JUDGMENT S.N. PRASAD, J. - In this writ petition the award dtd. 30.12.2008 passed in I.D. Case No. 102 of 2002 is under challenge whereby and where under the direction has been passed for reinstatement of the workmen in service after due identification by the representatives of the Union as per the list attached to the reference with a sump sum amount of Rs. 25,000/- only as compensation in lieu of back wages to each workman. Failing which the amount shall carry interest @ 9% per annum till its realization. 2.The workmen have raised a dispute which ultimately culminated in to following reference:- “Where the action of the management of Puri Electrical Division, Puri in refusing employment of Sri Gadadhar Biswal and 65 others as per list enclosed herewith is legal and or justified? If not to what relief they are entitled to? 3.The case of the workmen is that they were working under Puri Electrical Division, Puri as NMR workers till 1.4.1995, thereafter the management refused employment to them and while refusing, Section 25F and 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has not been complied with. They have completed 240 days of continuous service under the management before they were refused employment. Moreover some juniors were allowed to continue in service after the above said workmen were retrenched which is unjustified and illegal and as such they are entitled to be reinstated with full back wages. 4.While on the other hand the case of the management is that Puri Electrical Division, Puri which is coming under the Central Zone and was under the control of erstwhile OSEB, with the reform process came under the control of GRIDCO, thereafter under the control of CESCO and at present is functioning under CESU and for smooth functioning of distribution business some staff and workers were appointed as per the norms and guidelines of erstwhile OSEB. Apart from the permanent staff some casual worker were also engaged for construction and maintenance of line according to the need where ever it is required. They were being engaged temporarily for a short period to complete a particular nature of work and after completion of the work they were being disengaged and as such no formal appointment letter was issued to any of them. They were being engaged temporarily for a short period to complete a particular nature of work and after completion of the work they were being disengaged and as such no formal appointment letter was issued to any of them. The said casual labours/NMR workers were being appointed on daily wage basis and as such no notice issued to them at the time of their disengagement. None of workmen has completed continuous service for a period of 240 days. The management has furnished the detail particulars of some workmen and the period of their engagement in the year 1981, 1982 and 1983. So, according to the management compliance of Section 25F and 25N of the Act, 1947 were not required. 5.Learned senior counsel representing the management while assailing the award has taken the following grounds:- (i) The Central Electricity Supply Utility (in short CESU) is not liable to engage the workmen due to restructuring of Orissa State Electricity Board by way of Reformation Act having been promulgated by the State of Orissa under Orissa Electricity Reforms Act, 1995 and as per the said reorganization having been taken w.e.f. 1.4.1996 GRIDCO has taken over the transmission and distribution business and the Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (in short OHPC) has taken over the Hydropower Generation business of OSEB. The distribution business came under the control of GRIDCO and for smooth functioning of the distribution business, GRIDCO on 19.11.1997 incorporated four wholly owned subsidiary companies for effecting transfer of distribution functions to those companies in the respective four distribution zones, namely, (1) Central Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Ltd. (CESCO), at present known as CESU, Bhubaneswar for Central Zone, (2) Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Ltd. (SOUTHCO), Berhampur for southern zone, (3) North Eastern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Ltd. (NESCO) Balasore for north eastern zone and (4) Western Electricity Company of Orissa Ltd. (WESCO) Burla for western zone. Puri Electrical Division, Puri which is coming under Central Zone was under the control of erstwhile OSEB, with the reform process the said division came under the control of GRIDCO, thereafter under the control of CESCO and at present is functioning under CESU, hence in view of the foundational change in the restructuring of the Board, now the award cannot be said to be binding upon CESU. (ii) There is delay of 7 years in raising the dispute and as such on the ground of delay the Labour Court ought to have rejected the claim of the workmen. (iii) The Labour Court has not appreciated the fact that there is no evidence to the effect that all the workmen who are the members of the association have worked for 240 days regularly, the same has not been brought on record by the workmen, rather the evidence regarding continuity of service for 240 days has been brought only by the four workmen, but the Labour Court on the basis of continuity of service of four workers only has came to conclusion that all the workmen who are related to the dispute have performed their duties continuously for a period of 240 days and thereafter came to conclusion that there is violation of Sec. 25F of the Act, 1947. 6.While on the other hand learned counsel appearing for the workmen has vehemently opposed the prayer of learned senior counsel representing the petitioner –management by submitting that the Labour Court has passed the award which suffers from no infirmity. The reference is against the Executive Engineer, Puri Electrical Division, Puri and the Puri Electrical Division, Puri is now under the control of CESU, hence the award is to be implemented by the Executive Engineer, Puri Electrical Division, Puri where the workmen were continuing in service. He submits that even there is foundational change in restructuring but that foundational change is only in the administrative and managerial level without touching the zonal/divisional/field offices and only the control has been shifted from the erstwhile Orissa State Electricity Board to different functionaries and in this case upon the CESU, hence merely due to the reason of restructuring of the Orissa State Electricity Board, it cannot be said that CESU is not liable to implement the award. The point with respect to the liability of CESU is being raised for the first time before this Court and it has not been raised either before the Labour Court at the time when the award was passed on 30.12.2008, even not before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 3272 of 2009 which has been preferred by the workmen assailing the award dtd. 30.12.2008 and even not before the Labour Court when the matter has been initiated afresh in pursuance to the direction passed by this Court in W.P. © No. 3272 of 2009 and as such the management cannot be allowed to agitate this issue for the first time at such a belated stage, that too before this Court. He submits that four workers have given their evidence but that cannot be confined to them only, rather the evidence has been brought on record even with respect to the other workmen. He further submits that the scope of High Court is very limited in the matter of interfering in the finding given by the Labour Court since only in case of perversity or error apparent on record, High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere for the purpose of issuance of writ of certiorari and ‘perversity’ is well defined, i.e. if any point is being raised or has been raised before the Labour Court or the Tribunal or before any authority and if no finding to that effect is being given by the authority or the quasi judicial body, then it would be said to be perverse order. Since the petitioner is raising the point of liability of CESU for the first time before this Court in the second round of litigation, as such on that ground it cannot be said that the Labour Court has committed any error, rather it will be said that there is no perversity in the award since this point has never been raised by the management before the Labour Court. 7.Parties have been heard at length and documents have been perused. So far as the point raised by the management under ground no. (i) that CESU is not liable in any way with respect to the dispute which is the subject matter of the instant writ petition, but this argument is not worth to be considered for the reasons: The reference is made to the effect that “whether the action of the management of Puri Electrical Division, Puri in refusing employment of Sri Gadadhar Biswal and 65 others as per the list enclosed herewith is legal and are justified? If not, to what relief they are entitled to?” After going through the reference it is evident that the reference is against the action of the management of Puri Electrical Division, Puri and the said reference was made by the appropriate Government in exercise of power conferred under sub-section 5 of Section 12 read with clause 12 of sub-section 1 of Section 10 of the I.D. Act on 3.9.2002, i.e. after promulgation of Orissa Electricity Reforms Act, 1995 which has been implemented w.e.f. 01.04.1996 whereby and where under the GRIDCO has taken over the transmission and distribution business, OHPC has taken over the Hydropower Generation Business of OSEB. For smooth functioning of distribution business GRIDCO has constituted four subsidiary companies on 19.11.1997 and one of the subsidiary companies is CESU, under which the management of Puri Electrical Division, Puri is directly under the control, earlier it was under the control of OSEB. The management has never challenged the terms of reference by assailing the reference as to why after the Reformation Act, 1995 having came into effect w.e.f. 1.4.1996, the management of Puri Electrical Division, Puri has been put to question for its adjudication before the Labour Court. The Labour Court has passed an award on 30.12.2008, although answering the reference against the opposite party-workmen, which has been challenged by the workmen before this Court under its writ jurisdiction being W.P.(C) No. 3272 of 2009 and this Court while disposing of the writ petition vide order dtd. 24.2.2010 has remitted the matter before the Labour Court directing the management to produce the documents which are under its custody, but in the writ petition also although the management of Puri Electrical Division, Puri has appeared and in his presence the order has been passed, but nowhere this point has been raised regarding liability of CESU, rather the management has again contested the case before the Labour Court when it has been initiated afresh for adjudicating the issue in pursuance to which the fresh award has been passed on 19.1.2011. The reformation Act, 1995 having been promulgated by the State of Orissa for restructuring the Orissa Electricity Board, whereby and where under the restructure has been done and the result is the creation of subsidiary companies to look after the distribution and transmission business of the erstwhile Orissa State Electricity Board, but that does not mean that the management and administrative of the circle or the division or the sub-division has also been changed, rather the set up which was under the circle or under the division or under the sub-division was same, but only the change was the controlling authority since previously it was under the control of OSEB, now it is under the control of subsidiary companies having control over the respective zones and CESU is meant for controlling the distribution function for central zone having its head office at Bhubaneswar under which the decision of Puri comes under its control, meaning thereby merely because the foundational structure has been changed, it does not mean that the structure or the liability in the circle or divisional level will also deemed to have been changed and that is the reason the management has not challenged the terms of reference regarding questioning the action of the Electrical Executive Engineer, Puri in disengaging the workmen from services and since it has not been challenged the management cannot be allowed to raise this point for the first time before this Court in the second round of litigation under writ jurisdiction. There is no dispute about the fact that the legal question can be raised at any stage of proceeding, but it cannot be said as a legal question, rather it is the factual position and the management ought to have raised this point from its inception, but in spite of ample opportunity, the management has not chosen to raise it. In view of the discussion made herein above we find there is no merit in the argument so far ground no. (i) is concerned. 8.So far as ground no.(ii) is concerned, learned senior counsel has submitted that since there is delay of seven years, as such the award should not have been passed. In view of the discussion made herein above we find there is no merit in the argument so far ground no. (i) is concerned. 8.So far as ground no.(ii) is concerned, learned senior counsel has submitted that since there is delay of seven years, as such the award should not have been passed. Admittedly the dispute has been raised by the workmen and the reference has been made on 03.09.2002 and according to the management the petitioner has been refused to work from the year 1978 till 31.03.1995 and from 1995 till 2002 there is delay of 7 years, hence the reference itself is bad in the eye of law due to the reason of delay of 7 years and to that effect learned senior counsel has relied upon the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India Vrs. Gopinath Sharma, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 221 . We have gone through the record and from the pleading it is nowhere been stated by the petitioner that as to when the dispute has been raised by the workmen and when it has been referred before the Conciliation Officer. However, we find from the written statement filed by the management that a joint enquiry report was submitted before the District Labour Officer, Khurda vide letter No. 4682 dtd. 23.8.1999 with a copy to the General Secretary, O.S.E.B. , Shramik Mahasangha, Bhubaneswar vide memo No. 4683 dtd. 23.8.2004, from which we gathered that at least on 23.8.1999 an enquiry report was submitted before the District Labour Officer who was the Conciliation Officer and as such it cannot be said that the workmen is at fault in causing delay in raising the dispute, rather from 23.8.1999 the matter was pending before the District Labour Officer and thereafter on the failure report, the reference has been made on 3.9.2002, hence delay cannot be said to be attributable to the workmen. So far as reliance placed in the judgment rendered in the case of Reserve Bank of India (supra) the said judgment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case since in that case there is delay of 13 years in making the reference, but that is not the fact here as has been discussed herein above. In view of the discussion made herein above this ground is also having no force. In view of the discussion made herein above this ground is also having no force. 