JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri M. Devananda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri H. Tarunkumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for quashing the impugned letters dated 23-12-2015 cancelling the tender being No. Cont. (1)/RTC/RH JBMKOI/ROMAN/2015 dated 07-11-2015 and E-Tender Notice dated 23-12-2015 issued by the Deputy General Manager (R), FCI, Regional Officer, Manipur. 3.1. According to the petitioner, the respondent No. 1, the Deputy General Manager (R), FCI, Regional Office, Manipur issued an E-Tender notice dated 07-11-2015 inviting tenders for appointment of Road Transport Contractor from Rail Head Jiribam to FCI FSD Sangaiprou and FSD Koirengei (Hired), Imphal and the last date of submission of tenders through online was upto 12:00 p.m. of 30-11-2015 and the technical bid was to be opened on the same day at 01:00 p.m. In response to the said notice, the petitioner firm submitted its tender through online on 29-11-2015 with the price bid @ Rs. 4,314/- MT/Entire distance. As per the said tender notice, the technical bid was opened on 30-11-2015 in the presence of the representatives of the contractors/bidders and only 2 (two) Contractors/Transporters including the petitioner firm were found to be qualified for the price bid or financial bid. On 19-12-2015, the office of the Deputy General Manager (R) addressed a letter to the petitioner firm and others informing that the opening of the price bid had been fixed on 21-12-2015 at 02:00 PM at the Conference Hall of FCI Regional Office, Manipur. After the financial bid being opened, the petitioner firm was found to be the lowest bidder with its price bid at Rs. 4,314/-. 3.2. To the shock and surprise of the petitioner firm, the respondent No. 1, the Deputy General Manager (R), FCI addressed a letter to the said two contractors including the petitioner firm informing that after the evaluation of the price bid by the Tender Committee, it was found that the rate quoted by the lowest bidder namely the petitioner firm @ Rs. 4,314/- MT/Entire Distance was on the higher side and accordingly, the said tender vide E-Tender notice dated 07-11-2015 had been scrapped and it had been decided to refloat the tender with the same VOC and EMD for appointment of Road Transport Contractor from Rail Head FSD Jiribam to FSD Koirengei (Hired). 4,314/- MT/Entire Distance was on the higher side and accordingly, the said tender vide E-Tender notice dated 07-11-2015 had been scrapped and it had been decided to refloat the tender with the same VOC and EMD for appointment of Road Transport Contractor from Rail Head FSD Jiribam to FSD Koirengei (Hired). On the same day i.e., 23-12-2015 another E-Tender notice dated 23-12-2015 was issued inviting tenders for appointment of Handling & Transport Contractors. Being aggrieved by the actions of the respondents, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner questioning the letters dated 23-12-2015 and E-Tender notice dated 23-12-2015 on the ground that the same are arbitrary and illegal. 4. The instant writ petition is contested by the respondent No. 1 by filing an affidavit-in-opposition wherein it is stated that the Tender Committee, after evaluation of the rate quoted by the petitioner firm @ Rs. 4,314/- MT/Entire Distance, found it to be on the higher side in comparison with the existing contract rates. The rate of the existing contract of the petitioner firm from RH Salchapra to FSD Koiregei (which is about 291 km.) is Rs. 12.82/- MT/KM i.e., Rs. 3,745.14/- MT/Entire Distance which was appointed by the FCI, Manipur Region whereas the rate quoted by the petitioner firm in the present tender for RH/FSD Jiribam to SFD/Koirengei (which is about 230 km.) is Rs. 4,314/- MT/Entire Distance i.e., Rs. 18.75/MT/Km. and therefore it is not reasonable to appoint the contractor namely the petitioner firm at such high rate. As per Clause No. 11 of the Model Tender Form signed and submitted by the petitioner firm, the FCI reserves the right to reject any or all the tenders without assigning any reason. Although Clause No. XX (b) of the terms and conditions of the MTF stipulates that in case of any dispute arising out of and touching upon the contract, the same would be first referred to the Dispute/Grievance Redressal Committee constituted and functioning at the zonal office of the corporation with a view to settle the dispute, the petitioner firm had knowingly opted not to avail the said remedy and therefore, the question of illegality, arbitrary and violation of the principle of natural justice or being non-application of mind did not arise at all in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. 5. In matters relating to award of contracts having commercial element, the scope of judicial review is very limited and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions has settled the law in this regard. It is not necessary for this court to burden itself in referring to those decisions and suffice it to say that in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Vs. State of Karnataka & ors., reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216 the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after examining the various decisions, has summarised the principles as under:- “23. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:- (a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and nonarbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities; (b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and the courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by courts is very limited; (c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by courts is not warranted; (d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work; and (e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by court is very restrictive since no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. 24. 24. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”? and (ii) Whether the public interest is affected? If the answers to the above questions are in the negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226.” 