JUDGMENT : D.P. Choudhury, J. Challenge has been made to the order dated 5.7.2011 passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Odisha, Cuttack (in short “the State Commission”) in Consumer Complaint No.09 of 2008. FACTS 2. The factual matrix leading to the petitioner’s case is that the petitioner has got a factory at Chandaka Industrial Estate, Bhubaneswar in the name and style of M/s. Jaya Foods. The petitioner had two insurance policies under New India Assurance Company Limited, opposite party No.2 and it was effective from 7.3.2007 to 6.3.2008. It is averred that on 18.4.2007 night, there was a fire accident in the factory for which the petitioner claimed damages of plant and machineries to the tune of Rs.16,56,650/- but the surveyor of the Insurance Company made assessment for Rs.1,57,000/-. So, the petitioner filed Consumer Complaint No. 09/2008 before the opposite party no.1 claiming the aforesaid loss along with loss of interest, compensation towards loss sustained for payment of interest, compensation towards payment of salary and other components making total Rs.27,18,650/- payable by the opposite parties 2 and 3. 3. It is also averred that during pendency of Consumer Complaint No.09/2008, the petitioner filed Misc. Case No. 386/2010 for amendment of the complaint petition which was allowed on 13.4.2010. Another misc. case, i.e., Misc. Case No. 385/2010 came to be filed by petitioner with a prayer to direct the opposite party No.2 therein not to take any coercive action against the petitioner till disposal of the said consumer complaint case. Be it stated, Misc. Case No. 385/2010 was fixed to 5.7.2011 to be heard in presence of the learned counsel appearing for the complainant since the learned counsel for the complainant remained absent on the last date. This misc. case was actually listed on 5.7.2011 under the heading “ORDERS”. On that date, learned counsel for the complainant remained absent for which it was dismissed for default. On the same day, the State Commission also dismissed the main consumer complaint which is allegedly illegal. It is averred inter alia that the complainant was not given a notice about the hearing of the main consumer complaint case for which he could not take appropriate steps and the State Commission had committed gross error by dismissing the main consumer complaint case. It is averred inter alia that the complainant was not given a notice about the hearing of the main consumer complaint case for which he could not take appropriate steps and the State Commission had committed gross error by dismissing the main consumer complaint case. As such the principles of natural justice has been violated in the instant case as the complainant was not given due opportunity of hearing in the main consumer complaint case, of being heard. So, the writ petition came to be filed to quash the order dated 5.7.2011 passed in main Consumer Complaint No.09/2008. SUBMISSIONS 4. It is submitted by Mr. Bibekananda Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner that the State Commission had committed error by dismissing the main Consumer Complaint No.09/2008 by not following the procedure of law, inasmuch as, Regulation 6 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 (hereinafter called as “the Regulations, 2005”) duly framed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission with the previous approval of the Central Government, states, that the cause list of the Consumer Forum for the entire week shall be made ready before the closure of the working hours of the preceding week and displayed on the notice board and accordingly the cause list in the present case does not display about the fixing of the present matter for final disposal. He further submitted that when the learned counsel for the petitioner was not present, the State Commission ought to have given notice to the petitioner to get ready for hearing of the main consumer complaint case. 5. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when the misc. case was posted for hearing under “ORDERS”, the State Commission has committed error by dismissing the main consumer complaint case along with the misc. case. In support of his submission, he has filed the certified copy of the cause list dated 5.7.2011 showing that at Sl. No.6, the misc. case no. 385/2010 arising out of Consumer Complaint No.09/2008 was listed for “ORDERS”. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner, having no any efficacious remedy to ventilate the claim, has filed the present writ petition alleging that no due opportunity of hearing in the main consumer complaint case was afforded, resultantly, he has lost his valuable right case before the State Commission. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner, having no any efficacious remedy to ventilate the claim, has filed the present writ petition alleging that no due opportunity of hearing in the main consumer complaint case was afforded, resultantly, he has lost his valuable right case before the State Commission. He also cited the Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce –V- Minarva Dash and others; reported in 121 (2016) CLT 333, where this Court has held that the writ petition is maintainable against the order passed under Section 17(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called as “the Act”) by the State Commission. So, he submitted to quash the impugned order dated 5.7.2011 and to allow him to contest the matter on merit before the State Commission. 