JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. The award passed in I.D. case No.78 of 2005 dated 31.3.2009 is under challenge whereby and where under while answering the reference in favour of the workman the labour court has directed for re-instatement of the workman in service and to pay lump sum amount of Rs.10,000/- towards back wages. 2. The case of the workman is that he was appointed as Scientific Assistant in Chilika general Monitoring work by the management on 16.4.1998 on a consolidated salary of Rs.1440/-per month which was enhanced to Rs.3,000/- per month and till the date of retrenchment, i.e. 31.3.2004 he was getting salary at the above rate. During the tenure of his service there was no stigma against him. He was never appointed under Hydrobiological Monitoring Project but on the pretext that the said project came to an end w.e.f. 31.3.2004, his services were terminated with effect from the above date. He had worked continuously for more than 240 days every year, but section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act, 1947) was not complied at the time of termination of his service, hence he raised an industrial dispute, conciliation proceeding was initiated by the Asst. labour Officer, Bhubaneswar but failed, so the dispute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The case of the management is that some persons were engaged on daily wage basis w.e.f. 16.4.1998 and the workman of the present case was one of them. The engagement was not against sanctioned post, the workman was not appointed on regular basis following any recruitment procedure. He was last engaged in Hydrobiological Monitoring Project as per the office order No.1009(11) dtd.20.6.2000 which was communicated to him. As the aforesaid project was likely to come to an end w.e.f. 31.3.2004, the said fact was intimated to the workman vide letter No.2875 dtd.31.12.2003, a separate office order to this effect was passed vide order No.700(13) dtd.15.3.2004. Since the aforesaid project came to an end, all the persons engaged in the project including the workman were disengaged w.e.f.1.4.2004. The conciliation having been failed and on the basis of failure report, a reference to the effect as indicated herein below has been made to the Labour Court. Since the aforesaid project came to an end, all the persons engaged in the project including the workman were disengaged w.e.f.1.4.2004. The conciliation having been failed and on the basis of failure report, a reference to the effect as indicated herein below has been made to the Labour Court. “Whether the action of the management of Chief Executive, Chilika Development Authority, Bhubaneswar in terminating the services of Sri Rabindra Kumar Mohapatra, workman, w.e.f. 1.4.2004 is legal or justified? If not to what relief the workman Sri Mohapatra is entitled?” The Labour Court in course of hearing has framed the following issues:- (i) Whether the action of the management of Chief Executive, Chilika Development Authority, Bhubaneswar in terminating the services of Sri Rabindra kumar Mohapatra, workman with effect from 1.4.2004 is legal or justified? (ii) If not, to what relief the workman Sri Mohapatra is entitled? 3. To substantiate his claim the workman examined himself as W.W.1 and filed a large number of documents. Similarly the management also examined the Scientific Officer, Chilika Development Authority as M.W.1 and relied on three documents. The labour court on the basis of materials produced before it has answered the reference in the following terms:- “The action of the management of Chief Executive, Chilika Development Authority, Bhubaneswar in terminating the services of Sri Rabindra Kumar Mohapatra, workman with effect from 1.4.2004 is illegal and unjustified. The workman Sri Mohapatra is entitled to be reinstated in service and to get lump sum amount of Rs.10,000/- towards backwages. The management is directed to reinstate the workman in service immediately and to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- towards back wages within one month from the date of publication of the award in the Official Gazette.” Learned counsel assailing the award has taken the following grounds:- (i) The management is not an industry as per definition as contained in Sec.2(j) of the I.D. Act, 1947; (ii) In alternative it has been submitted that even though the management is said to be an industry, then also there should not be an award of re-instatement, since the award of reinstatement ought to have been passed by the labour court only in the exceptional cases and not as a matter of course. He submits that if there is violation of Sec.25F, the ends of justice will be met if the labour court would have directed for lump sum compensation to be paid by the management in favour of the workman. Learned counsel representing the workman has opposed the grounds by submitting that the fact regarding the management is an industry or not has never been raised before the labour court and as such this point is not available with the management to raise before this court for the first time under its writ jurisdiction in which the prayer has been made to issue writ of certiorari. He further submits that writ of certiorari is only to be issued by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the order is without jurisdiction or the finding is perverse or there is error apparent on the face of record and if this point has not been taken by the management before the Labour Court, this is not available at this moment to raise before the high Court in order to reverse the finding. He further submits that the management is an industry and deals with the business and taking into consideration this aspect of the matter and also taking into consideration the fact that this point has not been raised, hence the Labour Court has formulated two issues for answering the reference, as such it cannot be said that the Labour Court has committed error of law or the finding suffers from perversity. He submits that the reinstatement order is proper, but so far as the direction to pay lump sum amount of Rs.10,000/-, the same is absolutely illegal and improper as because the petitioner has illegally been deprived of his duties, hence he is entitled to 100% back wages for the intervening period. In response learned senior counsel representing the management has submitted that the management is industry or not since is a legal question, it can be raised before the high Court even under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and if that would be done, it will not be said to be any illegality. 4. In response learned senior counsel representing the management has submitted that the management is industry or not since is a legal question, it can be raised before the high Court even under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and if that would be done, it will not be said to be any illegality. 4. Before reaching to the conclusion with respect to the finding given by the larbour Court, it would be relevant to have a discussion regarding the provision which is relevant for the present case, i.e. Section 25F which reads as follows :- “25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. – No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) The workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) The workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) Notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” This section was inserted as a part of chapter VA by Section 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953. The object behind inserting this provision is that an employer could not be expected to carry the economic dead weight of surplussage of labour, the legislature provided for the compensation under this section to soften the rigour of hardship resulting from an employee being thrown out of employment thought for not fault of his. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Parry & Co. ltd. Vrs. P.C. Pal, reported in (1970) 2 LLJ 429 . In enacting Section 25F, the legislature has also standardized the payment of compensation to workmen, ‘retrenched in normal or ordinary sense in an existing or continuous industry’ (reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vrs. In enacting Section 25F, the legislature has also standardized the payment of compensation to workmen, ‘retrenched in normal or ordinary sense in an existing or continuous industry’ (reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vrs. Workmen, reported in 1973 Lab IC 461 (SC). This section is captioned ‘conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen’ and the conditions laid down in it have been preamble with the words, ‘no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by the employer until. The postulates of this provision are that the person claiming its protection must be; (i) Having the relation of employee with the employer, (ii) He must be a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, (iii) The establishment in which he is employed must be an industry within the meaning of Sec.2(j) and (iv) He must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any one of these conditions is lacking, the provisions of this section will not be attracted. 5. The next question arises as to whether should an order of reinstatement automatically followed in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Hon’ble Apex Court in various decisions was of the opinion that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal the relief of reinstatement with full backwages would ordinarily follow. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagbir Singh Vrs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 327 , U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Uday Narain Pandey, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 479 , Uttaranchal Forest Department Corporation Vrs. M.C. Joshi, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 353 , State of M.P. Vrs. Lalit Kumar Verma, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 575, M.P. Administration Vrs. Tribhuban, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 748 , Sita Ram Vrs. Moti lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 75 , Jaipur Development Authority Vrs. M.C. Joshi, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 353 , State of M.P. Vrs. Lalit Kumar Verma, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 575, M.P. Administration Vrs. Tribhuban, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 748 , Sita Ram Vrs. Moti lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 75 , Jaipur Development Authority Vrs. Ramsahai, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 684 , G.D.A. Vrs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 261 and Mahboob Deepak Vrs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 575 . But the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad Vrs. Employer I/R to Management of F.C.I., reported in AIR 2014 SC 1848 has laid down the proposition differing with the earlier proposition of automatic reinstatement in case of violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 on the analogy and reasons that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation, since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization in pursuance to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vrs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 and that he cannot claim regularization and when he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. It has been held that the order of re-instatement can be passed in such a position where the service of a regular / permanent workman are terminated illegally and / or mala fide and / or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice, etc. 6. It has been held that the order of re-instatement can be passed in such a position where the service of a regular / permanent workman are terminated illegally and / or mala fide and / or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice, etc. 6. The Management has raised the dispute regarding the management being not an industry as per the provision made U/s.2(j) of the I.D. Act and in order to substantiate his argument he has referred the provision of Sec.2(j) of the I.D. Act, 1947 and the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Physical Research Laboratory Vrs. K.G. Sharma, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1855 . Before answering this issue, we have examined the award, written statement and other documents available on record and found that the management has not raised this point before the Labour Court and as such no finding has been given in this regard. The management is raising this issue for the first time before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein this writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari; there is no dispute about the settled position that writ of certiorari can only be issued in case of adverse finding or error apparent on the face of record or the order is without jurisdiction. Perversity will be said to have been occurred in an order, in case, point / issue having been raised before the administrative authority / quasi judicial authority / judicial authority / before any court of law and if no finding is being given by appreciating the rival submission of the parties based upon the document, it will be said that the finding is perverse, meaning thereby the finding has been given without considering the materials available on record. There is no dispute about the fact that the award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal can be assailed before the High Court for seeking a writ of certiorari on the ground of perversity or error apparent on the face of the record or the order having without jurisdiction, but whether in the case at hand can it be said that the finding is perverse regarding non-framing of issue as to whether the management is an industry within the meaning of Sec.2(j) of the I.D. Act, 1947 or not. According to us since this point has not been raised before the Labour Court, as such the management cannot have right to raise this point for the first time after passing of an award on 31.3.2009, i.e. after lapse of about 8 years before the Writ Court by accepting the argument of the management that it can be raised at any time since it is purely legal issue, but we differ from this submission for the reason that this issue is not a legal issue, rather it is mixed question of law and facts which can only be adjudicated before the Tribunal. It is also not that this point was not available with the management and accordingly on this pretext the finding cannot be said to be perverse and if we will allow this submission of the management, then it will be said to be allowing the management to fill up the lacuna by directing the Labour Court to adjudicate a new issue which has not been raised at any time in course of adjudication of the issue. 8. We also not thought it proper to remit the matter before the Labour Court for the reason that the dispute is of the year 2004 and since then 12 years have already elapsed and if the matter would be remitted before the Labour Court, it will not only be harsh for the workmen, rather the entire purpose of adjudication of dispute would frustrate and thereby the purpose and intent of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be frustrated. Since this Act has been legislated by way of a beneficial piece of legislation and perhaps due to lingering attitude the management has not raised this point before the Labour Court at the initial stage. 9. So far as the fact that there is violation of Sec.25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, we have gathered from the documents available on record that the petitioner was appointed as Scientific Assistant on 16.4.1998 on a consolidated salary of Rs.1440/- per month which was subsequently enhanced to Rs.3000/- per month till the date of retrenchment, i.e. on 31.3.2004. So far as the fact that there is violation of Sec.25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, we have gathered from the documents available on record that the petitioner was appointed as Scientific Assistant on 16.4.1998 on a consolidated salary of Rs.1440/- per month which was subsequently enhanced to Rs.3000/- per month till the date of retrenchment, i.e. on 31.3.2004. According to the management the workman was engaged on daily wage basis w.e.f. 16.4.1998 and since he was not engaged against sanctioned post, not appointed on regular basis, rather he was engaged on Hydrobiological Monitoring Project and since the project itself has been closed, as such he was disengaged w.e.f. 1.4.2004. According to the management it is a case U/s.2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act, 1947 which contains definition of ‘retrenchment’ which means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include termination of service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, hence the workman will come under the zone of Section 2(oo)(bb), so, there is no question of applicability of Section 25F of the Act, 1947. The Labour Court after discussing in detail regarding applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) has taken into consideration various documents and on appreciation of the same it has been held that the respondent employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of sub-clause (bb) and all that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily wagers in a project, for want of proof attracting applicability of sub-clause (bb) it has been held that the termination of services of the appellant amounting to retrenchment and thereafter it has been held that since in the present case the management has failed to prove the ingredients of sub0clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hence the termination of services of the workman has been held to be retrenchment. This finding has been given after taking into consideration the deposition of M.W.1 wherein he has stated that the workman was first appointed on 16.4.1998 and continued to work till 31.3.2004. This finding has been given after taking into consideration the deposition of M.W.1 wherein he has stated that the workman was first appointed on 16.4.1998 and continued to work till 31.3.2004. He further deposed that the workman was working on daily wage basis. He was appointed in the post of Scientific Assistant in the Hydrobiological Monitoring Project w.e.f. 20.06.2000 with some terms and conditions. He has also taken note of the fact that while shifting the petitioner in the Hydrobiological Monitoring Project on 20th June, 2000 no intimation has been given to the workman and to that effect management has not produced any document to prove that the workman had knowledge about his engagement in the aforesaid project. He has also taken note of the fact that while shifting the petitioner in the Hydrobiological Monitoring Project on 20th June, 2000 no intimation has been given to the workman and to that effect management has not produced any document to prove that the workman had knowledge about his engagement in the aforesaid project. The Labour Court came to finding after taking into consideration Ext.D which is a copy of the letter written by the Chief Executive to Padmashree (Dr.) P. Mohanty Hejmadi wherein the workman has been identified as Scientific Assistant of the management, Ext.4 which is a copy of the letter of training programme of the workman signed by the Chief Executive of the management on 18.12.2000 wherein also the workman has been identified as Scientific Assistant, Ext.5 which is a copy of certificate issued to the workman for participating in a training programme from 19.12.2000 to 22.12.2000 signed by the Chief Engineer, Project Planning & Formulation, Orissa, Secha Sadan, Bhubaneswar, Ext.7 which is a copy of work programme of Scientific Assistants including the workman for the month of August, 2001 issued by the M.W.1, Ext.9 which is a copy of another letter issued by M.W.1 wherein the workman was directed to appear before the Chief Executive of the Management on 4.6.2002 for review of the work, Ext.10 which is copy of minutes of the work review meeting of Scientific Assistants held on 4.6.2002 and Ext.11 which is a copy of direction by the Chief Executive of the management to the workman on 10.10.2002, Ext.13 to 13/g and Ext.14 to 14/b which are the vouchers regarding receipt of salary of the workman, but in none of these aforesaid documents there is mention about engagement of the workman in a project named as Hydrobiological Monitoring Project, rather in all the vouchers marked as Ext.13 series and Ext.14 series it is noted that the workman has received an amount of Rs.3000/- per month towards his consolidated salary for a particular month from the Chief Executive of the Management. On the basis of these documentary evidence the Labour Court has reached to conclusion that it is not a case falling under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act, 1947, rather it is a case of retrenchment and as such the provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act is applicable. On the basis of these documentary evidence the Labour Court has reached to conclusion that it is not a case falling under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act, 1947, rather it is a case of retrenchment and as such the provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act is applicable. The Labour Court after reaching to the conclusion that there is violation of provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 has passed an order of reinstatement with sump sum compensation to the tune of Rs.10,000/-. 10. It is settled position that scope of High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to reverse the fact finding given by the Labour Court or Tribunal is very limited. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it has been held that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not exercise its power to review the fact finding giving by the Tribunal after appreciation of the factual aspect produced before it, otherwise also it will be said that the High Court has acted as appellate court. The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good and in this respect reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s.Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” From perusal of the proposition laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases referred herein above it is evident that the scope of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to reverse the fact finding given by the Tribunal or the Labour Court is very limited to the extent that in case of perversity in the finding or in case of error apparent on the face of record, the High Court can interfere regarding the finding of the Labour Court or the Tribunal, but after the detailed discussion having been made in this order as above, there is no perversity in the finding or error apparent on the face of record, hence this court declines to interfere with the finding given by the labour court regarding non-observation of provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. 11. Now the question remains as to whether the order of reinstatement can be said to be proper order? Indisputably, the industrial court exercises a discretionary jurisdiction but such discretion is required to be exercised judiciously. Relevant factors therefore, were required to be taken into consideration; the nature of appointment, the period of appointment, the availability of job, etc. should weigh with the court for determination of such an issue. As already discussed herein above regarding the earlier view of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of violation of provision of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 that was reinstatement with back wages but after taking into consideration various judgments pronounced in this regard by the Hon’ble Apex Court and placing reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of State of Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi (supra) and in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 as follows:- “17. Umadevi (supra) and in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 as follows:- “17. xxxxxxx Taking note of the judgments referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs and also few more cases in other portion of the said judgment, the legal position was summed up in the following manner: “It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization. Thus when he cannot claim regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him wee regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied”. The judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.S.N.L. Vrs. Bhurumal, reported in AIR 2014 SC 1188 wherein it has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court as to what would be the course if the daily wagers who have come in service earlier than those who have come later on, but the principle of last come first go if not followed and dealing with that situation it has been held in that judgment at paragraph 25 as follows:- “25. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied.” We have examined the direction passed by the Labour Court in the award which is the order of reinstatement along with back wages to the tune of Rs.10,000/-. We have already discussed hereinabove, the position of law as on today with respect to the fact that in case of violation of provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947, the earlier view of the Hon’ble Apex Court was to reinstate the workman in service but subsequently, this view has been changed as would be evident from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (Supra), we have examined the part of the order by which the order of reinstatement has been passed as to whether it is coming under the exception as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) whereby and where under, it has been held that only in case of disengagement of permanent / regular employee on ulterior motive or by way of unfair labour practice order of reinstatement should have been passed otherwise the award should have been passed by directing for making payment of retrenchment compensation and that ratio has been laid down taking into consideration the judgment rendered in the case of State of Karnataka vrs. Umadevi (3) reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , whereby and where under the regularization has been prohibited as because if in case order of reinstatement is passed, then the employer/management will again retrench the workman after making payment of retrenchment compensation. Hence, the order of compensation has been found just and proper in case of violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act as per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka vrs. Umadevi (3) (supra). Hence, the order of compensation has been found just and proper in case of violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act as per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka vrs. Umadevi (3) (supra). Admittedly in this case one advertisement was published by the management inviting