JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. K.M. Patel, learned Senior Counsel for Mr. P.S. Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Niyani R. Bhimani, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. From the record it appears that the Court Admitted the petition vide order dated 9.3.2011 having regard to the contention against the impugned order dated 12.7.2010 passed by learned Labour Court at Junagadh in Recovery Application No. 181 of 2003 which is impugned in present petition, more particularly the contention with regard to the learned Labour Court's jurisdiction to entertain the type of claim which is decided by the impugned award in Recovery Application filed under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "I.D. Act"). The said order dated 9.3.2011 reads thus:-- "Notice issued by this Court to respondent for final disposal is served, but, no appearance is filed by any advocate on behalf of respondent and respondent is also not remained present today before this Court. Therefore, this Court has no other option except to proceed with the matter in absence of respondent. Heard learned advocate Mr. P.S. Gogia appearing on behalf of petitioner. I have considered submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Gogia. Learned advocate Mr. Gogia has shown this Court Page 33 that during pendency of revision application No. 2 of 2002, one purshis was filed by Chairman of Junagadh District Central Cooperative Bank Limited that without prejudice to their rights, they are prepared to reinstate workman on temporary basis. On that basis, order of appointment has been accordingly issued by petitioner bank on 3rd September, 2002 and appointed respondent in service on purely temporary basis with a fixed salary of Rs. 3,000/- per months till the matter is finally decided by Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot. Learned advocate Mr. Gogia submitted that on the basis of aforesaid order passed by petitioner dated 3rd September, 2002, a recovery application has been made by respondent under Section33(C)(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where, wages has been claimed for the period from 18th January, 2001 to 31st August, 2002. Learned advocate Mr. Learned advocate Mr. Gogia submitted that on the basis of aforesaid order passed by petitioner dated 3rd September, 2002, a recovery application has been made by respondent under Section33(C)(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where, wages has been claimed for the period from 18th January, 2001 to 31st August, 2002. Learned advocate Mr. Gogia submitted that for aforesaid period, he was not in service at all, then, question of granting amount of wages by Tribunal for the period from 18th January, 2001 to 31st August, 2002 does not arise and for that, respondent has not proved pre-existing right to receive last wages from petitioner. Considering his submissions, question raised and involved in present petition requires detailed examination, hence, RULE. Ad-interim relief in terms of Para 6(b) is granted. Notice to interim relief returnable on 15th April, 2011." 3. It appears from the above quoted order that the fundamental objection against the Labour Court's order dated 12.7.2010 is on the ground that the claim raised by present respondent in Recovery Application No. 181 of 2003 could not have been decided by learned Labour Court inasmuch as the said claim was neither "existing right" nor "crystallized right" and therefore it was beyond the labour Court's jurisdiction to entertain such claim in application under Section 33(c)(2) of the I.D. Act. 3.1 Before proceeding further it is relevant and necessary to mention at the outset that during the hearing of this petition, a suggestion for over - all settlement was made by learned advocate for the respondent. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner fairly agreed to call for instruction in response to the suggestion for settlement made by learned advocate for the respondent. 5. Learned advocate for the respondent had, upon instruction from the respondent suggested that instead of full amount awarded by learned Labour Court the respondent is ready and willing to accept part of the decreed amount in full and final settlement of all disputes. 6. Today at the time of hearing Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the suggestion by learned advocate for the workman is considered by the petitioner and the petitioner is ready to pay lump sum amount of Rs. 6. Today at the time of hearing Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the suggestion by learned advocate for the workman is considered by the petitioner and the petitioner is ready to pay lump sum amount of Rs. 25,000/- as ex gratia payment to the respondent with the clarification that the said amount is paid as ex gratia payment though the respondent is not entitled for any amount from the petitioner in view of the fact that he had worked with the petitioner only for 57 days however, with a view to putting an end to the litigation the petitioner has agreed to pay said amount as ex gratia payment. 7. Learned advocate for the respondent agreed to accept the said amount as ex gratia payment and he also agreed to declare, stipulate and undertake that upon payment of the said amount any right or claim or dispute or demand of whatsoever nature by the respondent will not survive against the petitioner. 8. In view of the said agreement between the parties, it is jointly requested by learned advocates for the petitioner and the respondent that appropriate order may be passed, however contention against impugned award may be decided. 8.1 In view of the said submission it is necessary to take into account relevant facts. 