6. Mr. S.S. Rao, learned counsel for the Insurance Company, opposite party No.2, submitted that the writ petition before this Court is not maintainable because there is provision of appeal under the Act against the impugned order. He further submitted that the Consumer Court is meant for consumer disputes as enshrined under the Act, but the allegations before the State Commission made by the petitioner are not consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act for which the main consumer case before the State Commission is also not maintainable. He further submitted that the misc. case was posted for hearing along with the main consumer complaint case and the same is clearly revealed from the order dated 27.6.2011 as per the contents of the writ petition and on the date fixed for hearing, when the complainant remained absent without taking steps, the State Commission has rightly dismissed the misc. case along with main consumer complaint case for default. He also further submitted that the decision of this Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner relates to revision but not to appeal. According to him, although the provisions in the Act have got objective of securing justice at the earliest, but by filing the writ petition before this Court, the petitioner has made a dilatory tactics by frustrating the objective of the legislative intention behind the Act. So, he submitted to dismiss the writ petition. 7. Miss Ratho, learned Additional Government Advocate supported the arguments of Mr. S.S. Rao, learned counsel for the Insurance Company. Mr. So, he submitted to dismiss the writ petition. 7. Miss Ratho, learned Additional Government Advocate supported the arguments of Mr. S.S. Rao, learned counsel for the Insurance Company. Mr. Tuna Sahu, learned counsel for the opposite party No.3, while supporting the argument of Mr. S.S. Rao, learned counsel for the opposite party No.2, submitted that the loan incurred by the petitioner has remained unpaid due to such frivolous litigation filed by the petitioner before the State Commission. He submitted that there is no reason to file Misc. Case No.385/2010 before the State Commission to stop recovery of the loan amount by the State Commission because the State Commission has no jurisdiction to stay the recovery of the loan amount outstanding against the petitioner. So, he submitted to dismiss the writ petition for the early recovery of the outstanding dues from the petitioner. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 8. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition is maintainable? DISCUSSIONS 9. It is the admitted case of both the parties that the Consumer Complaint No.09/2008 was filed by the petitioner against the opposite parties before the State Commission. It is also admitted that Misc. Case No. 385/2010 arising out of said Consumer Complaint No.09/2008 was filed by the petitioner to pass order for not taking coercive steps against the petitioner for recovery of the dues and the misc. case was posted to 5.7.2011 for “ORDERS”. The same fact is also available from the certified copy of the cause list dated 5.7.2011 under Flag-B annexed to the memo dated 19.2.2016 filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. It is also admitted fact that on 5.7.2011, the misc. case and the main consumer complaint were dismissed for non-prosecution by the State Commission because of the learned counsel for the complainant was remained absent. 11. On going through Annexure-3, it appears that the petitioner filed consumer complaint against the present opposite parties 2 and 3 claiming compensation of Rs.27,18,650/- with 12% interest and further prayed to adjust the outstanding dues to be recovered by the present opposite party No.3 against the compensation amount to be recovered from opposite party No.2. 12. For better appreciation, Section 17(1) of the Act is placed below: “17. 12. For better appreciation, Section 17(1) of the Act is placed below: “17. Jurisdiction of the State Commission — (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction— (a) to entertain— (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees twenty lakhs but does not exceed rupees one crore; and (ii) appeals against the orders of any District Forum within the State; and (b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any District Forum within the State, where it appears to the State Commission that such District Forum has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.” 13. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the case was filed essentially under Section-17(1)(a)(i) of the Act because with effect from 15.3.2003, then value of the goods or services and compensation where it should exceed Rs.5.00 lakhs but should not exceed Rs.20.00 lakhs. However, this is a case under Section-17(a)(i) filed before the State Commission. 14. The relevant portion of the impugned order dated 5.7.2011 of the State Commission is placed below: “xxx xxx xxx xxx Although misc. case was filed some time during, 2010 on several occasions, Mr. B.Nayak, learned counsel for the complainant did not turn up. Besides on the request made on his behalf, we allowed time on five occasions. When the matter is called, Mr. B.Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the complainant is found absent and no mention is made on his behalf for adjourning the matter to any other date. In such circumstances, we dismiss the misc. case. As it seems, the complainant has no interest to pursue the matter. As such we dismiss the complaint for non-prosecution without affording any further chance to him.” 15. From the impugned order dated 5.7.2011, it is very clear that due to absence of the learned counsel for the complainant (petitioner), misc. case as well as the main consumer complaint case have been adjourned earlier to the relevant date. On the said date, neither the leaned counsel for the complainant was present nor any steps were taken on his behalf to pursue the misc. case. case as well as the main consumer complaint case have been adjourned earlier to the relevant date. On the said date, neither the leaned counsel for the complainant was present nor any steps were taken on his behalf to pursue the misc. case. It is only observed by the State Commission that as the complainant was not interested to pursue the matter, it dismissed the matter for non-prosecution without affording any further opportunity. When the misc. case was dismissed for non-prosecution being adjourned for hearing previously, there is no any reason for dismissing the main consumer complaint case for non-prosecution. The last paragraph of the order of the State Commission also does not disclose that the main consumer complaint case was fixed for hearing and it only appears that the main consumer complaint case was dismissed for non-prosecution as the complainant is not interested to pursue the matter. 