JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. P. Tamphamani, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Shyam Sharma, learned G.A., Mr. S. Biswajit, learned counsel for the State respondents as well as Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Tapan, learned counsel for the private respondent no. 4 in W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016. 2. These two writ petitions W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013 and W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016 are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment and order considering the interconnectedness of the issues involved in these two writ petitions. 3. W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013 was filed by two petitioners, namely, Sri R.K. Biren Singh and Sri L. Saratchandra Singh. Of the said two writ petitioners, Sri R.K. Biren Singh has retired during the pendency of this petition and has not pursued his claims as submitted by the Ld. Senior counsel for the petitioners and as such, it may not be necessary to refer to the factual positions concerning petitioner No. 1 unless required. The second writ petitioner, Sri L. Saratchandra Singh has pursued his claim challenging the order dated 10.09.2013 by which representation filed by the two writ petitioners against the order treating them as deputationists by considering their absorption as void, thus making them liable to be repatriated to the parent department was not accepted by the authorities. In W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016 the lone petitioner, Sri L. Saratchandra Singh has challenged the order dated 23.01.2016 by which the petitioner has been repatriated from DRDA, Chandel to his parent department i.e., Loktak Development Authority, Manipur with immediate effect. 4. The facts as may be common and relevant to these writ petitions may be stated briefly as follows. 5. Sri L. Saratchandra Singh who is the common petitioner in both the writ petitions was serving on regular basis as an Assistant Engineer having been promoted as such vide order dated 30.06.1999 in the Loktak Development Authority which is a Government undertaking. While serving as such, the petitioner, Sri Saratchandra was deputed as an Executive Engineer, a higher post in the DRDA, Chandel vide order dated 20.01.2003. Thereafter, after a year, the service of the petitioner and other deputionists in various DRDAs were absorbed to the posts of Executive Engineers vide order dated 30.06.2004. While serving as such, the petitioner, Sri Saratchandra was deputed as an Executive Engineer, a higher post in the DRDA, Chandel vide order dated 20.01.2003. Thereafter, after a year, the service of the petitioner and other deputionists in various DRDAs were absorbed to the posts of Executive Engineers vide order dated 30.06.2004. The petitioner Sri L. Saratchandra Singh was absorbed as an Executive Engineer in the DRDA, Chandel. On absorption of the petitioner as an Executive Engineer in DRDA Chandel, the earlier post of Assistant Engineer held by the petitioner in the parent department Loktak Development Authority was filled up on regular basis by promotion on the recommendation of a DPC held on 7.10.2005. It seems certain issues arose about the absorption of the deputionists in the DRDAs and the Government intimated the DRDAs vide their WT Message dated 4.08.2004 that the absorption of the deputionists in DRDAs were kept in abeyance. However, the said WT Message dated 4.08.2004 was superseded by another WT Message dated 07.12.2004 intimating that the earlier order of absorption dated 30.06.2004 will remain in force. It seems the issue regarding absorption of the deputionists in the DRDAs was not settled as evident from the subsequent letter dated 27.09.2010 issued by the Additional Chief Secretary (RD & PR) addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Chandel in which it was stated that the DRDAs are manned by persons appointed on contract basis or on deputation since its inception in 1999. It further stated that, the Government has not taken steps to regularize or absorb the employees of the DRDAs. The said letter emphasized that such being the case, the order dated 30.06.2004 for absorption of some of the DRDA staff was devoid of Government sanction. The said letter continued to state that absorption tantamounts to regularization of the services of employees concerned. The letter clarified that since the Government had not yet considered any proposal of regularization of DRDA staff, the absorption of the DRDA staff was, therefore, wrong ab anitio and informed that all orders issued by the then Joint Secretary (RD) do not have any Government approval either. Accordingly, the letter declared that the Government instructions issued for repatriation of the deputionists still stand and directed the Deputy Commissioner, Chandel to release all the deputionists under intimation to the Government. 6. Accordingly, the letter declared that the Government instructions issued for repatriation of the deputionists still stand and directed the Deputy Commissioner, Chandel to release all the deputionists under intimation to the Government. 6. The said communication dated 27.09.2010 from the Additional Chief Secretary (RD & PR) was challenged by two petitioners including the present petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 635 of 2010 before the Gauhati High Court, Imphal Bench and the Hon’ble High Court while issuing notice in the said writ petition on 6.10.2010 suspended the operation of the aforesaid communication dated 27.09.2010. The petitioners took the plea in the said writ petition as well as in the present writ petition W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013 that the aforesaid order for repatriation was passed on the basis of a false and fabricated letter dated 19.06.2010 purportedly issued by the Union Minister, RD & PR for repatriation of staff under the DRDA on deputation which was subsequently found not to have been issued by the Ministry. 6.1 It was also submitted in that writ petition that the case of the petitioners is squarely covered by the decision in WP(C) No. 491 of 2009 passed on 09.09.2009 in which the Gauhati High Court held the repatriation of a deputationist after being absorbed in the borrowing department, was not permissible and declared the petitioner therein to be deemed to be in service of the borrowing department. 6.2 According to the petitioners, while the said writ petition, WP(C) No. 635 of 2010 was pending, it came to be known that such a letter dated 19.06.2010 from the Union Ministry was a forged one which was purportedly the basis for directing repatriation of the deputationists from DRDAs. The petitioners claimed that the parent department, i.e., the Loktak Development Authority in their letter dated 01.06.2011 had informed the Forest & Environment Department that as regards the instruction issued to all the DRDAs for repatriation of deputationists to the parent departments, there was no communication from the DRDA, Senapati/Churachandpur/Chandel and as far as the 3 (three) officers including Sri L. Sharatchandra Singh, were concerned there was no more lien for them in the LDA due to non availability of posts. The petitioners further claimed that, in the meantime, the authorities in the Department of RD & PR, Government of Manipur made a process for absorption of all technical staffs in the DRDAs in Manipur in the line department of Department of RD & PR. In view of the aforesaid development, the petitioners withdrew the said writ petition, WP(C) No. 635 of 2010. 6.3 Thereafter, the petitioners submitted a representation on 29-10-2012 requesting the withdrawal and cancellation of the Government letter dated 27-09-2010 (which was challenged in W.P.(C) No. 635 of 2010, which was subsequently withdrawn) for repatriation and for absorption of the petitioners in the Department of RD &PR, Government of Manipur. In the meantime, the Deputy Commissioner/Chandel sought a clarification vide letter dated 29-10-2012 from the Addl. Chief Secretary, (RD&PR), Govt. of Manipur regarding absorption and repatriation of the deputationists. According to the petitioners, since there was no response from the authorities regarding their representation and as the Govt. letter dated 27-09-2010 directing repatriation of the deputationists was not withdrawn, the petitioners again filed another writ petition, WP(C) No. 432 of 2013 which was disposed of on 17-6-2013 with the direction to the respondent authorities to consider the representation submitted by the petitioners on 29-10-2012 by issuing a speaking order by taking into consideration the order passed in WP(C) No. 491 of 2009 with the further direction that till disposal of the representation, the services of the petitioners may not be disturbed. 6.4 In terms of the aforesaid direction of this Court in WP(C) No. 432 of 2013, the respondents considered and rejected the representation of the petitioners vide Government order dated 10-09-2013 which has been challenged in this writ petition, WP(C) No. 903 of 2013. The gist of the grounds of rejection of the representation of the petitioners is that the Govt. has not taken any decision to regularise or absorb the deputationists in the DRDA and the absorption of the deputationists vide order dated 30-6-2004 was devoid of Govt. sanction and hence void ab initio and the earlier order for repatriation stands. It was further stated that in view of the irregularity in the order of absorption, the services of the petitioners are to be treated as on deputation until repatriated and they are to be repatriatied after lien is ascertained and/or recreated in the parent department, i.e., LDA whichever, is later. It was further stated that in view of the irregularity in the order of absorption, the services of the petitioners are to be treated as on deputation until repatriated and they are to be repatriatied after lien is ascertained and/or recreated in the parent department, i.e., LDA whichever, is later. 6.5 The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid Government order dated 10.9.2013 rejecting the representation of the petitioners in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 contending that it is not correct and is a false statement that the Government had not taken steps to regularise by absorbing employees of DRDAs or that the order dated 30.6.2004 for absorption of some of the DRDAs staffs was devoid of government sanction and such absorption order was wrong ab-initio and accordingly, have submitted that the Government instruction issued for repatriation of those deputationist still stands is untenable. The petitioners claim that the Government of Manipur issued the order of absorption dated 30.6.2004 after following due process and after obtaining approval of the higher authorities concerned including the Minister-in-Charge which can be seen from the relevant file i.e. File No. 2/7/98-DEVT(MC-Pt) which the petitioners insist the respondent No.1 is bound to produce before this Court. It has been also contended that there are various orders of appointments of technical staffs in DRDAs as Section Officers, Assistant Engineers, Executive Engineers, etc. on regular basis issued by the then Joint Secretary (DR&DA). However, no order for repatriation has been issued in respect of such officers and as such, the impugned Government order dated 10.9.2013 is illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was also stated that the process for absorption of the regular staff of the DRDAs in Manipur were in active progress. However, instead of upholding the absorption of the petitioners, the impugned order dated 10.9.2013 had been issued by the Respondent authority for victimising the petitioners. Hence, the petitioners filed this writ petition W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013. 7. It was also stated that the process for absorption of the regular staff of the DRDAs in Manipur were in active progress. However, instead of upholding the absorption of the petitioners, the impugned order dated 10.9.2013 had been issued by the Respondent authority for victimising the petitioners. Hence, the petitioners filed this writ petition W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013. 7. At this stage, it may be mentioned that before filing of the aforesaid W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 by the two petitioners, a writ petition being W.P(C) No.267 of 2013 was filed by four persons, who were serving in the DRDA, Chandel in various capacities of Project Officer, Assistant Project Officers, Statistical Investigator and Account Officer seeking issuance of a writ of Quo Warranto against Shri L. Saratchandra Singh who is one of the petitioners in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 by declaring that his absorption to the post of Executive Engineer in the Engineering Cell of the DRDA, Chandel is illegal and unconstitutional as he is not eligible to hold the said post as per the recruitment rules for the post of Executive Engineer at the relevant point of time. The aforesaid four persons in W.P.