JUDGMENT : A.Y. Kogje, J. 1. The appeal is challenging oral judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 30.04.2010 in Special Civil Application No. 10390 of 1994, wherein the learned Single Judge has uphold the order of discharge of the appellant from the Bank's service. The appellant before the Court is an employee of a Nationalized Bank (hereinafter to be referred as "the petitioner" for brevity) and the respondent is a Nationalized Bank (hereinafter to be referred as "the respondent Bank"). 2. The facts in brief necessary for the purpose of this case and as emerging on the record are as under:-- 2.1 The petitioner was employed as clerk in the respondent Bank in the main Branch at Ahmedabad. He was charge sheeted for a gross misconduct vide communication dated 13.10.1980. Three charges of gross misconduct were communicated under the aforementioned letter, which are as under:-- "I. Doing an act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and involving the Bank in serious loss. II. Willful damage to the property of the Bank or its customers. III. Forging signatures of an official of the Bank." 2.2 The circumstances on the basis of which the aforementioned charges were applied are as under:-- "i) On 28.8.1980, you opened a fictitious Savings Bank Account No. 73578 in the name of one Shantilal M. Shah. On the account opening form cum specimen signature sheet in respect of the said account, you signed as S.M. Shah. You also filled in the initial pay-in-slip of Rs. 10/- for opening the account and signed as S.M. Shah thereon. Thereafter in the ledger sheet you altered the balance in the said account by posting a fictitious credit entry therein. On 1.9.1980 you withdrew Rs. 10,000/- from the said account by signing as S.M. Shah on the withdrawal form and thereby you defrauded the Bank and accused loss to the Bank of the said amount. ii) On 9-9-1980, when the alleged fraud came to light, while balancing the books, a search was made to trace the relevant records, but except the first pay-in-slip for opening the said account, the following were not traceable: (i) account opening form-cum-specimen signature sheet (ii) ledger sheet (iii) withdrawal of Rs. 10,000/- and (iv) pass book. These documents were surreptitiously removed by you to destroy the evidence of the same fraud committed by you. iii) On 3-9-1980, you credited Rs. 10,000/- and (iv) pass book. These documents were surreptitiously removed by you to destroy the evidence of the same fraud committed by you. iii) On 3-9-1980, you credited Rs. 6,000/- in the Savings Bank Account No. B-28155 of Shri D.I. Bhatt, Officer (JMG) of C&I (Deposits) Division of the Main Branch, and obtained a cheque from him in your favour for the same amount. You forged the signature of Shri D.I. Bhatt on the pay-in-slip for Rs. 6000/- as also on the reverse of the cheque-book requisition slip of Shri D.I. Bhatt and in the cheque book issue register in token of a cheque book, bearing Nos. A.024921 to A-024940, having been issued to Shri D.I. Bhatt." 2.3 Under the same communication, it was conveyed to the petitioner that he will be given an opportunity to produce witnesses and any evidence, oral or documentary. He was also communicated that he will be permitted to appear before the Inquiry Officer and cross-examine the witnesses. He was also informed that he would be permitted to be defended by the representative of his choice. 2.4 At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to an important aspect with regards to aforementioned incident. A criminal prosecution was launched against the petitioner and another in the form of Summary Case No. 889 of 1981. The gist of the charge framed against the petitioner and co-accused is that both the accused had conspired together to misappropriate Bank's amount of Rs. 10,000/- and therefore, on 20.08.1990 opened a bogus account in the name of Shantilal M. Shah and for that purpose, prepared forged documents and used the same as genuine. Though there was no money in the said account, on 01.09.1990, the petitioner withdrew cash amount of Rs. 10,000/- and to facilitate his transaction, deposited cash of Rs. 6,000/- in the account of co-accused from whom he received and cheque and withdrew amount of Rs. 6,000/- as well. He was further charged that the documents relevant for opening of the fictitious account were deliberately misplaced or destroyed and thereby, though being a Bank employee, has committed misappropriation, for which he was charged for offences under Sections 409,419, 468, 471, 204 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 2.5 The trial had proceeded and ultimately, learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 11, Ahmedabad was pleased to order termination of the trial vide judgment and order dated 05.11.1992. 2.5 The trial had proceeded and ultimately, learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 11, Ahmedabad was pleased to order termination of the trial vide judgment and order dated 05.11.1992. The learned Magistrate opined that there were clouds of suspicion on the case of the prosecution and therefore, the prosecution is unable to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, thereby leading to acquittal of the petitioner by granting him benefit of doubt. 