JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner, a sub-inspector in the Central Industrial Security Force (hereafter the CISF), was proceeded against departmentally by the Commandant, CISF Unit, ONGC, Jorhat. In 2010, a lady viz. Smt. Meera Devi, had complained of financial transactions that the petitioner had with her ultimately resulting in such lady being duped by him. On the basis of such complaint, three articles of charge were drawn up against the petitioner, which shall be referred to at a later part of this judgment. The said charges were contested by the petitioner by asserting that the complaint had no nexus with his line of duty. In course of inquiry, the lady abandoned the complaint on the ground of a compromise having been reached with the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the proceedings/inquiry thus could not have been continued. 2. The officer entrusted to inquire into the charges submitted a report dated November 23, 2010, holding all the three charges framed against the petitioner as proved. The report of inquiry was furnished to the petitioner seeking his comments. Upon consideration of the evidence adduced in course of inquiry, the report of the inquiry officer and the petitioner’s written representation there against dated January 1, 2011, the commandant passed a final order dated February 14, 2011 imposing on the petitioner the penalty of “DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE, WHICH SHALL ORDINARILY BE A DISQUALIFICATION FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE GOVERNMENT”. The order of dismissal was carried by the petitioner in a departmental appeal dated March 9, 2011 before the Deputy Inspector General, CISF Unit, ONGC, Nazira. By an order dated May 6, 2011, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal. The appellate order was challenged by the petitioner by filing a revision petition dated May 27, 2011 before the Inspector General, CISF, N E S, Head Quarters, Kolkata. The revision petition was also rejected being devoid of merit by the revisional authority vide order dated December 9, 2011. This was followed by a mercy petition for reinstatement, addressed to the Hon’ble Minister of State, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi dated February 27, 2012 which, however, was not considered. 3. The revision petition was also rejected being devoid of merit by the revisional authority vide order dated December 9, 2011. This was followed by a mercy petition for reinstatement, addressed to the Hon’ble Minister of State, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi dated February 27, 2012 which, however, was not considered. 3. Appalled by the order of dismissal from service, since confirmed in appeal and upheld in revision, the petitioner has presented this writ petition dated September 18, 2012, challenging such orders and has sought for, inter alia, orders for setting aside the same and reinstatement in service with full financial benefits. 4. The writ petition had initially been dismissed for default and thereafter restored on recall of the dismissal order. On January 25, 2016, a coordinate Bench upon hearing the parties was prima facie of the following view: “Prima facie, it appears that the respondent authorities had no business to institute any disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner or take it to the absurd level of dismissing the petitioner from service despite the complainant withdrawing her complaint. The matter will appear a fortnight hence. The respondents should indicate by filing an affidavit as to why the entire departmental proceedings, from its institution, should not be set aside and the petitioner immediately reinstated in service.” 5. Later, the writ petition was admitted by such Bench on February 9, 2016 and after exchange of affidavits was listed for final hearing on June 8, 2016. The order passed on that date reads thus: “Since the respondents are not represented and an adjournment is sought on their behalf, costs thrown away for the infructuous hearing are reserved at Rs.10,000/- which will be added to any costs that may be imposed on the respondents at the final hearing. The petition will appear in the next monthly list.” 6. Upon reading the aforesaid orders of the coordinate Bench and prior to the Bench embarking on a full-fledged hearing, Mr. Dhar, learned senior advocate for the petitioner was called upon to give his initial response. Punctiliously fair as he is, Mr. Dhar submitted that the order of dismissal from service is too harsh and not commensurate with the gravity of the charges framed and proved against the petitioner and that, upon setting aside of the order of dismissal from service, the disciplinary authority may be directed to revisit the matter on the question of imposition of penalty. Dhar submitted that the order of dismissal from service is too harsh and not commensurate with the gravity of the charges framed and proved against the petitioner and that, upon setting aside of the order of dismissal from service, the disciplinary authority may be directed to revisit the matter on the question of imposition of penalty. 