JUDGMENT : Banwari Lal Sharma, J. 1. Accused/Petitioner Pushpendra Singh has preferred this Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. assailing impugned order dated 18.01.2016 passed by Learned Special Judge Dacoity Affected Area, Bharatpur in Criminal Appeal No. 64/2012 by which Learned Lower Appellate Court declined the acquittal of accused/petitioner for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and for quashing judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 5th December, 2012 in Criminal Case No. 307/2011 (State v. Pushpendra Singh) passed by Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 3 Bharatpur. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent/complainant Ms. Jyotsna Singh lodged an FIR No. 94/2006 against present petitioner at Police Station Mahila Thana, Bharatpur for offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 IPC where in after investigation police submitted charge-sheet against the present petitioner before Learned Magistrate where in after trial accused/petitioner was convicted for offence under Section 498-A IPC and sentence for 3 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 5000/-. In default, there of 2 months simple imprisonment. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 5th December, 2012 passed by Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Bharatpur in Criminal Regular Case No. 307/2011 (State of Rajasthan v. Pushpendra Singh) accused/petitioner preferred Criminal Regular Appeal which is presently pending before Learned Special Judge Dacoity Affected Area, Bharatpur being criminal appeal no. 64/2012 (Pushpendra Singh v. State) 4. During pendency of appeal accused/petitioner and respondent no. 2/complainant settled their dispute amicably before the Mediation Centre of this Court on 20.04.2015 with the help of mediator. 5. On 20.04.2015 an application under Section 320 Cr.P.C. was submitted by the accused/petitioner and respondent no. 2 complainant before Lower Appellate Court on 30th September, 2015 and prayed that they have settled their dispute amicably, therefore judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 5th December, 2012 may be quashed and set aside and accused/petitioner may be acquitted for offence under Section 498-A IPC which was rejected by the Lower Appellate Court vide impugned order dated 18th January, 2016. Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 18th January 2016 accused/petitioner preferred this Misc. petition the Court with the aforesaid prayer. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 18th January 2016 accused/petitioner preferred this Misc. petition the Court with the aforesaid prayer. 6. On 20th May, 2016 during course of hearing following question of general importance arised for consideration before this court: "In case relating to non-compoundable offence after conviction and sentence, whether High Court can acquit the accused while exercising inherent powers vested under Section 482 Cr.P.C. during pendency of appeal before the Lower Appellate Court i.e. Sessions Judge on the ground of compromise." 7. A general notice was issued among the learned Members of the Bar with request to address to court on the aforesaid question of law on 24th May, 2016 at 11A.M. in pursuance of the aforesaid notice. I have heard the learned counsel for petitioner. Learned PP as well as learned counsel fa respondent No. 2/complainant with Members of Bar who addressed the court. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner Sh. Manish Sharma submits that dispute between petitioner/accused and respondent No. 2 complainant is private is nature i.e. matrimonial dispute. Apart from criminal case, petition under Section 13 Hindu Marriage Act for divorce, and proceedings under Section 125 (3) Cr.P.C. for recovery of maintenance amount are also pending in other courts. He submits that the maintenance amount awarded in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in favour of respondent/complainant was assailed before the High Court in Criminal Petition No. 1237/2011 (Pushpendra Singh v. Jyotsna Singh) wherein during pendency of revision petition the dispute of parties was referred by the Court to Mediation Center of this court wherein by the intervention of the mediator the dispute of parties was settled amicably and settlement deed/agreement has already beer prepared and signed by the parties along with their respective counsels and mediator. He submits that Article 39-A of Constitution of India was inserted in the Constitution of India by 42nd Amendment. After insertion of Article 39-A of Constitution of India, Legal Services Authority Act 1987 was passed and the object of the said Act is to reduce the dispute of parties by way of the alternate dispute resolution method is mediation and applying Alternative Dispute Resolution system in this matter by the help of mediator petitioner and complainant resolved their old dispute amicably. After mediation proceedings, petitioner and respondent No. 2 moved an application before the learned Lower Appellate Court (Special Judge Dacoity Affected Area) Bharatpur on 30th September, 2015 and prayed that on the basis of compromise the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 5th December, 2012 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Bharatpur may be quashed and petitioner/accused/appellant may be acquitted for the offence under Section 498-A IPC which was wrongly rejected by the learned Lower Appellate Court vide impugned order dated 18th January, 2016 (Annexure-3) on the pretext that as per section 320 Cr.P.C. offence under Section 498-A IPC is not compoundable, therefore, compromise cannot be attested. He submits that when the parties have entered into compromise and the dispute is matrimonial in nature and they settled their all disputes amicably, then no purpose will be served by continuing the criminal appeal and the same will be misuse of the process of law, therefore, the impugned order may be quashed and