JUDGMENT : Rastogi, J. Learned Single Judge of this Court because of the two conflicting views expressed by different coordinate Single Benches of this Court on the question in regard to interpretation of Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short, 'the Act 1950') in the case of Gopal Singh Vs. Civil Judge(JD), Bijaynagar, District Ajmer & Ors., 2011(1) CDR 333(Raj.), and in Jagannath Vs. Jodha Ram , 1980 RLW 42 & Jamna Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal, 1982 WLN 751, referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for placing the question for determination by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 17.12.2013, in pursuant thereto, the matter has been placed before us. 2. The facts, in brief, necessary for examining the question raised for our consideration, are that the revision-petitioner/landlord filed a suit for eviction, inter alia, on the ground of bonafide necessity and default as the defendant/respondent has not paid the rent since 01.06.1992, continuously for six months before filing of the suit. After the notices of the suit came to be served upon the defendant/respondent, written statement was filed and after taking note of the submissions made, the learned trial Court determined the provisional rent upto 30.11.1994 vide its order dated 24.11.1994 and also the monthly rent, which was to be deposited as per the provisions contained in Section 13(3) of the Act 1950. As alleged by the revision-petitioner, there was a default in making the payment of monthly rent by the defendant/respondents in the following months:- Rent for the month Became due on Rent deposited on Delay March, 1997 15.04.1997 19.04.1997 4 days December, 1997 15.01.1998 23.01.1998 8 days January, 1998 15.02.1998 17.02.1998 2 days August, 1998 15.09.1998 17.09.1998 2 days 3. Indisputably, no application was filed by the respondent-tenant seeking permission of the Court for extension of the prescribed time for depositing the rent within the extended period. There is no dispute that when the rent was not deposited on or before fifteenth day of succeeding month, as determined under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act 1950, which is the requirement of Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, at that stage, an application was filed by the revision petitioner/landlord on 08.11.2006 for striking off the defence of the respondent-tenant under Section 13(5) of the Act 1950. The reply to the application was filed but even at the stage of filing reply, it was nowhere prayed that the extended period within which the monthly rent has been deposited, may be regularized and at the same time, there was no separate application filed by the defendant/respondent in support thereof. 4. The learned trial Judge, taking note of the scheme of the Act 1950, struck out the defence of the respondent-tenant vide its order dated 09.10.2007, which came to be challenged by the respondent-tenant in appeal before the learned District & Sessions Judge, Kota and the learned Court of appeal after hearing the parties, set aside the order of the learned trial Judge, dated 09.10.2007, and restored the right of defence to the respondent-tenant under its order dated 01.02.2011, which was initially challenged by the petitioner in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein on an objection raised regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of order impugned being revisable, the learned Single Judge under its order dated 17.12.2013, directed the Registry to treat the writ petition as revision petition and to number it accordingly and in compliance of the order of the learned Single Judge, the writ petition was registered as S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 21/2014. 5. Learned Single Judge after hearing the matter and taking note of two different views in regard to interpretation of Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, in the case of Gopal Singh Vs. Civil Judge (JD), Bijaynagar, District Ajmer & Ors. (supra), and in Jagannath Vs. Jodha Ram (supra) & Jamna Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (supra), framed the following question for consideration:- “As to whether the appellate court has rightly extended the time for deposit of provisional rent within the fifteen days discretionary period conferred on civil courts under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950.” 6. Mr. (supra), and in Jagannath Vs. Jodha Ram (supra) & Jamna Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (supra), framed the following question for consideration:- “As to whether the appellate court has rightly extended the time for deposit of provisional rent within the fifteen days discretionary period conferred on civil courts under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950.” 6. Mr. Rajvir Sharma, Counsel appearing on behalf of the revision-petitioner submits that after due determination of the provisional rent by the learned trial Judge under Section 13(3) of the Act 1950, the respondent-tenant was under an obligation to deposit the amount determined by the Court within fifteen days from the date of such determination and the monthly rent by the fifteenth day of each succeeding month and even after the fifteenth day of succeeding month, the provisional rent could have been deposited but within such further period not exceeding 15 days and that could have been possible only if an application is filed and time is extended by the Court under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act 1950 and according to him, the tenant cannot deposit the monthly rent after expiry of the fifteenth day of succeeding month without prior permission of the Court or at least, he has to seek extension of time and has to reasonably justify the delay caused in depositing the rent and to seek extension to extend the period within the prescribed period of 15 days by passing appropriate orders by the Court and no presumption could be drawn and Sec. 13(4) clearly envisages that monthly rent has to be deposited by fifteenth day of each succeeding month, or within such further time not exceeding 15 days, as extended by the Court and the word 'may be extended by the court' has its own significance for proper interpretation and it is the Court, who has the power to extend upto 15 days and the rent can be deposited by the tenant after expiry of the 15th day on condoning the default in depositing the provisional rent, but that could have been possible only if an application is filed by the tenant seeking appropriate orders, to be passed by the Court. In support of his submissions, the Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Gopal Singh Vs. Civil Judge (JD), Bijaynagar, District Ajmer & Ors.