(C) No. 267 of 2013 contended that the respondent No.4 therein, Sri L. Saratchandra Singh, (petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013) is a Diploma Holder in Civil Engineering and was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer of the Loktak Development Authority only on 30.6.1999 and as per the relevant rules for the post of Executive Engineer, an Assistant Engineer, who is a Diploma Holder, is eligible for promotion to the higher post of Executive Engineer after rendering 9 years of regular service as Assistant Engineer and as such he would become eligible for promotion to the higher post of Executive Engineer only in the year 2008. It had been contended that however, in violation of the statutory provisions of the recruitment rules, Sri L. Saratchandra Singh was absorbed to the post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA, Chandel vide order dated 30.6.2004 though he had completed only 5 years of service as an Assistant Engineer. It has been also contended that the post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA, Chandel could not be filled up by way of deputation. It has been also contended that the post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA, Chandel could not be filled up by way of deputation. It had been further contended that, since the normal period of deputation is 3 years, as he had exceeded the period of deputation, his continuation in the DRDA, Chandel is illegal and unconstitutional. However, the said writ petition, W.P(C) No.267 of 2013 was dismissed by the High Court at the Motion stage on the ground that the four petitioners did not have locus standi to challenge the appointment of the respondent No.4 Sri L. Saratchandra Singh as these four petitioners were not in any way concerned with the appointment of the respondent No.4 as they were working in different posts and they cannot be even remotely considered for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer throughout their service career. The Hon’ble Court accordingly held that in such a situation, it would be appropriate for such persons working in the cadre of Assistant Engineer whose chances may be adversely affected by the appointment Sri L. Saratchandra Singh to challenge his absorption and not by the said four petitioners. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal of the said writ petition, W.P(C) No.267 of 2013, two of the four writ petitioners, namely, Shri Stephen Modan and Shri W. Iboyaima Singh preferred an SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was registered as SLP Civil No.22743 of 2013 in which Sri L. Saratchandra Singh has been impleaded as Respondent no. 4. 9. In the meantime, while this SLP was pending, the said L. Saratchandra Singh filed this writ petition being W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 as mentioned above, in which this Court passed an interim order on 20.12.2013 to the effect that the service of the petitioner shall not be disturbed unless alternative post is available to accommodate in the parent department considering the contention of the petitioner that the post of Assistant Engineer earlier held by him had been filled up while he was on deputation in DRDA, Chandel and there is no post available in the parent Department of LDA for the deputationist to go back. 10. When the aforesaid SLP was taken up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 21.1.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the aforesaid SLP as infructuous with the following order : [ Order dated 21.01.2015 ] “Learned counsel for respondent No.4 Mr. 10. When the aforesaid SLP was taken up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 21.1.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the aforesaid SLP as infructuous with the following order : [ Order dated 21.01.2015 ] “Learned counsel for respondent No.4 Mr. Laishram Saratchandra Singh draws our attention to I.A. No.3 filed by him pointing out that his client has since been repatriated to his parent department thereby rendering the entire controversy infructuous. He further states that Mr. Laishram Saratchandra Singh has since been relieved from DRDA, Chandel and has joined back in his parent department. That submission is supported by an Order dated 10.9.2013 passed by the Government of Manipur, a copy whereof is placed as Annexure P-8 to the application. In that view learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this petition can be disposed of as infructuous. We order accordingly.” From the above, it is evidently clear that the said SLP No.22743 of 2013 was closed on the submission made by the counsel for the said L. Saratchandra Singh, (the petitioner in these two writ petitions under consideration) that he has been relieved from DRDA, Chandel and joined his parent Department in terms of the order dated 10.9.2013 passed by the Government, which is challenged in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013. 11. However, the aforesaid order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court closing the said SLP as infructuous, was recalled by a subsequent order passed on 20.4.2015 on an application filed on behalf of the said L. Saratchandra Singh stating that the earlier submission made that L. Saratchandra Singh had been relieved and had joined the parent Department was wrongly made by the junior colleague of the counsel for the said L. Saratchandra Singh (respondent no. 4) on mis-appreciation of true facts and the said respondent No.4 continues to be with the DRDA. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recalled the order dated 21.1.2015 and directed that the SLP No.22743 of 2013 be heard finally on merit. The aforesaid recalling order dated 20.4.2015 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is reproduced hereinbelow: [ Order dated 20.04.2015 ] “Heard. SLP No.22743 of 2013 was disposed of by our order dated 21.01.2015 as infructuous on a statement made on behalf of respondent No.4 to the effect that the respondent had since been relieved from DRDA, Chandel and had joined back in his parent department. SLP No.22743 of 2013 was disposed of by our order dated 21.01.2015 as infructuous on a statement made on behalf of respondent No.4 to the effect that the respondent had since been relieved from DRDA, Chandel and had joined back in his parent department. In the present application respondent No.4 has sought modification of the said order to the extent that respondent No.4 has not been relieved and that he continues to serve in DRDA, Chandel. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.4 that the statement made on behalf of respondent No.4 that he stood relieved from DRDA and that he had joined back in his parent Department was made by his junior colleague on a mis-appreciation about the true facts. It is submitted by him that the order of this Court dated 21.01.2015 could be suitably corrected to the extent that respondent No.4 continues as a borrowed employee on deputation with DRDA. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since the very basis on which SLP(C) No.22743 of 2013 was disposed of as infructuous is now found to be factually incorrect and since respondent No.4 continues to be with DRDA there is no option but to recall order dated 21.01.2015 and to hear the SLP on merits. We find merit in that contention. We accordingly recall our order dated 21.01.2015 and direct that SLP(C) No.22743 of 2013 shall now be listed for final hearing on merits. I.A. is accordingly disposed of.” 12. When the matter was called up for hearing on 27.10.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made certain observations and sought for clarifications concerning certain facts relating to the deputation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court took cognisance of the order dated 10.9.2013 (challenged in W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013) passed by the Government of Manipur and observed that it appears from a reading of the said order dated 10.9.2013 that the earlier order passed by the Government for regularisation of the services of the respondent No.4 L. Saratchandra Singh (petitioner in these two petitions) has been reversed and the said respondent was allowed to continue on deputation till such time he is repatriated by either creating a supernumerary post in the parent Department or vacancy available against the substantive post. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that though the proposal for creation of supernumerary post appeared to have been made sometime in September, 2013, it is not clear from the affidavit as to what had happened soon thereafter and as the counsel for the State was also unable to inform the Hon'ble Supreme Court as to whether the Government had taken any step for creation of any supernumerary post, the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted time to the State to file additional affidavit for furnishing information as mentioned in the said order dated 27.10.2015. The aforesaid order dated 27.10.2015 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: [ Order dated 27.10.2015 ] “The principal grievance made in this petition arising out of an order passed by the High Court of Manipur at Imphal is that respondent No.4 has been sent on deputation against the post of Executive Engineer in the District Rural Development Agency, Chandel District, and has continued in that capacity for about 12 years, although in terms of the Fundamental rules applicable the tenure of such deputation cannot go beyond 5 years in any event. Our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the petitioner to an order dated 10.09.2013 passed by the Government of Manipur according to which the Government has been approached by the administrative department concerned for creation of supernumerary posts to adjust officials who had been sent out of the Department on deputation and who have completed their period of deputation. From a reading of the said order, it further appears that the earlier order passed by the Government for regularisation of the service of respondent No.4 has been reversed and the said respondent allowed to continue on deputation till such time he is repatriated by either creating a supernumerary post in the parent department or against a substantive vacancy becoming available. The proposal for creation of supernumeraries appears to have been moved some time in September, 2013. As to what has happened ever since September 2013 is not very clear from the counter affidavit filed by the State. Learned counsel for the State is also unable to tell us as to whether the Government have taken any steps for creation of any supernumerary posts. It is also not very clear whether any vacancy has become available in the parent department against which the respondent No.4 could be repatriated. Learned counsel for the State is also unable to tell us as to whether the Government have taken any steps for creation of any supernumerary posts. It is also not very clear whether any vacancy has become available in the parent department against which the respondent No.4 could be repatriated. In view of the above situation, learned counsel for the State seeks time to file an additional affidavit indicating the following: (i) Whether the proposal for creation of supernumerary posts in terms of order dated 10.9.2013 has been examined by the Government and if so what are the orders passed in regard thereto. (ii) In case the Government has not considered the creation of supernumerary posts, the reason for its failure to do so. (iii) In case the supernumerary posts have been created, the reason why respondent No.4 has not been repatriated against the same to his parent Department. (iv) Whether any vacancy on a substantive post has become available in the parent Department of respondent No.4. If so, why was respondent No.4 not repatriated against the same till now. (v) In case the supernumerary posts are not created the time within which it is proposed to do so may be indicated. Needful shall be done within four weeks. List immediately after four weeks.” 13. When the matter was taken up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 5.02.2016, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was apprised of the order dated 23.1.2016 (challenged in W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016) by which the respondent No.4 therein, L. Saratchandra Singh was repatriated from DRDA, Chandel to his parent Department i.e. LDA with immediate effect. Hon'ble Supreme Court also noted that the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 therein also confirmed the passing of the aforesaid order. In the circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that nothing survives in the SLP for consideration and the same stands disposed of, further observing that however, it is open for the respondent No.4 therein to work out his remedy in future in the manner known to law, in regard to the order dated 23.01.2016. In the circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that nothing survives in the SLP for consideration and the same stands disposed of, further observing that however, it is open for the respondent No.4 therein to work out his remedy in future in the manner known to law, in regard to the order dated 23.01.2016. The aforesaid order dated 05.02.2016 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No.22743 of 2013 is reproduced hereinbelow: [ Order dated 05.02.2016 ] “Pursuant to our order dated 27.10.2015, it is now brought to our notice that the Government of Manipur, Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department has passed orders dated 23.01.2016, a perusal of the said order disclose that among others the respondent No.4 herein has been repatriated from D.R.D.A., Chandel to his parent Department i.e. Loktak Development Authority, Manipur with immediate effect. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 also confirmed the passing of the above-said order by which Respondent No.4 has been repatriated to his parent Department. In such circumstances, nothing survives in this special leave petition, the same stands disposed of. However, it is open for Respondent No.4 to work out his remedy, if any, in the manner known to law, in regard to the present order dated 23.01.2016.” 14. It may be stated that the order dated 23.01.2016 repatriating the said L. Saratchandra Singh from the DRDA, Chandel to the parent Department i.e. Loktak Development Authority with immediate effect was passed during the pendency of the SLP and the respondent No.4 had already filed the writ petition before this Court on 29.01.2016 being W.P(C) No.59 of 2016 challenging the said order dated 23.01.2016 before the disposal of the SLP by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 05.02.2016. This Court while considering the said writ petition, W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016 filed by L. Saratchandra Singh, passed an interim order on 1.2.2016 to the effect that if the petitioner had not been repatriated in terms of the impugned order dated 23.01.2016, he may remain at his present place of posting in view of the fact that there is an earlier order passed in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 where the Court had directed that the service of the petitioner shall not be disturbed. Accordingly, the said L. Saratchandra Singh continues to remain in DRDA, Chandel on the strength of the Court’s order. Accordingly, the said L. Saratchandra Singh continues to remain in DRDA, Chandel on the strength of the Court’s order. It seems the aforesaid interim order passed by this Court on 1.2.2016 in W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016 was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court when the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the SLP No.22743 of 2013 on 05.02.2016 on the basis of the aforesaid Government order dated 23.1.2016 challenged in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016. 15. From the above, it is, therefore, evident that issues relating to deputation/absorption/repatriation of the said L. Saratchandra Singh are the core issues involved in these proceedings in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 as well as W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016. 16. The submission of Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions, W.P.(C) No. 903 of 2013 and W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016 in short is that the service of the petitioner, L. Saratchandra Singh was absorbed in the DRDA, Chandel as an Executive Engineer by following all the procedures and also after obtaining necessary approval from the competent authority and as such, it was not permissible to change the status of his regular appointment by way of absorption in the DRDA as an Executive Engineer to that of a deputationist again. It has been further submitted that even if it is assumed that it is permissible to do so, since the petitioner was not given an opportunity of being heard before such adverse order changing the status of the petitioner from being a regular staff in the DRDA on being absorbed to that of a deputationist, the aforesaid actions are not permissible, being violative of principles of natural justice. Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel has also submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while closing the SLP No.22743/2013 had given liberty to the petitioner to work out his remedy, if any, in the manner known to law, in regard to the order dated 23.1.2016 and as such, the petitioner has all options to challenge the order of repatriation and cancellation of his absorption which has been done by filing this writ petition W.P(C) No.59 of 2016. 17. In response, Mr. 17. In response, Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondent No.4 in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016 has submitted that while disposing of the SLP No.22743 of 2013 on 27.10.2015, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration the order dated 10.9.2013 passed by the State Govt. (impugned in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013) declaring the absorption of the petitioner as void and treating the petitioner as a deputationist and after taking cognisance of the aforesaid dated 10.9.2013, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had sought for certain clarifications from the State as regards the proposal for creation of supernumerary post as mentioned in the order dated 10.9.2013 with a specific query as to whether any vacancy in the substantive post has become available in the parent department against which the said L. Saratchandra could be repatriated and in case supernumerary post is not created, to indicate the time within which it is proposed to do so. In terms of the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made on 27.10.2015 in the light of the aforesaid order dated 10.9.2013, the LDA made the necessary clarifications to the State Government about the creation of a supernumerary post, and the State Government filed an affidavit dated 08.01.2016 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifying the position as regards the queries made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the order dated 27.10.2015. In the said affidavit filed by the State Government, it was stated that the RD&P had written to the LDA, Manipur on 27.11.2015 that it is the duty and responsibility of the parent department to take back its regular employee when the deputation period is over and in case of non-availability of vacant post in the parent department, a supernumerary post/substantive post has to be created. In response to the said letter, the LDA had replied to the RD&PR vide letter dated 07.01.2016 that at present one post of Assistant Engineer is vacant. It has been submitted that in fact, on the basis of the aforesaid affidavit as well as information received from the LDA, the repatriation order dated 23.1.2016 was passed by the Department of RD & PR which has been challenged in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016. Accordingly, Mr. It has been submitted that in fact, on the basis of the aforesaid affidavit as well as information received from the LDA, the repatriation order dated 23.1.2016 was passed by the Department of RD & PR which has been challenged in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016. Accordingly, Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned senior counsel has submitted that since a detailed order was passed on 27.10.2015 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court after duly considering the order dated 10.9.2013, examination of the validity of the said order dated 10.9.2013 challenged in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 will be beyond the scope of this Court. Referring to the order dated 5.2.2016 by which the Hon'ble Supreme Court closed the SLP No.22743 of 2013, it has been submitted that it was brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that pursuant to the earlier order dated 27.10.2015 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Department had passed order dated 23.1.2016 which clearly discussed amongst others, that the respondent No.4 in the SLP (writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016) has been already repatriated from DRDA to his parent department i.e. LDA. 18. Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned senior counsel submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court further recorded the submission of the counsel for the respondent No.4 confirming the passing of the above order by which the respondent No.4 has been repatriated to his parent department. Thus considering submission made by the counsel for the respondent No.4, the petitioner herein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that nothing survives in SLP for consideration and accordingly disposed of the said SLP. In that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is for the respondent No.4 (writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016) to work out his remedy, if any, in the manner known to law with regard to the order dated 23.1.2016. 19. Accordingly, Mr. In that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is for the respondent No.4 (writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016) to work out his remedy, if any, in the manner known to law with regard to the order dated 23.1.2016. 19. Accordingly, Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned senior counsel submits that the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the petitioner to seek his remedy was in respect of the repatriation order dated 23.1.2013 and not in respect of the validity of the order dated 10.9.2013, which had been already considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as a valid order on the basis of which the earlier detailed order dated 27.10.2015 was passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and as such, even if any liberty given to the respondent No.4 therein (writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016) to approach the Court, that is confined only to the repatriation order dated 23.1.2016 and not for questioning the validity of the order dated 10.9.2013 which had held the respondent No.4 (writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016) to be a deputationist, liable to be repatriated. Mr. B.P. Sahu further submits that the remedy available to the respondent No.4 (writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016) as mentioned in the 27.10.2015 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relates to the consequences of his repatriation like promotion, seniority, etc. in the parent department and not concerning the validity of the order of repatriation itself. Mr. B.P. Sahu submits that the expression used “in the manner known to law” in the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while closing the SLP refers to challenge of the order dated 23.1.2016 and not in respect of the order dated 10.9.2013. Mr. in the parent department and not concerning the validity of the order of repatriation itself. Mr. B.P. Sahu submits that the expression used “in the manner known to law” in the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while closing the SLP refers to challenge of the order dated 23.1.2016 and not in respect of the order dated 10.9.2013. Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned senior counsel submits that this interpretation is supported by the relief claimed by the writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016, where the petitioner has sought for quashing of the order dated 23.01.2016 on the ground that two junior officers who were holding the posts of Assistant Engineers have been promoted as Executive Engineers on in-charge basis and as such, the petitioner will be compelled to work under them after repatriation in the parent department which would be illegal, thus clearly indicating that he is not so much aggrieved by the repatriation order but by the fact that his juniors have been given promotion to higher posts of Executive Engineer in the parent department. Mr. B.P. Sahu submits that the relief claimed in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 was for quashing the order dated 10.09.2013 whereby his absorption order was held to be void and liable to be repatriated. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition before this Court, when the aforesaid SLP was taken up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the said order dated 10.09.2013 wherein it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that from a reading of the said Government order dated 10.09.2013, it appears that the earlier order passed by the Government for regularisation of the service of the respondent No.4 (writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016) dated 30.06.2004 has been reversed and the said respondent No.4 (writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016) was allowed to continue on deputation till such time he is repatriated by either creating a supernumerary post in the parent department or against a substantive vacancy becoming available. According to Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned Senior Counsel, this observation clearly shows that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had upheld the validity of the order dated 10.9.2013 and as such, there is no further scope for examining the validity of this order in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013. 20. Mr. According to Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned Senior Counsel, this observation clearly shows that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had upheld the validity of the order dated 10.9.2013 and as such, there is no further scope for examining the validity of this order in W.P(C) No.903 of 2013. 