16. Section-18 of the Act states that the provisions of Sections-12, 13 and 14 of the Act and Rules made thereunder for disposal of the complaint by District Forum shall, with such modifications as may be necessary, be applicable to the disposal of the disputes by the State Commission. 17. Section-13(2)(c) of the Act relates to the procedure to be followed by the District Forum in respect of the deficiencies services complained by the complainant. The same is placed below for better appreciation: “(2)(c) Where the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing before the District Forum, the District Forum may either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits.” 18. From the aforesaid provisions, it appears that when the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing then the complaint may be dismissed for default or decided on merits. In the instant case, from the cause list it does not appear that the main consumer complaint case was fixed for hearing and, therefore, the State Commission should not have dismissed the main consumer complaint case in default even if the State Commission is very much dissatisfied with the conduct of the complainant about his consistent absence. It could have issued notice fixing the case for hearing and on the date of hearing, if at all the complainant again remained absent, the courses are open as per Section-13(2)(c) of the Act. 19. It could have issued notice fixing the case for hearing and on the date of hearing, if at all the complainant again remained absent, the courses are open as per Section-13(2)(c) of the Act. 19. Next question arises when the main consumer complaint has been dismissed for default whether the State Commission can be approached to restore the complaint. There is no provision made in the Act or the Rules made thereunder to restore the complaint by the State Commission. Section-19 of the Act is placed below for better appreciation: “l9. Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed: Provided that the National Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period. Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less: 19A. Hearing of appeal - An appeal filed before the State Commission or the National Commission shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour shall be made to finally dispose of the appeal within a period of ninety days from the date of its admission: Provided that no adjournment shall be ordinarily granted by the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, unless sufficient cause is shown and the reasons for grant of adjournment have been recorded in writing by such Commission: Provided further that the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, shall make such orders as to the costs occasioned by the adjournment as may be provided in the regulations made under this Act. Provided also that in the event of an appeal being disposed of after the period so specified, the State Commission or, the National Commission, as the case may be, shall record in writing the reasons for the same at the time of disposing of the said appeal.” 20. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that any order passed by the State Commission in exercise of its power conferred by Sub-clause (i) of Clause-a of Sub-section(1) of Section 17 of the Act is appealable before the National Commission under the Act. It is already observed in the earlier paragraphs that this is a case filed by the petitioner under Section-17(a)(i) before the State Commission. So, the provisions of appellate Court are well enshrined against the impugned order 21. Moreover, Section 13 (3) and (4) of the Act state as follows:- “(3) No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. (4) For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:- (i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath, (ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence, (iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits, (iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source, (v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness, and (vi) any other matter which may be prescribed”. From the aforesaid provisions it is also clear that any proceeding under Sub-section 2(c) cannot be questioned on the ground that principles of natural justice have not been complied with. Moreover, sub-Section (4) conferred the power of Civil Court on the Consumer Forum but never it directs to comply Order 9 of the C.P.C. although there are provisions as to summoning of attendance of witnesses, examination of witnesses, discovery and production of the documents, receipt of evidence on affidavits and calling for the report from any scientific laboratory or any other sources. It also allows issuance of commission for the examination of witnesses. Baring such provision no other provision of C.P.C. has been allowed or prescribed so far to be undertaken by the commission. The Consumer Protection Rules, 1987 (hereinafter called as “the Rules”) and the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 (in short “the Regulation”) do not add any power as available under Order 9 C.P.C. to be exercised by the District Forum or the State Commission. Of course in 2002 there is amendment to the provisions of the Act conferring the power to National Commission to review or recall its own order passed. Apart from this, such Rules and Regulations made under the Act have prescribed the manner of preparation of cause list and the procedure for hearing appeal by the National Commission. It may not be out of place to mention that against the order of the National Commission, appeals would lie to the Hon’ble Apex Court as per the provisions of the Act. The Regulations made under that also direct the hearing hours, manner of issue of notice and the adjournment, hearing of argument by District Forum and State Commission. 