JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 2. This Revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1887”) has arisen from judgment and order dated 4.11.2008 passed by Sri P.K. Jain, Special Judge (E.C. Act), Kanpur Nagar dismissing Small Causes Suit No. 44 of 2005 instituted by revisionist-landlord for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent in respect to disputed premises which is a shop. The shop was let out to defendant-respondent allegedly on a monthly rent of Rs. 4000/- per month, but it is submitted that despite repeated demand, rent has not been paid since February’ 2003. It is further submitted that property in dispute was let out to defendant-respondent for a period of eleven months only which expired on 4.2.2003 and since period of lease has not been extended, therefore, the tenant is liable to be evicted. 3. Court below formulated five issues as under: ^^1- D;k oknxzLr lEifRr ij m0iz0 vf/kfu;e la[;k 13 lu~ 1972 ds izko/kku ykxw gksrs gSa] tSlk fd izfroknh us vfHkdfFkr fd;k gS\ 2- D;k oknxzLr nqdku edku la[;k 88@384] gqek;awckx] dkuiqj uxj ikVZ AA dk Hkkx gS] tSlk fd okfnuh us vfHkdfFkr fd;k gS vFkok ;g nqdku edku la[;k 88@384] gqek;awckx] dkuiqj uxj esa fLFkr gS] tSlk fd izfroknh dgrk gS vkSj D;k edku uEcj ds bl vUrj dk oknxzLr nqdku dh f'kuk[r ij dksbZ izHkko gS vFkok ugha\ 3- D;k izfroknh dh fdjk;snkjh fnukad 5-2-2002 ls izkjEHk gqbZ vkSj bl ckcr i{kdkjksa ds e/; dksbZ fyf[kr vuqcU/k fu”ikfnr gqvk vkSj oknxzLr nqdku dk fdjk;k 4000@& :i;s izfrekg r; gqvk vFkok fookfnr nqdku esa izfroknh o”kZ 1993 ls 500@& :i;s izfrekg dh nj ls fdjk;snkj vkckn pyk vkrk gSA 4- D;k izfroknh us fdjk;k vnk;xh esa dksbZ pwd dh vkSj D;k mldh fdjk;snkjh uksfVl fnukafdr 17-3-2005 }kjk lekIr dh tk pqdh gSA 5- okfnuh fdl vuqrks"k dks ikus dh vfèkdkfj.kh gS\** “1. Whether the provisions of the UP Act 13 of 1972, as averred by the defendant, is applicable to the property in litigation? 2. Whether the provisions of the UP Act 13 of 1972, as averred by the defendant, is applicable to the property in litigation? 2. Whether the shop in litigation is a part of house no 88/384, Humayun Baag, Kanpur Nagar, Part II as averred by the lady plaintiff, or the shop is situated in house no 88/384, Humayun Baag, Kanpur Nagar as averred by the defendant and whether this difference in the house numbered above put any effect on the identification of the disputed shop or not? 3. Whether tenancy of the defendant commenced since 5.2.2002 and any written contract in this regard was executed between the parties fixing the rent of the shop in litigation as Rs 4000/- per month or whether the defendant has been a tenant being in possession over the disputed shop since 1993 @ 500/- per month. 4. Whether the defendant has defaulted in payment of the rent and whether his tenancy has been terminated vide notice dated 17.3.2005? 5. What relief the plaintiff is entitled to get?” (English Translation by Court) 4. While answering Issue 1, Court below has said that premises in question is not governed by provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1972”) since the shop in question was constructed on and after 1991. Issue 2 has been answered observing that premises in question is identifiable. Coming to substantial Issue 3, Court below has found that alleged agreement was not proved though it was disputed by defendant and therefore onus lay upon plaintiff to prove the said document which has not been discharged. Further, plaintiff also failed to prove any default in payment of rent, and, in fact, Court below found that monthly rent was only Rs. 500/- per month and not Rs. 4000/- per month and document allegedly executed on 5.2.2002 was a forged document. Issue 3 was answered accordingly. Issue 4 then has also been answered in favour of defendant holding that there was no default and in these facts and circumstances, suit has been dismissed. 5. Counsel for revisionist at this stage contended that respondent has purchased another premises and the premises in question is lying under lock, therefore respondent should be evicted therefrom and the shop be handed over to revisionist. 6. The submission, in my view, is thoroughly misconceived. 5. Counsel for revisionist at this stage contended that respondent has purchased another premises and the premises in question is lying under lock, therefore respondent should be evicted therefrom and the shop be handed over to revisionist. 6. The submission, in my view, is thoroughly misconceived. Suit was not instituted on the ground that respondent has purchased any premises and should be evicted for that reason alone. No such ground is available under Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1882”). Admittedly this ground is available to a tenanted premises, if it is governed by Act, 1972, but in the case in hand Court below has clearly returned Issue No. 1 holding that Act, 1972 is not attracted to premises in question and, therefore, the ground of eviction available in Act, 1972 cannot be applied to premises in question. The eviction of defendant-respondent was sought on the ground of expiry of period of lease as also default and both have been answered by Court below against plaintiff-revisionist. Before this Court also, on these findings of fact recorded by Court below no argument has been advanced to show that judgment of Court below and findings recorded are not in accordance with law or not based on evidence or otherwise perverse etc. No interference, therefore, is called for. 7. Even otherwise, this aspect cannot be examined at all since there is no material at all to substantiate the same and the scope of revision under Section 25 of Act, 1887 is only whether the decree or order made by Small Cause Court was according to law or not. Undoubtedly it is a supervisory power and not appellate power. The Revisional Court can call for record to see whether decree is according to law and, if not, it can pass such order with respect thereto as it may thinks fit. 8. The next question is, the ambit of the words “according to law” occurring in Section 25 of Act, 1887. 9. The Apex Court considered the same in Hari Shanker v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhary, AIR 1963 SC 696 and held that it refers to the decision as a whole and not to be equated to error of law of or of fact simpliciter. It contemplates that entire decision, i.e., the overall decision must be according to law. 9. The Apex Court considered the same in Hari Shanker v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhary, AIR 1963 SC 696 and held that it refers to the decision as a whole and not to be equated to error of law of or of fact simpliciter. It contemplates that entire decision, i.e., the overall decision must be according to law. There should be no miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. 