applications for fulfilling the vacant posts of Scientific Assistants on contract basis. Thus, it is evident from the action of the management that the post of Scientific Assistant was required during the period of litigation which suggests that nature of work is perennial. Furthermore, it is evident that the Chilika Development Authority is directly under the control of Forest and Environment Department, State of Odisha to look after the various developmental activities in the Chilika Lake which is the largest lake in the country. It is also settled that one stopgap arrangement cannot be substituted by another stopgap arrangement. Reference in this regard needs to be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Piara Singh, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118 wherein at paragraph 46 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “46. Secondly, an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regular selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.” It is to be noted that the judgment rendered in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Piara Singh (supra) is regarding regularization, however, that part of the ratio concerning regularization has been over ruled by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi (3) (supra), but the other part remains same. This fact has come out with publication of an advertisement for engagement of Scientific Assistant on contractual basis after dispensing with service of the opposite party-workman and as such we have got no hesitation in holding that the action of the management is absolutely arbitrary and it is unfair on the part of management to dispense with the service of the opposite party-workman and to fill up the vacancies on contractual basis by another engagement. On the basis of this fact, we hold that the case of the opposite party-workman is also required to be considered under the exception. On the basis of this fact, we hold that the case of the opposite party-workman is also required to be considered under the exception. Even though in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) it is held that the order of reinstatement can be passed in a situation when there is retrenchment of workman who was holding the post under regular establishment and in the case of B.S.N.L. (supra) the daily wagers who have come in service later on than the workman who has been retrenched and he has been regularized and as such in a situation the principle of first come last go if not followed, then the order of reinstatement is to be passed. Although the fact of this case is not similar to the situation as has been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and B.S.N.L. (supra) but even then since the management has come out with the advertisement for appointment of Scientific Assistant on contract basis which suggests that there is requirement of work and as such the management cannot be allowed to substitute one ad hoc arrangement by another ad hoc arrangement. We have not found anything on record that the workmen have discharged duties with complaint and as such in the facts and circumstances of this case it would be just and proper to pass an order of reinstatement in favour of the workmen, other wise it will lead to unfair labour practice and the workmen will be subjected to exploitation which will hit the very purpose of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we find that the Labour Court has not committed any error in passing the order of reinstatement. 12. So far as the back wages is concerned, we thought it proper to have discussion of the judgments pronounced by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vrs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 which has been delivered by Hon’ble Apex Court after dealing with the previous judgments rendered in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vrs. K.P. Agarwal, (227) 2 SCC 433 and Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli Vrs. Prakash, (2009) 4 Mah.L.J. 628, Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., Vrs. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 , Surendra Kumar Verma Vrs. Central Govt. K.P. Agarwal, (227) 2 SCC 433 and Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli Vrs. Prakash, (2009) 4 Mah.L.J. 628, Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., Vrs. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 , Surendra Kumar Verma Vrs. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443 , Mohan lal Vrs. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 478 has given its verdict whereby and where under it has been held that the order directing the management to pay full back wages and to that effect the proposition laid down at paragraph 35 is being reproduced here under as:- “35. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 327 , this Court noted that as on the date of retrenchment, respondent No.1 had worked for less than 11 months and held: (SCC p.335, paras 14-15) “14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-Falthough may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 15. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and back wages in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to suffer from any legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages.” In another judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Tapas Kumar Paul Vrs. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages.” In another judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Tapas Kumar Paul Vrs. BSNL and another, 2014 (4) SCR 875 wherein also the order of re-instatement with full back-wages has been directed to be paid and this order has been passed taking into consideration the fact that “True occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted” and after taking into consideration the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepali Gundu (supra) in which reliance has been placed in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) and Hindustan Tin Workers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the order of re-instatement with back wages has been passed. In view of the settled position of law as on date as per the judgments rendered in the case of Deepali Gundu’s case (supra), Tapas Kumar Paul’s case (supra), etc, the direction of Labour Court to pay lump sum amount of Rs.10,000/- is too less and that part of award needs to be modified in view of the judgments pronounced by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Deepali Gunda, Tapas Kumar Paul, etc. as referred herein above. We accordingly modified the part of the award by directing the management to reinstate the petitioner with all back wages. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of observations and directions made hereinabove.