set aside and on the basis of compromise petitioner/accused/ appellant may be acquitted for offence under Section 498-A IPC. 9. Learned counsel for petitioner relied on Ajay Kumar & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Another, 2009 (3) RCC 920, Nathuram v. State of Rajasthan 2007 (1) Cr.L.R. 414 (Rajasthan), Manish & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Another, Criminal Misc. Petition No. 348/2011 decided by co-ordinate bench of this court on 21st February, 2011, Manzoor Alam & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Another, Criminal Revision Petition No. 252/2016 decided on 11th May, 2016, Sandeep v. State of Madhya Pradesh M.Cr.C. No. 810/2016 decided on 29th March, 2016, Mumtaz Mohammad v. State of Punjab & Others, Criminal Misc. No. M-4780/2016 by Single Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court on 17th March, 2016, Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, 2014 (2) Crimes 299, Arvind Barsaul v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2008 (5) SCC 794 , B.S. Joshi & Others v. State of Haryana & Another, 2003 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 579 : (2003) 4 SCC 675 , Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 753 : 2012 (10) SCC 303 , Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babits, 2013 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 506 : 2013 (4) SCC 58 , Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 57 : 2014 (6) SCC 466 . 579 : (2003) 4 SCC 675 , Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 753 : 2012 (10) SCC 303 , Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babits, 2013 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 506 : 2013 (4) SCC 58 , Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 57 : 2014 (6) SCC 466 . Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Baba Lal H. 2010 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 745 : (2010) 5 SCC 663 and Ramgopal & Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 13 SCC 540 . 10. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Sh. Biri Singh Sinsinwar submitted that after conviction accused/appellant cannot be acquitted during pendency of appeal by the High Court on the basis of compromise while exercising inherent powers vested in High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. He submitted that the various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and our own High Court clearly state that proceedings of criminal case can be quashed in non-compoundable offences where there is remote chance of conviction, therefore, when one's conviction is recorded then the stage of chance has gone, therefore, only appellate court can alter judgment after appreciation of evidence. 11. Learned Counsel Sh. Banwari Sharma relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Another, reported in 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 753 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 , submitted that a reference was made before Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding quashing of criminal proceedings while exercising powers vested in High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in non-compoundable cases wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering various judgments of Supreme Court in Para 61 of the judgment issued certain guidelines and answered the reference in the terms of said guidelines. He submits that High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers can be invoked. Learned counsel relied on 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 753, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303 , Shiji @ Pappu & Others v. Radhika & Another, Narinder Singh & Others v. State of Punjab & Another and Nanda Gopalan v. State of Kerala. 12. Learned counsel Sh. P.C. Dewanda submitted that in matrimonial cases even after conviction in offences like 498-A Cr.P.C. powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked to render justice. 12. Learned counsel Sh. P.C. Dewanda submitted that in matrimonial cases even after conviction in offences like 498-A Cr.P.C. powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked to render justice. Learned counsel relied on N. Shenbagaraj v. The Inspector of Police, Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 6718/2014 decided on 18th June, 2014 by the Single Bench of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court and G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad 2000 AIR (SC) 2474. 13. Learned counsel Sh. Suresh Sahni also supported the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that only in heinous and serious crimes generally the criminal proceedings should not be quashed on the basis of compromise but in matrimonial disputes like offence under Section 498-A IPC the guiding factor is, as to whether the ends of justice would serve while exercise such power. Learned counsel relied on Nariender Singh & Another v. State of Punjab, 2014 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 57 : 2014 (6) SCC 466 . 14. Learned counsel Sh. Hemant Nahta submitted that though offences under Section 498-A IPC is not compoundable and is not liable to compromise but since the dispute is between husband and wife which is private in nature and matrimonial one it can be quashed. Learned counsel relied on Gold Quest International Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2014) 15 SCC 235 , Mumtaz Mohammad v. State of Punjab & Others Criminal Misc. No. M-4780/2016 decided on 17th March, 2016 by the Single Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, Dr. Arvind Barsaul v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2008 (5) SCC 794 . 