20. Mr. B.P. Sahu by referring to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Union of India vs. Bhanwar Lal Mundan, (2013) 12 SCC 433 has submitted that the repatriation has to be to the original post and benefits of promotion in the department to which an employee is deputed is of no consequence and will be subject to entitlement of the status available in the parent department. Accordingly, he submits that when the writ petitioner in W.P(C) No.59 of 2016 has been repatriated to the LDA as an Assistant Engineer by order dated 23.01.2016, it is in tune with the judgment in Bhanwar Lal Mundan (supra), and hence there is no illegality in the said repatriation order dated 23.1.2016. 21. Mr. Biswajit, learned counsel for the State respondents in W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016, echoing the submissions made by Sri B.P. Sahu has submitted that nothing survives in WP(C) No. 903 of 2013 for consideration of the validity of the order dated 10.09.2013. He also submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court after comprehensive examination and consideration of all the documents and after exhaustive hearing of the learned counsel for the parties on various issues and contentions raised and after examining the merit of the matter determined the issue regarding repatriation and came to the conclusion that the present petitioner can be repatriated if there is vacancy in the parent department. Learned counsel for the State respondents submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court after careful deliberation narrowed down the scope of examination to the specific issue of repatriation as evident from the order dated 27.10.2015 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and ultimately closed the SLP vide order dated 05.02.2016. It has been submitted that after having considered the matter of repatriation, the issue of absorption or validity of the cancellation of the absorption cannot be raised, as the same stands closed. Mr. It has been submitted that after having considered the matter of repatriation, the issue of absorption or validity of the cancellation of the absorption cannot be raised, as the same stands closed. Mr. Biswajit, learned counsel has submitted by referring to the order dated 27.10.2015 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that reading of the aforesaid order would clearly indicate that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was fully seized of the matter relating to repatriation and sought for certain clarifications from the State Government for the purpose of repatriation of the petitioner. This, according to him, would be clear from the queries no. (iv) and (v) recorded in the order dated 27.10.2015 by which the Supreme Court desired to know from the State Government of the existence of any vacancy on a substantive post in the parent department and if so, why the petitioner has not been repatriated against the said vacant post and in case the supernumerary post is required to be created, the time to create the supernumerary post is also to be indicated. Therefore, it will be very clear from the aforesaid queries contained in the order dated 27.10.2015 that the Supreme Court was concerned with the modality of repatriation treating the issue of repatriation as a forgone conclusion and was no more concerned with the issue of validity of the absorption order. Mr. Biswajit, learned counsel has also drawn attention of this Court to the order dated 20.04.2015 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court while recalling the earlier order dated 21.01.2015 recorded the submission made by the counsel for the respondent No. 4 (petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 59 of 2016) that the earlier order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 21.01.2015 could be suitably corrected to the extent that the said respondent no. 4 continues as a borrowed employee on deputation with DRDA. He, therefore, submits that once such a statement is made before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, admitting that he continues as an employee on deputation, the question of examining the validity of the absorption of the petitioner does not arise. Mr. Biswajit also has submitted that the repatriation order can be challenged only on two grounds, i.e. of malafide and also overstay. In the present case, there is no such case of malafide and overstay and on the contrary, the petitioner had overstayed of more than 5 years. 22. Mr. Mr. Biswajit also has submitted that the repatriation order can be challenged only on two grounds, i.e. of malafide and also overstay. In the present case, there is no such case of malafide and overstay and on the contrary, the petitioner had overstayed of more than 5 years. 22. Mr. Biswajit also has submitted that the present writ petition is also barred by principle of res judicata in as much as the issue regarding absorption and repatriation had been already decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid SLP where the same issue has been raised in the present petition filed on the same subject matter of absorption and repatriation and since the issue relating to the validity of the absorption of the petitioner in the DRDA had been virtually decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by directing repatriation, this issue cannot be agitated any more before this Court. It has been also submitted that the liberty granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was only in respect of the matters regarding the consequential benefits which will flow on repatriation of the petitioner to his parent department and is not regarding challenge to the validity of the repatriation order. Mr. Biswajit also submits that the observation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the order dated 05.02.2016 while closing the SLP to the effect that nothing survives in this SLP was made in the context of the order dated 23.01.2016 passed by the department repatriating the petitioner to his parent department and as such, the issue of absorption cannot be raised. He submits that at best, the petitioner could raise the issue of consequential benefits which will arise out of the implementation of the order dated 23.01.2016. 23. Mr. Biswajit further contesting the claim of the petitioner that the aforesaid order dated 10.09.2013 was passed in violation of natural justice, submits that it was in fact passed as a consequence to a direction of this Court to dispose of the representation submitted by the petitioner in which the petitioner had raised his grievances. Therefore, passing of the aforesaid order dated 10.09.2013 as a response to the representation cannot be said to be in violation of the natural justice and submits that the said principle is not applicable in the present case. 24. Therefore, passing of the aforesaid order dated 10.09.2013 as a response to the representation cannot be said to be in violation of the natural justice and submits that the said principle is not applicable in the present case. 24. From the facts and the contentions raised, it is clearly evident that the basic issues involved in these two writ petitions are regarding deputation of the petitioner from the Loktak Development Authority to DRDA, Chandel vide order dated 20.01.2003, subsequent absorption of the petitioner who was holding the post of Assistant Engineer on regular basis in the LDA to the post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA, Chandel vide order dated 30.06.2004 and the subsequent order of the repatriation dated 23.01.2016 which was preceded by order dated 10.09.2013 declaring the petitioner to be a deputationist liable to be repatriated on the availability of post in the parent department. In view of the above issues involved in these petitions, the fundamental principles governing deputation, absorption of a deputationist and the repatriation needs to be restated. 25. As to what is deputation in service, has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Inder Singh and Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 372 , which essentially means deputing or transfer the employee outside his cadre to another department on temporary basis and on completion of the period of deputation, the employee has to come back to his parent department. Such a transfer by way of deputation has to be done with the consent of the employee as held in para 18 of Inder Singh (supra) which is reproduced herein below: “18. The concept of “deputation” is well understood in service law and has a recognized meaning. “Deputation” has a different connotation in service law and the dictionary meaning of the word “deputation” is of no help. In simple words “deputation” means service outside the cadre or outside the parent department. Deputation is deputing or transferring an employee to a post outside his cadre, that is to say, to another department on a temporary basis. After the expiry period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per the Recruitment Rules. After the expiry period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per the Recruitment Rules. Whether the transfer is outside the normal field of deployment or not is decided by the authority who controls the service or post from which the employee is transferred. There can be no deputation without the consent of the person so deputed and he would, therefore, know his rights and privileges in the deputation post. The law on deputation and repatriation is quite settled as we have also seen in various judgments which we have referred to above. There is no escape for the respondents now to go back to their parent departments and working there as Constable or Head Constables as the case may be.” 26. The other principle which governs deputation is that a deputationist has no right as to be absorbed in the borrowing department though there is no such bar in absorption and such a deputationist can be reverted to parent department at any time. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G. Muniyappa Naidu Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 543 has held that there cannot be any absorption contrary to the regulations, as absorption is really nothing but appointment and there cannot be any appointment contrary to the relevant service rules. In Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Managing Director, U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Limited and Others, (1999) 8 SCC 381 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that although an employee on deputation has no right to be absorbed in the service where he is working on deputation, in some cases depending upon the statutory rules the position may be to the contrary. Thus, if the rules provide for absorption of the employee, then such employee has the right to be absorbed in the service in accordance with the rules. It was further observed that whether a deputationist is to be absorbed or not, is a matter of policy but at the same time, once the policy is accepted and rules are framed for such absorption, such absorption must be done in accordance with rules and not arbitrarily and dehores the rules. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also clarified in Kunal Nanda Vs. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also clarified in Kunal Nanda Vs. Union of India and Another, (2000) 5 SCC 362 that it is well settled that unless the claim of the deputationist for permanent absorption in the department where he works on deputation is based upon any statutory rule, regulation or order having the force of law, a deputationist cannot assert and succeed in any such claim for absorption. The basic principle underlying deputation is that the person concerned can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department to serve in his substantive position at the instance of either of the departments and there is no vested right in such a person to continue for long on deputation or get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on deputation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the absorption of a deputationist being one against the direct quota, the possession of basic educational qualification prescribed for direct recruitment i.e. a degree is a must and essential. From the aforesaid judgment it can be also gathered that if the absorption of a deputationist is against the direct recruitment quota, the possession of basic educational qualification prescribed for direct recruitment is a must and essential. Thus, it is obvious that the deputationist who is being absorbed in a particular post must possess the qualification prescribed for the said post. 27. Though recruitment to a service may be made by way of deputation, such appointment by way of deputation does not necessarily result in absorption in which the employee is deputed and there can not be any absorption unless the consent of the employee and both the lending and borrowing departments agree (See Umapati Chowdhury Vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 4 SCC 659 ). The reason is not far to seek, as at the time of appointment in the parent department on regular basis, certain rules and regulations are followed and only because of certain exigency of service, the borrowing department makes a request for deputation and the lending department after obtaining the consent of the employer, sends him on deputation to the borrowing department. The status of a deputationist in the borrowing department thus, is of a temporary nature. The status of a deputationist in the borrowing department thus, is of a temporary nature. Therefore, as a corollary, unless the rules in the borrowing department provide and the consent of the lending department as well as the employee have been obtained, there can not be any absorption in the borrowing department, as absorption in the borrowing department would virtually amount to a regular appointment in the borrowing department. The consent of the lending department would be necessary as otherwise, the right to recall a deputationist would be extinguished. Further, it is well established that any regular appointment in a department has to be made in accordance with the applicable service rules and after conforming to the mandate of Article 14 and 16, as such, absorption being another method of regular appointment, has to be in conformity with the rules. 