10. Some of the instances where the Court can interfere under Section 25 are, (1) where the Court has no jurisdiction in the matter; (2) where a party had not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or that the burden of proof had been misplaced on wrong shoulders; (3) where the Court had based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted; (4) where there has not been a proper trial according to law; and (5) if on certain facts two views are possible, then a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 was not interfered. 11. The observations of Beaument, C.J. in Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Ramraj, AIR 1938 Bombay 223, were referred and approved by Apex Court in Hari Shanker v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhary, AIR 1963 SC 696. It further said: “the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.” 12. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas Firm, AIR 1969 SC 1344 , it was held that a wrong decision on facts by a competent Court is also a decision according to law. The Court has no power to de novo examine the findings of facts reached by Trial Court. 13. In Ram Narain v. Kanhaiya Lal Vishwakarma, 1965 ALJ 989, a Division Bench said that Revisional Court is not empowered under Section 25 to look into evidence of case and decide whether the finding of fact arrived at by Court below is justified by evident on record or not. 14. The language of Section 25 is different than the Revisional Court powers conferred on Civil Court under Section 115 C.P.C. 15. Act, 1887 constitute Small Cause Courts of exclusive on preferential and limited jurisdiction. The class of suits not cognizable by small causes is listed in the schedule appended to Act, 1887. 14. The language of Section 25 is different than the Revisional Court powers conferred on Civil Court under Section 115 C.P.C. 15. Act, 1887 constitute Small Cause Courts of exclusive on preferential and limited jurisdiction. The class of suits not cognizable by small causes is listed in the schedule appended to Act, 1887. The provisions of Civil Procedure Code inapplicable to Small Cause Court are provided in Section 7 of C.P.C. By Section 40 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 certain provisions thereof, i.e., Sections 15, 32, 37, 38 and 39 have been applied to Small Cause Courts. vide Section 7 the applicability of Sections 96, 112 and 115 C.P.C. is made inapplicable to Small Causes Court, meaning thereby its judgment is made non-appealable. The Trial in Small Cause Court is summary and its decision is final subject to revision under Section 25 only. It is in these circumstances, one has to make a distinction between power of Revisional Court under Section 25 and other appellate and revisional powers under C.P.C. or other provisions of procedural statutes. 16. The circumstances where Revisional Court to find out whether decision of Small Cause Court is in accordance with law may look into the facts without assessment have been explained in para 19 and 20 of judgment of Division Bench in Laxmi Kishore and another v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 and it says: “19. If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on admissible evidence. In such case, the Court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The Court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law, viz. validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. 20. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order, as the justice of the case requires; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine as issue of fact for itself. 20. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order, as the justice of the case requires; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine as issue of fact for itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, asses it and determine an issue of fact.” 17. The bar is in effect with respect to reassessment of evidence and substitute its conclusion of fact but not where relevant evidence has not been considered or finding is based on inadmissible evidence or finding is without any evidence etc. In Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675, the Apex Court reiterate that reassessment of evidence is not permissible to substitute its own inference but not where the decision is not in accordance with law. If the Revisional Court does not agree with finding, that by itself cannot be a ground since it is within the realm of assessment of evidence. This is what has been observed by Apex Court in Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and others, JT 1998(8) SC 157; Sri Raj Laxmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswami, JT 1998(4) SC 46; Sarla Ahuja v. United Insurance Company Ltd., JT 1998 (7) SC 297; and, Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu, JT 1999(10) SC 51. 18. Recently, the scope of Revisional Court has been considered by Constitution Bench of Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, 2014 (9) SCC 78 and while expressing its agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259, the Court said that power of Revisional Court under Rent Statute though is wider than the revisional power under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, but it is not wide enough to make the Revisional Court a second Court of First Appeal. It clarified that when the Court has to satisfy itself that the decision of Court below is according to law, in order to find out whether a finding of fact recorded by subordinate Court is according to law, it can see whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality or misreading of evidence or overlooking or ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers from perversity or any such illegality or such finding has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice, but it does not empowers the Revisional Court to appreciate the evidence and take a different view as if sitting in appellate jurisdiction. In para 43 of judgment, the Court said as under: “43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a Court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.” 19. In view of above exposition of law, we do not find any procedural or otherwise error in the order impugned in this revision so as to warrant interference. 20. Dismissed. 21. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 22. Certify this order to the Lower Court immediately. ———————