7. Mr. Roy, learned advocate for the petitioner, however, contended by placing reliance on the decision reported in (1984) 3 SCC 316 [A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.] that the respondents had no authority to impose penalty on the petitioner without defining with precision and accuracy what would amount to a misconduct, proof whereof would entail penal consequences. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Roy on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 2015 (2) All. LJ 392 [Union of India v. Sameer Kumar] wherein, upon consideration of the decision reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 [Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police], the Bench speaking through Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J. observed that the complaint, which was the genesis of the charge-sheet, having been withdrawn, the basic complaint made against the employee stood not proved and, accordingly, upheld the decision of the tribunal that was under challenge. 8. Mr. Roy also placed reliance on the decisions reported in (2015) 9 SCC 345 [Raj Kumar Dixit v. Vijay Kumar Gauri Shanker], (2013) 10 SCC 324 [Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. ED.)] and (2014) 15 SCC 313 [Tapash Kumar Paul v. BSNL], in support of his contention that should the petitioner be found entitled to reinstatement, appropriate order may be made extending to him full financial benefits. 9. Per contra, Mr. Dhar relied on the decision reported in (1997) 3 SCC 387 [Secretary to Government v. A.C.J. Britto] in support of the submission that the decision in A.L. Kalra (supra) was duly considered and distinguished by observing that the rule empowered the competent authorities to impose penalty upon the members of the police force for good and sufficient reasons and that if a proceeding had been initiated for good and sufficient reason, it would not be proper exercise of discretion to interfere on the ground that the act of delinquency complained of is not specified in the rules as an act of misconduct. It was also submitted by Mr. It was also submitted by Mr. Dhar that the materials on record would establish a settlement having been reached by the petitioner and Smt. Meera Devi for which she did not press the complaint but there was no unconditional withdrawal of such complaint at any point of time. It is for such reason, Mr. Dhar contended that the decision in Sameer Kumar (supra) was distinguishable. 10. Having regard to the rival contentions, the broad issues emerging for decision are: (I) In the absence of the Central Industrial Security Force Act (hereafter the CISF Act) and the Central Industrial Security Force Rules (hereafter the CISF Rules) specifying acts which could be treated as misconduct/offence, could disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner be initiated for the perceived acts of delinquency? (II) In course of inquiry the complainant having expressed her disinclination to have the complaint pursued further, were the respondents justified in continuation of the proceedings? (III) Are the impugned orders liable to be interdicted? (IV) To what relief is the petitioner entitled in law? 11. Since the issues are inter-related, the same are dealt with together. 12. To appreciate the controversy, it would be necessary to read the articles of charges framed against the petitioner. The same read: “ARTICLE OF CHARGE – I In violation of good order and act of indiscipline, the Member of Force No. 014500561 SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B. of CISF Unit DHEP Doyang, while being posted at CISF Unit BCCL Dhanbad, then as Const/GD, from March, 2002 to June, 2006, established intimate family relations with a civilian Lady, namely Smt. Meera Devi, W/O Shri K. Kumar, serving Safety Officer of Akash Kinari Colliery of BCCL, through his official positional standing and further got himself involved in some financial transactions with Smt. Meera Devi, which latter-on culminated into a complaint against SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B., by Smt. Meera Devi, which tantamount to gross misconduct spoiling the image of the Force. Being a responsible member of the Armed Force of the Union, such act on the part of No. 014500561 SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B. tantamount to gross misconduct, indiscipline and unbecoming of a member of the Force.”. Hence the charge. Being a responsible member of the Armed Force of the Union, such act on the part of No. 014500561 SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B. tantamount to gross misconduct, indiscipline and unbecoming of a member of the Force.”