JUDGMENT : Anand Byrareddy, J. 1. Heard the learned Senior Advocate Sri C.V. Nagesh appearing for the Counsel for the appellant and the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the Central Bureau of Investigation-the respondent. 2. The present appeal is preferred against the judgment rendered in Special CC No. 3 of 2007, wherein the appellant was the accused, for having committed offences punishable under Sections 9 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'PC Act' for brevity). The appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for an offence punishable under Section 9 of the PC Act and rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for offences under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(l)(d) of the PC Act. The sentences were to run concurrently. 3. The case of the prosecution is as follows: The appellant was said to be a public servant working as the Chief Office Superintendent in the Office of the Divisional Personnel Officer, Deputy Regional Manager's Office, South Western Railway, Bangalore, during October 2004. It is alleged that in order to gain pecuniary advantage for himself by adopting illegal means and abusing his official position and with such a motive, had demanded from one V. Manjula, the complainant, a sum of Rs. 54,000/- as illegal gratification to showed official favour by ensuring appointment of her daughter, one Asha, on compassionate grounds, since Manjula's husband, who was a Class-IV employee employed in the Railways, died while in harness. It was alleged that the appellant had indicated that he had carried influence with the higher ups and that he was in a position to hasten the appointment of the complainant's daughter and demanded a part of the bribe amount to be paid to him on 9-10-2004. Since Manjula was not in a mood to pay him any bribe, it transpires that she had approached the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 7-10-2004 and Manjula having brought this to the attention of Manoj Kumar, a Police Inspector attached to the CBI, ACB, Bangalore, it was decided that a trap would be laid on 9-10-2004 in order to catch the appellant red-handed while accepting such illegal gratification. Therefore, elaborate procedure of conducting a trap was explained to Manjula and necessary preparations were made of collecting the currency notes that would be handed over to the appellant and treating the same with phenolphthalein powder in order to ensure that the same would adhere to the appellant's hands if he touched the currency notes and thereafter, on his hands being dipped in Sodium Carbonate solution, the same would turn colour indicating that he had indeed touched the tainted notes. In this vein, on 9-10-2004, preparations were made whereby the complainant would invite the appellant to visit her home to receive the bribe amount and on his coming there and making a demand for the bribe amount and accepting the same, it was expected that the appellant would be caught red-handed. Accordingly, P.W. 3-the Investigation Officer (IO) had requisitioned the services of P.W. 2, who was said to be the manager in a bank, to act as the shadow witness, in order to corroborate the evidence that would be tendered against the appellant as regards the demand and acceptance. It transpires that the IO and his team, along with P.W. 2, had come much earlier before the appointed time, at which the appellant was expected to come over to the house of the complainant and P.W. 3 stationed himself inside the kitchen of the complainant's house, which consisted of a small room, a hall and a kitchen. It transpires that P.W. 2 had stationed himself in the small room. The appellant is said to have come there at about 1.30 p.m. and sat down on a diwana, which was kept in the hall and P. Ws. 2 and 3 had hidden themselves in such a manner that they could look into the hall and hear the appellant, whereas he could not readily see them. The appellant is said to have come there at about 1.30 p.m. and sat down on a diwana, which was kept in the hall and P. Ws. 2 and 3 had hidden themselves in such a manner that they could look into the hall and hear the appellant, whereas he could not readily see them. Incidentally, a micro tape recorder was also placed under the diwana in order to record the conversation, if any, between the complainant and the appellant and when the appellant seated himself on the diwana, Manuja is said to have broached the subject of her daughter's appointment, at which the appellant is said to have made hand gestures to inquire as to whether the money available and she had immediately taken out the tainted notes which were given to her earlier from where she had kept in her clothes and the appellant had received it in his right hand and then counted the same with both the hands and kept them in his right hand pant pocket. It is at that time that Manjula, after handing over the notes and after the appellant had received it, had walked into the kitchen on the pretext of preparing tea and informed P.WT. 3, who was present that she had paid the money and he had received it. It is thereafter that P.W. 3 had intimated his men, who were hiding some 300 metres away from the house, to come over to the complainant's house and he had immediately come to the hall and at which, P.W. 2 as well came out and on seeing them, the appellant was filled with fear and upon questioning him as to why he was present there, he had replied that he was having discussions about the examination which was to be held soon for selection on compassionate grounds. It is thereafter in a short while, the other members of the team had reached there and the test was carried out on the hands of the appellant by dipping the hands of the appellant with the Sodium Carbonate solution, which was prepared and the same turned colour indicating that he had touched and received the tainted currency notes. It is thereafter in a short while, the other members of the team had reached there and the test was carried out on the hands of the appellant by dipping the hands of the appellant with the Sodium Carbonate solution, which was prepared and the same turned colour indicating that he had touched and received the tainted currency notes. Thereafter, he was asked to remove his pant and the pant pocket was also washed with sodium carbonate solution and it also indicated that the tainted notes had been kept in the right hand pant pocket. It is after carrying out such other exercise of drawing up mahazar and having recorded the statement of the appellant and on the face of the material that is gathered, a case was registered before the Special Court, which was duly numbered as above and further proceedings having taken place, the accused had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The Court had then framed charges. The prosecution had then tendered evidence of 7 witnesses and marked several documents as exhibits and after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court below has framed the following points for consideration: "1. Does prosecution prove that the sanction accorded for prosecution of accused for the offences under Sections 9 and 13(2) read with Section 13(l)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is valid in law? 2. Does prosecution prove that the accused being a public servant while working as Chief Office Superintendent, Divisional Personal Office, DRM Office, South Western Railway demands and accept the bribe of Rs. 5,000/- on 9-10-2004 from complainant-Manjula for exercising his personal influence with higher ups for the purpose of securing employment for Kum. R. Asha, the daughter of complainant so as to constitute offence under Section 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? 3. Does prosecution further prove that accused while working as public servant as stated above accepted bribe of Rs. 5,000/- as part of agreed bribe of Rs. 54,000/- from complainant-Manjula on 9-10-2004 for using his personal influence with higher ups for grant of application submitted by Kum. 3. Does prosecution further prove that accused while working as public servant as stated above accepted bribe of Rs. 5,000/- as part of agreed bribe of Rs. 54,000/- from complainant-Manjula on 9-10-2004 for using his personal influence with higher ups for grant of application submitted by Kum. R. Asha, the daughter of complainant and thus obtained pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means so as to constitute misconduct within the contemplation of Section 13(2) read with Section 13(l)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?" The Court below has answered points 1 to 3 in the affirmative and has convicted the accused as aforesaid. It is that which is under challenge in the present appeal. 4. The learned Senior Advocate Sri C.V. Nagesh would firstly point out that the complainant was examined as P.W. 1. It is not in dispute that she had resiled from her complaint and had been treated as a hostile witness. The prosecution had thereafter cross-examined at length the inconsistent statements that were elicited from her, which could not bring home any allegation against the petitioner as the very basis of the complaint was taken away if the complainant herself did not support the case of the prosecution. On the other hand, she had stated that she had borrowed money from the appellant for the marriage of her daughter in a sum of Rs. 20,000/- and that she had returned Rs. 15,000/- and the last instalment of Rs. 5,000/- was to be returned to the appellant, who was a friend of the family and known to her and therefore, he was there in her house to receive that amount which was paid to him. It is also pointed out that the tainted notes reaching the hands of Manjula to be handed over to the appellant was explained by the fact that the notes were given to her by one Satyanarayana, who was said to be a rival union leader and therefore, had axe to grind on the basis of an earlier complaint which the appellant had instituted. It is in that manner that the tainted notes which were treated with phenolphthalein powder may have reached the hands of Manjula through Sathyanarayana and that she had not paid illegal gratification as alleged. It is in that manner that the tainted notes which were treated with phenolphthalein powder may have reached the hands of Manjula through Sathyanarayana and that she had not paid illegal gratification as alleged. It is further pointed out that insofar as the other witnesses are concerned, namely, P.W. 2 who was the shadow witness, apparently claims to have hidden himself in a small room of the hall, where the appellant was said to be sitting when he allegedly received the illegal gratification. It is pointed out that a small room had a window opening into the hall and it is apparently claimed that the said witness had occasionally peeped through the window in order to see the sequence of events which according to the learned Senior Advocate is unbelievable, as in such a small confined space, any person every now and then peeping into the hall to see the action going on over there would definitely attract the attention of the appellant and it is inconceivable that the sequence of events as alleged by the