8.2 From the record it has emerged that the respondent herein had filed an application under the provisions of BIR Act against the petitioner with the request for restrain order against the petitioner. The said application was listed as BIR Application No. 12 of 2001. In the proceedings before learned Labour Court the petitioner claimed that the respondent was already relieved from service w.e.f. 17.1.2001 and that therefore there was no question of stay against any order terminating service of the respondent. It appears that in the said proceedings the learned Labour Court granted ex-parte order of status-quo. However, after considering the reply/submission by present petitioner learned Labour Court rejected the application for interim relief vide order dated 22.3.2002. It appears that thereafter the workman preferred Revision Application No. 2 of 2002 wherein Industrial Court granted status-quo. Thereafter on 27.8.2002 purshis was filed before Industrial Court for claiming reinstatement of the workman. In view of the purshish the workman was reinstated on 3.9.2002. It appears that thereafter the workman preferred Revision Application No. 2 of 2002 wherein Industrial Court granted status-quo. Thereafter on 27.8.2002 purshis was filed before Industrial Court for claiming reinstatement of the workman. In view of the purshish the workman was reinstated on 3.9.2002. Thereafter on 30.4.2006 the Revision Application No. 2 of 2002 came to be rejected by the Industrial Court and BIR Application No. 12 of 2001 was remanded for fresh adjudication. It appears that thereafter workman was terminated by the petitioner on 12.5.2006 and the workman filed fresh BIR Application No. 3 of 2006 and challenged the order of termination. After considering the facts and material available on record the learned Labour Court allowed the said BIR Application No. 3 of 2006 vide order dated 21.4.2008. It comes out from the record that after the learned Labour Court allowed the BIR application No. 3 of 2006 the bank filed appeal and challenged the said order dated 21.4.2008 passed in said BIR application. The said Appeal was registered as Appeal No. 7 of 2008. It appears from the record that having heard the said appeal the Court set aside the BIR Application No. 3 of 2006 and remanded the said application for fresh adjudication. Thereafter on 9.11.2009 the BIR Application No. 12 of 2001 was dismissed by the learned Labour Court for non-appearance of the workman. 9. Today at the time of hearing learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the respondent worked with the petitioner for very limited tenure of 57 days and he was discontinued by the petitioner w.e.f. 17.1.2001 after office hours. 10. In this background learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the respondent herein claimed wages from the petitioner from 18.1.2001 to 31.8.2002 however the petitioner opposed the claim on the ground that the respondent workman was relieved from service after office hours on 17.1.2001 and that therefore he was not entitled for wages for the period after 17.1.2001. 11. It was claimed by the petitioner that unless and until the dispute as to whether the respondent was in service after 17.1.2001 or by virtue of any order he was deemed to be in service from 18.1.2001 or not, is decided by competent Court, recovery application claiming wages for period after 17.1.2001 could not have been adjudicated. 11. It was claimed by the petitioner that unless and until the dispute as to whether the respondent was in service after 17.1.2001 or by virtue of any order he was deemed to be in service from 18.1.2001 or not, is decided by competent Court, recovery application claiming wages for period after 17.1.2001 could not have been adjudicated. 11.2 The petitioner claimed that for demanding wages (for the said period) in recovery application, the workman should have first got the dispute adjudicated before the competent Court (as regards the factum of his employment after 17.1.2001) and unless the said dispute is decided, the learned Labour Court, under Section 33(C)(2) cannot pass any order for such claim. 11.3 Learned Labour Court however, disregarded the said contention, and without addressing the said issue proceeded to decide the recovery application and passed an order dated 12.7.2010. 11.4 From the facts of the case, which are discussed herein above, it has clearly emerged that the basis of respondent's claim against the petitioner (i.e. for wages after 17.1.2001) was in dispute. Whether the respondent was dismissed and whether he had worked with the petitioner after 17.1.2001 and/or whether the termination was illegal and whether he was entitled for wages for the period after 17.1.2001 were the issues which could have been decided by learned Labour Court under appropriate substantiate application under BIR Act and not in a proceedings related to application under Section33(c)(2) of the I.D. Act. 11.5 Learned Labour Court, acting under Section 33(c)(2) of the I.D. Act and entertaining the application filed under said Act, acts, essentially, as an Executing Court and its jurisdiction would be akin to the jurisdiction of Civil Court, and therefore, any substantive application cannot be decided on merits by the learned Labour Court acting under Section33(c) (2) of the I.D. Act. 11.6 Substantive dispute can be decided by competent Court and after the substantive dispute is decided then if need for computation of the crystallized right in terms of money arises then it can be undertaken by the learned Labour Court under Section 33(c)(2) of the I.D. Act but substantive dispute cannot be decided in application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act. 12. In present case without appreciating the aforesaid aspect of jurisdiction, the learned Labour Court entertained the application and adjudicated the claim by the respondent. 12. In present case without appreciating the aforesaid aspect of jurisdiction, the learned Labour Court entertained the application and adjudicated the claim by the respondent. The order passed by learned Labour Court is without jurisdiction and the learned Labour Court has passed the award by exercising jurisdiction not conferred on it by exercising its limited jurisdiction arbitrarily. Therefore, the award deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. 12.1 However, in view of the fact that reasonable and fair settlement is arrived at between the parties and the petitioner has agreed to pay ex gratia payment of Rs. 25,000/- to the respondent, though the award is set aside, the petitioner shall, as and by way of ex gratia payment, pay Rs. 25,000/- to the respondent on or before 30.4.2016. The parties shall abide by their agreement. With the aforesaid clarifications the petition is disposed of and the impugned award dated 12.7.2010 passed by learned Labour Court at Junagadh in Recovery Application No. 181 of 2003 is set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Orders accordingly.