2.6 It appears that after the trial was concluded, by communication dated 06.11.1993 written brief of the Presenting Officer was forwarded to the defence representative of the petitioner calling upon him to submit the written brief within a period of 10 days. It appears that the departmental inquiry had proceeded in due course and somewhere in January 1994, the Inquiry Officer submitted the inquiry report, wherein he concluded as under:-- "32. In view of the circumstances commented I believe that: Charge No. 1 : Doing an act prejudicial to the interest of Bank and involving the Bank in serious loss stands partially proved to the extent that an act of CSE was prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and involving the Bank in serious loss as the Bank has not suffered the loss since the CSE has confessed the act and repaid the amount. Charge No. 2 : Willful damage to the property of the Bank or its customers stands proved on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Charge No. 3 : Forging signatures of an official of the Bank stands proved fully." 2.7 This report was also furnished to the petitioner under communication dated 15.02.1994, wherein the petitioner was called upon to submit his representation on the report in writing on or before 28.02.1994. The petitioner in response thereto submitted his written representation dated 18.04.1994. 2.8 The disciplinary authority after taking into consideration the inquiry report as well as the representation of the petitioner issued communication dated 23.06.1994 wherein it was communicated to the petitioner that the disciplinary authority concurs with the findings of the inquiry officer and proposes to impose punishment of Discharge from the Bank's service for the gross misconduct as per para-521(5)(e) read with para-521(10)(c) of the Sastry Award. Under this communication, the petitioner was also informed that he has been given an opportunity to show cause as to why the aforementioned punishment be not inflicted. Under this communication, the petitioner was also informed that he has been given an opportunity to show cause as to why the aforementioned punishment be not inflicted. He was also afforded personal hearing and was informed that he could be represented by a representative of his choice. It appears from the record of this case that the petitioner submitted final submissions in writing through his defence representative and also written representation under his own signature on 04.08.1994. Considering the inquiry report, final submissions of the defence representative and the representation of the petitioner, the disciplinary authority considering the serious nature of the gross misconduct that was established wherein the petitioner was involved in forgery, willful damage to the property of the Bank and acts prejudicial to the Bank's interest, thought it fit not to continue the petitioner in service in the best interest and security of the Bank, thereby inflicting penalty of Discharge from the Bank's service on the petitioner. 2.9 Challenging this order of Discharge, the petitioner filed writ petition before this Court raising several contentions prominent amongst them being, (a) that the disciplinary authority has given undue importance to the two confessional letters written by the petitioner. At the same time, disregarding the letter wherein the petitioner has retracted his earlier statement, (b) criminal case filed against the petitioner and the departmental proceedings are based on the selfsame facts and evidence and therefore, as the criminal trial has resulted in acquittal, the petitioner should be given benefit of the same in the departmental inquiry, (c) that the witnesses of the management were totally unreliable. 2.10 Not accepting the contentions of the petitioner, the learned Single Judge was pleased to dismiss the petition by holding as under:-- "7. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. In the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner, it was alleged (i) that the petitioner had done an act which was prejudicial to the interest of the respondent-Bank and had, thereby, put the Bank to a serious loss; (ii) that he had willfully caused damage to the property of the Bank or its customers; and (iii) that he had forged the signatures of an official of the Bank. Out of the above three charges, charge Nos. 2 & 3 were proved beyond doubt, whereas, charge No. 1 was partially proved. 8. Out of the above three charges, charge Nos. 2 & 3 were proved beyond doubt, whereas, charge No. 1 was partially proved. 8. So far as the contention raised by the petitioner with regard to recording the statements of the petitioner under duress is concerned, the same is devoid of any merits inasmuch as after giving his confessions, the petitioner had withdrawn the amount of deposit, which was lying with the respondent-Bank. Had the statements been recorded in duress, as has been contented by learned counsel for the petitioner, then the petitioner would not have withdrawn the amount of deposit before its maturity. The said action of the petitioner of withdrawing the amount of deposit lying with the Bank points towards his guilt. Hence, the said contention raised by the petition, being without any merits, deserves to be rejected. 9. Looking to the seriousness of the charges that stood proved against the petitioner and the facts discussed herein above, I am of the opinion that the decision taken by the respondent-Bank is just and proper, particularly, when the petitioner was employed in the banking sector. Hence, I find no reasons to interfere in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 3. Heard learned Advocate Shri Maulin Rawal for the petitioner and learned Advocate Shri Vinay Bairagra for M/s. Trivedi & Gupta for the respondent Bank. 4. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has painstakingly taken us through the documents on record, which consist of inquiry report, two confessional statements dated 13.09.1980 and 15.09.1980, retraction letter, judgment in trial being Summary Case No. 889 of 1981 and also the final submissions made by the defence representation. Shri Rawal also persuaded us to cursorily go through the evidence in the departmental proceedings, which consists of statements of the management witnesses. 5. Learned Advocate for the petitioner firstly contended that it is a case of no evidence as the decision of the disciplinary authority is based on the confessional letters whereas the letter of retraction is not taken into consideration. A perusal of the two letters which are in handwriting form narrate the sequence of events which took place at the time of incident and the exact role played by the petitioner. He has admitted to opening of an Account in the fictitious name. He has admitted to preparing forged documents to facilitate opening of the Account. A perusal of the two letters which are in handwriting form narrate the sequence of events which took place at the time of incident and the exact role played by the petitioner. He has admitted to opening of an Account in the fictitious name. He has admitted to preparing forged documents to facilitate opening of the Account. He has admitted to making entry falsely in the ledger sheet and pass book for Rs. 10,000/-. He has also admitted to withdrawing an amount of Rs. 10,000/- with the help of the account of co-employee. He has admitted that to prevent detection of his actions, he has destroyed the pass book, ledger sheet, withdrawal form and accounting form. He has lastly admitted that he has re-deposited the amount of Rs. 10,000/- in sundry account on 15.09.1980. Reading of the statement of retraction which is on record at Annexure-G would suggest that he has stated that the confessional statements that he has written were under duress. However, the petitioner has not discharged his burden to establish his contention that the confessional statements were recorded under pressure or duress. Nothing prevented the petitioner from leading any evidence to establish this fact. In absence of the evidence to establish durance or pressure, this Court cannot presume that the confessional statements were written by the petitioner under duress. Moreover, retraction appears to be an afterthought. Moreover, there is another evidence in the form of a document which appears at M.Ex-12 (M.Ex-4), which is account voucher of Rs. 10,000/- dated 15.09.1980 prepared in the handwriting of the petitioner which he had confessed. According to Management Witness No. 6 Shri M.R. Desai, this entire exercise was carried out by the petitioner without there being any pressure or duress. Over and above this, 7 management witnesses have given their statements on one aspect of other of the incident during the departmental proceedings and therefore, this Court cannot come to conclusion that this is a case of no evidence. In support of his contention of no evidence, learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, reported in AIR 1964 SC, page No. 364, more particularly paras 20, 22 and 23 which read as under:-- "20. This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal. In support of his contention of no evidence, learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, reported in AIR 1964 SC, page No. 364, more particularly paras 20, 22 and 23 which read as under:-- "20. This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal. It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and-, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or other wise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311 (2), the High Court under Art. 226 has Jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charge framed against him are in the nature of quasi judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence. In fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney-General, we ought to add that he did not seriously dispute this, position in law. 22. We are not prepared to accept this contention. Malafide exercise of power can be attacked independently on the ground that it is mala fide. Such an exercise of power is always liable to be quashed on the main ground that it is not a bona fide exercise of power. 22. We are not prepared to accept this contention. Malafide exercise of power can be attacked independently on the ground that it is mala fide. Such an exercise of power is always liable to be quashed on the main ground that it is not a bona fide exercise of power. But we are not prepared to hold that if mala fides are not alleged and bona fides are assumed in favour of the appellant, its conclusion on a question of fact cannot be successfully challenged even if it is manifest that there is no evidence to support it. The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari' can be issued in favour of the respondent. 23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him? This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence." 6. However, in the facts of this case, we are unable to hold that this is a case of no evidence and as stated hereinabove, there is in fact sufficient evidence and as is held in this very judgment in para-23, this Court, while conducting exercise as contemplated in para-23, is unable to conclude that this is a case of no evidence. 