prosecution could be accepted. He would point out that insofar as the evidence of P.W. 3 is concerned, he is again the IO, who is said to have hidden himself in the kitchen and looked into the hall while also keeping out of the sight of the appellant, which is again unbelievable. It is not the case of either P.W. 2 or P.W. 3 that they heard the appellant make a demand for the bribe. On the other hand, they speak of the hand gestures being made by the appellant which could mean anything. They have not explained as to how he could make hand gestures as to whether the bribe amount was ready. The learned Senior Advocate would further submit that it is also not readily acceptable that P.Ws. 2 and 3 were able to simultaneously see from two directions of the money being handed over and being received by the appellant. Incidentally, it is stated that apart from the presence of Manjula, the appellant, two witnesses, the daughter of Manjula Asha and the mother of Manjula were also present in the house. However, the prosecution did not choose to examine the daughter and mother of Manjula as witnesses. Incidentally, it is stated that apart from the presence of Manjula, the appellant, two witnesses, the daughter of Manjula Asha and the mother of Manjula were also present in the house. However, the prosecution did not choose to examine the daughter and mother of Manjula as witnesses. He would next contend that Manjula had carried on conversation with the appellant, according to the prosecution and it was all recorded in a microcassette recorder which was kept under the diwana, on which the appellant was seated. Significantly, the said tape recorder is never produced as part of the record. It is further pointed out that there was a previous recording even prior to the preparation of the trap, in order to record the conversation between Manjula and the appellant as to the demand for the bribe and fixing the bribe amount. Even that conversation or recording are not part of the record. In this fashion, when the very payment of the illegal gratification is not forthcoming from the complainant's evidence, the question of the evidence of other witnesses being sufficient to bring home the charges cannot be accepted, when they speak of the impossibility of they having witnessed the act from very close quarters, without the appellant becoming aware of their presence or noticing them. It is this the Court below has accepted as having been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. In this regard, he would place reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court. The learned Senior Advocate would draw attention to a decision of the Apex Court in Krishan Grander v. State of Delhi 2016(1) Supreme 129 , wherein the Trial Court had convicted the appellant therein for offences similarly alleged as in this case and the High Court had dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant, which was reversed by the Supreme Court holding thus: "36. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the approach of both the Trial Court and the High Court in the case is erroneous as both the Courts have relied upon the evidence of the prosecution on the aspect of demand of illegal gratification from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan (P.W. 2) by the appellant though there is no substantive evidence in this regard and the appellant was erroneously convicted for the charges framed against him. The prosecution has failed to prove the factum of demand of bribe money made by the appellant from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan (P.W. 2), which is the sine qua non for convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(l)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thus, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law and therefore, liable to be set aside." The learned Senior Advocate would also seek to draw sustenance from a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (2015)10 SCC 152 . The Supreme Court while discussing the settled position of law, insofar as the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount was concerned, has held as follows: "22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern the imperative prerequisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined in B. jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014)13 SCC 55 ; in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Section 13(l)(d)(i) and 13(l)(d)(ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is ex-tendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Section 13(l)(d)(i) and 13(l)(d)(ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasised, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise. 23. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasised, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise. 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Section 7 and 13(l)(d)(i) and 13(l)(d)(ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge there for, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, de hors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction there under. 24. The sheet anchor of the case of the prosecution is the evidence, in the facts and circumstances of the case, of P.W. 1-S. Udaya Bhaskar. The substance of his testimony, as has been alluded to herein above, would disclose qua the aspect of demand, that when the complainant did hand over to the appellant the renewal application, the latter enquired from the complainant as to whether he had brought the amount which he directed him to bring on the previous day, whereupon the complainant took out Rs. 500/- from the pocket of his shirt and handed over the same to the appellant. Though, a very spirited endeavour has been made by the learned Counsel for the State to correlate this statement of P.W. 1-S. Udaya Bhaskar to the attendant facts and circumstances including the recovery of this amount from the possession of the appellant by the trap team, identification of the currency notes used in the trap operation and also the chemical reaction of the sodium carbonate solution qua the appellant, we are left unpersuaded to return a finding that the prosecution in the instant case has been able to prove the factum of demand beyond reasonable doubt. Even if the evidence of P.W.I-S. Udaya Bhaskar is accepted on the face value, it falls short of the quality and decisiveness of the proof of demand of illegal gratification as enjoined by law to hold that the offence under Section 7 or Section 13(l)(d)(i) and 13(l)(d)(ii) of the Act has been proved. True it is, that on the demise of the complainant, primary evidence, it any, of the demand is not forthcoming. According to the prosecution, the demand had in fact been made on 3-10-1996 by the appellant to the complainant and on his complaint, the trap was laid on the next date i.e. 4-10-1996. However, the testimony of P.W. 1-S. Udaya Bhaskar does not reproduce the demand allegedly made by the appellant to the complainant which can be construed to be one as contemplated in law to enter a finding that the offence under Section 7 or Section 13(l)(d)(i) and 13(l)(d)(ii) of the Act against the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt." Therefore, the learned Senior Advocate would submit that the legal position is well-settled and the case of the appellant is squarely covered by the aforesaid decisions, which are nothing but reiteration and restatement of the law that has been consistently laid down by the Supreme Court and seek that the judgment of the Court below be set aside and the appellant be acquitted. 5. While on the other hand, Sri Prasanna Kumar, the learned Counsel appearing for the CBI would seek to justify the judgment of the Trial Court. Insofar as the grounds raised in the present appeal are concerned, the learned Counsel would submit that the contention that the demand and acceptance has not been proved satisfactorily and therefore the case of the prosecution would fall to the ground, may not be apt, as in the case on hand, there is no denial of the appellant having received the money. The appellant however has set up a defence that he was receiving refund of a loan that had been obtained by Manjula and it is the same stand taken by Manjula, though inconsistent with her complaint. In which event, it would be for the appellant to establish that he had indeed provided loan to Manjula and refund was being made at that point of time. This is the legal position when admittedly, the money is received by the accused. In which event, it would be for the appellant to establish that he had indeed provided loan to Manjula and refund was being made at that point of time. This is the legal position when admittedly, the money is received by the accused. In terms of Section 20 of the PC Act, the burden would shift on the accused and therefore it was incumbent on him to establish the fact that there was a loan transaction and the money was indeed repayment of the loan amount. And in that regard, he has miserably failed. Though the appellant had not produced any evidence in support of the loan transaction, the complainant, during the course of cross-examination, had stated that there was a notebook maintained by her of monies that she had borrowed from several persons, including the appellant and that she had noted down the date and amount that she had received from the appellant. However, no attempt was made to test the same before the Court, when the appellant had entered the witness-box and he had the opportunity to demonstrate that such payment was made. The further explanation as to the currency notes which had been treated before laying the trap and the manner in which it could have reached the hands of Manjula was sought to be explained by a vague reference to one Satyanarayana, a Union Leader. This again was a matter of evidence, which ought to have been proved by the accused, but he has failed to do. Merely making a reference to an earlier dispute between Satyanarayana and himself and seeking to claim that he had been framed at the instance of Satyanarayana, as an accused, has not been established and therefore it could be said that the appellant had failed to discharge his burden under Section 20 of the PC Act and consequently, it would be deemed that he had accepted the illegal gratification. In this regard, the learned Counsel would place reliance on following authorities: In Krishna Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009)11 SCC 708 , the Supreme Court has held that the presumption would be against the accused when he had failed to discharge that the amount recovered from his possession was indeed refund of a loan amount: "21. In this regard, the learned Counsel would place reliance on following authorities: In Krishna Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009)11 SCC 708 , the Supreme Court has held that the presumption would be against the accused when he had failed to discharge that the amount recovered from his possession was indeed refund of a loan amount: "21. Once it is proved that the money was recovered from the possession of the appellant, the burden of presumption as contemplated under Section 20 of the PC Act, 1988 shifts upon the appellant, which he could not rebut through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing reliable and convincing evidence to prove that D.W. 1 advanced Rs. 500/- as loan to the appellant through the complainant. D.W. 1-Ram Chandra has not given any reason why he chose the complainant alone to deliver a sum of Rs. 500/- to the appellant on the day when he was apprehended by the Anti-Corruption Team. In these circumstances, the High Court has rightly concluded that the explanation given by the appellant was not probable and reasonable." In Sayyed Shabiralli Hafizali v. State of Maharashtra (2009)6 SCC 724 , it is laid down by the Apex Court that mere explanation put forward by the accused would not take the place of proof and unless it is established by cogent evidence, the burden is not discharged. The learned Counsel for the respondent draws attention to paragraphs 16 to 18 of the judgment, which reads as follows: "16. Admittedly, when the post-trap panchnama was drawn the accused was present there. So also the panch witness, Sayajirao was present. After drawing the panchnama a copy of the same was immediately given to the accused. Not only that, he made endorsement on the original panchnama for having received a copy. If really the accused had handed over the receipt of the cloth to the complainant and accepted Rs. 100/- as a price of the lost cloth, he would have told the panchas as well as to the police that the receipt has been handed over to him and the said fact be mentioned in the panchanama but this has not happened. There was no mention about the accused having stated to have brought the chit of the cloth. 17. Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 reads as follows: "4. There was no mention about the accused having stated to have brought the chit of the cloth. 17. Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 reads as follows: "4. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. -(1) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or of an offence referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of this Act, punishable under sub-section (2) thereof, it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification, (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said Section 161, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code, or under clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of this Act, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward, such as is mentioned in Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the Court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing, aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn." 18. In State of Assam v. Krishna Rao, AIR 1973 SC 28 , it was observed as follows: "22. ... In State of Assam v. Krishna Rao, AIR 1973 SC 28 , it was observed as follows: "22. ... where it is proved that a gratification has been accepted, the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act shall at once arise, it is a presumption of law and it is obligatory on the Court to raise it in every case brought under Section 24. ... the words 'unless the contrary is proved' mean that the presumption raised by Section 4 has to be rebutted by proof and not by bare explanation which may be merely plausible. The required proof need not be such as is expected for sustaining a criminal conviction: it need only establish a high degree of probability."" In State of Assam v. Krishna Rao and Another (1973)3 SCC 227 it is laid down as follows: "22. In State of Madras v. A. Vaidiarrtha Iyer, 1958 SCR 580 , after reproducing the relevant provisions of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act this Court observed that where it is proved that a gratification has been accepted, the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act shall at once arise. It is a presumption of law and it is obligatory on the Court to raise it in every case brought under Section 4. In the reported case this Court allowed the appeal of the State of Madras and setting aside the impugned order of acquittal passed by the High Court restored that of the Special Judge convicting the respondent there. In C.I. Emden v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1960)2 SCR 592 , the appellant, who was working as a loco foreman, was found to have accepted a sum of Rs. 375 from a railway contractor. The appellant's explanation was that he bad borrowed the amount as he was in need of money for meeting the expenses of the clothing of his children who were studying in school. The Special Judge accepted the evidence of the contractor and held that the money had been taken as a bribe, that the defence story was improbable and untrue, that the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act had to be raised and that the presumption had not been rebutted by the appellant and accordingly convicted him under Section 161 of IPC and Section 5 oi the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. On appeal the High Court held that on the facts of that case the statutory presumption, under Section 4 had to be raised, that the explanation offered by the appellant was improbable and palpably unreasonable and that the presumption had not been rebutted, and upheld the conviction. The appellant contended, on appeal in this Court, inter alia: (i) that the presumption under Section 4 could not be raised merely on proof of acceptance of money but it had further to be proved that the money was accepted as a bribe; (ii) that even if the presumption arose it was rebutted when the appellant offered a reasonably probable explanation. This