22. It is profitable to go through the principles of law as enunciated by Hon’ble Apex Court on the subject. It is reported in (1999) 4 SCC 325 : Jyotsana Arvindkumar Shah v. Bombay Hospital Trust where Their Lordships observed at para-7: “7. We heard learned Counsel on both sides for quite some time. When we asked the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent to point out the provision in the Act which enables the State Commission to set aside the reasoned order passed, though ex parte, he could not lay his hands on any of the provisions in the Act. As a matter of fact, before the State Commission the appellants brought to its notice the two orders, one passed by the Bihar State Commission in Chief Manager, UCO Bank v. Ram Govind Agarwal (1996) 1 CPR 351 and the other passed by the National Commission in Forest Research Institute v. Sunshine Enterprises (1997) 1 CPR 42 holding that the redressal agencies have no power to recall or review their ex parte order. The State Commission had distinguished the above said orders on the ground that in those two cases the opponents had not only not appeared but also failed to put in their written statements. The State Commission had distinguished the above said orders on the ground that in those two cases the opponents had not only not appeared but also failed to put in their written statements. In other words, in the case on hand, according to the State Commission, the opponent (respondent) having filed the written statements, the failure to consider the same by the State Commission before passing the order would be a valid ground for setting aside the ex parte order. The State Commission, however, fell into an error in not bearing in mind that the Act under which it is functioning has not provided it with any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte reasoned order. It is also seen from the order of the State Commission that it was influenced by the concluding portion of the judgment of the Bombay High Court to the effect that the respondent (writ petitioner) could approach the appellate authority or make an appropriate application before the State Commission for setting aside the ex parte order, if permissible under the law. Here again, the State Commission failed to appreciate that the observation of the High Court would help the respondent, if permissible under the law. If the law does not permit the respondent to move the application for setting aside the ex parte order, which appears to be the position, the order of the State Commission setting aside the ex parte order cannot be sustained. As stated earlier, there is no dispute that there is no provision in the Act enabling the State Commission to set aside an ex parte order”. In the aforesaid case the State Commission passed the order ex parte against the respondent and the respondent instead, preferring appeal, chose to file a writ application before the Bombay High Court where the Bombay High Court dismissed the writ application with an observation that respondent would approach the appellate authority or could make an appropriate application before the State Commission for setting aside the impugned order, if permissible under the law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court laid emphasis on use of sentence “if permissible under the law” in the aforesaid case and observed as hereinabove. 23. It is reported in 2000 AIR SCW 703: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Srinivasan where Their Lordships observed at Paras-17, 18 and 19: “17. But that is not the end of the matter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court laid emphasis on use of sentence “if permissible under the law” in the aforesaid case and observed as hereinabove. 23. It is reported in 2000 AIR SCW 703: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Srinivasan where Their Lordships observed at Paras-17, 18 and 19: “17. But that is not the end of the matter. Mahmood, J. in his dissenting judgment in the Full Bench case of Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey, (1883) ILR 5 All 183, observed : "The Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle, prohibitions cannot be presumed, and in the present case, therefore, it rests upon the defendants to show that the suit in the form in which it has been brought is prohibited by the rules of procedure applicable to the Courts of justice in India." 18. We only intend to invoke the spirit of the principle behind the above dictum in support of our view that every court or judicial body or authority, which has a duty to decide a lis between two parties, inherently possesses the power to dismiss a case in default. Where a case is called up for hearing and the party is not present, the court or the judicial or quasi-judicial body is under no obligation to keep the matter pending before it or to pursue the matter on behalf of the complainant who had instituted the proceedings. That is not the function of the court or, for that matter, of judicial or quasi judicial body. In the absence of the complainant, therefore, the court will be well within its jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint for non-prosecution. So also, it would have the inherent power and jurisdiction to restore the complaint on good cause being shown for the non-appearance of the complainant. 19. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that a complainant may harass a party by repeatedly filing the complaint against him. He may file a complaint, draw the opposite party to the State or National Commission and then have the complaint dismissed for default. 19. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that a complainant may harass a party by repeatedly filing the complaint against him. He may file a complaint, draw the opposite party to the State or National Commission and then have the complaint dismissed for default. He may repeat the exercise again only to harass the defendant. This practice, or to put it a little sternly, these tactics would be intolerable for any authority under the Act. In such a situation, the District Forum or the State or National Commission would not be helpless and it would be open to them to dismiss the fresh complaint on the ground of abuse of the process available under the Act. They can, in that situation, legitimately invoke the principles of Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C.” 24. With due regard to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that in the event complaint being dismissed for default, provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. can be invoked by the State Commission to restore the complaint on good cause to be shown for non-appearance of the complainant. 25. Above two decisions have been well dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Hitendra Pathak and Others v. Achyut Kashinath Karekar and Another: (2011) 9 SCC 541 where Their Lordships observed at paras-34, 35, 36 and 37 in the following manner: “34. On a careful analysis of the provisions of the Act, it is abundantly clear that the Tribunals are creatures of the Statute and derive their power from the express provisions of the Statute. The District Forums and the State Commissions have not been given any power to set aside ex parte orders and their power of review and the powers which have not been expressly given by the Statute cannot be exercised. 35. The legislature chose to give the National Commission power to review its ex parte orders. Before amendment, against dismissal of any case by the Commission, the consumer had to rush to this Court. The amendment in Section 22 and introduction of Section 22-A were done for the convenience of the consumers. We have carefully ascertained the legislative intention and interpreted the law accordingly. 36. In our considered opinion, the decision in Jyotsana's case laid down the correct law and the view taken in the later decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. We have carefully ascertained the legislative intention and interpreted the law accordingly. 36. In our considered opinion, the decision in Jyotsana's case laid down the correct law and the view taken in the later decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. is untenable and cannot be sustained. 37. In view of the legal position, in Civil Appeal No.4307 of 2007, the findings of the National Commission are set aside as far as it has held that the State Commission can review its own orders. After the amendment in Section 22 and introduction of Section 22A in the Act in the year 2002 by which the power of review or recall has vested with the National Commission only. However, we agree with the findings of the National Commission holding that Complaint No. 473 of 1999 be restored to its original number for hearing in accordance with law”. 26. With due respect to the aforesaid decisions, it is found that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of three member Bench have been pleased to hold that the decision in New India Assurance Company Limited (supra) would not be sustained whereas decision of Jyotsana Arvindkumar Shah’s case (supra) being correct in law to be followed. 27. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that where any authority created by the statute has no inherent power to review or recall its decision unless prescribed by the statute itself. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court have analyzed the provisions of the Act and arrived at the aforesaid conclusion and accordingly the Hon’ble Supreme Court remitted the matter back to the National Commission who has been endowed with the power by insertion of Section 22-A in the Act during the year 2002, to consider the complaint expeditiously and dispose of the same within three months. 28. It is also reported in AIR 1970 SC 1273 : Patel Narshi Thakershi and others v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji where Their Lordships observed at paragraph-4 in the following manner: “xxx It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order xxx”. 29. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order xxx”. 29. With due regard to the aforesaid decision, it is made clear that the provision must be made in the Act under which the statutory authority can derive the power to recall or review the order. In the instant case, since there is no provision for the District Forum and the State Commission to set aside the ex parte order or restoration of the case of dismissal for default which amount to review of its own order, the power to recall the order of dismissal for default by restoring the case does not lie with District Forum or the State Commission. 