7. The next contention of learned Advocate for the petitioner is that confession of misconduct cannot be the only evidence on which the disciplinary authority can base his findings for gross misconduct. Firstly, we do not agree that the confession is the only piece of evidence available against the petitioner. Secondly, there are three different confessions made by the petitioner in handwriting. The perusal of the evidence of this M.W. 6 Shri M.R. Desai clearly demonstrates that this witness has stated that the M.Ex-12 document is in the own handwriting of the petitioner and the same was written in presence of this witness and other bank officer. He has also stated that there was no apparent pressure or duress. The perusal of the evidence of this M.W. 6 Shri M.R. Desai clearly demonstrates that this witness has stated that the M.Ex-12 document is in the own handwriting of the petitioner and the same was written in presence of this witness and other bank officer. He has also stated that there was no apparent pressure or duress. Even the cross examination of M.W. 6 in this connection yield any result in favour of the petitioner. Over and above this, management witnesses have given their statements. In support of his contention about confession, learned Advocate for the petitioner relied upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kanda Padayachi v. State of T.N., reported in AIR 1972 SC, page No. 66 and in case of Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State of A.P., reported in AIR 2008 SC, page No. 2819. This Court finds that both these judgments are in the realm of criminal jurisprudence and therefore, applicability of this proposition cannot be attracted to the facts of this case. The strict standard of proof applied to the confessional statement in a criminal trial can never be applied to the departmental proceedings while attaching evidentiary value to the confession. 8. The next contention of learned Advocate for the petitioner is that criminal trial and the departmental inquiry are based on self-same facts and same set of evidence. Perusal of the record would lead us to conclude that the criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings are not on the self-same facts and evidence. It is a settled principle that departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings operate in different spheres altogether and as observed in the preceding paras, charge framed in the criminal proceedings is quite different than the charge in the departmental proceedings. The disciplinary authority in the departmental proceedings is mainly concerned with the enforcement of the discipline, level of integrity in the employee and desirability of continuing such delinquent in the services of the Bank. Over and above this, perusal of the judgment of acquittal would indicate that the prosecution had examined Shri Manubhai Ratilal Desai-Exh. 5, Shri Jitendra Gulabchand Bhavsar-Exh. 21, Shri Bhagwandas Jethalal Bhavsar-Exh. 50, Shri Rashmikant Chandrakant Kinariwala-Exh. 51, Shri Gautambhai Dalpatbhai Maheriya-Exh. 52, Shri Chimanlal Jayram Patel-Exh. 53 and Shri Sendhabhai Kanjibhai Prajapati, Handwriting Expert -Exh. Over and above this, perusal of the judgment of acquittal would indicate that the prosecution had examined Shri Manubhai Ratilal Desai-Exh. 5, Shri Jitendra Gulabchand Bhavsar-Exh. 21, Shri Bhagwandas Jethalal Bhavsar-Exh. 50, Shri Rashmikant Chandrakant Kinariwala-Exh. 51, Shri Gautambhai Dalpatbhai Maheriya-Exh. 52, Shri Chimanlal Jayram Patel-Exh. 53 and Shri Sendhabhai Kanjibhai Prajapati, Handwriting Expert -Exh. 54, whereas in the departmental inquiry, 7 management witnesses who were examined are Shri R.C. Kinariwala-MW1, Shri J.B. Shah-MW2, Shri D.I. Bhatt-MW3, Shri V.K. Shah-MW4, Shri C.J. Patel-MW5, Shri M.R. Desai-MW6 and Shri Pravinchandra J. Shah-MW7. Further, the petitioner was given benefit of doubt by the Court in the criminal case and it was not a case of honourable acquittal. In support of his contention, learned Advocate has relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., reported in AIR 1999, SC, page No. 1416(1). The question that came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme court was whether the acquittal coupled with other circumstances, specially ex parte proceedings of the case will have the effect of vitiating the departmental proceedings or the order of dismissal passed against the appellant. The facts of this case would reveal that the departmental inquiry had proceeded ex parte, culminating into dismissal prior to acquittal in the criminal trial. Therefore, armed with the acquittal, the petitioner had approached the High Court for reinstatement and learned Single Judge allowed the petition and directed reinstatement with liberty to the department to initiate fresh inquiry. The Letters Patent Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge giving rise to SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme court in paras-33 and 34 held as under:-- "33. Since in the instant case the appellant was not provided any Subsistence Allowance during the period of suspension and the adjournment prayed for by him on account of his illness, duly supported by medical certificates, was refused resulting in ex-parte proceedings against him, we are of the opinion that the appellant has been punished in total violation of the principles of natural justice and he was literally not afforded any opportunity of hearing. Moreover, as pleaded by the appellant before the High Court as also before us that on account of his penury occasioned by nonpayment of Subsistence Allowance, he could not undertake a journey to attend the disciplinary proceedings, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer at such proceedings, which were held ex-parte, stand vitiated. 34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, 'the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom.' The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex- parte departmental proceedings, to stand." 