Court, dealing with the presumption under Section 4, observed that such presumption arose when it was shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration. The word 'gratification' in Section 4(1) was to be given its literal dictionary meaning of satisfaction of appetite or desire; it could not be construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe. The High Court was justified in raising the presumption against the appellant as it was admitted that he had received the money from the contractor and the amount received was other than legal remuneration. On the facts the explanation given by the accused, in agreement with the opinion of the High Court, was held to be wholly unsatisfactory and unreasonable. In Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 575 , it was observed that in order to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act what the prosecution has to prove is that the accused person has received 'gratification other than legal, remuneration' and when it is shown that he has received a certain sum of money which was not a legal remuneration, then, the condition prescribed by this section is satisfied and the presumption there under must be raised. In D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1966)3 SCR 736 , the above decisions were approved and it was observed that mere receipt of money is sufficient to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 23. In D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1966)3 SCR 736 , the above decisions were approved and it was observed that mere receipt of money is sufficient to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 23. Recently in Sailendranath Bose v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1292 , this Court reviewed the case-law on the point and observed: "We next take up the question as to the scope of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. As mentioned earlier, the appellant admits the fact that he received a sum of Rs. 5 from P.W. 4 on March 14,1964. Once that fact is admitted by him, the Court has to presume unless the contrary is proved by the appellant that he accepted the sum in question as a motive or reward for issuing the fit certificate. Mr. Mookherjea's contention was that the presumption in question does not arise unless the prosecution proves that the amount in question was paid as a bribe. He urged that the presumption under Section 4 arises only when the prosecution proves that the appellant had received 'any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person'. He laid stress on the word 'gratification' and according to him the word 'gratification' can only mean something that is given as a corrupt reward. If this contention of Mr. Mookherjea is correct then the presumption in question would become absolutely useless. It is not necessary to go into this question in any great detail as the question is no more res integra. In C.I. Emden v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), this Court held that the presumption under Section 4 arose when it was shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration. The word ’gratification' in Section 4(1) was given its literal dictionary meaning of satisfaction of appetite or desire; it could not be construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe." 24. The Court then set out a passage from Emden case (supra) which was followed in D.B. Desai case (supra) and D. Jhingan case (supra). The word ’gratification' in Section 4(1) was given its literal dictionary meaning of satisfaction of appetite or desire; it could not be construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe." 24. The Court then set out a passage from Emden case (supra) which was followed in D.B. Desai case (supra) and D. Jhingan case (supra). The Court then dealt with the question of the onus on the accused for proving the contrary and observed that, according to the well-settled view of this Court, the words "unless the contrary is proved" mean that the presumption raised by Section 4 has to be rebutted by proof and not by bare explanation which may be merely plausible. The required proof need not be such as is expected for sustaining a criminal conviction: it need only establish a high degree of probability." On the aspect as to whether the complainant having turned hostile would be fatal to the case of the prosecution, reliance is placed on Indra Vijay Alok v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016)1 SCC 709 . One of the principal witness having turned hostile, the Supreme Court has opined that if the credibility of the other witnesses in support of the prosecution is not shaken, that would be sufficient to bring home the charges, notwithstanding one of the principal witnesses having turned hostile. The learned Counsel would therefore submit that the contentions on the part of the appellant cannot be sustained in the above circumstances and seeks dismissal of the appeal. 