JUDGMENT : Servesh Kumar Gupta, J. At the outset, I would like to mention that this writ petition has been filed putting the title under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, while in fact it must be treated as if filed under Article 227 of the Constitution because it challenges the judicial order of the Divisional Commissioner, Nainital, and the High Court has the power of superintending over all course. The Divisional Commissioner while hearing the appeal against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority sits as a judicial authority, and not in his administrative capacity. Needless to say that Article 226 vests the power in the High Court to issue certain writs, which is an extraordinary constitutional remedy and to set aside the order of Divisional Commissioner while sitting in the judicial capacity, there is no need to invoke the extraordinary constitutional remedy as pondered under Article 226 of the Constitution, wherefor the powers vested under Article 227 of the Constitution do have their propriety and relevance and the applicability. Now, I come to the aspects of the matter. 2. The facts of the present case is a glaring illustration as to how the petitioner along with private respondents has succeeded to frustrate the object of the legislature in enacting the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter called as the Act). The law was enacted in the interest of community to ensure the increased agricultural production and to provide land to the landless agricultural labourers and for other public purposes to subserve the common good. But by abusing the process of law in the hierarchy of the courts, how a tenure-holder, who is presently the petitioner and his associates including their predecessors in-interest could succeed to prolong the litigation for nearly half a century and still their nefarious designs have not exhausted and the present writ petition is further an attempt in that direction. It may be demonstrated exploring the history of all these litigations as below. But even before proceeding ahead, perhaps it would be expedient to make the things more clear by way of producing the pedigree of petitioner’s ancestors, as provided to this Court and a portion of the same is available on the record also. It may be demonstrated exploring the history of all these litigations as below. But even before proceeding ahead, perhaps it would be expedient to make the things more clear by way of producing the pedigree of petitioner’s ancestors, as provided to this Court and a portion of the same is available on the record also. Rai Bahadur Hari Singh Rai Bahadur Sher Singh Baba Kharag Singh (Died in 1963) Prithvipal Singh (Died in 1947) Sundar Singh (born on 15.5.1891) (died on 1.11.1986) Jagat Singh Manjeet Singh Jagjeet Singh (All died and none had left any legal heir) Joginder Singh (born on 18.2.1919) (Alive) S. Rajinder Singh (born on 13.5.1921) (died in 2012) Bhagtender Singh (born on 15.9.1925) (Petitioner) (Alive) Kanwerinder Singh (born on 15.4.1927) (died in 2015) Jasinder Singh (born on 12.3.1943) (Alive) 3. During the course of arguments, it was revealed that as a reward of participation in the first world war, which probably happened in the late second decade of the 20th century, a vast agricultural land was given to the predecessors of the petitioner and the area of such land covered several hundreds of bighas (probably 644.16264 bighas) in the village Deohari, Tarai Bhawar area of Tehsil Bajpur and the said land was being used by the predecessors of the petitioner Bhagtender Singh, namely, Mr. Sundar Singh and even before by others, to their every benefit and use, but possession of this excess land was made vulnerable by the ceiling enactment, wherefor the discussions in the Legislative Assembly began in 1960 and the Act came into operation as general in 1961 giving liberty to the State Government to make it applicable specifically in area to area by way of publication of separate notification in the official gazette. 4. It has been submitted by learned Counsel of the private opposite parties that although this Act became applicable w.e.f. 8.6.1973 in Kashipur, but was made applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 24.1.1971 and as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, it was declared that from the date of its applicability, no tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate, any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. Pursuant to the applicability of the Act, a notice was issued by the Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2) on 26.9.1975 asking Mr. Pursuant to the applicability of the Act, a notice was issued by the Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2) on 26.9.1975 asking Mr. Sundar Singh (father of the present petitioner then alive) to surrender the excess land of 33.50 hectares (i.e. 529.635 bighas). He filed the objections dated 10.11.1975 and the