9. As observed hereinabove, the ratio of this case cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case, which are quite different. Moreover, the department proceedings had proceeded ex parte, unlike the present case. 10. Learned Advocate for the petitioner next relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in 2009 (2) SCC, page No. 570. Learned Advocate relied upon paras-4, 14, 15 and 23, which read as under:-- "4. Moreover, the department proceedings had proceeded ex parte, unlike the present case. 10. Learned Advocate for the petitioner next relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in 2009 (2) SCC, page No. 570. Learned Advocate relied upon paras-4, 14, 15 and 23, which read as under:-- "4. After five years of the said incidence, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the appellant stating that during the period 18.11.1991 and 9.10.1993, he had taken away one blank draft issue book bearing No. 626401 to 626425. A show-cause notice was issued. Cause was shown by him. He was found guilty by the Enquiry Officer. In the said proceeding, reliance was placed on the purported confession of the appellant before the police authorities in the year 1993. It was marked as Exhibit PE-3. 14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left." 11. These paras would clearly indicate that the facts before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were that the inquiry officer while finding the delinquent guilty, had placed reliance on sole evidence which was in the form of purported confession of the appellant before the police authorities. No evidence was examined by the Inquiry Officer and hence, facts of this case being different from facts in the instant case, would not held the case of the petitioner. 12. Learned Advocate for the petitioner next relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of S. Bhaskar Reddy v. Superintendent of Police, reported in 2015 (2) SCC, page No. 365. In this case, the facts giving rise to the controversy are recorded in paras-4 and 5, which read as under:-- "4. The appellants herein were appointed as Armed Reserve Constables by the Superintendent of Police Chittoor, Andhra Pradesh. They were transferred on deputation basis to the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Railways, Guntakal, to discharge their duties in that establishment. While they were on deputation with the Railway Police, it is alleged that they were implicated in a murder case and the charge memo was issued to them on 11.09.2004. The Deputy Superintendent of Railway Police was appointed as an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges against them. On 13.06.2005, the Enquiry Officer after affording an opportunity to the appellants submitted his enquiry report. Subsequently, they were repatriated to their parent department. On 27.03.2007, the borrowing department-the first respondent herein passed the orders of dismissal of both the appellants from the services of the police department. 5. The appellants, aggrieved by the orders of dismissal passed against them by the first respondent filed original application before the Tribunal urging various legal grounds. Subsequently, they were repatriated to their parent department. On 27.03.2007, the borrowing department-the first respondent herein passed the orders of dismissal of both the appellants from the services of the police department. 5. The appellants, aggrieved by the orders of dismissal passed against them by the first respondent filed original application before the Tribunal urging various legal grounds. The case of the appellants before the Tribunal was that the order of dismissal passed against them by the first respondent is a major penalty, as enumerated under Rule 9 (ix) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1991 (in short 'the Rules') and that the first respondent being the borrowing authority has no competence to pass orders of dismissal against the appellants. Only the second respondent, who is the lending authority, has got the competence under Rule 30 of the Rules." 13. In para-19 of this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the manner of expression "honourable acquittal" by considering previous judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Para-19 reads as under:-- "19. It is an undisputed fact that the charges in the criminal case and the Disciplinary proceedings conducted against the appellants by the first respondent are similar. The appellants have faced the criminal trial before the Sessions Judge, Chittoor on the charge of murder and other offences of IPC and SC/ST (POA) Act. Our attention was drawn to the said judgment which is produced at Exh. P-7, to evidence the fact that the charges in both the proceedings of the criminal case and the Disciplinary proceeding are similar. From perusal of the charge sheet issued in the disciplinary proceedings and the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer and the judgment in the criminal case, it is clear that they are almost similar and one and the same. In the criminal trial, the appellants have been acquitted honourably for want of evidence on record. The trial judge has categorically recorded the finding of fact on proper appreciation and evaluation of evidence on record and held that the charges framed in the criminal case are not proved against the appellants and therefore they have been honourably acquitted for the offences punishable under 3 (1) (x) of SC/ST (POA) Act and under Sections 307 and 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The law declared by this Court with regard to honourable acquittal of an accused for criminal offences means that they are acquitted for want of evidence to prove the charges. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" was discussed by this Court in detail in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. v. S. Samuthiram[3], the relevant para from the said case reads as under:-- "24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted." (Emphasis laid by this Court) After examining the principles laid down in the above said case, the same was reiterated by this Court in a recent decision in the case of Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 2325 Of 2009 (decided on November 11, 2014. Further, in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. (supra) this Court has held as under:-- "34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, "the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles there from". The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand. 35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case." (emphasis laid by this Court) Further, in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Ors.(supra) this Court held as under:-- "20.......... Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant for the alleged charges punishable under the provisions of the PC Act on the same set of facts and evidence. It was submitted that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar (verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The appellant has been honourably acquitted by the competent court on the same set of facts, evidence and witness and, therefore, the dismissal order based on the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law......... 30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law......... It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of [pic]difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed." (emphasis laid by this Court)" 14. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed." (emphasis laid by this Court)" 14. In the facts of the case before the Hon'ble Apex Court the question was that of "honourable acquittal" and therefore, benefit was available to the delinquent in that case whereas in the instant case, it is not the case of "honourable acquittal", but it is a case of benefit of doubt. This being the distinguishing factor, this judgment would not come to the rescue of the petitioner. 15. Yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this line is in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in 2006(2) GLH, page No. 533. Learned Advocate for the petitioner placed reliance on paras-22 to 24 and 28 to 29, which read as under:-- "22. It is thus seen that this is a case of no evidence. There is no iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that the appellant is guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income by way of gratification. The respondent failed to prove the charges leveled against the appellant. It is not in dispute that the appellant being a public servant used to submit his yearly property return relating to his movable and immovable property and the appellant has also submitted his return in the year 1975 showing his entire movable and immovable assets. No query whatsoever was ever raised about the movable and immovable assets of the appellant. In fact, the respondent did not produce any evidence in support of and/or about the alleged charges levelled against the appellant.. Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant for the alleged charges punishable under the provisions of P.C. Act on the same set of facts and evidence. It was submitted that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar (verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The appellant has been honourably acquitted by the competent Court on the same set of facts, evidence and witness and, therefore, the dismissal order based on same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 23. We shall now scan through the judgments on this issue. 24. In the case of Capt. 23. We shall now scan through the judgments on this issue. 24. In the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr.(supra), the question before this Court was as to whether the departmental proceedings and the proceedings in a criminal case launched on the basis of the same set of facts can be continued simultaneously. In Paragraph 34, this Court held as under: "34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely "the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom". The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to the proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand." 28. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are not distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 29. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed." 16. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed." 16. Here also, the Hon'ble Apex Court on the facts of the case found that the departmental charge sheet and the charges in the criminal trial were identical. Moreover, criminal trial had resulted in "honourable acquittal" and not benefit of doubt as in the present case. Hence, this judgment would not help the case the case of the petitioner. 17. A later pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is in the case of Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale (D) thr. Lrs. v. Union of India, reported in 2012 (13) SCC, page No. 142. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered all the earlier judgments on the subject and in somewhat similar set of facts and circumstances, has held as under:-- "44. This Court recently reiterated the legal principle that departmental proceedings can be conducted simultaneously to the criminal trial in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao (supra). In this case, making reference to almost all the previous precedents, this Court has reiterated the legal position as follows (a) There is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously. (b) The only valid ground for claiming that the disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would be to ensure that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. But even such grounds would be available only in cases involving complex questions of facts and law. (c) Such defence ought not to be permitted to unnecessarily delay the departmental proceedings. The interest of the delinquent officer as well as the employer clearly lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. (d) Departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where both the proceedings are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common. In our opinion, the principles culled out by this Court would be a complete answer to all the submissions made by Mr. Jain. 45. In view of the aforesaid legal principles enunciated and reiterated by this Court, we cannot accept that because the appellant had been prosecuted, the departmental proceedings could not have been continued simultaneously. As pointed out by Mr. Jain. 45. In view of the aforesaid legal principles enunciated and reiterated by this Court, we cannot accept that because the appellant had been prosecuted, the departmental proceedings could not have been continued simultaneously. As pointed out by Mr. Dwivedi, the charges against the appellant in the criminal trial related to the commission of criminal offences under Sections120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of Indian Penal Code. The proof of criminal charges was depended upon prosecution producing proof beyond reasonable doubt relating to the culpability of the appellant alongwith other persons. In the departmental proceedings, the basic charge was that appellant whilst posted as a Branch Manager of Washi Turbhe Branch, failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer. The aforesaid charge clearly related to the manner in which the appellant performed the duties as the Manager of the Branch of the Bank. It had nothing to do with any criminal liability attaching to such conduct. It must be emphasised that Bank officials act as trustees of funds deposited by the public with the Bank. They have an obligation to earn the trust and confidence of not only the account holders but also the general public. The standard of integrity required of the Bank officials, particularly the cashiers, accountants, auditors and the Management at all levels, is like the Caesar's wife, they must be above suspicion. Mr. Bhosale failed to maintain such high standards of integrity. He therefore, acted in violation of Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Jain. 46. Mr. Dwivedi, in our opinion, has rightly pointed out that the conduct of the criminal trial was in the hands of the prosecuting agency. Having registered the First Information Report, the Bank had little or no role to play, apart from rendering assistance to the prosecuting agencies. In our opinion, the failure of the prosecution in producing the necessary evidence before the trial court can not have any adverse impact on the evidentiary value of the material produced by the Bank before the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceedings. In our opinion, the failure of the prosecution in producing the necessary evidence before the trial court can not have any adverse impact on the evidentiary value of the material produced by the Bank before the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceedings. Before the Inquiry Officer, the Bank had placed on the record all the relevant documents which clearly establish that the appellant had exceeded his discretionary powers in purchasing the cheques and issuing demand drafts to show undue favour to the three construction companies named in the charge sheet. In view of the above, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer can not be said to be based on no evidence. It is a settled proposition of law that the findings of Inquiry Officer cannot be nullified so long as there is some relevant evidence in support of the conclusions recorded by the Inquiry Officer. In the present case, all the relevant documents were produced in the Inquiry to establish the charges levelled against the appellant. It is a matter of record that the appellant did not doubt the authenticity of the documents produced by the Bank. He merely stated that the signature on the documents were not his. The aforesaid statement of the appellant was nullified by Mr. S.M. Mahadik, who appeared as a witness for the Bank. He clearly stated that he recognized the signature of the appellant as he had been working as his subordinate. 47. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be based on no evidence. In such circumstances, the appellant cannot take any advantage of the findings of innocence recorded by the criminal court. The 'clean chit' given by the learned Magistrate was influenced by the failure of the prosecution to lead the necessary evidence. No advantage of the same can be taken by the appellant in the departmental proceedings. 