28. Absorption in service is another specie of regularisation of an employee, as on being absorbed in a department, the employee is conferred the status of a regular employee. Thus, the general principles which are applicable for regularisation of service would be also applicable in case of absorption. Some of these principles as, may be applicable in the present case, may be stated as below: (i) The employee must fulfill all the conditions under the relevant recruitment rules/service rules for regular appointment or absorption to the particular post in which the employee is absorbed. (ii) Since the absorption amounts to regularization of a service in a department, certain procedures which are reasonable, fair and transparent in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution must be followed for effecting such absorption. It goes without saying that such absorption must be in conformity with the statutory rules and cannot be contrary to the rules. Thus, absorption must be made at the recommendation of a competent recommending authority in the manner of a selection committee in the case of direct recruitment or a departmental promotion committee as in the case of promotion, so as to examine the eligibility, suitability of the person who is sought to be absorbed in a department. (iii) Since the absorption amounts to regularisation to a post, more particularly, if the deputationist is a regular employee in the parent department, the absorption of the deputationist must be against a regular post in the borrowing department. (iii) Since the absorption amounts to regularisation to a post, more particularly, if the deputationist is a regular employee in the parent department, the absorption of the deputationist must be against a regular post in the borrowing department. (iv) Since the deputationist has come to the borrowing department after the lending department had temporarily spared the service of the deputationist, before any such absorption takes place in the borrowing department, the consent of the lending department and not only consent of the deputationist must be obtained. The reason being that if the lending department again wishes to get back the service of the deputationist, which is the right of the lending department, such right of the lending department can not be extinguished on account of absorption of the deputationists in the borrowing department unless the consent of the lending department had been obtained. (v) Because of the very nature of deputation, as the employee has not permanently left the parent department, he would retain his lien over to the post which he was holding in the parent department so that when the employee returns to his parent department on completion of the period of deputation he would be adjusted to his former post. 29. As regards repatriation, it means the reversion of the employee to his substantive post in his parent department on completion of the period of deputation. Normally, deputation is for a specific period which may be either mentioned in the order of deputation or under a general service rule and an employee cannot avoid repatriation merely on the ground of hardship. 30. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind we will proceed to examine the issues involved in this writ petition. As regards the deputation of the petitioner, it is seen that he was so deputed by order dated 20.01.2003. On examination of the deputation order dated 20.01.2003, it is clearly revealed that the petitioner, Shri L. Saratchandra Singh at the time of deputation was holding the substantive post of Assistant Engineer in the Loktak Development Authority but was deputed to the higher post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA Chandel. After his deputation to DRDA Chandel, the petitioner L. Saratchandra Singh was absorbed as Executive Engineer, Chandel which is a higher post vide order dated 30.06.2004. 31. After his deputation to DRDA Chandel, the petitioner L. Saratchandra Singh was absorbed as Executive Engineer, Chandel which is a higher post vide order dated 30.06.2004. 31. So far as deputation of the petitioner is concerned, there may not be any legal infirmity in as much as law does not prohibit deputation of a person to a higher post. Therefore, when the petitioner who was holding the substantive post of Assistant Engineer in LDA was deputed in the DRDA, Chandel in a higher post of Executive Engineer, there may not be any issue. However, absorption of the petitioner to a higher post of Executive Engineer vide order dated 30.06.2004 would raise certain questions which would require proper examination. The respective contentions of the rival parties are focused on this order of absorption which the petitioner contends to be valid stating that the said absorption order had been issued in accordance with law and the rights arising out of the said absorption order can not be withdrawn without following the due process and not by violating the principles of natural justice. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondents that such absorption order was issued without the sanction of the Government and the competent authority and is void ab initio and hence does not confer any right of regular appointment/absorption in the borrowing department of DRDA and as such the petitioner is liable to be repatriated to his parent department. 32. Though the petitioner has contended that the proceedings for the absorption of the petitioner is to be found in the File No. 2/7/98-Dev(MC)Pt/104A, it is mentioned in file produced before this Court by the respondent authorities that the said file is not traceable and there is also no explanation as to how the said file relating to the absorption of the petitioner is not traceable. The absence of the aforesaid file, however, neither proves the invalidity of the absorption order, nor proves the validity of the same though it could have provided a clinching evidence as regards the validity or otherwise of the absorption order. However, this Court is of the view that absence of the relevant file may not render this exercise futile as other relevant records and inferable materials may throw light on the validity of the absorption order. 33. However, this Court is of the view that absence of the relevant file may not render this exercise futile as other relevant records and inferable materials may throw light on the validity of the absorption order. 33. The aforesaid disputed absorption order dated 30.06.2004 reads as follows: “GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR SECRETARIAT : DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT (MONITORING CELL) ORDERS Imphal the 30th June, 2004 No.2/7/98-Dev(MC)Pt/104A. The Governor of Manipur is pleased to the absorption of the following Engineers, who have been on deputation to DRDA’s Manipur with immediate effect in their respective grade under the provisions of DRDA guideline and places of their posting will remain unchanged till further orders. Sl. No. Name of Engineers Name of Post Place of Posting 1. R.K. Biren Singh Executive Engineer Churachandpur 2. Kh. Binod Kumar Singh Executive Engineer Senapati 3. L. Saratchandra Singh Executive Engineer Chandel 4. I. Nara Singh Executive Engineer Ukhrul 5. Kh. Rajendra Singh Executive Engineer Imphal-East 6. Ksh. Tomcha Singh Assistant Engineer Churachandpur 7. Sheri Dirang Gangmei Assistant Engineer Tamenglong By Orders etc, Sd/- (Y. Neta Singh) Joint Secretary (RD&PR), Govt. of Manipur. Copy to:- 1. The P.S. to the Hon’ble Minister (RD&PR), Manipur. 2. The Commissioner (Vigilance), Govt. of Manipur. 3. The Deputy Commissioner/Chairman/Executive Director of the concerned DRDAs. 4. The Accountant General Manipur, Imphal. 5. The Project Director, L.D.A. Manipur. 6. The Registrar, T.P. Cell, Imphal, Manipur. 7. The Director (Family Welfare), Manipur. 8. The Chief Engineer, P.H.E.D. (Rural) Imphal, Manipur. 9. The Chief Engineer, P.W.D. Imphal, Manipur. 10. The incumbent concerned. 11. Guard file.” The order of deputation dated 20.01.2003 of the petitioner which preceded the order of absorption reads as follows : “GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR SECRETARIAT : DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT (MONITORING CELL) ORDERS Imphal the 20th Jan., 2003 No.4/17/2002-Dev(MC)pt-II/128. The Governor of Manipur is pleased to order to the deputation of the following Engineers to the DRDAs, Manipur as shown against their names at the relevant time scales for period of 4 (four) years from the date of their joining to the respective DRDAs under the normal term and conditions of deputation of the State Government. Sl. No. Name of Engineers Deputation Post Place of Posting 1. R.K. Biren Singh i/c EE/LDA EE Churachandpur 2. Kh. Binodkumar Singh i/c EE/LDA EE Senapati 3. L. Saratchandra Singh AE/LDA EE Chandel 4. L. Nara Singh AE/T.P. Cell EE Ukhrul 5. Kh. Rajen Singh AE/FW EE Imphal East 6. Ksh. Sl. No. Name of Engineers Deputation Post Place of Posting 1. R.K. Biren Singh i/c EE/LDA EE Churachandpur 2. Kh. Binodkumar Singh i/c EE/LDA EE Senapati 3. L. Saratchandra Singh AE/LDA EE Chandel 4. L. Nara Singh AE/T.P. Cell EE Ukhrul 5. Kh. Rajen Singh AE/FW EE Imphal East 6. Ksh. Tomcha Singh S.O./PHED AE Senapati By Orders etc, Sd/- (L.P. Gonmei) Commissioner (RD&PR), Government of Manipur. Copy to:- 1. The P.S. to the MOS(RD&PR), Manipur. 2. The Commissioner (Vigilance), Govt. of Manipur. 3. The Deputy Commissioner/Chairman/Executive Director of the concerned DRDAs. 4. The Project Director, LDA, Manipur. 5. The Registrar, T.P. Cell, Imphal, Manipur. 6. The Director (Family Welfare), Manipur. 7. The Chief Engineer, P.H.E.D. (Rural), Imphal, Manipur. 8. The incumbent concerned. 9. Guard file.” 34. A perusal of the aforesaid absorption order dated 30.06.2004 clearly reveals that there is no indication that the order of absorption was made on the recommendation of any authority. Neither the order indicates that the consent of the lending/parent department had been obtained. Absence of any reference to a recommendation of competent selection committee or a recommending authority or absence of recording that the lending authority had been consulted in the absorption order, however, will not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the aforesaid absorption order is not a valid order. Therefore, this Court will take into consideration other available relevant and referable materials to examine the validity of this order. 