6. In the light of the above rival contentions and from an examination of the record, insofar as the first contention of the learned Senior Advocate that it would be necessary for the complainant to support the case of the prosecution in the first place as that is the foundation on which the prosecution is laid, there is substance in the contention. As laid down by the Supreme Court, even if the key witness for the prosecution does not support the case of the prosecution, if the evidence of other witnesses is credible and not shaken in cross-examination, it would be enough to bring home the charge. Therefore, it would be necessary to examine how far the case of the prosecution can be sustained in the absence of the complainant seeking to support the case of the prosecution. Therefore, it would be necessary to examine how far the case of the prosecution can be sustained in the absence of the complainant seeking to support the case of the prosecution. In the lengthy cross-examination of the complainant, there have been contradictions and inconsistencies that have been elicited. Therefore, if the complainant has resiled from her complaint and has only given contradictory statements and there are in consistencies, there is no utility in such evidence to prove the case of the prosecution. It is then for this Court to examine how far the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3, who are the key witnesses, to bring home the charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant, can be sustained. There is a sketch available in the file, though it has not been marked as evidence to indicate the humble home of the complainant, in which the appellant is said to have been caught red-handed while receiving illegal gratification. There is an extended room towards the front of the house, which has a window looking into the hall, where the accused had seated himself and there is a door again from the hall providing entrance into the room. P.W. 2 is said to have hidden in the said room. It was at 1.30 p.m., that the incident is said to have taken place. It can then be presumed that there was sufficient light both inside and outside the hall and any movement either in the room or in the kitchen can be seen by anybody sitting in the hall. Therefore, if there were two people, one in the room and the other in the kitchen and if they were looking into the hall directly, it is quite possible that the appellant would have noticed it. Therefore, the only other possibility was that they had hidden themselves well out of sight and were keenly peeping to follow the sequence of events. If this had happened, the movement of somebody peeping his head out or looking into the hall would be noticed by a person sitting in the hall. Therefore, it would have to be presumed that both P.Ws. 2 and 3 had hidden themselves well and could not be noticed by the appellant at all and they were out of sight. If this had happened, the movement of somebody peeping his head out or looking into the hall would be noticed by a person sitting in the hall. Therefore, it would have to be presumed that both P.Ws. 2 and 3 had hidden themselves well and could not be noticed by the appellant at all and they were out of sight. In which event, the said witnesses having seen the appellant making any gestures, possibly asking in sign language, whether the money was ready and available, could not also have been seen by them. Further, the fact that Manjula handed over cash to the appellant could not also have been seen. This is not satisfactorily addressed in claiming that both the witnesses simultaneously watched the scene while keeping out of the sight of the appellant. This was not possible in a confined space such as that, at 1.30 p.m. when there was sufficient light, unless they had darkened both the room and the kitchen as preparation for such trial. There is no such evidence tendered. Further, it is the case of the prosecution that the money having been recovered from the possession of the appellant was sufficient to cast burden on the appellant. To discharge the burden that he had indeed received the money as gratification or rather as refund of a loan that he had lent Manjula, would require firstly that the money was illegal gratification which was received by the appellant and it is then that the burden shifts on the accused. If there was a defence to the effect that it was refund of money which is candidly supported by the complainant herself, it is difficult to presume that it was illegal gratification. The manner in which the currency notes may have been tendered before hand and how it reached Manjula would pale into insignificance. For it is quite possible that there was rivalry between the appellant and one Sathyanarayana who may have engineered such a trap being engineered. Further, it is noticed that P.W. 5, the appellant's superior had been examined as a witness and he has stated that the appellant was not in any way concerned with the compassionate appointment of employees and he was in a department which was alien to the same and therefore, the appellant was not in a position to showed any favour to the complainant's daughter in providing her employment. The contention that the appellant was carrying influence with P.W. 5 and was in a position to secure employment for the daughter of Manjula, is not the categorical case of the prosecution. In any event, any such allegation ought to have found place in the complaint and a charge ought to have been framed invoking Section 7 of the PC Act. The allegation ought to have been categorical of the appellant having influenced the complainant of being able to influence another public servant to secure favour for the complainant. This is not forthcoming. Therefore, on these circumstances, it is quite possible to accept the case of the appellant that the charges have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court below was not justified in holding that notwithstanding the complainant having turned hostile, the evidence of other witnesses was sufficient to bring home charges. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Court below is set aside. The accused is acquitted. The fine amount, if any, shall be refunded to the appellant. The bail bond stands cancelled.