Ceiling Case No. 51/27 of 1974-75, State of U.P. v. Sundar Singh, was decided by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority on 5.8.1976. He declared the land indicated above as surplus. So, this was taken as a jolt by the petitioner and he filed a Ceiling Appeal No. 904/1976 before the appellate authority, who rendered his judgment on 7.12.1977, whereby such appeal was partly allowed and the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was modified directing him to reconsider the matter asking the tenure-holder to submit his choice as to which khasras of land he wanted to surrender, and which not. He was also directed that while considering the matter afresh, the orders passed in the Ceiling Appeal No. 913/1976, Amrik Kaur v. State, and the Ceiling Appeal No. 915/1976, Jasbir Singh v. State, shall also be considered. These orders were neither brought before this Court enabling it to look as to what were the directions in those two appeals nor a single whisper raised by learned Counsels on behalf of either the petitioner or any of the respondents. 5. Mr. Sundar Singh feeling dissatisfied with the appeal judgment, preferred a Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 184/1978 before the Allahabad High Court, wherein the judgment was rendered on 28.8.1978 and the matter was remanded back to the Prescribed Authority to decide it afresh after having a look on determination of irrigated and un-irrigated land as envisaged under Section 4-A and giving the choice to the tenure-holder as contemplated under Section 12-A of the Act. 6. Mr. Sundar Singh still remained dissatisfied and preferred the SLP before the Hon’ble Apex Court, which too was dismissed on 15.10.1981 with the result the orders passed by the Allahabad High Court, as stated above, attained finality. 7. Up to this stage, as elaborated above, the private respondents, namely, Lokesh S/o Diwan, Harwansh Singh S/o Sahdev Singh, Sahdev Singh S/o Sant Singh, Devendra S/o Preetam, and Smt. Madhupreet Chahal D/o Premnath Kakkar or even Mr. 7. Up to this stage, as elaborated above, the private respondents, namely, Lokesh S/o Diwan, Harwansh Singh S/o Sahdev Singh, Sahdev Singh S/o Sant Singh, Devendra S/o Preetam, and Smt. Madhupreet Chahal D/o Premnath Kakkar or even Mr. Premnath Kakkar or his any other successor, namely, Surendra Kakkar, Mina Devar, Girish Kakkar never came in the picture, though they were not only residing in the same locality but, as claimed, were in possession of nearly four hundred bighas of land. This way the previous Prescribed Authority Case No. 51/27 of 1974-75 was renumbered as P.A. Case No. 51/18 of 1990-91, State v. Sundar Singh, and this time these private respondents, as has been shown in the array of writ petition, appeared for the first time claiming that they are the leaseholders in the following manner. (i) Harwansh Singh (respondent no. 4) claimed that a lease deed dated 30.11.1965 was executed by Mr. Sundar Singh in his favour pertaining to Khasra no. 145 for the total area of 72 bigha and 10 bishwa and he was in the possession of the same. (ii) Sahdev Singh (respondent no. 5) claimed that a lease deed dated 30.11.1965 was executed by Mr. Sundar Singh in his favour pertaining to Khasra nos. 118/1, 119, 120/2, 121/2/3, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143 and 144 covering total area of 48 bigha and 2 bishwa. (iii) Premnath Kakkar, S/o Ram Lal, whose daughter Smt. Madhupreet Chahal is respondent no. 7 in the writ petition, claimed that a lease deed dated 30.11.1965 was executed through an agreement by Mr. Sundar Singh in his favour pertaining to Khasra no. 138 for the total area of 75 bigha and 2 bishwa. (iv) One Lal Singh claimed that a lease deed of the same date, i.e. 30.11.1965, was executed by Mr. Sundar Singh in his favour pertaining to Khasra No. 158 covering total area of 42 bigha and 5 bishwa. (v) One Preetam Singh, S/o Harnam Singh, (now died), whose son Devendra Singh is respondent no. 6 in the present writ petition, claimed that a lease deed of the same date, i.e. 30.11.1965, was executed in his favour pertaining to Khasra Nos., which are the same as of Mr. Sahdev, for the same area i.e. 48 bigha and 2 bishwa. (vi) Mr. Lokesh (respondent no. 3 in the instant writ petition) claimed that a lease deed of the same date, viz. Sahdev, for the same area i.e. 48 bigha and 2 bishwa. (vi) Mr. Lokesh (respondent no. 3 in the instant writ petition) claimed that a lease deed of the same date, viz. 30.11.1965, was executed in his favour pertaining to Khasra No. 138 for a total area of 75 bigha and 2 bishwa. 8. This way, Mr. Sundar Singh executed the so-called lease deeds on the same one date in favour of all these persons named above on the stamp paper of either rupee one or rupees two or like such amount. Pursuant to these lease deeds, all these persons were put into possession. 