JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This petition is directed against the order dated 16.11.2015 rendered by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.1, Una in CMA under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil Suit No. 94 of 2006. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the respondents-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the “plaintiffs” for convenience sake) instituted a Civil Suit No. 94/2006 against the petitioners for declaration. The suit was contested by the petitioners. Issues were framed. Plaintiffs have already led their evidence and closed the same on 30.10.2015. Petitioners moved an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for permission to examine co-plaintiff Joginder Pal as one of the witnesses of defendants. The application was contested by the plaintiffs. It was rejected by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court No.1, Una on 16.11.2015. 3. Mr. Pawan Gautam has vehemently argued that plaintiff Roshan Lal in his cross-examination has admitted that present suit has not been filed by Joginder Pal. He also pointed out that on 7.11.2015, Sh. Joginder Pal appeared before the court and filed an affidavit in order to examine as defendants’ witness, however, he was not examined by the court. Thereafter, an application was filed for allowing him to be examined as witness on behalf of defendants. According to Roshan Lal, his relation with coplaintiff Joginder Pal has become strained after filing the suit and in these circumstances, petitioners in connivance with Joginder Pal were trying to cause prejudice to him. 4. Learned trial court has rightly observed in the impugned order that defendants could not file the application to examine co-plaintiff as defendants’ witness. 5. In Mahunt Shatrugan Das versus Bawa Sham Das and others: their Lordships of the Privy Council have held that calling of defendant by plaintiff as his witness is condemnable. 6. Division Bench of Mysore High Court in Mallangowda and others versus Gavisiddangowda and another, AIR 1959 Mysore 194 has held that practice of calling the opposite party as a witness should not be countenanced as it is not in the interest of justice. Division Bench has held as under: “[7] In this case whether the transaction is an absolute sale or not has to be gathered from reading the plaint as a whole and putting it in juxta position with the evidence in this case. Division Bench has held as under: “[7] In this case whether the transaction is an absolute sale or not has to be gathered from reading the plaint as a whole and putting it in juxta position with the evidence in this case. Plaintiff himself has been examined as a witness, no doubt, on behalf of the defendant. We have, in unmistakable terms, stated in this Court previously that this practice of calling the opposite party as a witness on his side should not be countenanced as it is not in the interests of justice. A scrutiny of the plaintiff's evidence throws light as to the nature of the transaction that was entered into between him and the defendants.” 7. Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sri Awadh Kishore Singh and another versus Brij Bihari Singh and others, AIR 1993 Patna 122 has held that there is no provision to show that a party is debarred from examining its adversary as a witness on his behalf. Division Bench has held as under: “[16] Now I proceed to consider the merit of the impugned order. By the impugned order, the plaintiffs have been debarred from examining defendant No. 2 as a witness on their behalf, as no order was passed by trial Court for acceptance of written statement filed by this defendant. No provision could be brought to our notice on behalf of any of the parties to show that a party is debarred from examining its adversary as a witness on his behalf. A plaintiff can examine any witness he so likes – the witness may be a stranger, may be a man of his own party or party himself or may be a defendant or his man. Therefore, if a plaintiff wants to examine a defendant as a witness on his behalf, he cannot be precluded from examining him on the ground that the said defendant has neither appeared in the suit nor upon appearance filed written statement nor prayer for filing written statement has been rejected. Therefore, in my view, trial Court has committed material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction in debarring the plaintiffs from examining defendant No. 2 as a witness on their behalf.” 8. Therefore, in my view, trial Court has committed material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction in debarring the plaintiffs from examining defendant No. 2 as a witness on their behalf.” 8. Learned Single Judge of Andhra High Court in Kosuru Kalinga Maharaju vs. Kosuru Kailkamma, 2000 (2) ALT 409 has held that Legislature has felt the need for a direct provision enabling the Court to summon a party for giving evidence as a witness to help curbing the malpractice of a party not appearing as a witness and forcing the other party to call him as a witness, and adjudicate the issues under order 16 rule 14 CPC. What is laid down in the above provision is that if the Court is satisfied about such a necessity to cause any person to be examined as a witness, Court can summon such person as a witness. In this case defendant in OS No. 70 of 1995 had invoked order 16 rule 14 CPC seeking examination of second plaintiff in the suit either as a court witness or as a witness on his behalf by filing the application. The court below, however, dismissed the application holding that summoning of a party to the suit proceedings as a witness by the other party on his behalf is unknown to law. Learned Single Judge held that the dismissal of IA No. 476 of 1999 by the court below on the sole ground that such petition was unknown to law, was improper and accordingly, the impugned order was set aside. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “[6] Legislature has felt the need for a direct provision enabling the Court to summon a party for giving evidence as a witness to help curbing the malpractice of a party not appearing as a witness and forcing the other party to call him as a witness, and adjudicate the issues properly. What is laid down in the above provision is that if the Court is satisfied about such a necessity to cause any person to be examined as a witness, Court can summon such person as a witness. The emphasis is laid on the subjective satisfaction of the Court. However, this power is to be exercised by the Courts guardedly and not as a matter of routine. The emphasis is laid on the subjective satisfaction of the Court. However, this power is to be exercised by the Courts guardedly and not as a matter of routine. [8] In this case, the petitioner who is the first defendant in the suit OS No.70 of 1995 has invoked the provisions under Order 16, Rule 14 CPC seeking to examine the second plaintiff either as a Court witness or as a witness on his behalf, by filing IA.No.476 of 1999. In the affidavit filed in support of the said I.A., the petitioner has not properly enlisted the reasons seeking the assistance of the Court in that regard. The Court below, however, dismissed the said I.A. holding that summoning of a party to the suit proceedings as a witness by the other party on his behalf is unknown to law. Probably, dismissal of the said IA on the ground that the petitioner has not given sufficient reasons seeking the assistance of the Court by invoking the provisions under Order 16, Rule 14 CPC, by the Court below would be justified rather than dismissing the said I.A. holding that the petition filed for the said purpose by the petitioner is unknown to law. [9] Taking stock of the entire situation, I am inclined to hold that the dismissal of IA. No. 476 of 1999 by the Court below on the sole ground that such a petition is unknown to law, is improper and accordingly, 1 set aside the impugned order dated 7-9-1999. However, the petitioner is permitted to file a fresh application under Order 16 Rule 14 CPC indicating reasons before the Court below for summoning the second plaintiff in the suit either as a Court witness or as a witness on his behalf to give evidence in the Court. On such application being- filed, the Court below would pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.” 9. Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Jortin Antony and others versus Padmanabha Dass Marthanda Verma and others, AIR 2000 Kerala 369 has held that a party to the suit has not been conferred any specific right to summon the opposite party as a witness to be examined on his side. Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Jortin Antony and others versus Padmanabha Dass Marthanda Verma and others, AIR 2000 Kerala 369 has held that a party to the suit has not been conferred any specific right to summon the opposite party as a witness to be examined on his side. Division Bench has further held that considering the general principle recognized by the Privy Council we are inclined to the view that in the absence of any provision conferring such a right on a party to the suit, it must be held that there is no right as such in a party to the suit to summon his opponent to give evidence. It is left to the Court, possibly after the evidence of all the witnesses made available is completed, to consider whether the examination of one of the parties who has not come before Court, is necessary and in that context if found necessary, to compel that party to give evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under R. 14 of O. 16 of the Code. The plaintiff could not as a matter of course include the defendant in his schedule of witnesses and as of right seek the issuance of summons to the defendant for being examined as a witness on his own behalf. Division Bench has held as under: [7] On a reference to the history of the legislation, it is seen that at one time in some parts of the country, a practice had grown by which a party to the suit was withheld from box by his counsel, which compelled the opposite party to cite him as a witness and to examine him, thus permitting the party to be cross-examined by his own counsel. This was considered as a pernicious practice by the Privy Council. In Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal (1909) 36 Ind App 9 the Privy Council commented on this practice in rather strong terms. This was considered as a pernicious practice by the Privy Council. In Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal (1909) 36 Ind App 9 the Privy Council commented on this practice in rather strong terms. This is what their Lordships stated :-"as to this last matter, it would appear from the judgment of the High Court that in India it is one of the artifices of a weak and somewhat paltry kind of advocacy for each litigant to cause his opponent to be summoned as a witness, with the design that each party shall be forced to produce the opponent so summoned as a witness, and thus give the counsel for each litigant the opportunity of cross-examining his own client. It is a practice which their Lordships