JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 16.7.2010, made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP (T) No. 5083 of 2008, titled Babu Ram versus State of H.P. and others, whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner came to be allowed, for short “the impugned judgment”, on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. Brief facts. 2. Babu Ram petitioner came to be appointed as Electrician Grade-I vide Annexure A1 in HP Public Works Department, hereinafter referred to as “PWD” for short. He was promoted as Foreman (Electrical) Vide order dated 23.9.1987, Annexure A2 and relieved on 14.12.1987, for reporting his duty to Irrigation & Public Health Department Division No.2, hereinafter referred to as the I&PH Department” for short and vide order dated 18.12.1987 Annexure A3, petitioner joined as such at Jagroti Pumping Station and is serving as such till today. 3. On 22.9.1984 the State Government made a decision to bifurcate PWD and I & PH Departments into two separate and independent Departments, which was actually materialized on 27.4.1994. Petitioner remained with the I & PH Department and accordingly, provisional seniority list of work charge Foreman working in I&PH Department was issued vide Annexure A5 dated 30.9.1997. The name of petitioner was figuring at Sr. No. 3 of the said list. 4. Annexure A4 is the final seniority list of Electrician Grade-I which was issued by the PWD, on 17.6.1986 before bifurcation and name of the petitioner was figuring at Sr. No. 11 and names of junior to the petitioner, namely Natha Ram and Shri Om Parkash were figuring at Sr. No. 12 and 13 respectively of the said seniority list. 5. Vide Annexure A6 dated 21.3.1998, two employees, namely Natha Ram and Shri Om Parkash, who were junior to the petitioner were promoted to the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical). It is only after noticing this, the petitioner filed Original Application No. 870 of 1998, and sought the writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to allocate the services of the applicant to P.W.D. and his seniority may be maintained in the cadre of Foreman (Electrical) in P.W.D. Department and also to promote the applicant as Junior Engineer (Electrical) from the date his juniors have been promoted with all consequential benefits. 6. 6. The said Original Application, on abolition of the HP State Administrative Tribunal, came to be transferred to this Court and registered as CWP (T) No. 5083 of 2008, subject matter of this LPA. 7. The petitioner has made the foundation of the said reliefs, as per the grounds contained in paras 6 (i) to 6 (viii) in the said petition. 8. The respondents have filed the reply and resisted the petition on the ground that petitioner was promoted on 16.12.1987 and he joined in I & PH Department. A conscious decision was made by the Government in the year 1984 to create two separate departments and were functioning separately as such but a final decision was taken on 27.4.1994, as discussed hereinabove. The services of the officers/officials/employees were allocated to the I & PH Department on “As is where is” basis. The seniority list was issued by the I & PH Department Annexure A5 appended to the Original Application. The petitioner had not questioned the said decision or raised any finger for posting him in I &PH Department. The petitioner has also not questioned the decisions made thereafter. 9. The writ respondents/appellant herein have specifically denied paras 6 (i) to 6 (viii) of the Original Application. Further they have pleaded that the Original Application filed by the petitioner was time barred. 10. It is apt to record herein that the petitioner has not filed any rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondents. Thus, the averments contained in the reply have remained un-rebutted. 11. The petitioner has remained contented right from 18.12.1987 till his juniors were promoted and has not sought any relief qua the decision made on 27.4.1994 and seniority lists Annexures A4 and A5. Thus, was caught by delay, laches, waiver and acquiescence. 12. The said plea was raised by the writ respondents/appellant herein in para 6 (8) (A to C) of the reply, under the head “reply to ground with legal provisions.” It is profitable to reproduce reply to ground with legal provisions herein. “(A to C). In view of the aforesaid reply to para 6 above the legal grounds so raised by the applicant in these sub paras are not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. “(A to C). In view of the aforesaid reply to para 6 above the legal grounds so raised by the applicant in these sub paras are not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In fact, PWD and I and PH Department prior to 27.4.1994 were even functioning separately since 1984 however, on 27.4.1994 a formal decision in the exigency of service as well as in the public interest was taken by the respondent State through which decision officials/officers in thousands were effected. It is pertinent to mention here that none of the said officer/official had agitated the said decision to the knowledge of the replying respondent except the preset one. Moreover at this belated stage the said plea so raised by the applicant of taking prior option is not maintainable in the eye of law.” 13. It is beaten law of land that delay takes away the settings of law. A person who does not seek relief within time, his petition has to be dismissed only on the grounds of delay and laches, otherwise, it would amount to gross misuse of jurisdiction and disturb the settled position. 14. The Apex Court in a case titled as R & M Trust versus Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others, reported in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 91, held that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; delay defeats equity and it cannot be brushed aside without any plausible explanation. It is apt to reproduce para 34 of the judgment herein: “34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third-party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why should the Court come to the rescue of a person who is not vigilant of his rights?” 15. The Apex Court in cases titled as S.D.O. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and others versus Timudu Oram, reported in 2005 AIR SCW 3715 and Srinivasa Bhat (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. versus A. Sarvothama Kini (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2106, has also discussed the same principle. It is profitable to reproduce para 9 of the judgment in Timudu Oram's case (supra) herein: “9. & Ors. versus A. Sarvothama Kini (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2106, has also discussed the same principle. It is profitable to reproduce para 9 of the judgment in Timudu Oram's case (supra) herein: “9. In the present case, the appellants had disputed the negligence attributed to it and no finding has been recorded by the High Court that the GRIDCO was in any way negligent in the performance of its duty. The present case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others (supra), 1999 AIR SCW 3383 : AIR 1999 SC 3412 . The High Court has also erred in awarding compensation in Civil Appeal No. …........... of 2005 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 9788 of 1998). The subsequent suit or writ petition would not be maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit. The writ petition was filed after a lapse of 10 years. No reasons have been given for such an inordinate delay. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of 10 years. In such a case, awarding of compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be justified.” 16. It would also be apt to reproduce para 39 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board versus Kirshan Kumar Vij & Anr., reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 3342, herein: “39. Yet, another question that draws our attention is with regard to delay and laches. In fact, respondent No. 1's petition deserved to be dismissed only on that ground but surprisingly the High Court overlooked that aspect of the mater and dealt with it in a rather casual and cursory manner. The appellant had categorically raised the ground of delay of over eight years in approaching the High Court for grant of the said relief. But the High Court has simply brushed it aside and condoned such an inordinate, long and unexplained delay in a casual manner. Since, we have decided the matter on merits, thus it is not proper to make avoidable observations, except to say that the approach of the High Court was neither proper nor legal.” 17. But the High Court has simply brushed it aside and condoned such an inordinate, long and unexplained delay in a casual manner. Since, we have decided the matter on merits, thus it is not proper to make avoidable observations, except to say that the approach of the High Court was neither proper nor legal.” 17. The Apex Court in the case titled as State of Jammu & Kashmir versus R.K. Zalpuri and others, reported in JT 2015 (9) SC 214, held that a Writ Court while deciding a writ petition, is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. It is apt to reproduce paras 26 to 28 of the judgment herein: “26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias" - 'thanks to God'. 28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.” 18. This Court also in LPA No. 48 of 2011 titled Shri Satija Rajesh N. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others decided on 26.8.2014, LPA No. 150 of 2014 titled Mr. This Court also in LPA No. 48 of 2011 titled Shri Satija Rajesh N. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others decided on 26.8.2014, LPA No. 150 of 2014 titled Mr. Inderjit Kumar Dhir versus State of H.P. and others, decided on 17th September, 2014, batch of LPAs lead case of which is LPA No. 107 of 2014 titled Amit Attri and others versus Anil Verma and others decided on 3rd December, 2014 and LPA 270 of 2010 titled Bhem Sen Sharma versus HP University and another decided on 2nd May, 2016, has laid down the similar principles of law. 19. The petitioner has made a bald averment in para 6 (viii) of the Original Application that he had filed representation against the impugned seniority list but no decision has been made on the said representation. No such representation is either on the file or brought on the record. This averment has been specifically denied by the writ respondents in paras 6 (i) to 6 (viii) of the reply to the writ petition. 20. Be that as it may, submission of a representation can be a ground to condone the delay for the reason that when an aggrieved party pursue a cause and despite making representations, his grievance is not redressed, he has to seek appropriate remedy, as early as possible, and, that too, an equitable remedy without inordinate delay and mere filing of representations here and there cannot be a ground to condone the delay. 21. The Apex Court has considered the same issue and point in a case titled as Delhi Administration and Ors. versus Kaushilya Thakur and Anr., reported in AIR 2012 Supreme Court 2515. It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the judgment herein: “10. We have heard Shri H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri Rishikesh, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and perused the record. In our view, the impugned order as also the one passed by the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside because:- (i) While granting relief to the husband of respondent No. 1, the learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that the writ petition had been filed after almost 4 years of the rejection of an application for allotment of 1000 sq. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ petitioner made further representations could not be made a ground for ignoring the delay of more than 3 years, more so because in the subsequent communication the concerned authorities had merely indicated that the decision contained in the first letter would stand. It is trite to say that in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot entertain belated claims unless the petitioner offers tangible explanation State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai (1964) 6 SCR 261 . (ii) The claim of Ranjodh Kumar Thakur for allotment of land was clearly misconceived and was rightly rejected by the Joint Secretary (L&B), Delhi Administration on the ground that he was not the owner of land comprised in khasra No. 70/2. A bare reading of Sale Deed dated 12.7.1959 executed by Shri Hari Chand in favour of Ranjodh Kumar Thakur shows that the former had sold land forming part of khasra Nos. 166, 167 and 168 of village Kotla and not khasra No.70/2. This being the position, Ranjodh Kumar Thakur did not have the locus to seek allotment of land in terms of the policy framed by the Government of India. The payment of compensation to Ranjodh Kumar Thakur in terms of the award passed by the Land Acquisition Collector and the enhanced compensation determined by the Reference Court cannot lead to an inference that he was the owner of land forming part of Khasra No.70/2. In any case, before issuing a mandamus for allotment of 1000 square yards plot to the writ petitioner, the High Court should have called upon him to produce some tangible evidence to prove his ownership of land forming part of Khasra No.70/2. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court did not pay serious attention to the stark reality that Ranjodh Kumar Thakur was not the owner of land mentioned in the application filed by him for allotment of 1000 square yards land.” 22. The Apex Court in a case titled as Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others versus T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 108, has taken into consideration all the judgments and the development of law and held that delay cannot be brushed aside without any reason. The Apex Court in a case titled as Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others versus T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 108, has taken into consideration all the judgments and the development of law and held that delay cannot be brushed aside without any reason. It is apt to reproduce paras 13 to 17 of the judgment herein: “13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 , the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, which is as follows: (Balwant Regular Motor Service case, AIR 1969 SC 329 , AIR pp. 335-36, para 11) “11. …..Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.' (Lindsay Petroleum Co. case, PC pp/ 239- 40)” 14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) “19. case, PC pp/ 239- 40)” 14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) “19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person’s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon un-blameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.” 15. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Court observed that : (SCC p. 594, para 24) “24. …......it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.” It has been further stated therein that: (Nandlal Jaiswal case, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 , SCC p. 594, para 24) “24. …..... If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.” Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 23. The Apex Court in another case titled as State of Tripura and others versus Arabinda Chakraborty and others, reported in (2014) 6 Supreme Court Cases 460, has held that simply by making representations in absence of any statutory provision/appeal, period of limitation would not get extended. It is apt to reproduce paras 15, 17 and 18 of the judgment herein: “15. In our opinion, the suit was hopelessly barred by law of limitation. Simply by making a representation, when there is no statutory provision or there is no statutory appeal provided, the period of limitation would not get extended. The law does not permit extension of period of limitation by mere filing of a representation. A person may go on making representations for years and in such an event the period of limitation would not commence from the date on which the last representation is decided. In the instant case, it is a fact that the respondent was given a fresh appointment order on 22.11.1967, which is on record. The said appointment order gave a fresh appointment to the respondent and therefore, there could not have been any question with regard to continuity of service with effect from the first employment of the respondent. 16.…........... 17. The respondent did not make any representation or grievance when he was given a fresh appointment. He knew it well that his service had been terminated and he was obliged by the appellant authorities by giving him a fresh appointment. Had he been aggrieved by a fresh appointment after termination of his service, he should have taken legal action at that time but he accepted the fresh appointment and raised the grievance about his seniority and other things after more than a decade. Had he been aggrieved by a fresh appointment after termination of his service, he should have taken legal action at that time but he accepted the fresh appointment and raised the grievance about his seniority and other things after more than a decade. Even after the draft seniority list was published on 11.11.1972, which had been finalized in September, 1975, he did not file any suit but continued to make representations which had been rejected throughout. 18. It is a settled legal position that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which the cause of action takes place. Had there been any statute giving right of appeal to the respondent and if the respondent had filed such a statutory appeal, the period of limitation would have commenced from the date when the statutory appeal was decided. In the instant case, there was no provision with regard to any statutory appeal. The respondent kept on making representations one after another and all the representations had been rejected. Submission of the respondent to the effect that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which his last representation was rejected cannot be accepted. If accepted, it would be nothing but travesty of the law of limitation. One can go on making representations for 25 years and in that event one cannot say that the period of limitation would commence when the last representation was decided. On this legal issue, we feel that the courts below committed an error by considering the date of rejection of the last representation as the date on which the cause of action had arisen. This could not have been done.” 24. The respondents though have raised this plea but have not been discussed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. These grounds have also not been controverted by the petitioner by filing response or rejoinder. 25. The petition was filed on 18.5.1998 and the promotion was made on 21.3.1998 vide Annexure A6. The decision of bifurcation of the departments was made on 27.4.1994 and the seniority list was issued on 30.9.1997 as discussed hereinabove. 26. In terms of the mandate of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, for short “the Act”, an aggrieved person has to make an application within one year from the date on which final order has been made. 26. In terms of the mandate of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, for short “the Act”, an aggrieved person has to make an application within one year from the date on which final order has been made. Section 21 (3) provides six months’ extension of time in case the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. It is apt to reproduce Section 21 (1) (a) and (3) of the Act herein:- “21. Limitation:- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application - (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in Cl. (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in CI. (a) or CI. (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six. months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he has sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” 27. The similar principles of law have been laid down by this Court in CWP No. 5493 of 2014 titled Surender Kumar versus Union of India and others decided on 15th March, 2016. 28. Thus, the writ petition was to be dismissed only on this count. 29. The petitioner has also not sought quashment of seniority list, decision of bifurcation and promotion of his juniors. Thus, the writ petition had to be dismissed. 30. The effect of writ petition and the impugned judgment is to dislodge the settled seniority position of both the departments, which was settled right from 1984. 31. Having glance of the above discussion, the learned Writ Court has fallen in an error in granting the writ petition. 32. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside, the LPA is allowed and the writ petition is dismissed.