9. Learned Counsel of these respondents has vehemently contended that since all these deeds were executed at least five years prior to the crucial date of 24.1.1971, hence such transfer of the land by Mr. Sundar Singh keeps away such area of land from the effect of operation of the Ceiling Act. This contention of learned Counsel is of no avail for the reason that the Act was passed in 1960, so, the echo of curtailment of excess land which had already been surged years before and might had well been felt by the original tenure-holder and that was the reason that in order to defeat the object and purpose of the Act, he executed all these lease agreements of vast land in favour of different persons. 10. The Prescribed Authority permitted all these objectors to put forth their submissions with the condition that if their case is found to have even a little merit, then they will be impleaded in the fray and the opportunity of full hearing shall be given to them, including the production of evidence. But since after hearing the arguments of their learned Counsels, the Prescribed Authority could not find any substance in their assertions, hence pursuant to the directions of the Allahabad High Court in its judgment dated 28.8.1978, he heard the original tenure-holder with reference to Section 12-A and 4-A of the Act and thus rejected the objections of these so-called lease holders vide his judgment dated 30.5.1991 (Annexure 4 of the supplementary affidavit). 11. All these persons preferred a Ceiling Appeal No. 43 of 1990-91, which was quickly decided by the Divisional Commissioner, Kumaon Mr. B.K. Chaturvedi vide his judgment dated 16.7.1991 (Annexure 5 to the supplementary affidavit). 11. All these persons preferred a Ceiling Appeal No. 43 of 1990-91, which was quickly decided by the Divisional Commissioner, Kumaon Mr. B.K. Chaturvedi vide his judgment dated 16.7.1991 (Annexure 5 to the supplementary affidavit). Their objections preferred under Section 11(2) of the Act were again given no recognition for the elaborate reasons highlighted by the learned appellate authority in its judgment, which was primarily based on the reason that none of these persons was the tenure-holder and it was very amazing that the instant ceiling proceedings were in the process against the original tenure-holder since 1975 and all these objectors remained quite oblivious of all these facts continuously for 15 years, nevertheless they were residing in the same locality and for the first time they put their appearance before the Prescribed Authority in 1991. That apart, the reason for dismissing the appeal was that they could not show anything to prove their continuous possession over the land, in question, because the Khasras of 1975, 1976 and 1977 were available on the record, but none of these objectors was shown in any of those Khasras. If they were in the possession since 1965, then there was no reason for absence of their names in such Khasras continuously for such a long period. Even if their status as the leaseholder is accepted for a moment, then also such status does not confer any right to them as only a person in adverse possession acquires the Sirdari rights by way of applicability of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Learned Commissioner was also of the view that since all these lease agreements were unregistered, hence on that ground too, their claim was unacceptable. 12. A Writ Petition No. 21299/1999 was filed before the Allahabad High Court by Mr. Lokesh and others wherein they succeeded in getting the stay order dated 2.8.1991 and after such stay, they rested idle and worriless, without taking the least initiative for adjudication of such writ petition for the simple reason that either of the original tenure-holders Mr. Sundar Singh or his successors Mr. Bhagtender Singh, etc. or the persons to whom the interest of Mr. Sundar Singh had been deferred, viz. these so-called lease holders, were continuously enjoying the usufructs of this vast land, depriving the State to implement the objectives of the legislation. Sundar Singh or his successors Mr. Bhagtender Singh, etc. or the persons to whom the interest of Mr. Sundar Singh had been deferred, viz. these so-called lease holders, were continuously enjoying the usufructs of this vast land, depriving the State to implement the objectives of the legislation. That writ petition remained idle due to the reason, as stated above, in the Allahabad High Court for at least 10 years, and after carving out of the State of Uttarakhand, it was transferred to this Court and it bore a new Writ Petition No. 4985 (M/S)/2001. It was sure that none of the respondents was interested in getting this writ petition adjudicated ever because the stay dated 2.8.1991 was still effective and the local authorities of the State also did not have any duty interest to get it decided. So, the matter remained idle in the Registry of the High Court for further 10 years. It seems that after sending continuous notices to the parties to put their appearance before the writ court, the matter could be decided on 25.4.2011 by a coordinate Bench of this Court and the operative portion of the judgment reads as under:- “Since the Prescribed Authority has not decided the objection under Section 11(2) by a reasoned and speaking order, whether the objection is maintainable or not, therefore, the Prescribed Authority is directed to decide the objection U/s 11(2) of the Act keeping in mind the provision of Section 11(2), as has been observed by Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the above cited case. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as by the learned Commissioner, Kumaun, Nainital, are set aside and the Prescribed Authority concerned is directed to decide the objection of the petitioners filed U/s 11(2) of the Act on merit. Since the case is pending from 1991 and the proceeding was stayed by the High Court vide order dated 2-8-1991, the Prescribed Authority is directed to decide the objection on merit in accordance with law as early as possible. The interim order dated 2-8-1991 is vacated.” 13. Pursuant to the directions as above, the Ceiling Case No. 51/27 of 1974-75 was again taken up for hearing by the Prescribed Authority and several dates were fixed asking the objectors to adduce their evidence, but only single witness could be examined. The interim order dated 2-8-1991 is vacated.” 13. Pursuant to the directions as above, the Ceiling Case No. 51/27 of 1974-75 was again taken up for hearing by the Prescribed Authority and several dates were fixed asking the objectors to adduce their evidence, but only single witness could be examined. Most of the times, the case was adjourned for the reason that the lawyers were abstaining from the work or the Presiding Officer was out of station or had gone on leave or on any other administrative work. However, on 5.2.2014, when the case was taken up for hearing, all these objectors/respondents were absent, while DGC (Revenue) was present on behalf of the State. The matter was heard ex parte, While rejecting the objections of all these respondents, the judgment was pronounced on that very date by the Prescribed Authority against them and pursuant to such pronouncement, a notification on C.L.H. Form 6 under Rule 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1961 was issued. 14. Here itself, it would be opportune to mention that the learned Counsel for the private respondents argued that no opportunity of hearing was rendered to these respondents by the Prescribed Authority and the case continuously remained adjourned for other reasons, but for no fault of the respondents. I think this contention of the learned Counsel for the private respondents does not hold any water. To substantiate my view, the order sheet of the Prescribed Authority dated 17.11.2012 is to be looked into, wherein it has been categorically observed that uncaring the directions of the Hon’ble High Court in the judgment dated 25.4.2011, the respondents are neither turning up in the Court nor availing the opportunity of adducing their evidence. Hence, their objections were rejected. Even on 20 dates thereafter, all these respondents were given the opportunity to adduce the evidence warning them to be the last chance, but since they had no interest in getting this matter finally adjudicated and they wanted to prolong the same for the reasons as highlighted by this Court earlier, they again remained absent and did not produce any evidence. So, the Prescribed Authority was constrained to close such opportunity on 5.2.2014 and to pronounce the judgment. 15. So, the Prescribed Authority was constrained to close such opportunity on 5.2.2014 and to pronounce the judgment. 15. Even if the argument of learned Counsel is accepted for a moment, then also I feel as to what was available with all these private respondents to prove in the Court by adducing the oral testimony. At the most, they would have stressed on certain receipts which were showing that the crop of sugarcane was sold by one of the private respondents in the sugar factory or few of them deposited the irrigation charges. But all these factors by themselves are not complete in validating the so-called lease deeds, which is the basis of their case. A lease holder may be in possession for a long time, but I think that his mere long possession is not sufficient to declare him the owner of such land. 16. Since all these persons were enjoying the usufructs of the land wherefrom they might had been divested, hence again a Ceiling Appeal No. 9 of 2013-14 was preferred by Harwansh Singh and others. A parallel Ceiling Appeal No. 8/2013-14 was preferred by Mr. Bhagtender Singh, S/o Mr. Sundar Singh. A third Ceiling Appeal No. 10/2013-14 was also preferred by Mr. Lokesh. 17. Appeals of Harwansh Singh and Lokesh were rejected on merits by the Divisional Commissioner on 16.1.2015 and the appeal of Mr. Bhagtender Singh and his brothers was also dismissed on the same date by passing a separate judgment. In both these verdicts, he has categorically held that either of these persons are not interested in adducing the evidence and getting the matter adjudicated finally on merits despite having availed sufficient opportunity. 