6. In Maa Binda Express Carrier and anr. Vs. North East Frontier Railway and ors., reported in (2014) 3 SCC 760 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the said principles and held:- “8. The scope of judicial review in matters relating to award of contracts by the State and its instrumentalities is settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. While these decisions clearly recognise that power exercised by the Government and its instrumentalities in regard to allotment of contract is subject to judicial review at the instance of an aggrieved party, submission of a tender in response to a notice inviting such tenders is no more than making an offer which the State or its agencies are under no obligation to accept. The bidders participating in the tender process cannot, therefore, insist that their tenders should be accepted simply because a given tender is the highest or lowest depending upon whether the contract is for sale of public property or for execution of works on behalf of the Government. All that participating bidders are entitled to is a fair, equal and nondiscriminatory treatment in the matter of evaluation of their tenders. It is also fairly well settled that award of a contract is essentially a commercial transaction which must be determined on the basis of consideration that are relevant to such commercial decision. This implies that terms subject to which tenders are invited are not open to the judicial scrutiny unless it is found that the same have been tailormade to benefit any particular tenderer or class of tenderers. This implies that terms subject to which tenders are invited are not open to the judicial scrutiny unless it is found that the same have been tailormade to benefit any particular tenderer or class of tenderers. So also, the authority inviting tenders can enter into negotiations or grant relaxation for bona fide and cogent reasons provided such relaxation is permissible under the terms governing the tender process. 9. Suffice it to say that in the matter of award of contracts the Government and its agencies have to act reasonably and fairly at all points of time. To that extent the tenderer has an enforceable right in the court which is competent to examine whether the aggrieved party has been treated unfairly or discriminated against to the detriment of public interest. (See Meerut Development Authority v. Assn. of Management Studies and Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd.)” 7. It is not in dispute that the ETender notice dated 07-11-2015 was published for appointment of Road Transport Contractors from RH/FSD Jiribam to FSD Sangaiprou and RH/FSD Jiribam to FSD Koirengei and the petitioner firm had participated in the said tender in respect of RH/FSD Jiribam to FSD Koirengei. The Technical Bid was opened on 30-11-2015 at 01:00 PM and only 2 (two) contractors including the petitioner firm were found to be qualified in the technical bid and the price bid was opened on 21-12-2015 as per schedule. It is also not in dispute that the rate quoted by the petitioner firm was found to be the lowest. But the said tender was scrapped and cancelled by the respondents on the ground that the rate quoted by the petitioner was found to be on the higher side. Being aggrieved by the cancellation of the tender, the petitioner firm has questioned it. Shri M. Devananda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the action of the respondents cancelling the tender is unreasonable, arbitrary and illegal for the reason that no cutoff rate beyond which the bidders cannot quote the rate, was fixed at all. On the other hand, Shri H. Tarunkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the tender process has been done in a very fair and transparent manner and the impugned letters were issued on the basis of the recommendation of the Tender Committee. On the other hand, Shri H. Tarunkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the tender process has been done in a very fair and transparent manner and the impugned letters were issued on the basis of the recommendation of the Tender Committee. During the course of hearing, a copy of the recommendation of the Tender Committee was placed on record for perusal by this court. In Raunaq International Ltd. Vs. I.V.R. Construction Ltd and ors. reported in (1999) 1 SCC 492 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appellant acquired no right to claim the award of contract merely by reason of its being the highest. Relying upon the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme in Maa Binda Express Carrier case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the submission of tender is no more than making an offer which the State or its agencies are under no obligation to accept and the bidders in the tender cannot insist that their tenders should be accepted simply because a given tender is the highest or the lowest. It has further been held that the only enforceable right that a bidder has, is to examine by the court whether the aggrieved party has been treated unfairly or discriminated against to the detriment of public interest. From the perusal of the said recommendation of the Tender Committee, it is seen that the Tender Committee has considered mainly three points : (a) comparison of rates quoted by other contractors in respect of other existing contracts with that of the petitioner firm; (b) comparison of rate quoted by the petitioner firm with of its own rate quoted in respect of other contract and (c) requirement of appointment of a contractor who has not only the capacity to supply adequate trucks but whose rate is reasonable enough for giving more movement program as large quantity of food grains may be moved after the induction of food grains by rail to Manipur. While evaluating the rate quoted by the petitioner firm, it appears that the Tender Committee has kept in mind the loss that the FCI may suffer in the event of the bid of the petitioner firm being accepted by the respondents which is not against public interest. While evaluating the rate quoted by the petitioner firm, it appears that the Tender Committee has kept in mind the loss that the FCI may suffer in the event of the bid of the petitioner firm being accepted by the respondents which is not against public interest. Therefore, the recommendation of the Tender Committee cannot be said to be unreasonable and moreover, it is the recommendation given by the persons who have knowledge and expertise in the subject matter. There is no specific allegation against any member of the Tender Committee as being bias against the petitioner firm. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present, this court is of the view that the writ petition is devoid of any merit and hence, is liable to be dismissed. 8. For the reasons stated herein above, the instant writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.