48. We also do not find any merit in the submissions made by Mr. Jain that the order by the Disciplinary Authority is vitiated by non-application of mind. The extracts reproduced above would clearly indicate that the Disciplinary Authority was alive to all the submissions made by the appellant. The Disciplinary Authority had taken into consideration all the relevant material and only then concluded that the charges have been duly proved against the appellant. Jain that the order by the Disciplinary Authority is vitiated by non-application of mind. The extracts reproduced above would clearly indicate that the Disciplinary Authority was alive to all the submissions made by the appellant. The Disciplinary Authority had taken into consideration all the relevant material and only then concluded that the charges have been duly proved against the appellant. Furthermore, it is a matter of record that the appellant was duly supplied a copy of the Inquiry Report and he had submitted detailed objections to the same. These objections were placed before the Disciplinary Authority together with the Inquiry Report. Therefore, the appellant can not possibly claim that there has been a breach of rule of natural justice." 18. Therefore, as is held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned case, in the departmental proceedings, the petitioner cannot automatically be given advantage of acquittal recorded by the criminal Court. 19. The next contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is delay in commencing the departmental inquiry, which has deprived the petitioner of a fair and effective chance to strongly defend his case. Perusal of the final submissions by the defence representative, the tenor of the cross-examination and the written representation in response to the notice belies this contention. Moreover, learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank drew our attention to clause-19.4 of the Bipartite settlement, which reads as under:-- "19.4 It is after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of "gross misconduct" or of "minor misconduct" as defined below; provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or come to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharge, but he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in Clauses 19.3 supra. If within the pendency of the proceedings thus instituted he is put on trial such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of the trial, after which the provisions mentioned in Clause 19.3 above shall apply." 20. Therefore, the Bipartite settlement provides that if within the pendency of the departmental proceeding, the delinquent is put on trial then said proceedings shall be stayed pending completion of the trial. Therefore, it appears that the respondent-Bank has waited for conclusion of the criminal trial and thereafter, upon such conclusion, the departmental inquiry was proceeded further. At the relevant time, the petitioner raised no objection to the Bank staying the departmental proceedings awaiting completion of criminal case against the petitioner. 21. The last contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that the petitioner, after starting the departmental proceedings at a belated stage, there was haste in wrapping up the departmental proceedings. The inquiry report itself suggests the manner in which the inquiry had proceeded. We do not find anything to support this contention. In fact, it is found that there is no undue haste at any stage of the departmental proceedings. Moreover, during the entire course of departmental inquiry, no such contention was raised by the petitioner. Hence, this contention also does not help the petitioner. 22. This Court is aware of the limitation of judicial review under Article 226 with regards to the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings as is held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors., reported in (2003) 3 SCC, page No. 583. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paras-16 and 17 as under:-- "16. It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him; whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him; whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. [See State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 417 )]. In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. 17. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate Authority" 23. However, considering the charge of gross misconduct, we have gone through the records of the case and to some extent, record of the departmental proceedings to satisfy ourselves as to whether there was any perversity in the findings of the disciplinary authority. Having undertaken this exercise, we are unable to find any perversity in the conclusions drawn by the disciplinary authority after taking into consideration evidence on record. 24. Before parting, we may observe that the perusal of departmental proceedings record would indicate that several documents which were relevant to the proceeding were furnished by the respondent Bank on the 11th hour. Such practice is deprecated as the same may have some effect on effective representation of the case by delinquent. However, in the instant case, the petitioner has not been able to point out any prejudice that is caused to him in the event of certain documents were furnished to him during the on going departmental proceedings. 25. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, this Court holds that the disciplinary authority was fully justified in passing the impugned order of Discharge from service dated 17.09.1994. Hence, appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.