18. Since the purpose was to prolong the litigation and to remain in possession, hence a review application was again preferred by Lokesh and Harwansh on 28.1.2015, while separate review application was filed by Bhagtender Singh and his brothers (sons of Mr. Sundar Singh) on 31.1.2015. Both these review petitions were allowed by the learned Divisional Commissioner by passing the separate judgments on 16.4.2015, whereby he set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 5.2.2014 as well as his own judgment dated 16.1.2015 and asked the learned trial authority to decide the matter afresh after rendering opportunity to both the parties to adduce their evidence. 19. 19. Petitioner Bhagtender Singh did not challenge the order passed on his own review application by the Divisional Commissioner. By doing so, he invoked the authority to decide his ceiling matter after consideration of his objections and choice as directed by Allahabad High Court in its judgment dated 28.8.1978 vis-à-vis to Section 12-A and 4-A of the Act. But on the other hand, he challenged the order of the learned Divisional Commissioner passed on the same date on the review petition of Harwansh Singh and Lokesh and vehemently stressed that how this case was being dragged by Harwansh Singh and his associates and they are not permitting the case to be adjudicated even after the lapse of 50 years and this way the learned Commissioner has pushed back the whole case at the stage from where it had commenced in 1975. Therefore, vide order dated 1.7.2015, this Court feeling impressed by the said ex parte argument, stopped the operation of the order of Divisional Commissioner dated 16.4.2015 passed in review application of Harwansh Singh and Lokesh. 20. Since Bhagtender Singh was pursuing the Prescribed Authority to quickly consider the land of his choice without hearing Harwansh Singh and his associates (on account of operation of the stay order of this Court granted on 1.7.2015), hence the grievance of Mr. Harwansh Singh and his company was the natural. So, they also appeared before this Court and brought all these facts in the notice. Appreciating the facts, the Court vide its order dated 29.7.2015 stayed the ongoing proceedings in Ceiling Case No. 51/27 of 1974-75 till the final decision is taken after considering the pros and cons of the dispute. 21. After the said order dated 29.7.2015 passed by this Court, Bhagtender Singh woke up because his ceiling proceedings forestalled depriving him to take the land of his choice in his exclusive possession. 22. One yet more significant aspect of the matter is that this Bhagtender or his predecessors or his brothers executed some agreements to sell and the sale deeds of the remaining land of Khatauni No. 67 as under:- (i) Registered agreement to sell dated 22.12.1990 in favour of Girish Kumar and Munish Kumar, sons of Premnath Kakkar, pertaining to Khasra No. 146/3 minzumla total area of 5 acres. (ii) Registered agreement to sell dated 16.10.1990 in favour of same Girish Kumar and Munish Kumar, sons of Premnath Kakkar, pertaining to Khasra No. 158/1/3 for the total area of 8 acres i.e. 51 bigha and 4 bishwa. (iii) Registered agreement to sell dated 27.9.1990 in favour of same Girish Kumar and Munish Kumar, sons of Premnath Kakkar, pertaining to Khasra No. 158/1/3 for total area of 9 acres i.e. 57 bigha and 12 bishwa. (iv) Registered sale deed dated 26.3.1991 in favour of the same Girish Kumar and Munish Kumar pertaining to Khasra No. 158/1/3 minzumla area 17 acres i.e. 108 bigha and 15 bishwa and Khasra No. 146/3 minzumla area 5 acres i.e. 32 bigha. 23. This way the registered agreements to sell and the sale deed were executed for a huge area of almost 43 acres for good consideration at that time, as shown in all such deeds, without having the little care and consideration that the proceedings of ceiling, as contemplated under the Act, were in progress against him. But they have been forestalled at the initiation of either Bhagtender Singh or his predecessors in title or his brothers or these so-called lease holders, to whom the interest of Mr. Sundar Singh had been deferred in the shape of unbelievable lease agreements. Since he has done so, therefore, at best the Court can say that he and all these transferees have taken this venture at their own peril and the objectives of the legislation cannot adversely be affected by these deeds, which were impermissible under the law. 24. Having heard the learned Counsels of the parties, I feel that all these so-called lease deeds have been held to be invalid for the reasons highlighted in the Prescribed Authority’s order dated 5.2.2014 and such order was upheld by the learned Divisional Commissioner vide his judgment dated 16.1.2015. There was no reason either for Mr. Sundar Singh to execute unregistered lease agreements on the stamp papers of rupees two, three or five on 30.11.1965 for almost 361 bighas of land in favour of six persons. It was obviously done to subvert and thwart the objectives of the legislation of ceiling. Otherwise, there was no reason for parting with such a vast land from his possession in favour of different persons, who either themselves or their successors are the respondents in the present petition. 