(supra), & in Gopal (since deceased) through his LRs & Ors. In support of his submissions, the Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Gopal Singh Vs. Civil Judge (JD), Bijaynagar, District Ajmer & Ors.(supra), & in Gopal (since deceased) through his LRs & Ors. Vs. Murlidhar (since deceased) through his LRs and Ors., 2015(3) CDR 1101 (Raj.), and submits that the order of the learned Appellate Court is not sustainable. 7. Per contra, Mr. Goyal, learned Senior Counsel, who was requested to assist this Court on the question & Shri A.K. Gupta, Counsel appearing for the respondents submit that power of the Court to extend the time upto 15 days is statutory conferred under the Act 1950 and that can be exercised by the Court without seeking any formal application. Counsel submits that it is not a case where a person is seeking condonation of delay and there is no requirement of sufficient cause to be shown, which is the requirement while seeking condonation of delay in an application filed u/Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The word 'sufficient cause' is conspicuously missing in the present requirement to be fulfilled by the tenant while depositing the provisional rent under Section 13(4) of the Act 1950 and condonation of delay & seeking extension of time are altogether different in connotation and according to the Counsel, condonation of delay is the power to be exercised under the statutory provisions, while extension of time is the power to be exercised within the statutory powers mandated by law and the provisional rent is to be deposited within the fifteenth day of the succeeding month, or within such time not exceeding 15 days after expiry of the statutory period of 15 days, which certainly is permissible by law and time to be extended by the Court is formal and an empty formality. 8. The power of extension of time is really the statutory power conferred under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act 1950 and that needs no formal application to be filed by the tenant since the rent was deposited within such further time not exceeding 15 days, which is permissible under the law. 8. The power of extension of time is really the statutory power conferred under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act 1950 and that needs no formal application to be filed by the tenant since the rent was deposited within such further time not exceeding 15 days, which is permissible under the law. Counsel further submits that there is no provision of filing an application seeking extension of time for depositing the monthly rent after expiry of the fifteenth day of succeeding month and according to him, provisional rent once has been deposited within the further period of 15 days, it is within the statutory period of 15th day + 15 days and depositing the provisional rent within extended period of 15 days is deemed extension of time, which is statutorily acceptable in law and no application in support thereof is required to be filed seeking appropriate orders of the Court to deposit the rent. 9. Before we proceed to examine the question of interpretation of Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, we consider it appropriate to quote Section 13(3), 13(4) & 13(5) of the Act 1950 for better appreciation of the question raised for our consideration, as under:- “13. Eviction of tenants.- (1)..... (3) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1), with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the court shall, on the first date or hearing or on any other date the court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable up to the date of determination. Provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section, the court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of the filling of the suit. (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period up to which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3). (5) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4), on the date or within the time specified therein, the court; shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.” 10. From a bare perusal of the above-said provisions, it clearly envisages that in an eviction decree on the ground that tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due to him for six months, the Court on the first date of hearing or on any other date, as the Court may fix in this behalf, has to provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in the Court or paid to the landlord by the tenant as per sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act 1950 and at the same time, subsection (4) of Section 13 also mandates that the tenant shall deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord such amount as determined by the Court under sub-section (3), within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. It further envisages that the tenant has to continue to deposit or pay the monthly rent, month-by-month subsequent to the period upto which the determination has been made, by the fifteenth day of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the Court and the non-compliance of the provision contained in sub-section (4) would indeed entail the consequence of striking out of defence of the defendant-tenant under sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act 1950. 11. It further reveals that Legislature in its wisdom was of the view that there may be a situation where the tenant at some point of time may not be in a position to deposit the rent by the fifteenth day of succeeding month and has been able to show and justify some genuine difficulties or unforeseen obstacle in his way or for reasons beyond his control to meet out such contingency, at least he needs indulgence which may be considered and the time may be extended by the Court, if such reasons are found to be well justified in extending the period not exceeding 15 days and in absence of there being any restrictive provisions in that respect, it may be always open for the Court to extend the time for making the deposit at any time, but the Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed that further extension could be made for a period of not more than 15 days after the expiry of 15th day of the succeeding month & discretion vests in the Court, which obviously has to be exercised after examining the justification being tendered by the tenant. There cannot be any deemed presumption and the tenant has no right to seek extension of time, as a matter of course, but at the same time, the Court has to exercise its discretion which obviously has to be exercised in a judicial manner. 12. If we first look into the conflicting views, as have been expressed by the learned Single Judge while referring the matter to us, we find that the first judgment on the issue came up before the learned Single Judge was in the case of Jagannath Vs. Jodha Ram (supra), which was a case where a suit for ejectment was filed for granting of a decree on the basis of default and also on the basis of bonafide necessity. Jodha Ram (supra), which was a case where a suit for ejectment was filed for granting of a decree on the basis of default and also on the basis of bonafide necessity. An order was passed by the Court on 29.11.1975 for depositing the arrears of rent within one month and the period of one month expired during the winter vacations in Court from 24.12.1975 to 01.01.1976 and the arrears of rent were deposited on 02.01.1976 i.e. on first day of opening of the Court. The question therein arose as to whether the last date for depositing the rent if falls during the period of vacations and if it was deposited on the opening day of the Court after vacations, it could still be considered to be delay in depositing the amount of rent and the defence of the tenant was that he has deposited the rent within time, as such there was no occasion for him to file an application seeking further orders of the Court and the learned Single Judge held, after deliberations on the issue held that the rent was deposited within the time prescribed and looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances, the question did not arise seeking orders of the Court for extension of time for depositing the rent. 13. At the same time, in the later judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in Jamna Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (supra), it was a case where the provisional rent was determined to the tune of Rs.357/- and the interest thereon was determined as Rs.16.07 and the defendant was directed to deposit the total amount of Rs.373.07 by 31.01.1979. 13. At the same time, in the later judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in Jamna Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (supra), it was a case where the provisional rent was determined to the tune of Rs.357/- and the interest thereon was determined as Rs.16.07 and the defendant was directed to deposit the total amount of Rs.373.07 by 31.01.1979. Indisputably, the amount of rent to the tune of Rs.357/- was deposited by the tenant on the same day i.e. On 13.12.1978, but the interest which was to be deposited upto 31.01.1979, as ordered by the Court, was deposited by him on 09.02.1979 and at the same time, an application was filed by the tenant on 16.02.1979 with an objection that although he has deposited the amount of interest on 09.02.1979, but plaintiff may be directed to give the account as to how interest was calculated and has been arrived at and till the said application is decided, payment of interest may not be made to the plaintiff/landlord, and to meet out this controversy as to what is the basis for arriving to the payment of interest and whether one is entitled for interest or not, the question came up for consideration before the Single Bench & in this particular context of the matter as to whether it came to be observed that if the tenant failed to deposit the monthly rent within the stipulated period prescribed by law, what will be the effect, if application has not been filed. Learned Single Judge examined the scheme of the Act, in totality, and observed that since the defendant-tenant was contesting the matter in regard to computation of interest being arrived at, and that too has been deposited by him and an application was also moved contesting the award of interest and its computation, in totality of the matter and in the facts and circumstances, the Court observed that the defendant-tenant deserves extension of time in depositing the interest on an application for extension filed at the revisional stage, in the peculiar circumstances, Court observed that as there was requirement of passing of an order by the Court to extend the period, which obviously has to be on due appreciation of the factual material on record and since the Court is supposed to exercise its power judiciously, that would have been possible only if the matter would have come up before the Court on the application being filed by the applicant, whose rights are going to be jeopardized/affected. 14. In the later judgment of Gopal Singh Vs. Civil Judge (JD), Bijaynagar, District Ajmer & Ors.(supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court examined the scope and ambit of Section 13(4) of the Act 1950 and observed that this question is no longer res integra after the same has been examined by the Apex Court in Nasiruddin & Ors. Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal, AIR 2003 SC 1543 , and at the same time it was also observed that if the tenant wants statutory time to be extended to a maximum period of three months or 15 days, as the case may be, and seeks extension of time, an application has to be filed by the tenant before the prescribed period of 15th day is over and if the tenant files an application after statutory period of fifteenth day, he is required to file an application for condonation of delay for his failure to perform his statutory duty within the statutory period. Learned Single Judge finally arrived at a conclusion that an application has to be filed seeking extension of time within the period prescribed seeking appropriate orders of the Court, as contemplated in Section 13(4) of the Act 1950. 15. At the outset, we may observe that in the present scheme of the Act 1950 and Section 13(4) in particular, there is no scope for condonation of delay. 15. At the outset, we may observe that in the present scheme of the Act 1950 and Section 13(4) in particular, there is no scope for condonation of delay. The theory of condonation of delay come forward when one invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act by filing of an application beyond the period of limitation prescribed by law, where he has to tender sufficient cause for seeking condonation of delay. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Dass & Ors. Vs. Nathulal Baraya, AIR 1983 Raj. 222 , held that application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as provided in Section 13(4), is maintainable. For extension of time, an application has to be filed within the stipulated period of 15 days and if the period of 15 days is over, the tenant would be required to file an application for condonation of delay for his failure to perform his statutory duty within the statutory period, but it was observed that it is not the right of the tenant to obtain such an extension, but the Court has a discretion which should be exercised in a judicial manner only on an application being filed, obviously within the prescribed period stipulated under Section 13(4) of the Act. The matter came to be further examined in the case of Gopal (since deceased) through his LRs & Ors. Vs. Murlidhar (since deceased) through his LRs and Ors.(supra), wherein it has been observed that Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, imposes a mandatory duty upon the tenant to pay the amount determined under Section 13(3) within 15 days and the said mandatory provision has to be fulfilled within the period specified under Section 13(4) of the Act 1950 and the tenant has to seek extension within the time specified therein, but such extension cannot be claimed as a matter of right and it is the sole discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension or not if it is within the statutory period prescribed by law. The extension of time is permissible for the prescribed period and it should be sought by the tenant, as contemplated in Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, and if he failed to do so, his defence would be liable to be struck off under Section 13(5) of the Act 1950. 16. The extension of time is permissible for the prescribed period and it should be sought by the tenant, as contemplated in Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, and if he failed to do so, his defence would be liable to be struck off under Section 13(5) of the Act 1950. 16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also looked into the views expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in regard to interpretation of Section 13(4) of the Act 1950. 17. In the case of Jagannath Vs. Jodha Ram (supra) & Jamna Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (supra), the question did not arise at all as to whether an application is required to be filed seeking extension of time, particularly when the fact which was considered by the learned Single Judge was that when there were winter vacations during the relevant period and on the opening day of the Court, the monthly rent was deposited by the tenant, the question of filing of an application seeking extension of time does not arise. At the same time, in the case of Lalchand Vs. Santram AIR 1979 Raj. 140 and in Jamna Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (supra), this Court held, inter alia, that the provisions of Section 13 were amended so as to remove the hardship of the tenant where the tenant was unable to deposit the rent month by month within the specified time on account of some genuine difficulties or unforeseen obstacle and, therefore, beneficial construction should be given to the amended provisions of sub-section (4). The Court, therefore, held that in absence of any restrictive provisions for making application, the Court could extend the time for making the deposit at any time, subject to the condition that such extension could not be made for a period of more than 15 days, after the expiry of 15 days from the end of the month. Ofcourse, it was also observed that it is not the right of the tenant to obtain such an extension, but the Court has a discretion which should be exercised in a judicial manner. 18. It may be further noted that in the subsequent case of Gopaldas Vs. Nathulal Bariya, AIR 1983 Raj. Ofcourse, it was also observed that it is not the right of the tenant to obtain such an extension, but the Court has a discretion which should be exercised in a judicial manner. 18. It may be further noted that in the subsequent case of Gopaldas Vs. Nathulal Bariya, AIR 1983 Raj. 222 , this Court although held that an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of deposit of rent in terms of Section 13(4) of the Act was maintainable, but the said decision was re-considered by the Larger Bench of five Judges in the case of Sita Ram Agarwal Vs. Nasiruddin & Ors., 1997(1) RLR 686, wherein out of five, three members of the Bench held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable where there is default in deposit of arrears of rent within the specified period, whereas two members held to the contrary and the said judgment of the Full Bench was carried to the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal (supra), and the Apex Court held that wherever the special Act provides for extension of time or condonation of default, the Court possesses the power therefor, but where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the Court does not find the power to do so. It was also observed that in absence of such provisions in the present Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950, the Court did not have the power to either extend the period to deposit the rent, or to condone the default in depositing the rent over and above the time prescribed by law. On the issue whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable where there was a default in depositing the rent by the tenant under Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, the Apex Court held that by filing an application after the expiry of period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute, cause of action must arise and that the Court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise. 19. The Apex Court, therefore, held that Section 5 of the Limitation is not applicable to the provisions contained in Section 13(4) of the Act 1950. 19. The Apex Court, therefore, held that Section 5 of the Limitation is not applicable to the provisions contained in Section 13(4) of the Act 1950. The Apex Court further observed that this being entirely beneficial enactment, is not only for the benefit of tenant but also for the landlord and, therefore, balance has to be struck while interpreting the provisions of the Rent Acts. The Apex Court in para-38 of the judgment, observed as under:- “38. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. It is a well-settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified......” 20. The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed according to the intent of they that made it'. Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision and if the language of the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms and it is the duty of the Court that the same must be given effect to regardless of the consequences that may follow, but if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction, such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved and its consequences in giving it a purposive interpretation in preference to the other possible interpretation. 21. 21. When the law to be applied in a given case prescribes interpretation of statute, it is always open for the Court to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Obviously, interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts and it is the function of the legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the Court to say what the law is. 22. The "Golden Rule" of interpretation of statutes is that statutes are to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or liberal meaning unmindful of consequence of such interpretation and it was the predominant method of reading statutes. More often than not, such grammatical and literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the Legislature never intended. The Golden Rule of giving undue importance to grammatical and literal meaning of late gave place to 'rule of legislative intent'. 23. This being the legal position settled by the Apex Court, there remains no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 13(4) of the Act 1950 imposes a mandatory duty upon the tenant to deposit in Court or to pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, at the same time it casts a legal obligation upon the tenant to deposit the monthly rent by the 15th of each succeeding month, as envisaged under Section 13(4) of the Act 1950, meaning thereby the tenant has to deposit or pay the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within 15 days from the date of such determination and continue to deposit or pay month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period, upto which determination has been made by the fifteenth day of each succeeding month and the Court is empowered to extend the time for further period, not exceeding three months in the former case and not exceeding 15 days in the later case and if the provisional rent is not deposited within the specified time by the fifteenth day of succeeding month, the tenant has to seek extension of time to deposit the rent within another 15 days. The scheme of the Act 1950 and Section 13(4) clearly contemplate that the tenant has to move an application seeking extension of time and such extension he cannot claim as a matter of right and it is the sole discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension within the specified time or not. 24. After taking note of the scheme of the Act 1950 and Section 13(3) & 13(4) in particular, which casts a duty upon the tenant to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination or such further time not exceeding three months in the former case and not exceeding 15 days in the case of later, and has to continue to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord month by month, the monthly rent on or before the fifteenth day of each succeeding month and if the tenant fails to deposit the monthly rent by the fifteenth day of succeeding month and seeks extension of time, which may not exceed further 15 days, he is under an obligation to move an application for regularization of the extended period which may not exceed 15 days, but he cannot claim extension of time as a matter of right and it is the discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension, prayed for. The very expression “as may be extended by the Court”, presupposes the extension by a judicial order and, therefore, in our considered view, the extension of time upto permissible period may be sought by the tenant by filing an application within 15 days available at his disposal and is open for the Court to consider the genuine difficulties or unforeseen obstacle, which might have come in his way, or for reasons beyond his control, due to which the rent could not be deposited by him within the prescribed time by fifteenth day of the succeeding month. 25. 25. It is always expected from the Court to exercise its discretion in a judicial manner, at the same time in the absence of there being any restrictive provisions in that respect, the Court could extend the time for making the deposit at any time, subject to the only condition which is prescribed by the Legislature that further extension could not be made beyond the period of 15 days after the expiry of 15th day of the month and of-course, it must be understood that it is not the right of a tenant to obtain such an extension, but the Court has a discretion, which, as already discussed above, should always be exercised in a judicial manner. 26. In view of the discussion made above, we answer the question, raised for our consideration, in the following terms:- “If the tenant fails to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord u/Sec. 13(4) of the Act 1950 the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act 1950, within 15 days from the date of such determination, or fails to continue to deposit or pay month by month the monthly rent by the fifteenth day of each succeeding month, there is no other option left with the tenant but to make an application to the Court, which may exercise its discretion vests in it and it is open for the Court to consider and pass an order, in accordance with law, failing which it entail consequence envisaged u/Sec. 13(5) of the Act 1950." 27. In the light of our conclusion, the revision petition deserves to succeed & is hereby allowed and order of the Appellate Court dated 01.02.2011 is hereby quashed & set aside. No costs.