPC. 2. The prosecution story is that one Altab Hussain Khan lodged an ejahar with Officer In-charge, Barpeta Sadar Police Station on 28.01.2008 at 11.30 p.m. alleging that his younger sister Fatema Begum @ Manju married to one Md. Jehir Choudhury @ Jeku of North Barpeta, Barpeta Town died in her matrimonial house. He disclosed that Md. Jehir Choudhury, the husband of the deceased had informed him at 4.15 p.m. of the same day that Fatema Begum had committed suicide that day at about 1.30 p.m. According to the informant, Jehir Choudhury and his family members tortured the deceased physically and mentally in various ways so as to compel her to transfer her properties in their names. They used to keep her confined in a room alone under lock and key without providing her food. Failing to endure all these atrocities, she came back to paternal house at No. 1 Dolabari, Tezpur in the month of June, 2007. But in the month of October, 2007, two younger brothers of Jehir Choudhury took back the deceased to Barpeta promising that there would be no further torture on her. The informant expressed his doubt that Jehir Choudhury and all other members of the family, namely, Litan, Liku, Jubu, Mitali, Begi, Jeli and their mother must have killed Fatema in a pre-planned way. On the basis of this ejahar, Barpeta Police Station Case No. 65/2008 under Sections 147, 342, 304B of the IPC was registered and investigation started. 3. Police held inquest over the body, recorded statements of the witnesses and sent up the body for post mortem examination. The post mortem examination could not reveal any reason for death for which the doctor recommended for forensic examination of viscera. The stomach with its contents, part of liver tissue and left kidney were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory whereupon Shri Samudra Baishya, Senior Scientific Officer of Forensic Science Laboratory, Guwahati, opined that the viscera gave positive test for Organochlorine insecticide. The stomach with its contents, part of liver tissue and left kidney were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory whereupon Shri Samudra Baishya, Senior Scientific Officer of Forensic Science Laboratory, Guwahati, opined that the viscera gave positive test for Organochlorine insecticide. Having considered these reports along with the statements of the witnesses, the Investigating Officer submitted charge sheet against Jehir Choudhury and six other family members including three ladies under Sections 147, 342, 304B of the IPC on 21.04.2008. Having considered the charge sheet, the learned Magistrate committed the case to Sessions by an order dated 01.12.2010. Sessions Case No. 152/2010 was registered by the learned Sessions Judge, Barpeta and framed charges under Section 304B/ 34 of the IPC against all the 8 accused persons. The charges were read over to the accused persons whereupon they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. In course of trial, prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses and adduced 7 documents including ejahar (Ext. 1), Inquest Report (Ext. 2), post mortem report (Ext. 3), Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ext. 4) and charge sheet (Ext. 7). Considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the statements of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Sessions Judge delivered judgment on 11.06.2014 holding that prosecution failed to prove the charges against the accused persons and accordingly acquitted them. Aggrieved, the informant has preferred this appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. We have heard Mr. SK Medhi, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. BM Choudhury, Advocate for the accused persons and Ms. S Jahan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. We have also perused the records. 6. Learned Sessions Judge discussed the depositions of all the PWs and thereafter proceeded to answer the question as to who administered poison to the deceased or who induced her to consume the insecticide. Learned Sessions Judge found that PWs sharply differed among themselves on the relevant evidence. There were divergent testimonies in the evidence of the vital witnesses. PWs 1, 2 and 6 deposed in one line whereas PW 3 deposed on the other line. Altab Hussain Khan (PW 1) and Samsul Hussain Khan (PW 2) are the elder brothers of the victim and Naser Rahman (PW 6) is her cousin. There were divergent testimonies in the evidence of the vital witnesses. PWs 1, 2 and 6 deposed in one line whereas PW 3 deposed on the other line. Altab Hussain Khan (PW 1) and Samsul Hussain Khan (PW 2) are the elder brothers of the victim and Naser Rahman (PW 6) is her cousin. Julfikar Ali (PW 3) is the contiguous neighbour of the accused persons. The basic contention in the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 is that with the aim of receiving money either from his in-laws or from his wife by way of disposing her landed properties, the accused Jehir Choudhury put her to harassment and torture and let her to consume insecticides. But learned Sessions Judge noticed that during the visit of the victim with her husband at Tezpur since 22.01.2008 there was no disclosure as to discontent and dissatisfaction between the couple. According to PW 2, there existed some unhappiness and dissatisfaction between the couple relating to money. While PWs 1, 2 and 6 asserted that due to torture and harassment for money put by the accused persons the victim committed suicide, next door neighbour Julfikar Ali (PW 3) stated that victim died due to cardiac failure. The learned Sessions Judge did not fail to notice that cardiac failure could be cause of the consumption of insecticide as well. But this PW 