15. Learned counsel Ms. Shalini Sheoran submitted that permission for compounding of non-compoundable offence cannot be given, an offence which declares to be non-compoundable even with permission of court cannot be compoundable at all, however, Appellate Court can take lenient view in reducing the sentence learned counsel relied on Narinder Singh & Others v. State of Punjab & Another, 2014 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 57 : 2014 (3) SCC (Criminal) 54, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Deepak & Others, 2014 (10) SCC 285 , Ram Lal v. State of J & K, (1999) 2 SCC 213 , Surendra Nath Mohanthy v. State of Orissa, 1999 Cri. LJ 3496. 16. Learned PP Sh. 57 : 2014 (3) SCC (Criminal) 54, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Deepak & Others, 2014 (10) SCC 285 , Ram Lal v. State of J & K, (1999) 2 SCC 213 , Surendra Nath Mohanthy v. State of Orissa, 1999 Cri. LJ 3496. 16. Learned PP Sh. Sudesh Kumar Saini submitted that after recording conviction for non-compoundable offence High Court has no power to quash the conviction and acquit the accused during pendency of appeal before the Appellate Court (Sessions Court) while exercising powers vested under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Learned PP relied on Manohar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2014 SC 3649 . 17. I have considered the submissions made at bar and also went through the available record and various case laws. 18. In the present case as per settlement agreement between the parties, it reveals that apart from criminal case in which petitioner accused was convicted for offence under Section 498-A IPC, appeal is pending, divorce petition and proceedings of recovery of maintenance amount awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are also pending against the present petitioner. During settlement it was decided that in place of divorce petition under Section 13 Hindu Marriage Act parties shall submit divorce petition for mutual divorce under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act before learned Family Court, Bharatpur and the proceedings under Section 125 (3) Cr.P.C. shall be withdrawn by the respondent/ complainant wife. 19. In the matter of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the reference in following terms:- "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint to exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the evidence have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc. cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purpose of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 20. In Ajay Kumar & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Another (supra) Single Bench of this court in case of offence under Section 498-A and 320 and 324 IPC as also under Section 4 of Dowry of Prohibition Act set aside the judgment of conviction and acquitted the accused while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 21. Similarly in Nathuram v. State of Rajasthan (supra) petitioner accused was convicted for offence under Section 325 IPC and during pendency of revision petition the matter was compromised and compromise deed was submitted before the High Court for permission for compounding for the offence under Section 325 IPC which was allowed and petitioner accused was acquitted for offence under Section 325 on the basis of compromise in revision petition. But here no revision petition is pending, appeal is pending before Additional Sessions Judge and petitioner moved petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. therefore, facts of this case is different. 22. In Manish & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Another (supra) Single Bench of this Court allowed the misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and on the basis of settlement during pendency of criminal appeal, conviction and sentence for offence under Section 498-A IPC was set-aside. 23. In the matter of Manzoor Alam & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Another (supra) Single Bench of Jharkhand High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction allowed the revision petition and conviction of petitioner recorded by Trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court was set aside and he was acquitted. 24. This case also relates to revision petition, wherein while exercising revisional jurisdiction High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the conviction of trial court and appellate court. 25. In Sandeep v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) accused was convicted for offence under Section 498-A and 323/34 IPC which was challenged in appeal by the accused/husband. During pendency of appeal 40 application for compromise was moved by both the parties before Appellate Court and the Appellate Court found that section 498-A of the IPC is not compoundable under Section 320 (2) of Cr.P.C. and dismissed the application. Thereafter, a petition under Section 482 was preferred before the M.P. High Court, wherein Single Bench of M.P High Court allowed the petition 45 and conviction and sentence of accused was set aside. 26. Thereafter, a petition under Section 482 was preferred before the M.P. High Court, wherein Single Bench of M.P High Court allowed the petition 45 and conviction and sentence of accused was set aside. 26. In Mumtaz Mohammad v. State of Punjab & Others (supra) Single Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, during pendency of appeal while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. judgment of conviction and order of sentence was set aside and it was declared that the appeal preferred so by the accused/petitioner against the order of conviction and sentence rendered infructuous. 27. In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana (supra) Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court while allowing the misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. quashed the conviction and sentence of section 498-A IPC at appellate stage after imposing the condition that if breach of compromise or conditions or directions complainant always at liberty to recall compromise and proceedings. 