Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 842 (KER)

C. P. Ajith v. Saumya

2016-10-05

SUNIL THOMAS

body2016
ORDER : Sunil Thomas, J. Petitioners are the counter petitioners in M.C.No.30 of 2016 of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chavakkad. First respondent herein/wife invoking the provision under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short, 'the D.V.Act') filed an application seeking various reliefs against the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law. This is challenged by the counter petitioners on two specific grounds. Firstly, that the court below had no jurisdiction under section 27 of the D.V. Act. The second contention was that there was not even an iota of allegation against petitioners 2 and 3 herein and only allegation related to petitioner No. 1. 2. Regarding the question of jurisdiction, relying on section 27 of the D.V. Act, learned counsel contended that the jurisdiction dependent on either permanent or temporary residence. Learned counsel took me through the various portions of Annexure-6 complaint filed before the learned magistrate, especially paragraph 12, wherein the general allegations indicate that after the marriage, the couple were residing in Bangalore. Learned counsel specifically referred to paragraph 12, wherein there is a contention that when the dispute between the husband and wife was conveyed to the uncle, she was asked to come to Kerala. She came down to Kerala on 27.03.2016 and thereafter returned to Bangalore and there is a specific reference that she is staying in Bangalore. Relying on this, learned counsel for the petitioners herein contended that the first respondent herein never resided within the jurisdiction of the magistrate court, Chavakkad, either permanently or temporarily. Even assuming that they stayed there, that was only for the specific purpose and thereafter, she returned back to Bangalore. The averments clearly show that ever since the marriage, they have been living in Bangalore and after the matrimonial relationship got strained, she continued to live in Bangalore. Learned counsel, to buttress the argument, relied on the decision reported in Neeraj Goswami v. State of U.P (Cri.LJ 2013 1767), especially at paragraph 14, wherein it was held that the temporary residence under the Act does not include a residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place, only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the wife contended that the residence at Bangalore was in connection with her employment. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the wife contended that the residence at Bangalore was in connection with her employment. Essentially, the permanent residence as specifically contemplated under section 27A of the D.V.Act was the place of permanent residence of the aggrieved person. According to the learned counsel for the wife, the permanent residence of wife was at Chavakkad. The temporary residence was only in Bangalore, where the parties were, in connection with the employment only. 4. Having regard to the object of statute, which is essentially intended to confer reliefs to the aggrieved person, I feel that there is some basis in the above argument. There is yet another angle to that. Section 27B of the D.V.Act deals with residence of the first respondent. Though learned counsel advanced a contention that even going by section 27B of the D.V.Act, the residence of the first respondent can be taken into consideration and in this case, respondents 2 and 3 before the court below are residing in Kerala. However, the address shows that they are in Kodungallur, which appears to be not within the jurisdiction of Chavakkad Court. Hence, I feel that the question of jurisdiction, having regard to the object of the Act and on the basis of the reliefs sought should be interpreted in a pragmatic manner, especially in favour of the aggrieved person. 5. Regarding the jurisdiction, learned counsel for the petitioners herein contended that there is absolutely no averment touching upon respondents 2 and 3. No allegation of domestic violence was raised in the petition as against respondents 2 and 3. However, learned counsel for the wife invited my attention to paragraph 3 of complaint, wherein, it was stated that some of gold ornaments belonging to her were taken by the husband for the purpose of retaining in the locker of his father. It has later come out that the father was in possession of the gold ornaments. Having regard to this, there is a specific allegation against the father. 6. In the light of the above findings, I conclude that both the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners will not survive on the basis of the available materials. However, as against the third petitioner, there is absolutely no allegation. Having regard to this, there is a specific allegation against the father. 6. In the light of the above findings, I conclude that both the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners will not survive on the basis of the available materials. However, as against the third petitioner, there is absolutely no allegation. In the light of the above, I find that Crl.M.C is liable to be allowed to the extent of the third respondent before the court below, who is the third petitioner herein. In the result, Crl. M.C is allowed in part. All further proceedings as against the third petitioner, who is the third respondent before the court below, stand quashed. The court below can proceed with the husband and father who are respondents 1 and 2 before the court below.