35. As already mentioned above, the petitioner at the time of deputation was serving in the lower substantive post of Assistant Engineer in the Loktak Development Authority. This fact is not disputed by any one. If the petitioner who was earlier serving as an Assistant Engineer on substantive basis had been absorbed in the borrowing department of DRDA, Chandel in the same/equivalent post of Assistant Engineer, there may not have been much controversy. However, as seen from the absorption order dated 30-6-2004, the service of the petitioner was absorbed in a higher post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA. In view of the fact that, in service jurisprudence, absorption is another version for regularisation, the obvious question which will arise is whether a person holding the substantive lower post can be absorbed in a higher post as has been done in the present case. In view of the fact that, in service jurisprudence, absorption is another version for regularisation, the obvious question which will arise is whether a person holding the substantive lower post can be absorbed in a higher post as has been done in the present case. If the absorption is by adopting the method of promotion, still the question remains to be answered as to whether the person who was holding the lower post was eligible and had the requisite qualifications and suitability to be promoted to a higher post on substantive capacity. And, if it is against a direct recruitment post, whether such person possesses the qualifications for the said post for appointment as a direct recruit. As revealed from the records, the petitioner was stated to be holding the post of Assistant Engineer on regular basis and he was a diploma holder and not a degree holder. It has been noted that as per the relevant recruitment rules for the post of Executive Engineer, as applicable in the parent department, the post of Executive Engineer is to be filled by way of promotion from amongst the Assistant Engineers. However, different yard sticks are applied for consideration of Assistant Engineers depending on whether one is a diploma certificate holder or a degree certificate holder. In case of diploma holders, the concerned Assistant Engineer must have served a minimum period of nine years of service for being eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer as per the relevant recruitment rules. From the records, it is seen that the petitioner who was a Diploma holder was regularly appointed to the post of Assistant Engineer only on 30.06.1999. In view of the above, if the petitioner is to be considered for regular promotion to the higher post of Executive Engineer, he can be considered only after completion of 9 (nine) years of regular service which falls in the year 2008. In other words, the petitioner being a diploma holder would become eligible for promotion to the higher post of Executive Engineer in the year 2008. If that is so, the question would arise as to whether absorption of the petitioner, who is merely a diploma holder Assistant Engineer, in the higher post of Executive Engineer in the year 2004 before attaining the eligibility in experience, is permissible or not. If that is so, the question would arise as to whether absorption of the petitioner, who is merely a diploma holder Assistant Engineer, in the higher post of Executive Engineer in the year 2004 before attaining the eligibility in experience, is permissible or not. From the records it is seen that there is no specific service rules framed, more particularly in respect of Executive Engineer in the borrowing department other than the guidelines issued by the DRDA regarding the staffing. Thus, in absence of any specific provision under the DRDA or under the DRDA guidelines, providing for allowing an Assistant Engineer to be absorbed to the higher post of Executive Engineer with lesser service experience, absorption of the petitioner who was merely a diploma holder to the higher post of Executive Engineer without the requisite service experience would be ex facie impermissible. 36. Further, if the absorption is by way of promotion, obviously, the past service records of the petitioner, at least, for the last five years preceding the absorption date ought to have been considered. But, there is nothing on record to indicate that the service records of the petitioner for the last five years were requisitioned from the lending department, LDA which ordinarily would have the custody of such records. There seems to be no correspondence with the parent department, i.e. LDA prior to absorption of the petitioner in the borrowing department. Therefore, on this ground that a person who is yet to render requisite years of regular service for being considered for regular promotion to higher post of Executive Engineer, has been absorbed, the absorption order 30-6-2004 may be liable to be interfered with. On the other hand, if the absorption is by way of direct recruitment, it is doubtful whether the service rules in the DRDA provide for direct recruitment to the post of Executive Engineer. 37. That, absorption being another method of regular appointment, existence of a regular vacancy/post is a must. There is nothing on record to indicate the existence or creation of any regular post in the grade of Executive Engineer. Thus, lack of regular post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA is a serious flaw in the absorption of the petitioner as Executive Engineer. 38. There is nothing on record to indicate the existence or creation of any regular post in the grade of Executive Engineer. Thus, lack of regular post of Executive Engineer in the DRDA is a serious flaw in the absorption of the petitioner as Executive Engineer. 38. The other contention of the respondent authorities is that the absorption of the petitioner as Executive Engineer in the DRDA, Chandel, was done without the approval of the competent authority/State Govt., and as such, such absorption is void ab initio. Of course, the petitioner has vehemently argued that the said absorption order was issued after obtaining necessary approval from the authority, i.e., Minister in-charge as well as Commissioner, Secretary (DRDA) which can be ascertained from the records. This Court, in absence of the relevant record i.e, File No. 2/7/98-Dev(MC)Pt/104A mentioned in the absorption order, is not able to decide this issue with certainty as to whether there was approval of the competent authority as contended by the petitioner or there was lack of it as contended by the respondents. Even if the aforesaid file maintained by the DRDA containing the absorption process is not traceable and is missing, such an act of approval must have been preceded by a consultation process with the lending authority i.e. LDA, without whose consent there could not have been any absorption. In Umapati Chowdhury (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court noted the requirement of the consent of not only the deputationist but also of the parent department or the lending authority to make absorption valid. In para 8 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, “8. Deputation can be aptly described as an assignment of an employee (commonly referred to as the deputationist) of one department or order of even an organisation (commonly referred to as the parent department or leading authority) to another department or cadre or organisation (commonly referred to as the borrowing authority). The necessity for sending on deputation arises in public interest to meet the exigencies of public service. The concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and a corresponding acceptance of such services by the borrowing employer. It also involves the consent of the employees to go on deputation or not. In the case at hand all the three conditions were fulfilled. The concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and a corresponding acceptance of such services by the borrowing employer. It also involves the consent of the employees to go on deputation or not. In the case at hand all the three conditions were fulfilled. The University, the parent department or lending authority, the Board, the borrowing authority and the appellant the deputationist, had all given their consent for deputation of the appellant and for his permanent absorption in the establishment of the borrowing authority. There is no material to show that the deputation of the appellant was not in public interest or it was vitiated by favoritism or mala fide. The learned single Judge in the previous writ petition had neither quashed the deputation order nor issued any direction for its termination. Indeed the learned single Judge had dismissed the writ petition No material has been placed before us to show that between November 1987 when the Judgment of the single Judge was rendered and December 1991 when the division bench disposed of the writ petition filed by the appellant the petitioners of the previous case had raised any grievance or made any complaint regarding noncompliance of the directions made in the judgment of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances the division bench was clearly in error in declining to grant relief to the appellant. Further, the appellant has, in the meantime, retired from service, and therefore, the decision in the case is relevant only for the purpose of calculating his retiral benefits.” (emphasis added) In other words, even if it is assumed that the competent authority in the borrowing department had decided to absorb the services of the deputationists, the borrowing department ought to have informed and obtained the necessary consent from the lending department, as any decision to absorb the service of a person belonging to the lending department would require the consent of the lending department. However, there is nothing on record to indicate that the borrowing department had informed and obtained the consent of the lending department before issuing the absorption order. As mentioned above, absorption of deputationists would require not only voluntary act on the part of the borrowing department but also the consent of the employees concerned as well as the lending department. However, there is nothing on record to indicate that the borrowing department had informed and obtained the consent of the lending department before issuing the absorption order. As mentioned above, absorption of deputationists would require not only voluntary act on the part of the borrowing department but also the consent of the employees concerned as well as the lending department. It is to be remembered that deputation stands on tripartite consent, viz., the consent of the deputationist, the lending department and the borrowing department. Lack of any of these three legs would topple such a deputation and hence absorption also. 39. That apart, the State respondents in their affidavit have categorically stated that the Govt. had not taken any policy decision to absorb the service of the deputationists in the borrowing department. Absorption of deputationists can not be an isolated process only in respect of DRDA, Chandel. It must be applicable to DRDAs of other districts as well which would have necessitated taking a policy decision at the Government level. It defies logic that such a momentous decision to absorb deputationists could have been taken without consulting the LDA, Finance Department or other related departments like Law Department etc. as such a process would involve creation of regular posts with huge financial implications. However, there is no iota of material in any of the other related records produced by the petitioner or the respondents that such a policy decision was taken, except for relying on a missing file. Nothing is also discernable in the file produced by the respondents who had been taking a consistent plea that there was no such policy decision taken by the State Government to absorb the deputationists in the borrowing department. It is also seen from the file produced by the State Respondents [File No. 2/7/98-Dev (MC)] that the State Government was deeply concerned about the manner in which appointments have been made in DRDAs without obtaining the approval of the State Government and the fact that the DRDAs have not bothered to follow the procedures prescribed for making recruitments. Thus, by a Note(27) dated 13.03.2001 as well as Note (37) dated 16.08.2001 made by the Commissioner (RD&PR), he had proposed for termination of services of the illegal appointees. Of course, there is a reference to File No. 2/7/98-Dev(MC)Pt. which was stated to have been requisitioned by the Vigilance Department. Thus, by a Note(27) dated 13.03.2001 as well as Note (37) dated 16.08.2001 made by the Commissioner (RD&PR), he had proposed for termination of services of the illegal appointees. Of course, there is a reference to File No. 2/7/98-Dev(MC)Pt. which was stated to have been requisitioned by the Vigilance Department. The file notings dated 30.05.2013 indicates that the said file which was requisitioned by the Vigilance Department was missing. Interestingly, there is a letter dated 27.11.2003 written by the Joint Secretary (RD&PR), who also issued the absorption order dated 30.06.2004 stating that the Administrative Department is yet to frame the recruitment rules for the posts in the DRDAs which were introduced as per DRDA Guidelines till date. Though the said posts referred to are Statistical Assistant and A.P.O., it is very unlikely that the recruitment rules for the posts of Executive Engineer in the DRDA had been framed and it is most likely that the recruitment rules for the post of Executive Engineer as applicable in other Engineering departments have been applied in the DRDAs. Therefore, this Court cannot ignore lightly the submission made on behalf of the State respondents that there was no policy decision taken by the State Government for absorption of deputationists and this Court finds it difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that there was approval of the competent authority before absorption of the deputationists. 40. As already observed above, absorption of deputation to be valid must be based on service rules/statutory rules, and must conform to these rules and cannot be contrary to these. Therefore, we may proceed to examine this aspect, for which we must first ascertain as to whether there are service rules in the DRDA. The petitioner has not pointed out any such service rules, except for relying on the “Guidelines on DRDA Administration” as annexed as Annexure P/1 to the petition in support of the claim for absorption of deputationists. The aforesaid Guidelines have been issued to be effective from 01.04.1999. The relevant portions of the aforesaid Guidelines which have been relied upon by the petitioner may be reproduced herein below: “IV- Personnel Policy of the DRDAs 4.1. Currently, there is no uniform policy for engaging and/or recruiting the staff by the DRDA. In many States, there are staff both directly recruited as well as on deputation. The relevant portions of the aforesaid Guidelines which have been relied upon by the petitioner may be reproduced herein below: “IV- Personnel Policy of the DRDAs 4.1. Currently, there is no uniform policy for engaging and/or recruiting the staff by the DRDA. In many States, there are staff both directly recruited as well as on deputation. It is essential that prudent personnel policies are followed if the DRDA are to be a professional agency or are to perform the tasks expected of them. The following principles are laid down which must necessarily be followed. 