28. In Dr. Arvind Barsaul v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) considering the facts and circumstances of the case Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the proceedings of offence under Section 498-A IPC during pendency of appeal. 29. In B.S. Joshi & Others v. State of Haryana & Another (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in matrimonial disputes/offences, it is duty of court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 30. In Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in non-compoundable offences pertaining to matrimonial disputes, if court is satisfied that parties have settled the dispute amicably and without any pressure, then for purpose of securing ends of justice, FIR or complaint or subsequent criminal proceedings in respect of said offences can be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 31. In Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Baba Lal H. (supra) in cases of section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act Hon'ble Supreme Court issued certain guidelines in regard to compromise and also issued directions or imposing costs while attesting compromise. 32. In Ram Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that some of non compoundable offences under Section 498-A, 326 etc. can be made compoundable by introducing a suitable amendment in the statute and also adviced that Law Commission of India could examine whether a suitable proposal can be sent to the Union Government in this regard. 33. can be made compoundable by introducing a suitable amendment in the statute and also adviced that Law Commission of India could examine whether a suitable proposal can be sent to the Union Government in this regard. 33. In the matter of Shiji @ Pappu & Others v. Radhika & Another (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. It was further observed that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise and trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. But High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked. 34. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) in para 29, 30 and 31 it was observed that- "29. At this juncture, we would like also to add that the timing of settlement would also play a crucial role. If the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence when the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be somewhat liberal in accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings/investigation. Of course, it would be after looking into the attendant circumstances as narrated in the previous para. Likewise, when challan is submitted but the charge has not been framed, the High Court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. However, at this stage, as mentioned above since the report of the I.O. under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is also placed before the Court it would become the bounding duty of the Court to go into the said report and the evidence collected, particularly the medical evidence relating to injury etc. sustained by the victim. This aspect, however, would be examined along with another important consideration, namely, in view of settlement between the parties, whether it would be unfair or contrary to interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings and whether possibility of conviction is remote and bleak. sustained by the victim. This aspect, however, would be examined along with another important consideration, namely, in view of settlement between the parties, whether it would be unfair or contrary to interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings and whether possibility of conviction is remote and bleak. If the Court finds the answer to this question in affirmative, them also such a case would be a fit case for the High Court to give its stamp of approval to the compromise arrived at between the parties, inasmuch as in such cases no useful purpose would be served in carrying out the criminal proceedings which in all likelihood would end in acquittal, in any case. 30. We have found that in certain cases, the High Courts have accepted the compromise between the parties when the matter in appeal was pending before the High Court against the conviction recorded by the trial court. Obviously, such cases are those where the accused persons have been found guilty by the trial court, which means the serious charge of Section 307 IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt at the level of the trial court. There would not be any question of accepting compromise and acquitting the accused persons simply because the private parties have buried the hatchet. 31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: (I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. (II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. (II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is a form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. (III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecution which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statue like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. (IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. (V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and whether the possibility of convection is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. (VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 respondent IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 respondent IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally beth guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examined as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. (VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately, after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is skill under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should retrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime. 35. In Nanda Gopalan v. State of Kerala (Supra) in para 11, 12 and 13 observed that- "11. In our view, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent requires to be accepted. For compounding of the offences punishable under Indian Penal Code, a complete scheme is provided under Section 320 of the Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 329 provides that the offences mentioned in the table provided thereunder can be compounded by the persons mentioned in column 3 of the said table. Further, Sub-Section (2) provides that the offences mentioned in the table could by compounded by the victim with the permission of the court. As against this, Sub-section (9) Specifically provides that "no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section." In view of the aforesaid legislative mandate, only the offences which are covered by the Table 1 or Table 2 as stated above can be compounded and the rest of the offences punishable under Indian Penal Code could not be compounded. 