JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has approached this Court praying for setting aside of orders dated 13.9.2016, 14.9.2016 and 17.9.2016 passed by learned Judge, Special Court under the NDPS Act being the Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Malda in Special Case No. 126 of 2016 arising out of Baishnabnagar P.S. Case No. 163 of 2016 dated 13.3.2016 under Section 21(c)/25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act refusing to grant statutory bail to the petitioner. 2. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had been arrested on the accusation of being in alleged possession of 950 grams of amphetamine powder of commercial quantify and was produced on 14.3.2013. The petitioner was entitled to statutory bail after expiry of 180 days on 9.9.2016. Prayer for such statutory bail was, in fact, made on 13.9.2016. 3. It is pertinent to note that no report had been filed by the Special Public Prosecutor prior to the expiry of 180 days as is required under law for extending the period of detention up to one year. 4. Under such circumstances, it is argued that the Court ought not have adjourned the matter for submission of report by the Public Prosecutor or alternatively charge sheet and ought to have granted statutory bail to the petitioner which had been lawfully availed of. 5. Mr. Gupta, learned lawyer appearing for the State submitted that the Court adjourned the matter in view of the fact that the Special Public Prosecutor was absent and in the absence of the Special Public Prosecutor the Court was unable to adjudicate the matter and charge sheet was filed soon thereafter on 15.9.2016 and the prayer for statutory bail was rightly turned down. 6. The issue, therefore, which has fallen for decision as to whether the petitioner was entitled to statutory bail in the aforesaid factual matrix. 7. Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act reads as follows :- “Section 36A(4) :- In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19 or section 24 or section 27-A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) thereof to “ninety days”, where they occur, shall be construed as reference to “one hundred and eighty days”. Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days.” 8. By operation of the aforesaid special statute the statutory period of detention has been extended to 180 days in cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic substance. Such statutory period of detention may be further extended up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor being filed indicating the progress of investigation and the specific reasons for detention beyond the said period of 180 days. 9. Hence, the condition precedent for extension of the statutory period of detention up to one year is by way of filing of a report by the Public Prosecutor, as aforesaid, and in the absence of such report being filed there is no escape from the conclusion that the statutory period of detention in such cases is restricted to 180 days and the accused is, therefore, entitled to bail on default upon expiry of such period. 10. In Sanjay Kumar Kedia @ Sanjay Kedia Vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau & Anr. (2009) 17 SCC 631 , the Apex Court held that such condition is mandatory and requires to be scrupulously complied with. It held as follows:- “12. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section 167 (2) of the Code has been increased to 180 days for several categories of offences under the Act but the proviso authorizes a yet further period of detention which may in total go upto one year, provided the stringent conditions provided therein are satisfied and are complied with. The conditions provided are: (1) a report of the public prosecutor, (2) which indicates the progress of the investigation, and (3) specifies the compelling reasons for seeking the detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days, and (4) after notice to the accused.” 11. Admittedly, no report was filed by the Special Public Prosecutor within the period of 180 days in the instant case and the petitioner had rightly invoked his statutory right to bail on default under such circumstances. 12. Admittedly, no report was filed by the Special Public Prosecutor within the period of 180 days in the instant case and the petitioner had rightly invoked his statutory right to bail on default under such circumstances. 12. Such prayer being availed of, it was not within the power of the Court to adjourn the same so as to enable the prosecution to file the report as envisaged under subsection (4) of Section 36A of the NDPS Act or to file charge sheet so as to frustrate the prayer for statutory bail. In Uday Mohanlal Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC 453 , a three-Judge Bench held as follows:- “6. The expression “if not already availed of” used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt case must be understood to mean when the accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in para (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the same. With the aforesaid interpretation of the expression “availed of” if the charge-sheet is filed subsequent to the availing of the indefeasible right by the accused then that right would not stand frustrated or extinguished, necessarily therefore, if an accused entitled to be released on bail by application of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, makes the application before the Magistrate, but the Magistrate erroneously refuses the same and rejects the application and then the accused moves the higher forum and while the matter remains pending before the higher forum for consideration a charge-sheet is filed, the so-called indefeasible right of the accused would not stand extinguished thereby, and on the other hand, the accused has to be released on bail. Such an accused, who thus is entitled to be released on bail in enforcement of his indefeasible right will, however, have to be produced before the Magistrate on a charge-sheet being filed in accordance with Section 209 and the Magistrate must deal with him in the matter of remand to custody subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail and subject to the provisions of cancellation of bail, already granted in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in the case of Mohd. Iqbal v. State of Maharashtra.” 13. This view was reiterated in UOI Vs. Nirala Yadav (2014) 9 SCC 457 which held as follows:- “47. Coming to the facts of the instant case, we find that prior to the date of expiry of 90 days which is the initial period for filing the charge-sheet, the prosecution neither had filed the charge-sheet nor had it filed an application for extension. Had an application for extension been filed, then the matter would have been totally different. After the respondent-accused filed the application, the prosecution submitted an application seeking extension of time for filing of the charge-sheet. Mr. P.K. Dey, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the same is permissible in view of the decision in Bipin Shantilal Panchal but on a studied scrutiny of the same we find that the said decision only dealt with whether extension could be sought from time to time till the completion of period as provided in the statute i.e. 180 days. It did not address the issue what could be the effect of not filing an application for extension prior to expiry of the period because in the factual matrix it was not necessary to do so. In the instant case, the day the accused filed the application for benefit of the default provision as engrafted under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 CrPC the Court required the accused to file a rejoinder-affidavit by the time the initial period provided under the statute had expired. There was no question of any contest as if the application for extension had been filed prior to the expiry of time. The adjournment by the learned Magistrate was misconceived. He was obliged on that day to deal with the application filed by the accused as required under Section 167(2) CrPC. There was no question of any contest as if the application for extension had been filed prior to the expiry of time. The adjournment by the learned Magistrate was misconceived. He was obliged on that day to deal with the application filed by the accused as required under Section 167(2) CrPC. We have no hesitation in saying that such procrastination frustrates the legislative mandate. A court cannot act to extinguish the right of an accused if the law so confers on him. Law has to prevail. The prosecution cannot avail such subterfuges to frustrate or destroy the legal right of the accused. Such an act is not permissible. If we permit ourselves to say so, the prosecution exhibited sheer negligence in not filing the application within the time which it was entitled to do so in law but made all adroit attempts to redeem the cause by its conduct.” 14. It is, therefore, clear that an act of Court should not prejudice anyone and statutory bail or bail by default on account of failure on the part of the prosecution to file the police report or seek extension before the expiry of 180 days ought not to be extinguished by adjourning such prayer for bail so as to enable the prosecution to file the charge sheet in the meantime and frustrate such right availed of by the accused. 15. It is trite law that statutory bail if availed of and illegally denied to an accused, subsequent filing of a police report shall not disentitle him from the said privilege. 16. Under such circumstances, I set aside the impugned orders, as aforesaid and direct that the petitioner shall be entitled to avail of statutory bail upon furnishing bond of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs only) with two sureties of Rs.2,00,000/- each (Rupees Two Lacs only), one of whom shall be local, to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court and on condition that the petitioner shall not leave the jurisdiction of the Trial Court without the leave of the Court and shall attend the proceeding on each and every date of hearing and in the event he fails to do so without any justifiable cause, the Trial Court would be at liberty to cancel the bail without any reference to this Court. 17. With the aforesaid direction, the petition is disposed of.