4.2. As a matter of policy, the DRDA should not have any permanent staff. Taking employees on deputation to the DRDA for specific periods has the advantage of better choice of staff, flexibility in staffing pattern and of motivating the staff. The objective of strengthening of DRDAs is to provide them with certain professional capacity and have a flexible-staffing pattern. To start with, DRDAs shall no longer to be allowed to make any direct recruitment. In respect of the staff that is currently borne on the DRDA, the State Rural Development Department should immediately draw up a 3-5 year plan for absorption of the staff into the line departments.” A close examination of the aforesaid provisions, would show that the aforesaid provisions, rather than supporting the contention of the petitioner, seem to support the case of the respondents. 41. Para 4.2 of the aforesaid Guidelines as quoted above stipulates that as a matter of policy DRDA should not have any permanent staff. Regular appointment and as a corollary, absorption, in principle would be against the aforesaid stated policy of the DRDA. Therefore, the DRDA Guidelines recommend recruitment of staff by way of deputation. These also, discourage any direct recruitment. However, in respect of the staffs who were already in existence in the DRDA at the time of issue of the said Guidelines in 1999, the Guidelines have recommended for absorption of these existing staff in the line department. Hence, this provision for absorption of the staff is in respect of those who were already in service in the DRDA when the aforesaid policy was implemented w.e.f. 01.04.1999 and not for fresh deputationists. Hence, this provision for absorption of the staff is in respect of those who were already in service in the DRDA when the aforesaid policy was implemented w.e.f. 01.04.1999 and not for fresh deputationists. Therefore, though deputation of the petitioner and others may be in conformity with the aforesaid policy of the DRDA, absorption of deputationists cannot be said to be in conformity with the aforesaid policy but is contrary to it. The provision for absorption is only in respect of those staffs already in existence prior to the implementation of the aforesaid personnel policy. The petitioner was admittedly deputed to the DRDA, Chandel in the year 2003 after the aforesaid policy had become effective. The petitioner is not one of such staffs who were already serving in the DRDA on deputation before coming into force of the aforesaid personnel policy of the DRDA. There is no other provision in the DRDA Guidelines which has been brought to the notice of this Court by the petitioner which would provide for absorption of the deputationists in the DRDA. It can thus, be said that absorption of the petitioner is ex facie not in conformity with the existing personnel policy of the DRDA and is evidently contrary to the guidelines of the DRDA. 42. Thus, this Court would unhesitatingly hold that the absorption of the petitioner is without the approval of the State Government and certainly not in conformity with the relevant rules. 43. Further, even if assuming that the absorption order was issued after necessary approval from the competent authority, in this case, absence of consent of the lending department i.e. LDA cannot be said to be a mere irregularity as a deputationist cannot be absorbed without the specific consent of the parent department. Such a consent cannot merely be assumed or inferred, it has to be specific. That apart, it is also clearly discernable that the petitioner did not possess the necessary requisite qualifications for being appointed as an Executive Engineer, in absence of which, he could not have been absorbed as Executive Engineer. Further, as already discussed above, the absorption of the petitioner does not seem to be in conformity with the existing personnel policy of the DRDA. 44. Further, as already discussed above, the absorption of the petitioner does not seem to be in conformity with the existing personnel policy of the DRDA. 44. This Court is of the view that these shortcomings in the process of absorption of the petitioner in the DRDA cannot be said to be mere irregularities which could be ignored or subsequently rectified. These are incurable fundamental flaws in the absorption process which would render the absorption illegal and unsustainable. 45. The petitioner strongly urged that even if the absorption is held to be impermissible, since his status has been changed from that of the regular appointee by way of absorption to that of a deputationist, such a change in the status adversely affects his accrued right of being a regular employee of the DRDA and such a change cannot be effected without giving notice to the petitioner. True, before any action which adversely affects a person is taken, such a person is entitled to be heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Therefore, we will examine as to whether the principle of natural justice has been violated or not in the present case. Admittedly, there was no specific notice or order issued by the authority as to why the absorption order dated 30.06.2004 should not be cancelled. Yet, there are sufficient materials to show that the petitioner was provided with adequate opportunity to explain his position as regards the validity of the absorption order and for not treating him as a deputationist again by declaring the said absorption order as void. The petitioner challenged the order dated 27.09.2010 which declared the absorption of deputationists in the DRDA staff as void ab initio and directed repatriation of deputationists in W.P.(C) No. 635 of 2010 which was subsequently withdrawn by the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter, submitted a representation to the authorities on 29.10.2012 for cancelling the aforesaid order dated 27.09.2010. As the said representation of the petitioner was not disposed of, the petitioner again approached the High Court by filing a writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 432 of 2013 which was disposed of on 17.06.2013 with the direction to consider the representation submitted by the petitioner on 29.10.2012 by issuing a speaking order which was duly done by the authorities by issuing the order dated 10.09.2013. Therefore, the petitioner had ample opportunity to explain his position about the decision of the State Government to declare the absorption as void ab initio as well as against the proposed repatriation to his parent department. The impugned orders challenged in these writ petitions are mere reiteration of the decision of the State Government as contained in order dated 27.09.2010 in declaring the absorption order dated 30.06.2004 as void. These impugned orders were passed after considering the representation of the petitioner submitted against the said order dated 27.09.2010. Hence, it can be said that the petitioner was heard before the impugned orders were issued. This, in the opinion of this Court, would clearly amount to affording hearing to the petitioner and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above, it can be said to be proper compliance with the principles of natural justice. It may be also noted that the State authorities did not act immediately on the order dated 27.09.2010 declaring the absorption dated 30.06.2004 as void. The authorities issued the impugned orders dated 10.09.2013 and 26.01.2016 reitering their decision to declare the absorption as void and directing repatriation only after considering the representation submitted by the petitioner against the order dated 27.09.2010. Therefore, it cannot be said that no opportunity of being heard was not given to the petitioner. Since, the petitioner had the opportunity to submit his representation against the order dated 27.09.2010 declaring absorption as void, it can be said that he was given opportunity of being heard before the impugned orders dated 10.09.2013 and 26.01.2016 were issued. The opportunity to submit the representation on 29.10.2012 after the order dated 27.09.2010 was passed, also clearly amounts to affording post decisional hearing, which in the facts and circumstances complies with the agreement of principles of natural justice. Of course, one may argue that giving a post decisional hearing by way of considering representation may not be sufficient compliance with the requirements of natural justice. In this connection it may be stated that there is no statutory stipulation that a deputationist has to be given a right of hearing before his absorption is declared void. Therefore, this requirement of hearing is by way of implication. In this connection it may be stated that there is no statutory stipulation that a deputationist has to be given a right of hearing before his absorption is declared void. Therefore, this requirement of hearing is by way of implication. However, it is also now equally well established that where on indisputable facts, only one conclusion is possible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice by way of pre-decisional hearing, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs (See S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 ). Further, in Menaka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , the right to make representation after an action was taken was held to be a sufficient remedy. Therefore, in certain situations, as also obtaining in the present case, absence of pre-decisional hearing may not always be fatal, though pre-decisional hearing is always a more effective antidote to arbitrariness, unfairness and ought to be normally insisted upon, violation of which would render any such decision bad in law. But there is no universal law that unless there is pre-decisional hearing, any adverse action must be struck down. In the present case, shortcomings as discussed above afflicting the absorption order are too fundamental to be ignored and cannot cured and there cannot be any other conclusion, than holding that the absorption of the deputationist is void. Therefore, this Court rejects the plea of the petitioner that principles of natural justice has been violated in the present case. The numerous case laws cited by Sri N. Kumarjit, Ld. Senior Counsel in this regard would thus be of no avail to the petitioner. 46. The contention of the respondents, that the issue regarding the validity of the Government order dated 10.09.2013 had been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No. 22743 of 2013 and, therefore, cannot be reopened, however, cannot be accepted in as much as the Hon’ble Supreme Court though had discussed the issue about the repatriation in considerable detail, did not decide the validity of the order of absorption or the order dated 10.09.2013 which declared the absorption order void ab initio by the Government. The Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded on the presumption that the order of absorption was not valid and held that, the petitioner was, therefore, liable to be repatriated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded on the presumption that the order of absorption was not valid and held that, the petitioner was, therefore, liable to be repatriated. This Court holds that in absence of any consideration of the validity of the absorption order on merit by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the issue of validity of the absorption order had been finally decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In view of the above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioner to seek legal remedy as regards the order dated 23.01.2016 by which the petitioner has been repatriated. The order dated 23.01.2016 is a reiteration of the decision of the Government to declare the absorption order of the petitioner as void ab initio vide order dated 10.09.2013, and consequential repatriation of the petitioner to his parent department. To that extent, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the respondents. However, this Court also has noted the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner (respondent no. 4 in the said SLP), when the aforesaid SLP was restored vide order dated 20.04.2015 that the learned counsel for the petitioner (respondent No. 4 in the said SLP) had submitted that the order of this Court dated 21.01.2015 could be suitably corrected to the extent that the respondent no. 4 continues as a borrowed employee on deputation with DRDA. This admission of the petitioner (respondent No. 4 in the said SLP) would indicate that he had resigned to the position of being a deputationist or else he could have insisted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that he is no more a deputatioinist but already a regular staff of the DRDA after being absorbed in the DRDA. This is a self defeating admission made by the petitioner (respondent no. 4 in the SLP) which would indicate that he had waived his right to be considered as an absorbed employee of the DRDA. However, without taking into consideration this submission of the petitioner made before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court has already decided the issue regarding the validity of the absorption order, by holding it to be invalid for the reasons discussed above. 