12. 12. Further, the decision in Ram Pujan case, 1973 (2) SCC 456 , does not advance the contention raised by the Appellants. In the said case, Court held that the major offences for which the accused have been convicted were no doubt non-compoundable, but the fact of compromise can be taken into account in determining the quantum of sentence. In Ram Lal case, 1999 (2) SCC 213 , the Court referred to the decision of the Court in Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. (1990) SUPP. SSC 681 (SCC p. 682, para 3): 3. We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the trial court shall permit them to compound the offence and held is under: (SCC p.214, Para 3) We are unable to follow the said decision as a binding precedent, Section 20 deals with compounding of offences provides two Tables therein, one containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it and the other containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two Tables can be compounded and none else. 13. In the case of Y. Suresh Babu the Court has specifically observed that the said case "shall not be treated as a precedent". The aforesaid two decisions are based on facts and in any set of circumstances, they can be treated as per incuriam as pointed attention of the court to Sub-section (9) of Section 320 was not draw. Hence, the High Court rightly refused to grant permission to compound the offence punishable under Section 326. 36. In the matter of Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in non-compoundable offences permission to compound cannot be granted and the case of Ram Pujan v. State of U.P. 1973 (2) SCC 456 and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1988 (1) RCR (Criminal) 498 was declined as not in accordance with law and treated as per-incuriam. 37. 37. In Ram Lal v. State of J & K it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable even with permission of court cannot be compounded at all and also observed that a lanient view can be taken and sentence can be reduced in such cases. 38. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Deepak & Others (supra) High Court has accepted the compromise in offence punishable under Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and quashed the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but observed Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order of High Court of M.P of Gwalior Bench and directed the trial court to proceed with the trial of the case. 39. In Gold Quest International Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- "In view of the principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid cases. We are of the view that in the disputes which are substantially matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes with criminal facts. If the parties have entered into settlement, and it has become clear that there are no chance of conviction, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the same would not apply where the nature of offence is very serious like rape, murder, rubbery, dacoity, cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and another similar kind of offences in which punishment of the imprisonment or death can be awarded. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the learned Single Bench did not commit any error of law in quashing the FIR after not only the complainant and the appellant settled their money dispute but also the other alleged sufferers entered into an agreement with the appellant, and as such, they too settled their claims. 40. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.C. Prasad (supra) in para 12 Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- "12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. 40. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.C. Prasad (supra) in para 12 Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- "12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about re-rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts." 41. Considering the aforesaid observations Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the order of High Court whereby High Court quashed the criminal proceedings. 42. In N. Shenbagaraj v. The Inspector of Police (supra) accused was convicted for offence under Section 498(A), 506 (i) of IPC and r/w. Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act and sentenced for two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees 3000/- against which appeal was preferred and in appeal the conviction was confirmed but the sentenced was moved and in view of imprisonment, an additional fine was imposed thereafter convicts filed misc. petition before the High Court of Madras at Madurai Bench in which Single Bench of Madras High Court set aside the said sentence of fine and acquitted the petitioners/accused as the matter was compromised against which a appeal was filed before the High Court. 43. Recently in the matter of Manohar Singh v. State of M.P. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- "Section 498-A of the IPC is non-compoundable. Section 4 of the Dowry Act is also non-compoundable. It is not necessary to state that non-compoundable offences cannot be compounded by a Court. While considering the request for compounding of offences the Court has to strictly follow the mandate of Section 320 of the Code. Section 4 of the Dowry Act is also non-compoundable. It is not necessary to state that non-compoundable offences cannot be compounded by a Court. While considering the request for compounding of offences the Court has to strictly follow the mandate of Section 320 of the Code. It is, therefore, not possible to permit compounding of offences under Section 498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Act. However, if there is a genuine compromise between husband and wife, criminal complaints arising out of matrimonial discord can be quashed, even if the offences alleged therein are non-compoundable, because such offences are personal in nature and do not have repercussions on the society unlike heinous offences like murder, rape etc. In the present case, the appellant is convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment. He is convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Act and sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment. Substantive sentences are to run concurrently. Even though the appellant and wife have arrived at a compromise, the order of conviction cannot be quashed on that ground because the offences involved are non-compoundable. However, in such a situation if the court feels that the parties have a real desire to bury the hatchet in the interest of peace, it can reduce the sentence of the accused to the sentence already undergone. Section 498-A of the IPC does not prescribe any minimum punishment. Section 4 of the Dowry Act prescribes minimum punishment of six months but proviso thereto states that the Court may, for adequate or special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may be less than six months. Therefore, sentence of the appellant can be reduced to sentence already undergone by him. Considering fact and circumstances that appellant and respondent were married in 2007 and about seven years have gone by and in the interest of peach and amity the appellant's sentence must be reduced to sentence already undergone by him. Thus, conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Act is maintained but the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to sentence already undergone by him. Subject to the condition that the appellant pays a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- to respondent wife as compensation. 44. Thus, conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Act is maintained but the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to sentence already undergone by him. Subject to the condition that the appellant pays a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- to respondent wife as compensation. 44. In the case of Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2011 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 173 : (2011) 5 SCC 708 in paragraph No. 34 it was observed that jurisdiction of Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India or jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not tie invoked to direct quashing of a case involving crime against the society. 45. As such in Nariender Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), Nanda Gopalan v. State of Kerala (supra), Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa (supra), Ram Lal v. State of J & K (supra), Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), State of M.P. v. Deepak and Others (supra), Manohar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly observed fat accused can be acquitted on the basis of compromise in non-compoundable offences which are not serious in nature having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute the High Court can quash criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise where the possibility of conviction is smote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme Injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim at the stage of trial. But after recording conviction such powers can not be exercised as conviction by Trial court has already been recorded. But after recording conviction such powers can not be exercised as conviction by Trial court has already been recorded. After conviction the State of appeal, after hearing of appeal if Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction Appellate Court an reduce the sentence considering the fact of compromise but High Court should not acquit the accused on the basis of compromise is not compoundable cases during pendency of appeal. Only appellate court can take lenient view. 46. So far as judgments of own High Court and other High Courts wherein at appellate stage, in non-compoundable offence accused was acquitted by the High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are concerned most of these judgments was delivered before the aforesaid Supreme Court judgments, therefore, it does not help the petitioner. 47. In the case in hand since appellant has already been convicted and sentenced by trial court and appeal is pending against conviction and sentence. Therefore, as observed by Supreme Court in aforesaid judgments his court cannot acquit the petitioner/accused while exercising inherent lowers on the basis of compromise as the offence under Section 498-A IPC is not compoundable. Only Appellate Court can take the lenient view in warded sentence after hearing of appeal if it maintains the conviction, therefore, this misc. petition disposed of, accordingly. 48. I appreciate the assistance rendered by learned Senior Advocate Sh. Biri Singh Sinsinwar assisted by Sh. Harender Singh, Sh. Suresh Sahni, Sh. Anil Upman, Sh. Manish Sharma, Sh. Hemant Nahta, Ms. Shalini Sheoran, Sh. P.C. Dewanda, Sh. R.M. Sharma, Sh. Banwari Sharma, Sh. Anjani Kumar Sharma, Sh. Giriraj Prasad Sharma Advocates. 49. Copy of this order be sent to learned Lower Appellate Court. Petition disposed of as above.