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2016 DIGILAW 847 (GAU)

Jagadish Borah v. Central Bureau of Investigation

2016-09-07

M.R.PATHAK

body2016
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : M.R. Pathak, J. Heard Mr. Kamal Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Jyotirmoy Roy, learned counsel for the accused petitioner and Mr. P.N. Choudhury, learned Standing counsel CBI, for the sole Opposite Party. 2. The facts of the case is that the then Development Commissioner (Handicrafts), Government of India, New Delhi, being responsible for development of handicrafts for the entire country, while visiting Guwahati felt the need for a handicraft museum under the Government/Public Sector Unit in the North-east for showcasing its rich heritage and handicrafts & textiles considering that the people of Northeast are culturally and traditionally linked and accordingly suggested the present petitioner for the same. In view of that the accused petitioner the then Managing Director of North Eastern Handicrafts and Hand-loom Development Corporation Limited (NEHHDCL, in short) in the first part of the year 2009 submitted an estimated fund amounting to Rs. 50,00,000/- proposing to set up the Handicrafts Museum at in the 'Dye House' of NEHHDCL, at Pub-Bora Gaon, Gorchuk, Guwahati to showcase the rich handicrafts and textiles of the North Eastern Region. Thereafter, the Central Government in the Handicrafts Department sanctioned grants-in-aid of Rs. 50,00,000/- to the NEHHDCL, Guwahati and released 50% of the said 50,00,000/- being Rs. 25,00,000/- towards payment as first instalment as nonrecurring grant-in-aid to the said corporation for setting up the said Handicrafts Museum. 3. It is alleged that the accused persons including the petitioner herein entered into a crimin;d conspiracy jointly or severely and the accused persons in connivance with the concerned personnel of NEHHDCL by fraudulent means, using forged documents and the accused officials of the said corporation by issuing limited tenders allotted the work relating to designing of the concerned Handicrafts Museum and also the civil repairing works, to one of the accuse person caused a total loss to the Government of India to the tune of Rs. 6,74,648/- and corresponding wrongful gain to the accused persons which discloses commission of cognisable offences under Sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC read with Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 6,74,648/- and corresponding wrongful gain to the accused persons which discloses commission of cognisable offences under Sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC read with Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Accordingly, a criminal case being RC 0172013 A0003 was registered against the accused persons including the petitioner and after investigation of the matter, the Opposite Party CBI on 20.02.2013 submitted the Final Report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. before the Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Guwahati against the petitioner, and two others. The said case was registered & numbered as Special Case No. 4/2014 (CBI Vs. Jagadish Bora & others) before the Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati. The charge sheet of the case submitted by the CBI reveals that the petitioner being the Managing Director of the NEHHDCI. is a public servant and misused his official power for his own benefit, misappropriate the money that was sanctioned by the Ministry of Handloom, Government of India, towards construction of the Handloom Museum at Guwahati under grants-in-aid received from the Development Commissioner (Handloom), Government of India. The learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati, after hearing both the prosecution as well as the defence, by his order dated 27.05.2016 passed in said Special Case No. 4/2014 rejected the prayer of the accused petitioner to discharge him from the charges levelled against him in the said charge sheet dated 20.02.2013 submitted by the CBI and came to a finding that the charges would be framed against the accused persons including the petitioner and fixed the case for framing charge against all the accused persons. 4. Being aggrieved with the said rejection of discharging the petitioner from the charges levelled against him under Sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 IPC read with Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the P.C Act 1988, the petitioner has preferred this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Section 397 Cr.P.C. and Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside and quash the order dated 27.05.2016 passed in said Special Case No. 4/2014 by Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati and to discharge him from all charges in said Special Case No. 4/2014. 5. 5. Amongst others the accused petitioner have submitted that the Special Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective and arrived at an erroneous finding vide order dated 27.5.2016 which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice since the Court concerned failed to note the serious contradictions and discrepancies in the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is urged by the petitioner that while filing the charge sheet in the case, the CBI failed to appreciate that the work of construction of Handicraft Museum was of public interest which was completed to the satisfaction of all concerned and the prosecution failed to produce any document or evidence which holds that CP WD manual is applicable to NEHHDC Ltd, Guwahati for giving contract to carry out its project and that the accused petitioner has flouted the norms prescribed in the CPWD manual in allotting the designed work of said museum to one M/S. Aak Art Gallery, New Delhi of which the accused No. 1 of the case, Smt. Kakoli Barkakati, is the proprietor. It is stated by the petitioner that NEHHDC Ltd. is a public limited company under the Companies Act, 1956 and the Special Judge mistakenly held that said NHHHDC Ltd. is a department of Government and also came to a wrong conclusion that it in allotting any construction work by the said corporation, the