47. However, without taking into consideration this submission of the petitioner made before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court has already decided the issue regarding the validity of the absorption order, by holding it to be invalid for the reasons discussed above. 47. Before arriving at the final conclusion, this Court would like to deal with the submission of the petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to the same relief as granted in W.P(C) No.491 of 2009 (Annexure-A/8) whereby it was declared that the petitioner who was admittedly a deputationist and subsequently absorbed in DRDA, Senapati therein shall be deemed to be in service by setting aside the order of repatriation to the parent Department of Loktak Development Authority. The petitioner therein was also deputed to Loktak Development Authority and absorbed as Executive Engineer by an order dated 30.6.2004. In the said case, after the petitioner was absorbed as Executive Engineer in the DRDA, Senapati he was sought to be repatriated to Loktak Development Authority by an order dated 25.3.2008 issued by the Deputy Commissioner/Chairman, DRDA, Senapati district. The said writ petition was allowed by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court by relying on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Umapati Choudhury vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (1999) 4 SCC 659 . It was observed by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court that in the said case of Umapati Choudhury (supra), the petitioner before it was already absorbed in Bihar Sanskrit Education Board and thereafter, he was repatriated to the parent Department which the Apex Court held to be legally not permissible. The Hon’ble Gauhati High Court noted the plea of the petitioner in the said W.P(C) No.491 of 2009 that his case was squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as the petitioner therein was already absorbed as Executive Engineer, DRDA, Senapati by order 30.6.2004 and in absence of any cancellation/withdrawal/ modification of the order dated 30.6.2004, the order of repatriation could not have been issued. The Hon’ble Gauhati High Court also noted the submission made by the petitioner that no notice whatsoever was issued by the respondent authorities before issuing the repatriation order dated 25.3.2008 and that the said order was also stigmatic and no order attaching stigma could have been passed without holding any enquiry. The Hon’ble Gauhati High Court also noted the submission made by the petitioner that no notice whatsoever was issued by the respondent authorities before issuing the repatriation order dated 25.3.2008 and that the said order was also stigmatic and no order attaching stigma could have been passed without holding any enquiry. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court took a view that the petitioner therein had been able to make out a case for interference and accordingly, quashed the order of repatriation and declared that the petitioner in the said writ petition shall be deemed to be in service for all purposes. This Court is not able to accept the contention of the petitioner here that the said decision of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in W.P(C) No.491 of 2009 will be applicable in the present case. Firstly, there are some differences in crucial facts which are discernible. Though in the present case also, the petitioner too was absorbed but there are subsequent decisions of the State Government to declare the absorption of the petitioner as invalid and void ab initio due to lack of Government sanction and holding him to be a deputationist and accordingly rendering him to be liable to be repatriated, in terms of the orders dated 27.9.2010, 17.6.2013 as well as the order of repatriation dated 23.01.2016 directing repatriation of the petitioner by creating a supernumerary post of Assistant Engineer to accommodate the petitioner on repatriation to Loktak Development Authority after considering the representation of the petitioner. These are crucial factors which form the basis for this Court to hold the order of absorption of the petitioner to be illegal, which were absent in the said case. Thus, the case in W.P.(C) No. 491 of 2009 is distinguishable on facts. Further, this Court is also doubtful whether the decision in Umapati Choudhury (supra) will be applicable in the present facts of the case. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the absorption of the deputationist in the borrowing department was made after obtaining sanction of the lending Department and the State Government also had granted the permission in that regard. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the absorption of the deputationist in the borrowing department was made after obtaining sanction of the lending Department and the State Government also had granted the permission in that regard. This crucial aspect of obtaining consent of the lending Department as well as the approval of the competent authority was found to be present in the said case in Umapati Choudhury (supra) because of which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held the absorption to be valid. In the present case as already discussed above, the existence of the consent of the lending Department, Loktak Development Authority as well as the approval of the competent authority, the State Government has not been proved. Thus, this Court would hold that the decision of the Umapati Choudhury (supra) will not be applicable in the present case and hence, the petitioner can not derive any benefit out of the decision in W.P.(C) No. 491 of 2009, nor of the decision in Umapati Choudhury (supra). 48. The petitioner also has raised another plea that there are other deputationists who have been absorbed in DRDAs and as such, picking out the petitioner for repatriation will be clearly arbitrary and discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. This Court is not impressed with the aforesaid plea in as much as the detail particulars of such staffs are not before this Court for examination, and in any event, since the petitioner has failed to establish the fulfilment of the fundamental requirements for absorption as Executive Engineer in DRDA, Chandel which has rendered the absorption of the petitioners not tenable as discussed above, reference to the case of other persons, details of which are lacking before us, would be of no assistance to the petitioner. 49. Accordingly, this Court would uphold the decision of the State Government that absorption of the petitioner was illegal for the reasons discussed above and if the absorption of the petitioner is held to be illegal, he would be liable to be reverted to the status of being a deputationist as declared in the Government’s orders dated 10.09.2013 as well as in order dated 23.01.2016 and also be liable to be repatriated to his former post as has been directed in the order dated 23.01.2016 in his parent department i.e., LDA. Accordingly, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the orders dated 10.09.2013 and 23.01.2016 challenged in these two writ petitions. However, the repatriation order dated 23.01.2016 will stand modified to the extent indicated below as regards the service condition of the petitioner in the parent department of LDA on his repatriation. 50. The grievance of the petitioner that upon repatriation he will be posted as Assistant Engineer and placed under officers who were earlier junior to him in the rank of Assistant Engineer in the LDA has to be taken care of, as it would be unjust and impermissible in law for a senior person to work under junior officers which would cause grave prejudice to the petitioner. Therefore, if any of the Assistant Engineers belonging to the same category as the petitioner who were junior to the petitioner in the LDA had been subsequently promoted to the higher post of Executive Engineer, it would not suffice to create a supernumerary post in the rank of Assistant Engineer. To avoid this situation, the parent department has to either create supernumerary post in the higher grade of Executive Engineer and/or ensure that the petitioner is not compelled to function under officers who were junior to him at the time of deputation. It has been stated that a DPC was held in LDA in the year 2005 for promotion to the posts of Executive Engineer and Assistant Engineer. Therefore, the authorities will examine whether the petitioner was eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer under the appropriate quota when the DPC was held and if eligible and found suitable, he has to be given promotion to the post of Executive Engineer by creating a supernumerary post. Similar exercise has to be undertaken and steps taken if any DPC had been held subsequently after 2005, and if any of the officers junior to the petitioner had been given promotion to the higher post of Executive Engineer, in that event, the petitioner is entitled to be promoted and adjusted to the higher post of Executive Engineer by creating a supernumerary post, if necessary. 51. Perusal of the proceedings of the DPC held on 07.10.2005 indicates that 3 (three) Section Officers, namely, Sri Ng. 51. Perusal of the proceedings of the DPC held on 07.10.2005 indicates that 3 (three) Section Officers, namely, Sri Ng. Sanajaoba Meitei, Sri A. Budhachandra Singh who were degree holders and Smt. S. Hemabati Devi, who was a Diploma holder were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers in LDA. It has been stated by Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that Smt. S. Hemabati Devi who is a Diploma holder and who belongs to the same category as the petitioner has been now already appointed as Executive Engineer. If that is so, the authorities are directed to ensure that the petitioner after repatriation is not appointed to a post below or place below an officer who is/was junior to the petitioner. This Court directs so, in view of the fact that the petitioner on his repatriation to the parent department cannot be denied his legitimate rights and dues in terms of promotion and other service entitlements as he had been sent on deputation at the instance of the lending and borrowing departments and he should not be put to any disadvantageous position on account of the deputation and subsequent repatriation to the parent department. This Court directs that the aforesaid consideration must be done by the Respondent authorities in LDA on repatriation to LDA without any delay, and preferably within 3(three) months from today so that the petitioner is not placed to any disadvantageous position vis-à-vis his junior officers in the LDA. 52. Before this Court parts with this case, this Court has noted a very aspect. The official records under File No.2/7/98-Dev(MC)Pt are stated to be missing. There is also an official note in the file produced before this Court (which incidentally mentions No. 2/7/98-Dev(MC) & 2/7/98-Dev(MC)/Pt) that the file contains records of only 2/7/98-Dev(MC) and not 2/7/98-Dev(MC) Pt. The said missing file was also called for by the Vigilance Department vide their letter dated 29.04.2013. The absorption order dated 30.06.2004 in this case also refers to the same file which is stated to be missing. Missing of important Government file is a serious matter, mere so, if it creates hindrances to proper consideration and examination of validity of orders, as in the present case. The absorption order dated 30.06.2004 in this case also refers to the same file which is stated to be missing. Missing of important Government file is a serious matter, mere so, if it creates hindrances to proper consideration and examination of validity of orders, as in the present case. A file may become untraceable for various reasons like genuine misplacement or incompetency on the part of the concerned custodian of the file and the role of persons who may stand to gain by misplacement of file cannot be ruled out. In any event, in the present case, the absence of the relevant file has been a real hindrance in the search for truth about the validity of the absorption order because of which the Court had to undertake an extensive exercise to decide the issues. Therefore, this Court directs the Commissioner (Vigilance), Government of Manipur to institute a case with regard to the missing of the aforesaid file No. 2/7/98-Dev(MC) Pt and ascertain the cause for missing of the file and proceed against the persons responsible in accordance with law. 53. For the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that the writ petitions, W.P(C) No.903 of 2013 and W.P(C) No.59 of 2016 are devoid of merit and accordingly, are dismissed, however, subject to the observations and directions made above for protecting the interest of the petitioner in his parent department. Interim orders, if any, passed earlier stand vacated.