cannot help thinking all judicial tribunals ought to set themselves to render as abortive as it is objectionable. It ought never to be permitted in the result to embarrass judicial investigation as it has done in this instance. "these words were echoed by their Lordships again in Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal (1910) Ind App 1. It may be noted with respect that their Lordships were not commenting on the scope of Order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure or the corresponding provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure then obtaining. Their Lordships were only discouraging an unhealthy practice that was being resorted to in some parts of the country in the matter of examining the parties to the suit, as witnesses. It may also be noted that in England even under the Evidence Act of 1851, parties were admissible witnesses and they were held to be competent and compellable to give evidence. But the observations of the Privy Council led to a serious debate on the question whether a party to the suit was entitled to call the opposite party as a witness on his own behalf. Whereas some of the Courts took the view that it was permissible, majority of the High Courts veered round to the view that it was not permissible. In Narayana Pillai v. Kalliyani Amma, 1963 Ker LT 537 a learned single Judge of this Court held that the practice of a party causing his opponent to be summoned as a witness was disapproved in rather strong terms by their Lordships of the Privy Council. In Narayana Pillai v. Kalliyani Amma, 1963 Ker LT 537 a learned single Judge of this Court held that the practice of a party causing his opponent to be summoned as a witness was disapproved in rather strong terms by their Lordships of the Privy Council. Therefore, as a matter of right the plaintiff cannot have defendants examined as witnesses. This view was followed in a subsequent decision by the same learned Judge in Ebrahim Muhammed Kunju v. Shahubudeen, 1969 Ker LT 170. That was a case where the proceeding was under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Syed Mohammad v. Aziz (1990) 2 Ker LT 952 another learned Judge of this Court after referring to the decisions including the one in Narayana Pillai v. Kalliyani Amma, 1963 Ker LT 537 took the view that a defendant cannot compel another defendant to appear before Court as witness. In Mary Francis v. Kesavan (1993) 1 Ker LT 4 another learned single Judge after referring to the various decisions, noticed the impropriety of a situation in which counsel appearing for the opposite party has to cross-examine his own party. But his Lordship added a rider to the effect that it was true that the Court was not powerless in summoning an opposite party if there are suitable reasons. It is based on these decisions that the trial Court rejected the prayer of the plaintiffs in this case to issue summons to defendants 1 to 8 for having them examined as witnesses for the plaintiffs. [13] It is clear from Rule 14 of O. 16 of the Code as amended that the Court has the power when it thinks it necessary to examine a party to the suit or to compel a party to the suit to give evidence so as to enable the Court to take a decision satisfactory to its conscience. But this power available to the Court and made specifically available by the amendment brought to Rule 14 cannot be confused with the right of a party to call upon an opposite party to give evidence on his behalf. Clearly, when a party to the suit does not mount the box to speak in support of his case in the pleading, that can be a circumstance which would enable the Court to accept the case of the opposite party. Clearly, when a party to the suit does not mount the box to speak in support of his case in the pleading, that can be a circumstance which would enable the Court to accept the case of the opposite party. That can also be a circumstance where the Court can draw an adverse inference against the party who has withheld himself from the witness-box. But those consequences arising out of non-apperance of a party as a witness cannot confer a right on a party to the suit to cite his opponent as his own witness. The power available to the Court under Rule 14 of O. 16 cannot be confused with a right to a party to the suit. Whereas Rule 7 enables the Court to call on any person whether a party to the suit or a non-party to the suit who is present in Court to give evidence and provides the consequences for the failure of that person to give evidence, Rule 14 also enables the Court to summon a person to give evidence even if he is not present in Court whether he be a party or only a witness of its own accord and in furtherance of its quest to give a just decision in the cause. As regards a party to the suit even this power was not available until the year 1976 and this power becomes available only after the insertion of the amendment of 1976. All that Rule 21 says is that in case where the Court thinks that it is necessary to direct a party to give evidence, the procedure regarding a witness could be applied by the Court regarding that party as well. As recognised by Shamsuddin, J. in Mary Francis v. Kesavan (1993) 1 Ker LT 4 the Court is not powerless in summoning an opposite party if there are suitable reasons and that summoning could be in exercise of its power under R. 14 of O. 16 of the Code. [14] A few decisions on the question involved may be considered at this stage. In Pirgonda v. Vishwanath, AIR 1956 Bom 251 the practice of citing the opposite side as a witness was disapproved but the Court observed that if a party who is in a position to give evidence does not go into the box, the Court is free to draw an inference against him. In Pirgonda v. Vishwanath, AIR 1956 Bom 251 the practice of citing the opposite side as a witness was disapproved but the Court observed that if a party who is in a position to give evidence does not go into the box, the Court is free to draw an inference against him. This disapproval was also shared by the Mysore High Court in Mallan Gowda v. Gavisiddan Gowda, AIR 1959 Mysore 194. In Appavoo Asary v. Sornammal Fernandez, AIR 1933 Mad 821 and in Bhupathiraju Suryanarayanaraju v. Bantupalli Appanna, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 645 it was held that for summoning the opposite party as a witness, resort to O. 3, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not proper. But it was suggested that where one party desires the presence of the opposite party in Court for the purpose of examining him as a witness the proper procedure to adopt was the one under O. 16 of the Code. In Syed Yasin v. Syed Shah Mohd. Hussain, AIR 1967 Mys 37 a learned single Judge of the Mysore High Court held that it was permissible for the Court in exercise of its power under O. 16 of the Code to permit one party to cite his opponent as a witness. According to his Lordship, if the intention of the legislature was to impose any limitations on the power of a party in summoning and examining the other party as a witness, it would have specifically stated so in O. 16, Rules 1, 19 and 20 as it had done in Rule 14 and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prayer of a party to summon and examine the other party to the suit as his witness does not amount to an abuse of process of Court, the prayer in that behalf can be allowed. In Awadh Kishore Singh v. Brij Bihari Singh, AIR 1993 Pat 122 it was held that a party cannot be debarred from examining his adversery and an order refusing permission to the plaintiff to examine the defendant as a witness was a jurisdictional error liable to be corrected in exercise of jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the recent decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kosuru Kalinga v. Kaikamma, 2000 AIHC 786 it was held that the application seeking summoning of a party to the suit as a witness of the other party could not be dismissed on the sole ground of such a course being not known to law since that would mean the overlooking of Rule 14 of O. 16 of the Code. It was also indicated that if the applicant in that behalf fails to state reasons for such summoning, such a prayer cannot be allowed. All these decisions in our view only indicate that it is not as if the Court has no power to direct the examination of a party to the suit if it considers it necessary to order his examination. Though these decisions observe that there is nothing in the Code which prevents one party from citing the opposite party as his witness, it is also clear that there is no clear enabling provision which entitles one party to insist on his opponent being called as a witness. Considering the general principle recognised by the Privy Council we are inclined to the view that in the absence of any provision conferring such a right on a party to the suit, it must be held that there is no right as such in a party to the suit to summon his opponent to give evidence. These decisions in our view fortify generally the view expressed by Shamsuddin, J. in the decision in Mary Francis v. Kesava (1993) 1 Ker LT 4. [15] We are thus of the view that a party to the suit does not have a right as such to summon the opposite party to give evidence. It is really left to the Court, possibly after the evidence of all the witnesses made available is completed, to consider whether the examination of one of the parties who has not come before Court, is necessary and in that context if found necessary, to compel that party to give evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under R. 14 of O. 16 of the Code. A plaintiff like the one in the present case, cannot as a matter of course include the defendant in his schedule of witnesses and as of right seek the issuance of summons to the defendant for being examined as a witness on his own behalf. 10. Learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in National Insurance Company Limited Calcutta and others versus M/s. Susru Sea Foods, 2005 (2) RCR (C) 194 has held that plaintiff can summon the defendant to be examined as his witness and there is no legal impediment to this effect. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “[19] In the instant case, it is not as if, one of the defendants is summoned to give evidence on behalf of the plaintiff – though there are no legal impediments, as such, for even summoning a defendant to be examined as a witness at the instance of the plaintiff; if not as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff. The Court, in the interest of justice, can always summon even a stranger and in a given case any of the parties to the suit to give evidence if such evidence is required for resolution of the dispute in an effective manner.” 11. I am inclined to accept the view expressed by Division Bench rendered in Jortin Antony versus Padmanabha Dasa Marthanda Varma’s, reported in AIR 2000 Kerala 369. 12. The trial court has neither committed any jurisdictional error nor any material illegality by not allowing the petitioners to examine the co-plaintiff. 13. Accordingly, there is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. No costs.