3 specifically deposed that there was cordial relationship in the conjugal life between the husband and the wife and that he did not hear any quarrel between them. Having noticed such divergent views of the prosecution witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge held that there was no demand of dowry soon before the death of the victim or before she was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Accordingly, it was held that prosecution failed to prove by cogent, consistent and clinching evidence that the accused persons subjected Fatema Begum @ Manju to commit suicide in connection with demand of dowry during the continuance of marriage life with accused Jehir Choudhury and so ingredients of Section 304 B of the IPC could not be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the accused persons were acquitted from the charges. 7. Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned counsel for the appellant, did not make any endeavour to show that the aforesaid findings of the learned Sessions Judge are perverse. Consequently, the accused persons were acquitted from the charges. 7. Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned counsel for the appellant, did not make any endeavour to show that the aforesaid findings of the learned Sessions Judge are perverse. He has read out the depositions of all the witnesses including that of the medical officer and sought to establish that on an apprisal of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, a view can be taken against the accused persons. When he read out the depositions of the Investigating Officer it came to light that there were material improvements of the prosecution case during trial. The PW 1 did not make any mention about demand of money by accused Jehir Choudhury from him or his mother and did not say that the deceased was lying dead in her bed alone inside the house. But while deposing as PW 1 he improved his stand by making allegations to that effect. Similarly, PW 2 did not state before the Investigating Officer that he and his family members used to provide money to accused Jehir Choudhury every now and then for conducting business. He did not state under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he had given Rs. 40,000/- to the accused Jehir Choudhury for business. He also did not disclose to the Investigating Officer that a mobile set was given to the victim but whenever he used to call up, accused Jehir Choudhury used to pick up the call. Although, he stated in course of deposition that his another sister Meherjan had informed him about a disclosure made by the deceased that Jehir Choudhury demanded money from the victim, this Meherjan was not examined and so virtually there is nothing on record to base the allegation that victim made any disclosure to any of the prosecution witnesses about demand of money by Jehir Choudhury or his family members. The learned Sessions Judge considered the prosecution evidence in entirety and then arrived at the conclusion that ingredients of Section 304 B of the IPC are absent in the present case. No argument has been put forward to show that this finding is perverse. 8. In an appeal against acquittal the accused starts with a double presumption in his favour. The learned Sessions Judge considered the prosecution evidence in entirety and then arrived at the conclusion that ingredients of Section 304 B of the IPC are absent in the present case. No argument has been put forward to show that this finding is perverse. 8. In an appeal against acquittal the accused starts with a double presumption in his favour. First, the presumption of innocence and secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal from the trial court, unless the findings are shown conclusively that inference of guilt is irresistible, the same cannot be interfered with. If the findings recorded by trial court are not perverse or contrary to material or record and if there is no infirmity in the reasons assigned by the trial court for acquitting accused persons, no interference is warranted. This is why certain cardinal principles are required to be kept in mind while deciding an appeal against acquittal and they are as follows:- (i) that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused strengthened by the acquittal after trial before the trial court, (ii) that if two views are possible, a view favourable to the accused should be taken, (iii) that trial Judge had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of the witnesses, and (iv) that the accused is entitled to reasonable benefit of doubt, a doubt which a thinking man will reasonably, honestly and consciously entertained. The aforesaid view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Gambhir Singh & ors., AIR 2005 SC 2439 are the guiding principles in regard to appeal against acquittal on the basis of preponderant judicial pronouncements till date. We are, therefore, required to see as to whether the present appeal against acquittal warrants any interference. 9. Here in this case where prosecution proceeded to establish that accused Jehir Choudhury and his family members demanded dowry from the victim and her paternal relations. Charge under section 304 B of the IPC was accordingly framed against all the accused persons. Section 304 B is quoted below for ready reference:- “304B. Dowry death. 