ORDER : Aggrieved of the divergent finding recorded on the charge by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, setting aside the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court on the charge of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC") and Section 27 of the Arms Act, the appellant is before this Court. 2. Shri Manoj Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant very vehemently contended that the Trial Court despite many prosecution witnesses, except P.W. 1- Rakesh and P.W.8- Biniya Bai (son and wife of the deceased) turned hostile, considered their evidences and also the FSL report and there is no definite case rendered whether the bullet shots were fired either with weapon, Exhibit A-1 and A-2, the 12 bore country made pistols or Exhibit C-2, a 12-bore Shaktiman Express made metallic head. The Trial Court after detailed analysis of the evidence on record recorded the finding on the charge that the prosecution case suffers from infirmity that there is no cogent evidence placed on record, including the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 8 coupled with medical evidence. The benefit of doubt was extended in favour of the appellant and the Trial court acquitted him for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. It is contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant that P.W. 1 is the solitary eye-witness and P.W. 8's evidence does not support the case of the prosecution as informant of P.W. 8, namely, Birthia, who according to P.W. 8 informed her that the injury was caused by the accused to her husband, was not examined. Therefore, the Trial Court should not have recorded the finding of fact on the charge and passed the order of acquittal and having regard to the settled legal position laid down by this Court in the case of Rohtash v. State of Haryana reported in (2012) 6 SCC 589 , the High Court should not have interfered with the finding of acquittal. The High Court can interfere with the same only in exceptional circumstances when there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse. The High Court can interfere with the same only in exceptional circumstances when there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse. The Trial Court recorded the finding on the charge after proper appreciation of evidence on record and in a stretch of imagination it was reversed by the High Court, therefore, the interference with the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is erroneous in law and liable to be set aside. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has also placed reliance upon another judgment of this Court in the case of V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 617 in support of the proposition of law that the appellate Court has got the power of review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. The order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. In view of the observations made by this Court in the case of V.N. Ratheesh (supra), the setting aside of order of acquittal passed in favour of the appellant and convicting the accused of the charge is not existed in law. 3. Lastly, he has contended that having regard to the medical evidence on record, particularly, the rigor mortis, as stated by P.W. 7- Dr. V.P. Mathur, the time of occurrence is totally different. Therefore, the said evidence was considered by the Trial Court in arriving at a conclusion and held that the charge is not proved against the accused, has been erroneously interfered with by the High Court in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction and set aside the order of acquittal. Therefore, he submits that it is a fit case for interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. 4. Ms. Prachi Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the State sought to justify the divergent finding recorded in the impugned order by the High Court placing strong reliance upon the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 8 whose evidence is corroborated with the medical evidence of P.W. 7, which has been misread by the Trial court at the time of recording a finding on the charge. Therefore the said finding is rightly found fault with by the High Court and it is held that the said approach of the Trial Court in recording a finding in passing the order of acquittal is erroneous in law. Therefore the appellate court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction after proper re-appreciation of evidence on record rightly set aside the finding of acquittal and held that the charge framed against the accused is proved and further placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Umesh Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 360 , paragraph 22, 23.1 and 23.2 in support of the evidence of P.W. 7 regarding the rigor mortis wherein this Court at Paragraph 22 after adverting to the decision of this court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhagirath extracted paragraph 15, in which decision this Court has held that the opinion given by a medical witness need not be the last word on the subject. It would be appropriate to extract the said paragraph in this order which reads thus : "15. The opinion given by a medical witness need not be the last word on the subject. Such an opinion shall be tested by the court. If the opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, the court is not obliged to go by that opinion. After all opinion is what is formed in the mind of a person regarding a fact situation. If one doctor forms one opinion and another doctor forms a different opinion on the same facts it is open to the Judge to adopt the view which is more objective or probable. Similarly if the opinion given by one doctor is not consistent with probability the court has no liability to go by that opinion merely because it is said by the doctor. Of course, due weight must be given to opinions given by persons who are experts in the particular subject." 5. Learned counsel for the State further submits that the contention urged in this regard by learned senior counsel for the appellant that the time of occurrence is totally different having regard to the medical evidence, the said portion of opinion of the Doctor who was examined in the case need not be the last word for accepting the contention of the appellant and to disbelieve the prosecution case. 6. 6. With reference to the above rival contentions, we have very carefully examined the findings recorded on the charge by the Trial Court. It has no doubt that except P.W. 1 and P.W. 8, witnesses to the occurrence, and P.W. 7 the medical evidence, the other witnesses have turned hostile. It is well established principle of law that if the evidence of P.W. 1 the son, who is witness to the occurrence, with regard to the head injury sustained by the deceased by using country made pistol by the appellant and the said fact is corroborated from the evidence of P.W. 7 who spoke about the injury caused with bullet is perverse, it is to be substantiated by mentioning in the post mortem report. The finding of the Trial Court on the charge framed against the appellant is erroneous for non-consideration of evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 8 coupled with evidence of the Doctor P.W. 7 which is on record prove the guilt against him. This aspect of the matter has been carefully examined by the High Court by re-appreciating evidence on record by examining the case afresh, keeping in view the legal principles laid down by this Court and the ambit of the appellate Court's power to reverse the order of acquittal passed in favour of the appellant. The Division Bench of the High Court conscious of the fact that it is the order of acquittal, in that backdrop, it has examined the medical evidence on record afresh and arrived at a conclusion on the evidence placed on record and found that the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court is de hors the medical evidence and therefore it held that the said finding is erroneous in law. 7. We have carefully scrutinised the evidence on record to find out as to whether the divergent finding recorded by the High Court on the charge is proper or not. After careful scrutiny of the evidence on record viz. 7. We have carefully scrutinised the evidence on record to find out as to whether the divergent finding recorded by the High Court on the charge is proper or not. After careful scrutiny of the evidence on record viz. the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 8 read with P.W. 7 and also after considering the FSL report (Annexure P-2), we are of the view that the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is rightly interfered with by the appellate Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and further the reliance placed on the judgments of this Court in the cases of V.N. Ratheesh, Rohtash at para 27 (supra) has no application in the fact situation. Further, the contention of the appellant with regard to the rigor mortis supported by the evidence of P.W. 7 is opposed by the State counsel as the opinion rendered by P.W. 7 is contrary to the medical jurisprudence and law laid down by this Court referred to supra, upon which the learned counsel for the State relies it cannot vitiate other part of cogent evidences of P.W. 1 and 8. Therefore, it is very difficult for us in exercise of our jurisdiction to accept the contentions urged by the learned senior counsel for the appellant to interfere with the impugned judgment and set aside the same. In view of the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.