provisions of CPWD manual is mandatory. According to the petitioner there is no evidence or finding that any loss has been caused to the said corporation or that the accused petitioner has obtained any pecuniary gain for himself or others by dishonest intention, corruption, illegal process or by abuse of his position being a public servant and therefore, in absence of any such material, no charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 specifically under Sections 13(l)(d)&13(2) of the said 1988 Act could be framed against him. The petitioner also contended that as the charge sheet does not reveal any criminal intent on the part of the accused petitioner, he cannot be charged under criminal offences. The petitioner also contended that as the charge sheet does not reveal any criminal intent on the part of the accused petitioner, he cannot be charged under criminal offences. The petitioner stated that he served as Managing Director of said NEHHDC Ltd. with effect from 01.05.2008 and left the said job on 25.01.2013 (accused petitioner retired on superannuation on 30.01.2013) and the investigation conducted by the CBI was done in his absence after his retirement from said corporation and therefore, it is urged by him that the charge sheet filed by the CBI in the case is perverse as the CBI failed to appreciate the involvement of the accused petitioner and took a wrong view that he was involved in all stages of the proceeding. It is further stated that the petitioner being the Managing Director, it was not possible on his part to verify the credentials of the parties and as because he was the Managing Director he was bound to depend on his officers who are competent enough to take decisions, more so when the Committee has been constituted to verify the matters involving the case regarding issuance of contract to the accused No. 1; but the CBI failed to appreciate this aspect of the matter and the Special judge without considering all these passed the impugned order dated 27.05.2016. It is stated by the petitioner that the contract in question was given to the lowest bidder, the accused No. 1 and therefore, the question of involvement of the accused petitioner regarding misappropriation of fund in collusion with the accused persons that was sanctioned by the Central Government does not arise. According to the petitioner, no rule has been framed by the NEHHDC Ltd., Guwahati for issuance of any tender by it and the allotment of tender to accused No. 1 was a collective decision of the Tender Committee NEHHDC Ltd, which only needed approval of the accused petitioner, he being the Managing Director of the Corporation. 6. According to the petitioner, no rule has been framed by the NEHHDC Ltd., Guwahati for issuance of any tender by it and the allotment of tender to accused No. 1 was a collective decision of the Tender Committee NEHHDC Ltd, which only needed approval of the accused petitioner, he being the Managing Director of the Corporation. 6. The petitioner submitted that under the provisions of Section 226 of the Cr.P.C., it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to place all evidence before the Court by which charge has to be established and it is the duty of the Court to consider judiciously whether the material available on record warrants framing of the charges and that the Court should not blindly accept the decision of the prosecution directing the accused to face the trial and that in the present case, the learned Special Judge failed to appreciate the same in spite of there being no evidence on record to show that the accused petitioner has committed the offence as alleged. It is submitted by the accused petitioner that as there is no sufficient ground to proceed against him. the learned Special Judge failed to appreciate the facts of the case in appropriate manner and in-spite of prosecution's failure to place relevant evidence and record in the case, therefore, the impugned order dated 27.05.2016 passed the learned Special Judge, CBI. Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati in Special Case No. 4/2014 is liable to be set aside and quashed. 7. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. K. Agarwal for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgments reported in (1977) 4SCC 137 (Amur Nath Vs. State of Haryana); (1977) 4 SCC 551 (Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maha-rastra); (1998) 5 SCC 749 (Pepsi Foods Ltd. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate); (1998) 7 SCC 698 and (2000) 2 SCC 636 (G Sugar Suri Vs. State of U.P.) with regard to quashing of criminal proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., at the stage of framing charge, when no offence has been made out against the accused person and still why such accused persons require to undergo the agony of the criminal trial and t hat the accused persons are not debarred from approaching the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the criminal proceeding even at an earlier point of time when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. 8. 8. Perused the judgments cited by the learned Senior counsel and from all the judgments, it is seen that the Hon'ble Apex Court have clearly spelt out that High Court while quashing the proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. even after filing of charge sheet should exercise the said power sparingly in the interest of justice where the Court comes to a clear finding that continuation of such criminal proceeding against an accused person would be an abuse of the process of Court and in situations to prevent such abuse and to secure the ends of justice. 9. In the case of State of J. & K. Vs. Romesh Chander, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 90 , the Hon'ble Apex Court have held that - "The charge-sheet constitutes prima facie evidence constituting the offence for proceeding further in the matter. Necessarily, therefore, the Court has to look into the relevant law and the allegations made in the charge-sheet and then consider whether any offence has been committed to frame charges for trial before discharging the accused. Since the High Court has not done that, we think it proper that the High Court should reconsider the matter and dispose of it in accordance with law." 10. A three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 regarding High Court's inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a proceeding pending before the Sessions Judge on the ground of insufficiency of evidence have held that:- "The order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. It was held by this Court, while considering the true scope of Section 203 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not bound to accept the result of an enquiry or investigation and that he must apply his judicial mind to the material on which he had to form his judgment. It was held by this Court, while considering the true scope of Section 203 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not bound to accept the result of an enquiry or investigation and that he must apply his judicial mind to the material on which he had to form his judgment. These decisions show that for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible." 11. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 393 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case under Sections 227, 228, 219 Cr.P.C. regarding order of discharge or framing of charge against accused have held that - "If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the Court has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused is made out. The material placed before the Court must disclose grave suspicion against the accused. When two views are equally possible and if the Court finds that the material produced before it while giving rise to some suspicion does not give rise to grave suspicion against the accused, it will be fully within its right to discharge the accused. At Section 227 Cr.P.C. stage the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on." 12. In a matter where offences were tried by Special Judge under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. In a matter where offences were tried by Special Judge under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 4 , regarding Special Judge's power to pass order of discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. have observed that - "the legislatures have amended the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in order to cut out delays and simplify' the procedure and that the amended provisions of Section 227 Cr.P.C. conferred a dual responsibility on the trial Judge who is required first to examine the case on the basis of the statement of witnesses recorded by the police and the documents filed with a view to find out whether a prima facie case for trial has been made out and, then if such a case is made out to proceed to try the same and according to their Lordships' view the legislature has adopted the said course in order to avoid frivolous prosecutions and prevent the accused from being tried of an offence on materials which do not furnish a reasonable probability of conviction. In the said case, Hon'ble Apex Court also observed that as the offences alleged to have been committed by the respondents fall within the provisions of the Act, the Special Judge has been substituted for the Sessions Judge, the procedure of the Sessions Court having been applied fully to the trial of such cases. Thus, it is manifest that the accused has got only one opportunity and that too before the Sessions Judge for showing that no case for trial had been made out. This was obviously done to expedite the disposal of the criminal cases. Thus, it is manifest that the accused has got only one opportunity and that too before the Sessions Judge for showing that no case for trial had been made out. This was obviously done to expedite the disposal of the criminal cases. Hon'ble Court also observed that after the amendment of the Cr.P.C., the power of discharge has been entrusted to a senior court, namely, the Sessions Judge who is to conduct the trial himself and who has to decide before commencing the trial as to whether or not charges should be framed in a particular case against the respondents and as the said discretion, is now required to be exercised by a senior and more experienced court so as to exclude any abuse of power, therefore in that view of the matter, it is manifest that if the Sessions Judge exercises his discretion in discharging the accused for reasons recorded by him, his discretion should not normally be disturbed by the High Court or by this Court." 13. By interpreting and analysing the provisions of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. so far as pure sessions trials are concerned the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case of Prafulla Kumar Samal, (Supra) has held as follows:- "7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus: "If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." The words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex-facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 8. The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh reported in (1977)4 SCC 39 where Untwalia, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows: "Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.'' This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out. 9. In the case of K.P. Raghavan Vs. M.H. Abbas reported in AIR 1967 SC 640 this Court observed as follows: "No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. is not to act as a mere Post Office, and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session." To the same effect is the later decision of this Court in the case of Almohan Das Vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1970 SC 740 where Shah, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows: "A Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused: if there is some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case." In the aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope and ambit of Section 209 of the Code of 1898. Considering all the aforesaid authorities the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case of Prafulla Kumar Samal, (Supra) at Para 10 have held as follows: "10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge: (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two view's are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. I his however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial." 14. In the case of State of T.N. Vs. N. Suresh Rajan, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709 regarding framing of charge and discharge of accused under Section 227 Cr.P.C., the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that:- "True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging there from taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law' does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad Vs. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 715 . regarding discharge or framing of charge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. have held that - "In fact. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into. We wish to add a word regarding interference by the High Court against a charge framed by the Sessions Court. Section 227 which confers power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed." 16. Again in the case of Hem Chand Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 113 , regarding jurisdiction of Court at the stage of fhtming of charge under Sections 227, 228, 239 & 240 Cr.P.C., the Hon'ble Apex Court have held that - "It is beyond any doubt or dispute that at the stage of framing of charge, the court will not weigh the evidence. The stage for appreciating the evidence for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion as to whether the prosecution was able to bring home the charge against the accused or not would arise only after all the evidence is brought on record at the trial. It is one thing to say that on the basis of the admitted documents, the appellant was in a position to show that the charges could not have been framed against him, but it is another thing to say that for the said purpose he could rely upon some documents whereupon the prosecution would not rely. The court at the stage of framing charge exercises a limited jurisdiction it would only have to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out. The court at the stage of framing charge exercises a limited jurisdiction it would only have to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out. Whether a case of probable conviction for commission of an offence has been made out on the basis of the materials found during investigation should be the concern of the court. It, at that stage, would not delve deep into the matter for the purpose of appreciation of evidence. It would ordinarily not consider as to whether the accused would be able to establish his defence, if any." 17. Coming back to the case in hand, it is seen that the Annexures appended to the petition, clearly reflects that the North Eastern Handicrafts and Handlooms Development Corporation Limited, Guwahati is a Government of India Enterprise and therefore the petitioner while serving as the Managing Director of said NEHHDC Limited was a Government Servant. Further, from the charge sheet filed by the CBI involved in this case reflects that though the Tender Committee prepared a comparative statement on 16.02.2010 of the quotations received from the three firms/parties, the NEHHDC Limited flouted regarding the notice inviting tender dated 12.01.2010 for undertaking the design, concept development, supervision and execution of the Handicrafts Museum at Pub Boragaon, Gorchuk, Guwahati at an estimated value of Rs. 15,00,000/- and the proceedings drawn in that regard recommending the award of work to one M/s. Aak Art Gallery, New Delhi being the lowest bidder at the quoted rale of Rs. 14,99,200/- given to the accused No. 1 Ms. Kakoli Barkakati proprietor of the said firm after getting approval from the accused petitioner from accuse petitioner, the then Managing Director of said NEHHDC Ltd. was just a mere formality since the accused petitioner already decided that the tender for designing the said museum at Gorchuk, Guwahati would be allotted to the said accused No. 1 and the investigation has established that on 12.01.2010. the day on which the NIT for the museum work was to be floated, said accused No. 1 proprietor of M/s. Aak, Art gallery New Delhi visited the museum at Gorchuk along with the accused petitioner and one Mr. R. Sen and on the said date itself said R. Sen prepared a report with the assistance of said accused No. 1, Ms. Kakoli Barkakati which was in the handwriting of said Mr. R. Sen and on the said date itself said R. Sen prepared a report with the assistance of said accused No. 1, Ms. Kakoli Barkakati which was in the handwriting of said Mr. R. Sen and accused No. 1 Ms. Kakoli Barkakati. Further on the same day i.e. 12.01.2010 itself the said accused No. 1 prepared an estimate wherein the value of Rs. 15,00.000/- was indicated and the said estimate report of accused No. 1 was duly proved by said Sri R. Sen. Moreover, as proved by CFSL report dated 09.04.2014, all the three quotations i.e. in favour of M/S. Aak Art Gallery, New Delhi, of the aforesaid accused No. 1, M/S. Indrani Merchandise of the accused No. 2 Riten Barkakoti, brother of accused No. 1 and one M/S. D1) Agencies, a non-existent firm, which could not be traced out at the given address, were submitted by the said accused No. 1 Ms. Kakoli Barkakoti as evidence from the fact that the envelopes of all the three firms was written by the said accused No. 1. The charge sheet also reveals that the accused No. 2 Sri Riten Barkakti received three cheques in favour of M/S. Aak Art Gallery of accused No. 1 whereas the said accused No. 2 was only authorised to receive only one cheque of Rs. 97,843/- towards security money, that was never deposited with the NEHHDC Ltd. by said M/S. Aak Art Gallery of accused No. 1 at any point of time. The record of the case also reveals that the accused No. 2 Riten Barkakoti accepted the terms & conditions of work order issued in favour of his sister Ms. Kakoli Barkakoti, accused No. 1's farm M/s. Aak Art gallery, New Delhi and the said accused No. 2, who is the signatory in the work order in favour of said M/s. Aak Art Gallery, in connivance with the accused petitioner obtained the work order and further, the record reveals that the accused petitioner abusing his official position as a public servant being the Managing Director of said NEHHDC Ltd. conspired with accused No. 1 and accused No. 2 dishonestly & fraudulently issued limited tender in favour of accused No. 1 Ms. Kakoli Barkakoti instead of issuing the open tender knowing fully well that an open tender is required to be invited for a work of above Rs. Kakoli Barkakoti instead of issuing the open tender knowing fully well that an open tender is required to be invited for a work of above Rs. 5,00,000/-, which is a clear cut case on the part of public servant to show undue favour to the private persons unlawfully by flouting established norms. The charge sheet also reveals that some documents were sent for expert opinion of the forensic laboratories and others, which was still awaited to be filed as and when received from the CSFL, Guwahati. 18. From the impugned order dated 27.05.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI. Assam. Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati in Special Case No. 4/2014, it is seen that learned Judge came to a finding that NEHHDC Ltd. being a Government of India undertaking is a Central Government institution and therefore, the provisions of CPWD manual is applicable and therefore, the officers of said NEHHDC Ltd. are required to follow the procedure of calling tender as per CPWD work manual for its construction work. The Special Judge also considered the provisions of General Financial Rules incorporating Compendium Rules of Advances and came to the finding that the accused petitioner being the Managing Director of said NEHHDC Ltd. did not follow the procedure of the Rule 130, 132 and Sub-Rule of General Financial Rules and he allotted the work by violating the provisions of CPWD rules and General Financial Rules and rejected the submission of the accused petitioner that CPWD rules is not applicable to the case in hand. Moreover, the Special Judge considering the materials on record came to a finding that the accused persons including the petitioner herein are involved in the misappropriation of money in collusion with each other and that there are materials against the accused persons. Considering all these the Special Judge, by the impugned order dated 27.05.2016 did not find any reason to discharge the accused persons at the stage of passing order on the framing of charge and rejected the prayer of the accused persons for discharging them in the said in Special Case No. 4/2014. 19. Considering all these the Special Judge, by the impugned order dated 27.05.2016 did not find any reason to discharge the accused persons at the stage of passing order on the framing of charge and rejected the prayer of the accused persons for discharging them in the said in Special Case No. 4/2014. 19. Considering the above decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court it can be seen that the Court concerned has to be satisfied about the prima facie existence of relevant ingredients constituting the offence and if the evidence discloses prima facie commission of alleged offence, the said court is required to frame charge against the accused. This Court in the case of Smt. Situ Devi & Anr. Vs. Sri Shyam Singh & Ors. reported in 1994 Crl.L.J. 26 have held that at the stage of framing of charge under Section 227/228 Cr.P.C., it is to be seen whether a prima facie case regarding the commission of certain offence is made out or not and the question whether the charges has been proved or not can be determined only after evidence is recorded in the case. At the time of framing of charge, the Court does not see any independent corroboration to suffice the evidence for conviction. Further, if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a court can justifiably says that a prima facie case exists against him and framing of charge is justified. Law is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge under Section 227, 228 Cr.P.C. the Court would not indulge in meticulous evidence but it is required to evaluate the material and document on record with a view to finding of the fact emerging there from taken at the face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. 20. 20. Considering the above, it is found that the Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati by his impugned decision dated 27.05.2016 passed in Special Case No. 4/2014 while rejecting to discharge the accused persons including the petitioner from the said Special Case at the stage of framing of charge in the said case, being satisfied about the prima facie existence of materials against the accused persons came to the conclusion that there is reason to proceed with the case against the accused persons including the petitioner by full trial to ascertain the fact of their involvement. 21. But at the same time it is found that the Special Judge in his said order dated 27.05.2016 did not specify about the offence so constituted with regard to which the Court found prima facie material pertaining to the commission of such offence by the accused persons including the petitioner. 22. As the impugned order dated 27.05.2016 did not stipulate and spell out the offence for which the Special Court found prima facie materials against the accused persons, including the petitioner, therefore, the said order dated 27.05.2016 passed by Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati passed in Special Case No. 4/2014 being bad in law is hereby set aside and quashed to that extent, with the direction that the Special Judge concerned shall pass an appropriate order specifying the offences with regard to materials available against the accused persons on the basis of which he came to the conclusion that there is reason to proceed with the case against those accused persons including the petitioner by full trial. 23. Accordingly, this criminal petition is partly allowed. Learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati shall pass the order as directed above, at an early date, preferably within a period of 60 (sixty) days from the date of receipt of this order. 24. Registry shall furnish a copy of this order to the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1, Guwahati immediately for necessary compliance. No order as to cost.