30. It is reported in 1980 (Supp) SCC 420: Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others where the Hon’ble Apex Court have been pleased to observe about the expression ‘review’. In the said case the Hon’ble Supreme Court made some kinds of review, namely, procedural review and review on merits. Procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension. Secondly review on merits lies when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. Be that as it may, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Hitendra Pathak & Others (supra), it is clearly mentioned that the District Forum and State Commission have no inherent power to recall or review its own order even it is felt that such order could be recalled or reviewed by restoring the case to the files by the District Forum or the State Commission as the case may be. On the other hand, it is observed that there is efficacious remedy available. 31. On the other hand, it is observed that there is efficacious remedy available. 31. On the other hand, by virtue of the present complaint filed under Section 17 (a) (i) of the Act order of which is appealable under Section 19 of the Act and the aforesaid decision having not allowed to restore the case to its own file by the Commission itself, it can be well observed that there is efficacious remedy available under the Act to challenge the impugned order dated 5.7.2011. 32. Next question arises whether the writ application is maintainable in spite of efficacious remedy available to the petitioner. The principles of law on this score is no more res integra. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the singe Bench of this Court in the Oriental Bank of Commerce case reported in 121 (2016) CLT 333 (supra) have been pleased to observe that writ petition is maintainable. After going through the said decision it is revealed that the said decision was rendered while the order of the State Commission passed under Section 17 (1)(b) was challenged. In the same decision it has been observed that neither any appeal nor any second revision lie against the order passed under Section 17 (1)(b) of the Act. So, this Court held that writ petition is maintainable. Since the impugned order is passed under Section 17 (a)(i) of the Act but not under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Act, the decision of this Court is not applicable as the facts and circumstances of that case are completely different from the facts and circumstances of this case. 33. It is reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 : Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, where Their Lordships brought distinction about the issue of writ of certiorari under Article 226 and exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships observed at paras-26 and 38 which are quoted below: “26. In order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the courts have devised self-imposed rules of discipline on their power. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated or experience and expressed by enactments where the Legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. So long as an error is capable of being corrected by a superior court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction though available to be exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. However, there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error committed by the inferior court or tribunal would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded. Xxx xxx xxx xxx 38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:- (1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction – by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in super-session or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case”. 34. 34. With due regard to the aforesaid decision, it is derived that writ of certiorari can be issued in spite of the efficacious remedy is available by keeping away the appellate and revisional jurisdiction provided the error is manifest and apparent on the face of record and grave injustice and gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. At the same time, caution has been made by self impose rule of discipline to exercise the power by the High Court. It has been well observed that High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. In the instant case exercise of jurisdiction of this Court directing the Tribunal to restore the case to its file on being modified by petitioner will amount to sit over the matter as the appellate court and correct errors. 35. It is reported in (2012) 8 SCC 524 : Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory, where Their Lordships observed in paras-4 and 9 in following manner: “4. Despite this, we cannot help but state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is not expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds. Xxx xxx xxx xxx 9. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is not expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds. Xxx xxx xxx xxx 9. While declining to interfere in the present Special Leave Petition preferred against the order passed by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we hereby make it clear that the orders of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27-A(1)(c) lies to this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in issuing a direction of caution that it will not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts to entertain writ petitions against such orders of the Commission”. 