9. Here in this case where prosecution proceeded to establish that accused Jehir Choudhury and his family members demanded dowry from the victim and her paternal relations. Charge under section 304 B of the IPC was accordingly framed against all the accused persons. Section 304 B is quoted below for ready reference:- “304B. Dowry death. – (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. – For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The essential components of Section 304B as would appear from a bare perusal of the provision are as follows:- (i) death of a woman occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 years of marriage, (ii) soon before her death she should have been subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with any demand for dowry, and (iii) dowry within the meaning of section 304B would be same as that defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 10. In the case in hand, the victim was married to accused Jehir Choudhury in the year 2005 and she committed suicide in the year 2008 and so it is well within a period of 7 years of marriage. The first ingredient of the section 304B IPC is apparently satisfied. But to satisfy the second ingredient, the prosecution has to lead evidence to show that there was cruelty and harassment to the deceased with any demand for dowry soon before her death. In the case of Satvir Singh and others Vs. The first ingredient of the section 304B IPC is apparently satisfied. But to satisfy the second ingredient, the prosecution has to lead evidence to show that there was cruelty and harassment to the deceased with any demand for dowry soon before her death. In the case of Satvir Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another reported in (2001) 8 SCC 633 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the expression ‘soon before her death’ occurring in section 304B IPC indicates that there must be a perceptible nexus between the infliction of dowry related to harassment and cruelty on the woman and her death. PWs 1 and 2 stated in course of examination-in-chief that the accused Jehir Choudhury came to the house of his in-laws in June, 2007 along with victim and stayed for about 2/3 days and thereafter left the house leaving the deceased alone with her daughter. She stayed in her paternal house till October, 2007 when Litan and Liku, two accused persons who are brothers of accused Jehir Choudhury came and took her back in the matrimonial house giving assurance that there would be no further harassment on her. There is no evidence on record to show that during this period victim had disclosed about any demand of dowry to PWs 1 and 2 or their mother. Had there been a demand of dowry in that event, there was no question of taking back the victim to her matrimonial house without making any mention about the dowry. It is not the case of the prosecution that the victim was sent back to her paternal house to bring money. PW 2 stated in his examination-in-chief that he had given Rs. 40,000/- to Jehir Choudhury for doing business. This witness does not say that this amount was paid by him as a dowry or on demand by Jehir Choudhury or by his family members in connection with the marriage. Even if such payment has been made by PW 2 to Jehir Choudhury for doing business, would it amount to dowry? Explanation to Section 304B IPC provides that dowry within the meaning of this section would be same as that of section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the same is quoted below:- “Explanation. Even if such payment has been made by PW 2 to Jehir Choudhury for doing business, would it amount to dowry? Explanation to Section 304B IPC provides that dowry within the meaning of this section would be same as that of section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the same is quoted below:- “Explanation. – For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).” 11. The definition of dowry came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Appasaheb and another Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 9 SCC 721 . In paragraph 11 of this judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that even a demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. Paragraph 11 of this judgment is quoted below for ready reference:- “11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry" any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of Statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of India Vs. Garware Nylons Ltd. ( AIR 1996 SC 3509 ) and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1997 SC 558 ). (See Union of India Vs. Garware Nylons Ltd. ( AIR 1996 SC 3509 ) and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1997 SC 558 ). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.” 12. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court even if the statement of PW 2 in regard to payment of Rs. 40,000/- to accused Jehir Choudhury for business is accepted, it would not amount to dowry. The accused might have been in financial stringency or in need of money and PW 2 might have come forward to bail him out of the crisis. Such financial assistance rendered by a brother-in-law does not and cannot amount to a dowry. The second ingredient of Section 304B IPC, therefore, obviously has not been satisfied in the present case. 13. The learned Sessions Judge has discussed about the law regarding dowry death and has appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. Thereupon the learned Sessions Judge has arrived at the finding that ingredients of Section 304B of the IPC have not been satisfied in the present case. Having perused the evidence on record and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the findings of the learned Sessions Judge are based on the materials available on record and the same is inconformity with the law holding the field. The pre-conditions for interfering with judgment of acquittal do not exist in the present case. The appeal against acquittal is devoid of any merit. It is accordingly dismissed. 14. Send down the lower court records.