. Hence the charge. ARTICLE OF CHARGE – II In that No. 014500561 SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B. of CISF Unit DHEP Doyang, while being posted at CISF Unit BCCL Dhanbad, then as Const/GD, from March 2002 to June 2006 opened an account in Sahara India Financial Corporation Ltd., Kendua Branch, Dhanbad on 13.01.2006, and allowed Smt. Meera Devi, W/O Shri K. Kumar to maintain the said account, which he did not disclose to his superiors. Being a responsible member of the Armed Force of the Union, such an act on the part of No. 014500561 SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B. tantamount to gross misconduct, indiscipline and unbecoming of a member of the Force. Hence the charge. ARTICLE OF CHARGE – III In that No. 014500561 SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B., having involved himself into financial transaction with Smt. Meera Devi, W/O Shri K. Kumar, received some money from her during his stay at BCCL Dhanbad from March, 2002 to June, 2006 which he failed to return, as alleged by Smt. Meera Devi in her complaints dated 05.01.2009 and 22.01.2009. Instead, SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B. sent his SBI, ATM-CUM-DEBIT Card No. 6220180272700055465 of his salary account, to the said lady on her Bangalore address, without having sufficient balance. Such act on the part of No. 014500561 SI/Exe Aji Kumar M. B. tantamount to gross misconduct, indiscipline and unbecoming of a member of the Force. Hence the charge.” 13. A perusal of the charges would reveal that the perceived delinquent acts, if at all, were not performed by the petitioner in course of official duty, literally speaking. The petitioner might have developed a relationship of trust resulting in financial transactions between him and Smt. Meera Devi that were referred to by her in her complaint and that the petitioner had apparently duped her. As a member of the disciplined force, the petitioner ought to have been wise in the exercise of his discretion but mere indiscretion, without anything more, cannot be equated with misconduct. The petitioner was charged with violation of good order and having indulged in acts of indiscipline amounting to gross misconduct and indiscipline, unbecoming of a member of the force. As a member of the disciplined force, the petitioner ought to have been wise in the exercise of his discretion but mere indiscretion, without anything more, cannot be equated with misconduct. The petitioner was charged with violation of good order and having indulged in acts of indiscipline amounting to gross misconduct and indiscipline, unbecoming of a member of the force. Neither the articles of charge nor the statement of imputations of misconduct pointed to violation of any statutory provision. Bearing in mind the same, this Bench proceeds to look in some detail the decision in A.L. Kalra (supra). 14. It is noted that the employee was proceeded against on two articles of charge. The first charge was that despite drawing an advance of Rs.16,050/- for purchase of a plot of land, he did not furnish the relevant documents to the office nor did he refund the amount of advance within two months of drawal as required by Rule 10 of the House Building Advance (Grant and Recovery) Rules. Insofar as the second charge is concerned, the employee was charged with drawing a conveyance advance of Rs.11,000/- for purchasing a motor cycle but had neither utilized the amount for such purpose nor had refunded the amount of advance drawn as required under Rule 10 of the Conveyance Advance (Grant & Recovery) Rules. 15. The employer had proceeded against the employee on the charge that he was guilty of misconduct as prescribed in Rule 4 (1)(i) and (iii) reading as under: “4 (1) Every employee shall at all times: (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) … … …; (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a public servant.” Rule 5 prescribed various misconducts for which action could be taken against an employee governed by the rules. After noting such provisions, the Supreme Court proceeded to observe as follows: “22. Rule 4 bears the heading ‘General’. Rule 5 bears the heading ‘Misconduct’. The draftsmen of the 1975 Rules made a clear distinction about what would constitute misconduct. A general expectation of a certain decent behaviour in respect of employees keeping in view Corporation culture may be a moral or ethical expectation. Failure to keep to such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule 5. Failure to keep to such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule 5. Any attempt to telescope Rule 4 into Rule 5 must be looked upon with apprehension because Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. It is not necessary to dilate on this point in view of a recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut : (1984) 1 SCC 1 where this Court held that ‘everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short, it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty’. Rule 4 styled as ‘General’ specifies a norm of behaviour but does not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule 5, it is nowhere stated that anything violative of Rule 4 would be per se a misconduct in any of the sub-clauses of Rule 5 which specifies misconduct. It would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It may as well be mentioned that Rule 25 which prescribes penalties specifically provides that any of the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him. Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct.” 16. The observations in the aforesaid extract, on which emphasis has been laid by Mr. Roy, squarely apply on facts and in the circumstances. The CISF Act contains 22 sections. Section 15 ordains that every member of the CISF shall, for the purpose of the CISF Act, be considered to be always on duty and shall, at any time be liable to be employed at any place within or outside India. Section 15A restricts the rights of the members of the CISF to form associations, etc. Section 18(1) lays down that a member of the CISF who is guilty of any violation of duty or willful breach or neglect of any rule or regulation or lawful order made by a supervisory order or withdraws from the duties of his office without permission or who being absent on leave, fails without reasonable cause to report himself for duty on the expiration of the leave, or who engages himself without authority in any employment other than his duty as a member of the force or who is guilty of cowardice, may be taken into custody and shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. For the purpose of a decision on this writ petition, apart from the aforesaid provisions no other provision of the CISF Act sounds what is expected of a member of the CISF. 17. The CISF Rules comprises of 14 chapters. Chapter IX, titled ‘Conditions of Service and Conduct’, contains a couple of provisions. Rule 29 lays down as follows: “29. Manuals.–The Director General shall frame Training Manual, Establishment Manual as well as other manuals for administration of the Force with the approval of the Central Government.” 18. 17. The CISF Rules comprises of 14 chapters. Chapter IX, titled ‘Conditions of Service and Conduct’, contains a couple of provisions. Rule 29 lays down as follows: “29. Manuals.–The Director General shall frame Training Manual, Establishment Manual as well as other manuals for administration of the Force with the approval of the Central Government.” 18. Responding to a query of the Bench as to whether any manual specifying the standards of conduct that a member of the CISF is required to maintain has been framed by the Director General with the approval of the Central Government or not, Mr. Dhar replied in the negative. However, he produced for perusal of the Bench the CISF Discipline and Appeal Manual, 2006. 19. The Discipline and Appeal Manual has been perused. It lays down provisions for guidance when a member of the CISF may be placed under suspension, the circumstances warranting interim suspension and its review, the procedure for conducting departmental proceedings and provisions relating to appeal, revision, review and termination of service, identification of appointing authority and disciplinary authority, etc. 20. Much has been argued by Mr. Dhar that being a member of the CISF, the petitioner ought to have realized that he is required to conduct himself according to norms of discipline that are attached with rendering of duty in a disciplined force and that any act, albeit not in the line of his duty, could be treated as misconduct exposing him to departmental proceedings. 21. Upon such submission of Mr. Dhar, the Bench had drawn his attention to sections 145, 146 and 147 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 (hereafter the RPF Rules), Chapter III of the Border Security Force Act, 1968 and sections 9 and 10 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 indicating the standard of conduct that a member of each such force is required to maintain failing which he could be exposed to punishments. 22. The Railway Protection Force, the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force are also disciplined forces, akin to the CISF. 23. It would appear from a reading of rules 145, 146 and 147 of the RPF Rules that the code of conduct, behaviour and offences relatable to duties of enrolled members of the RPF have been provided. 22. The Railway Protection Force, the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force are also disciplined forces, akin to the CISF. 23. It would appear from a reading of rules 145, 146 and 147 of the RPF Rules that the code of conduct, behaviour and offences relatable to duties of enrolled members of the RPF have been provided. If, indeed, similar provisions had been engrafted for the members of the CISF in the CISF Act/Rules, that would have avoided a situation of the present nature where an ex post facto interpretation of the incident of the petitioner entering into financial transaction with Smt. Meera Devi has been camouflaged as a misconduct. This would have also prevented employees from being exposed to vagaries of subjective evaluation inasmuch as what is unbecoming of a member of the CISF might vary with individual senior officers, thereby exposing a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. Failure to keep a high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting a member of the CISF by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless specific acts of (mis)conduct are enumerated as misconduct in any manual formulated by the Director General, for which rule 29 of the CISF Rules is the repository of power. To attract provisions for imposing penalty on an enrolled member of the CISF, a substantial and proximate nexus between the alleged misconduct and the employment seems to this Bench to be essential, which is lacking here. 24. The decision in A.C.J. Britto (supra) distinguished the decision in A.L. Kalra (supra) on the ground that there was a legitimate order passed by an officer superior to the member of the police force which such member had not obeyed and such disobedience was regarded as an act of indiscipline, certainly providing a good and sufficient reason for initiating disciplinary proceeding. 25. It requires to be noticed that A.L. Kalra (supra) fell for consideration before the Supreme Court also in the decisions reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India] and (2006) 3 SCC 143 [Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. T.K. Raju]. 26. In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Court proceeded on the basis that accumulation of assets disproportionate to an officer’s known source of income even though not specified as a misconduct in the relevant Conduct and Appeal Rules, yet, was a misconduct in terms of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. 26. In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Court proceeded on the basis that accumulation of assets disproportionate to an officer’s known source of income even though not specified as a misconduct in the relevant Conduct and Appeal Rules, yet, was a misconduct in terms of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. 27. In T.K. Raju (supra), it has been laid down that the decision in A.L. Kalra (supra) does not lay down any inflexible rule and that the misconduct alleged against the delinquent was trivial. However, the Court was of the opinion that the delinquent acts complained of under consideration could indeed be treated as misconduct under the other provisions of the Conduct and Appeal Rules, as applicable to the officer. It follows therefrom that if allegations levelled against a delinquent are trivial in nature, the decision in A.L. Kalra (supra) may apply. The charges in this case are trivial and there is no reason why A.L. Kalra (supra) shall not be applicable. 28. Sections 19 and 20 of the CISF Act provide which enactments would apply to members of the CISF and which are not to apply. There is no indication in the CISF Act that the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 would apply to members of the CISF. As such, the contention raised in this behalf by Mr. Dhar is not acceptable. 29. It has also not been brought to the notice of this Bench that there exists any order issued by a competent authority restraining members of the CISF from interacting with civilians and/or carrying forward financial transactions between two consensual adults. In that view of the matter, the contention advanced by Mr. Roy that the respondents lacked the authority to proceed against the petitioner deserves to be upheld. 30. In view of the answer to issue no. 1, this Bench is of the considered view that it would be a redundant exercise to proceed with examination of issue no. 2 and to answer the same. 31. Having regard to the finding that the respondents lacked authority to proceed against the petitioner in the absence of any provision by which members of the CISF are prohibited from indulging in acts like those complained of, the orders impugned in the writ petition i.e. the original order, the appellate order and the revisional order, are indefensible and, accordingly, stand set aside. Issue no. 3 is, accordingly, answered. 32. Issue no. 3 is, accordingly, answered. 32. Moving on to issue no. 4, it is observed that the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service. He shall be reinstated in service immediately but not later than 30 (thirty) days from date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order. 33. Now, the vital question of financial benefits requires to be considered. Since the writ petition has been pending on the file of this Court for nearly four years and it is seen that the writ petition was dismissed for default on January 14, 2013 for non-appearance of the petitioner’s learned advocate and restored to its original file and number only on December 11, 2014 (after about twenty two months), whereafter steps may not have been taken for its consideration during 2015 and it was admitted only on January 25, 2016, the petitioner can claim no financial benefits during such period (i.e. January 14, 2013 till January 25, 2016). The petitioner shall be entitled to 50% of the financial benefits right from the date of his dismissal from service (i.e. February 14, 2011 till January 13, 2013), and 100% benefits from this date till date of reinstatement. 34. The petitioner shall, however, be treated to be in continuous service all throughout, as if he had not been fastened with the order of dismissal. Needless to observe, he shall be entitled to full salary and allowances from the date of his reinstatement. 35. The writ petition stands allowed with costs assessed at Rs.10,000/-, as ordered earlier by the coordinate Bench earlier, to be paid to him at the time of his reinstatement in service. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.