36. With due regard to the decision, it appears that the Hon’ble Apex Court have been pleased to caution the High Courts to entertain the writ applications against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to Hon’ble Apex Court under the provisions of the Act. It is explicitly observed that once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court. Moreover, in the aforesaid case the appeal lies to the Supreme Court against the order of the National Commission. But the High Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for which Their Lordships cautioned about the improper exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in entertaining the writ petition and also such decisions have been issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court to different High Courts for proper observance of the principles of law enunciated by Their Lordships. It is well assimilated that even when there is efficacious remedy available under the provisions of the Act, the Court should restrict itself to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as a general principle. There may be exception to such rule but in the fact and circumstances of this case, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is impermissible. There may be exception to such rule but in the fact and circumstances of this case, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is impermissible. 37. No doubt the objects and reasons of the Act are to serve the justice in cheap and speedy manner. It has got object, inter alia, to promote and protect the rights of consumers. It has also aim and object to provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery was sought to be set up at the district, State and Central levels. These quasi-judicial bodies have to maintain the principles of natural justice and have also been empowered to give relief of a specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate for compensation to consumers. Keeping in view the objects and reasons of the Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court have made above observation by not allowing to restore the consumer dispute by the same Forum or State Commission and also not to restore after setting aside the impugned order. Therefore, the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read with the provisions of the Act amply made it clear that in spite of efficacious remedy available for the defect as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the discussions in the above paras in passing the impugned order of dismissal of the complaint, for non-prosecution can be well agitated before the appellate authority as per Section 19 of the Act. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the writ petition against the impugned order is not maintainable as there is efficacious remedy available to the petitioner. The issue is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION 38. From the foregoing discussions, writ petition is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the petitioner can well file appeal before the National Commission to restore the case to file when it has been dismissed for non-prosecution. 39. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in case of dismissal of complaint for non-prosecution, a party is to visit New Delhi for restoring the case at National Commission, the consumer is unable to get justice by inexpensive speedy manner although the same is the object of the Act. 39. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in case of dismissal of complaint for non-prosecution, a party is to visit New Delhi for restoring the case at National Commission, the consumer is unable to get justice by inexpensive speedy manner although the same is the object of the Act. Learned counsel for the opposite parties also conceded the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner but they submit that for the provisions made in the Act, there is no other alternative than to proceed to the proper forum to agitate the matter. Under the Act 62 of 2002 which is effective from 15.3.2003, the National Commission was vested with power to make Regulations and accordingly Regulations were made. Similarly, the jurisdiction of the National Commission was also expanded by insertion of Section 22A whereunder the power has been given to the National Commission to set aside ex parte orders in the interest of justice. Section 30 has also allowed the Central Government and State Government to make rules for implementation of different provisions of the Act. Section 30 has given power to the Central Government to make Rules for carrying out the provisions of Clause-VI of sub-section (4) of Section 13 which states that the power of Civil Court other than in Clause (I) to (V) of Sub-Section (4) can be exercised if they are persuaded by rules or regulations. So, it is for the Parliament to consider to make suitable amendment to the Rules or Regulations under the Act for District Forum and State Commission on the same line of amendment as made in 2002 for National Commission to review or recall their own orders so as to render inexpensive, speedy and simple redressal to the consumers. 40. The suggestion as suggested above is only a suggestion to the Central Legislature to have a relook into the provisions of the Act for their effective implementation. At the same time the writ petition being not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case, is dismissed without awarding any cost to either of the parties. The petitioner is at liberty to file an appeal before the National Commission within a period of four weeks along with a petition for condonation of delay, which may be considered according to law by the National Commission. A copy of this judgment be handed over to Mr. The petitioner is at liberty to file an appeal before the National Commission within a period of four weeks along with a petition for condonation of delay, which may be considered according to law by the National Commission. A copy of this judgment be handed over to Mr. A.K. Bose, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India for its onward transmission to the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, Government of India for information.