25. It was obviously done to subvert and thwart the objectives of the legislation of ceiling. Otherwise, there was no reason for parting with such a vast land from his possession in favour of different persons, who either themselves or their successors are the respondents in the present petition. 25. The possibility to write these agreements some time after receiving the notice under Section 10(2) of the Act on 26.9.1975 cannot also be ruled out. It could have been done with the collusion of the stamp vendor by just putting a date 30.11.1965 on the back of the stamp paper. Otherwise there was no reason not to get them registered or at least produce the same before the Public Notary for their verification. At such time also, the Indian Registration Act (Central Act) was in force and the lease of immovable property was not permissible at all without getting it registered, as envisaged under the law. It was compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(d) of such Act and Section 49 contemplated the effect of non-registration of the documents required to be registered, providing that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall affect any immovable property comprised therein, or confer any power or create any right or relationship, or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power or creating such right or relationship unless it has been registered. 26. Even for a moment, if it is accepted that these lease deeds were executed in 1965, then what was the reason that all these respondents could not know the ceiling proceedings going on against their lessor for not 1 or 2 years, but for continuous 15 years, nevertheless they were residing in the same area and the locality. It is obvious that when Mr. Sundar Singh did not find any favour from any of the Courts, then all these persons came forward before the Prescribed Authority for the first time in 1991, and surely at the behest of Mr. Sundar Singh. 27. It is obvious that when Mr. Sundar Singh did not find any favour from any of the Courts, then all these persons came forward before the Prescribed Authority for the first time in 1991, and surely at the behest of Mr. Sundar Singh. 27. It has been highlighted by this Court that all these persons were not interested at all in getting the matter finally adjudicated from any level because had the proceedings been final, they would have been deprived from enjoying and taking the usufructs of this vast land and that is the reason that after procuring the stay order from Allahabad High Court on 2.8.1991, no attempt, much less any interest, was shown by them in getting the matter finally adjudicated. 28. In view of what has been set forth above, I set aside the judgment and order of learned Divisional Commissioner dated 16.4.2015 passed on the review applications moved either by Lokesh, Harwansh Singh and the sons of Mr. Sundar Singh. I uphold the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 5.2.2014 as well as the judgment and order of the learned Divisional Commissioner dated 16.1.2015 passed in the ceiling appeals preferred by all these persons. As a consequence, the validity of the notice issued by the Prescribed Authority in C.L.H. Form 6 under Rule 14 of the Ceiling Rules is also sustained. At the same time, it is hereby directed that while taking a decision to declare the land surplus, as elaborately mentioned in C.L.H. Form 6 already issued by the Prescribed Authority, the choice of the writ petitioner shall be given due regard, but subject to the decision in Ceiling Appeal No. 913/1976, Amrik Kaur v. State, and the Ceiling Appeal No. 915/1976, Jasbir Singh v. State. 29. Prescribed Authority is directed not to hear either of these persons or any other person further again because their only objective and interest is to defeat the purpose and objectives of the Act by abusing the process of law. Since all these persons could have been able to drag this litigation for little short of half a century, the trial court shall promptly take further steps pursuant to the notice issued by it, and all such proceedings shall be culminated at the earliest, but not later than three months from today. State Counsel shall communicate this order to all concerned. State Counsel shall communicate this order to all concerned. LCR shall be sent back to the Prescribed Authority and courts below through special messenger forthwith. 30. Writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms.