JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. 1. These Letters Patent Appeals are directed against the common judgment and order, dated 5th August, 2011, made by the learned Single Judge/Writ Court in a batch of writ petitions, CWP No. 616 of 2010, titled as Bikram Singh versus Him Urja and another, being the lead case, whereby all the writ petitions filed by the writ petitioners came to be allowed (for short “the impugned judgment”). 2. Since common questions of facts and law are involved, we deem it proper to determine all these appeals by this common judgment. Accordingly, this judgment will govern all the eight appeals. Brief facts: 3. The pleadings and the documents annexed with the writ petitions do disclose that the writ petitioners-respondents herein were engaged as Motivators on daily wage basis in terms of memorandum, dated 18th January, 1986 (Annexure P1). Their services came to be regularized on different dates. The details of the date of appointment and regularization, as pleaded in the writ petitions, are as under:- S. No. Name Date of appointment as daily wagers Date of Regularization Pay scale 1. Bikram Singh 28.02.1986 01.01.1997 770-1410 2. Kuldeep Singh 28.02.1986 01.01.1997 770-1410 3. Roshni Devi 18.05.1988 01.04.1998 2520-4140 4. Deen Dayal Thakur 01.02.1989 01.04.1998 2520-4140 5. Hem Raj 21.09.1989 01.04.1999 2520-4140 6. Vinod Kumar Sharma 16.12.1989 01.04.1999 2520-4140 7. Anjani Kumar Sharma 01.04.1990 01.04.1999 2520-4140 8. Atma Ram 11.02.1991 01.04.1999 2520-4140 4. The writ petitioners-respondents invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in the month of February, 2010, by the medium of the writ petitions and prayed for writ of mandamus commanding the writ respondents-appellants to fix their pay in the pay scale of 3120-5160 from the date of their initial appointments with a further command to refix their pay and to grant the arrears alongwith interest on the grounds taken in the memo of the respective writ petitions. 5. The writ respondents-appellants resisted the writ petitions by filing reply in two writ petitions. It is stated that the writ petitioners-respondents were appointed as Motivators on daily wage basis. The said post was not in the cadre of class-III post in the year 1986. Their services were regularized as per the approval of the Service Committee, HIMURJA/FC-cum/Secretary (Finance) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. It is stated that the writ petitioners-respondents were appointed as Motivators on daily wage basis. The said post was not in the cadre of class-III post in the year 1986. Their services were regularized as per the approval of the Service Committee, HIMURJA/FC-cum/Secretary (Finance) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. Further stated that the case of the writ petitioners-respondents was also considered for placing them in class-III cadre and it was decided by the Executive Committee, HIMURJA that Motivators will be considered as class-III post. 6. It is pleaded that neither the writ petitioners-respondents filed any representation nor was considered. It is worthwhile to record herein that the writ petitioners-respondents have not filed any rejoinder, thus, the averments contained in the reply have remained un-rebutted. 7. It has also been stated that at the relevant point of time, the writ petitioners-respondents were not possessing requisite qualification prescribed for the post of Motivators in terms of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules (for short “R&P Rules”). The Chief Executive Officer, HIMURJA exercised the power of relaxation and granted relaxation to the writ petitioners-respondents. That is how they were granted the scale of class-III with effect from 1st November, 2002. 8. In this backdrop, the following questions arise for determination in these appeals:- (i) Whether the writ petitioners-respondents were caught by the principle of delay and laches, waiver and acquiescence? (ii) Whether a representation can give fresh cause of limitation? (iii) Whether the writ petitioner-respondents, without questioning their regularization orders made in the years 1997/1998/1999 and the orders granting scale of class-III with effect from 1st November, 2002, can claim the reliefs sought in the respective writ petitions? 9. The services of the writ petitioners-respondents were regularized in terms of the provisions contained in the instructions issued vide letter No. PER(AP)CB( 2)2/ 97dated 16th December, 1997, which mandates that a daily waged/contingent paid worker, who has worked for less than ten years on a higher pay scale, is to be considered for regularization while taking into account the service, both in the lower scale and higher scale, but, shall be regularized on a lower post. 10. It is apt to reproduce para 8 of the reply herein: “8. Not admitted. 10. It is apt to reproduce para 8 of the reply herein: “8. Not admitted. It is to be mentioned here that the case of the petitioner was considered for regularization in accordance with the provisions of instructions issued vide their letter No. PER(AP)CB( 2)2/ 97dated 16th December, 1997, which clearly indicates that “In case a daily waged/ contingent paid worker, who has worked for less than 10 years on a higher pay scale, he will be considered for regularization by combining the service both in the lower scale and higher scale but he shall be regularized on a lower post because for regularization on a higher post, 10 years complete service is essential.” As such the petitioner was not eligible for the grant of higher pay scale. Hence, the plea of the petitioner does not seem genuine. As per to the above said instructions the scale of class-iv was allowed to the petitioner at that time.” (Emphasis added) 11. It is admitted fact that the writ petitioners-respondents were appointed as Motivators on daily wage basis, their services came to be regularized on the dates mentioned hereinabove, were placed on lower post and thereafter granted scale of class-III post with effect from 1st November, 2002. They have not made a murmur, rather accepted all the terms and conditions contained in the said orders, not to speak of questioning the same, and have come out of the deep slumber after more than a decade, i.e. in the month of February, 2010. 12. It is beaten law of land that delay takes away the settings of law. A person who does not seek relief within the time frame, his petition has to be dismissed only on the grounds of delay and laches, otherwise, it would amount to gross misuse of jurisdiction and dislodging the settled positions. 13. The Apex Court in a case titled as R & M Trust versus Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others, reported in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 91, held that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; delay defeats equity and it cannot be brushed aside without any plausible explanation. It is apt to reproduce para 34 of the judgment herein: “34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is apt to reproduce para 34 of the judgment herein: “34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third-party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why should the Court come to the rescue of a person who is not vigilant of his rights?” 14. The Apex Court in cases titled as S.D.O. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and others versus Timudu Oram, reported in 2005 AIR SCW 3715 and Srinivasa Bhat (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. versus A. Sarvothama Kini (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2106, has also discussed the same principle. It is profitable to reproduce para 9 of the judgment in Timudu Oram's case (supra) herein: “9. In the present case, the appellants had disputed the negligence attributed to it and no finding has been recorded by the High Court that the GRIDCO was in any way negligent in the performance of its duty. The present case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others (supra), 1999 AIR SCW 3383 : AIR 1999 SC 3412 . The High Court has also erred in awarding compensation in Civil Appeal No. …........... of 2005 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 9788 of 1998). The subsequent suit or writ petition would not be maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit. The writ petition was filed after a lapse of 10 years. No reasons have been given for such an inordinate delay. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of 10 years. In such a case, awarding of compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be justified.” 15. It would also be apt to reproduce para 39 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board versus Kirshan Kumar Vij & Anr., reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 3342, herein: “39. Yet, another question that draws our attention is with regard to delay and laches. In fact, respondent No. 1's petition deserved to be dismissed only on that ground but surprisingly the High Court overlooked that aspect of the mater and dealt with it in a rather casual and cursory manner. Yet, another question that draws our attention is with regard to delay and laches. In fact, respondent No. 1's petition deserved to be dismissed only on that ground but surprisingly the High Court overlooked that aspect of the mater and dealt with it in a rather casual and cursory manner. The appellant had categorically raised the ground of delay of over eight years in approaching the High Court for grant of the said relief. But the High Court has simply brushed it aside and condoned such an inordinate, long and unexplained delay in a casual manner. Since, we have decided the matter on merits, thus it is not proper to make avoidable observations, except to say that the approach of the High Court was neither proper nor legal.” 16. The Apex Court in the case titled as State of Jammu & Kashmir versus R.K. Zalpuri and others, reported in JT 2015 (9) SC 214, held that a Writ Court while deciding a writ petition, is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. It is apt to reproduce paras 26 to 28 of the judgment herein: “26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias" 'thanks to God'. 28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.” 17. Question No. (i) is answered accordingly. 18. The writ petitioners-respondents have averred in the writ petitions that they have made representations. They have annexed the photocopies of some representations. The writ respondents-appellants have specifically denied in their reply that the writ petitioners-respondents have filed any representation, which has not been controverted by the writ petitioners-respondents. 19. Mere filing of representations here and there cannot be a ground to condone the delay. It cannot furnish fresh cause to seek remedy. The period of limitation once has commenced to run will not cease to do so by reason of any subsequent event. Representation cannot be used as a tool to claim a relief, which is barred by time, or to defeat equity and to overcome the doctrine of 'delay defeats equity'. 20. The Apex Court has considered the same issue and point in a case titled as Delhi Administration and Ors. versus Kaushilya Thakur and Anr., reported in AIR 2012 Supreme Court 2515. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 10 of the judgment herein:- “10. We have heard Shri H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri Rishikesh, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and perused the record. In our view, the impugned order as also the one passed by the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside because:- (i) While granting relief to the husband of respondent No. 1, the learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that the writ petition had been filed after almost 4 years of the rejection of an application for allotment of 1000 sq. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ petitioner made further representations could not be made a ground for ignoring the delay of more than 3 years, more so because in the subsequent communication the concerned authorities had merely indicated that the decision contained in the first letter would stand. It is trite to say that in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot entertain belated claims unless the petitioner offers tangible explanation State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai (1964) 6 SCR 261 . ” 21. The Apex Court in a case titled as Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others versus T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 108, has taken into consideration all the judgments and the development of law and held that delay cannot be brushed aside without any reason. It is apt to reproduce paras 13 to 17 of the judgment herein:- “13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 , the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, which is as follows: (Balwant Regular Motor Service case, AIR 1969 SC 329 , AIR pp. 33536, para 11) “11. …..Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.' (Lindsay Petroleum Co. case, PC pp/ 23940)” 14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) “19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person’s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon un-blameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.” 15. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Court observed that : (SCC p. 594, para 24) “ 24. …......it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.” It has been further stated therein that: (Nandlal Jaiswal case, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 , SCC p. 594, para 24) “24. ….....If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.” Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 22. The Apex Court in another case titled as State of Tripura and others versus Arabinda Chakraborty and others, reported in (2014) 6 Supreme Court Cases 460, has held that simply by making representations in absence of any statutory provision/appeal, period of limitation would not get extended. It is apt to reproduce para 18 of the judgment herein: “18. It is a settled legal position that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which the cause of action takes place. Had there been any statute giving right of appeal to the respondent and if the respondent had filed such a statutory appeal, the period of limitation would have commenced from the date when the statutory appeal was decided. In the instant case, there was no provision with regard to any statutory appeal. The respondent kept on making representations one after another and all the representations had been rejected. Submission of the respondent to the effect that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which his last representation was rejected cannot be accepted. If accepted, it would be nothing but travesty of the law of limitation. One can go on making representations for 25 years and in that event one cannot say that the period of limitation would commence when the last representation was decided. On this legal issue, we feel that the courts below committed an error by considering the date of rejection of the last representation as the date on which the cause of action had arisen. This could not have been done.” 23. On this legal issue, we feel that the courts below committed an error by considering the date of rejection of the last representation as the date on which the cause of action had arisen. This could not have been done.” 23. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in LPA No. 48 of 2011, titled as Shri Satija Rajesh N versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 26th August, 2014; LPA No. 150 of 2014, titled as Mr. Inderjit Kumar Dhir versus State of H.P. and others, decided on 17th September, 2014; LPA No. 107 of 2014, titled as Amit Attri and others versus Anil Verma and others, and other connected matters, decided on 3rd December, 2014 and LPA No. 270 of 2010, titled as Bhim Sen Sharma versus H.P. University and another, decided on 2nd May, 2016. 24. Having said so, it can be safely held that the mandate of Limitation Act cannot be given a slip by filing representations, that too, at belated stage. 25. Question No. (ii) is replied accordingly. 26. It is also pertinent to mention herein that the writ petitioners-respondents have accepted their regularization orders/memoranda, wherein the pay scales granted to them were specifically mentioned as one of the terms and conditions, they were asked to report for duty in case the offer of appointment on the terms and conditions stipulated in the regularization orders/memoranda was acceptable to them. 27. The terms and conditions contained in each of the regularization orders/memoranda are almost similar. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of the memorandum, dated 5th January, 1998 (Annexure P4 in CWP No. 616 of 2010, subject matter of LPA No. 228 of 2012) herein: “If he is willing to accept this offer on the terms and conditions mentioned above, he should report to the Project Officer, HIMURJA (H.P. Govt. Energy Development Agency) Barsar, Distt. Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh for duty before 10-01-1998, failing which the offer will be treated as cancelled.” 28. In view of the above, the writ petitioners-respondents were asked to join in case the terms and conditions contained in the regularization orders/ memoranda were acceptable to them, have accepted the offer without raising any finger, cannot make a u-turn. They have not placed on record any document in order to prove that they have accepted the same under protest. In view of the above, the writ petitioners-respondents were asked to join in case the terms and conditions contained in the regularization orders/ memoranda were acceptable to them, have accepted the offer without raising any finger, cannot make a u-turn. They have not placed on record any document in order to prove that they have accepted the same under protest. Thus, the writ petitioners-respondents are caught by their own conduct. 29. Applying the principles to the instant case, the writ petitions were to be dismissed only on account of delay, laches, waiver and acquiescence, but the Writ Court has not thrashed out this legal angle. 30. The writ petitioners-appellants have sought writ of mandamus commanding the writ respondents-appellants to grant pay scale of 3120-5160 from the date of their initial appointments alongwith arrears. 31. As recorded hereinabove, the writ petitioners-respondents have accepted their regularization orders. Thereafter, they have also accepted notification/office order, dated 1st November, 2002, in terms of which they were declared as class-III and were granted the pay scale of 3120-5160, without any whisper. 32. The writ petitioners-respondents have not questioned the said orders, i.e. regularization orders and order, dated 1st November, 2002. Thus, without seeking quashment of these orders, the writ petitioners-respondents cannot seek writ of mandamus. That will amount to quashing the said orders to the extent they relate to the pay scale and other terms and conditions, without asking for. 33. The Writ Court has neither thrashed out the facts nor the niceties of law, thus, has fallen in a grave error in granting the writ petitions with all consequential benefits. 34. The writ respondents-appellants have specifically pleaded that even the post of Motivators was not falling in the cadre of class-III post, but a decision was made by the Chief Executive Officer, HIMURJA on 1st November, 2002 to include the said post in class-III post while exercising the power of relaxation in the R&P Rules. 35. The writ petitioners-respondents have not pleaded as to how they were entitled to such grade and which Rule was occupying the field at that time, which provided for grant of such pay scale. The writ respondents-appellants have referred to the instructions in para 8 of the reply, quoted hereinabove, which were occupying the field at that point of time for regularization, which have not been denied by the writ petitioners-respondents. 36. The writ respondents-appellants have referred to the instructions in para 8 of the reply, quoted hereinabove, which were occupying the field at that point of time for regularization, which have not been denied by the writ petitioners-respondents. 36. The said instructions provide that if the services of a daily waged/contingent paid worker are to be regularized, who has worked for less than ten years on a higher pay scale, he will be considered for regularization by combining the service both in the lower scale and higher scale, but he shall be regularized on a lower post. 37. The Writ Court has directed the writ respondents-appellants to grant the pay scale of higher post to the writ petitioners-respondents, which is not in tune with the said instructions. 38. It is beaten law of land that regularization or pay scale or benefits cannot be granted de hors the policy/scheme. 39. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Secretary, State of Karnataka and others versus Umadevi and others, reported in (2006) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1 and Union of India and others versus G.R. Rama Krishna and another, reported in (2013) 12 Supreme Court Cases 582, has laid down the same principle. It is apt to reproduce para 9 of the judgment in G.R. Rama Krishna's case (supra) herein: “9. From the aforesaid, it becomes apparent that there are three alternate modes of recruitment to the Post, namely, (1) by promotion, failing which (2) by transfer on deputation (including short term contract) and failing both (3) by direct recruitment. No doubt, if some departmental candidate is available and eligible to be considered, the promotion method is to be resorted to in the first instance. However, no departmental candidate was available. Concededly, the respondent had not completed 8 years regular service as Assistant Engineer. In such circumstances only out of sympathy the High Court could not have given the impugned direction. This judicial sympathy resulting into a right in favour of respondent to appoint him contrary to the recruitment rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India which are statutory in nature is clearly misplaced and needs to be denounced. Such a direction is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. As a result, the appeal is allowed restoring the order of the Tribunal dismissing the O.A. filed by the respondent. No costs.” 40. Such a direction is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. As a result, the appeal is allowed restoring the order of the Tribunal dismissing the O.A. filed by the respondent. No costs.” 40. In another case titled as Nand Kumar versus State of Bihar and others, reported in (2014) 5 Supreme Court Cases 300, the Apex Court has held that regularization/ absorption is not a matter of course and would depend upon facts of the case and can only be done by strict adherence to rules and regulations and cannot be de hors the rules. It is apt to reproduce paras 25 and 26 of the judgment herein: “25. We have consciously noted the aforesaid decisions of this Court. The principle as has been laid down in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , has also been applied in relation to the persons who were working on daily wages. According to us, the daily wagers are not appointees in the strict sense of the term 'appointment'. They do not hold a post. The scheme of alternative appointment framed for regular employees of abolished organisation cannot, therefore, confer a similar entitlement on the daily wagers of abolished organisation to such alternative employment. [Avas Vikas Sansthan v. Engineers Assn., (2006) 4 SCC 1 32]. Their relevance in the context of appointment arose by reason of the concept of regularisation as a source of appointment. After Umadevi (3) , their position continued to be that of daily wagers. Appointment on daily wage basis is not an appointment to a post according to the rules. Usually, the projects in which the daily wagers were engaged, having come to an end, their appointment is necessarily terminated for want of work. Therefore, the status and rights of daily wagers of a Government concern are not equivalent to that of a Government servant and his claim to permanency has to be adjudged differently. 26. In these circumstances, in our considered opinion, the regularisation/ absorption is not a matter of course. It would depend upon the facts of the case following the rules and regulations and cannot be de hors the rules for such regularisation/absorption.” 41. Question No. (iii) is determined accordingly. 42. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned judgment merits to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside, the appeals are allowed and the writ petitions are dismissed. Question No. (iii) is determined accordingly. 42. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned judgment merits to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside, the appeals are allowed and the writ petitions are dismissed. Pending applications are also disposed of accordingly.