9.So far as merit of the case is concerned, the admitted position is that on the basis of reference dtd. 3.9.2002 the Labour Court has passed award on 30.12.2008 answering the reference against the workmen for the reason that no document have been produced by the management for proving the fact regarding continuity of service of the workmen as to whether they have worked for 240 days or not and the Labour Court without making any exercise directed the management to produce the documents, without making any adverse inference against the management for non-furnishing the document has answered the reference against the workmen, hence the workmen has assailed this by challenging the award before this Court in W.P. © No. 3272 of 2009 which was disposed of on 22.4.2010, this Court while disposing of the writ petition directed for production of document by the management, in pursuance to the said direction passed by this Court in W.P. © No. 3272 of 2009 the Labour Court has initiated proceeding afresh but the management, in spite of specific direction passed by this Court has not produced the documents as would be evident from the detail discussion made by the Labour Court at paragraph 10, i.e. “inspite of direction of this Court, the management has not produced any such document” and no specific reason has been given by the management for non-production of document as called for, hence non-production of document by the employer and thereafter placing reliance upon the judgment in the case of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vrs. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda, reported in AIR 2010 SC 1236 whereby and where under it has been held that the workmen would have difficulty in having access to all official documents, muster roll etc. in connection with his service and when the workmen claimed and deposed that he worked for 240 days, burden of proof shifts to employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in requisite period to constitute continuous service and in view thereof the adverse inference has been drawn against the management for non-production of such documents and thereafter the Labour Court has held that there is violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act which is a pre-condition one before retrenchment. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vrs. Jagannath, reported in AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853 wherein their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraphs 7 and 8 as follows:- “7……. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of like find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court . He can be summarily thrown out any stage of the litigation. 8…..A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side than he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.” Thus it is evident after going through judgment that it is duty of the parties to produce all the relevant documents in order to assist the Court properly for passing an appropriate order and in case a party, specifically the State conceals any document from the Court, it amount to playing with the Court, in other words it is fraud upon the Court. In the backdrop of this factual aspect the ground taken by the management that documents have not been proved is not sustainable. 10.The Labour Court after taking into consideration the material available on record and depositions of the workmen that they have discharged their duty continuously for a period of 240 days and it will be said to be continuous service in view of provision of Section 25B(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hence the pre-conditions stipulated U/s. 25 F of the I.D. Act ought to have been followed mandatorily, but since it has not been followed, as such there is violation of Sec. 25F of the Act, 1947, accordingly the order of re-instatement has been passed. Learned senior counsel has submitted that the deposition of only four workmen has been taken with respect to continuation in service, but that is contrary to the record as because in the award it has been referred that the workmen have deposed regarding the work having been performed by the other workmen, moreover the fact regarding continuity in service could only be proved from the document which has never been produced before the Labour Court and accordingly the adverse inference has been drawn. In view thereof this argument has also got no force. In view of the discussion having been made by us hereinabove, we find that the Labour Court after discussing in detail the materials produced before it has given finding. Since the finding given by the Labour Court is based upon the materials available before it and it is settled position that scope of High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to reverse the fact finding given by the Labour Court or Tribunal is very limited. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in this case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others. AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it has been held that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not exercise its power to review the fact finding giving by the Tribunal after appreciation of the factual aspect produced before it, otherwise also it will be said that the High Court has acted as appellate Court. The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob(supra) still holds good and in this respect reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” From perusal of the proposition laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases referred herein above it is evident that the scope of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to reverse the fact finding given by the Tribunal or the Labour Court is very limited to the extent that in case of perversity in the finding or in case of error apparent on the face of record, the High Court can interfere regarding the finding of the Labour Court or the Tribunal, but after the detailed discussion having been made in this order as above, there is no perversity in the finding or error apparent on the face of record, hence this Court declines to interfere with the finding given by the labour Court regarding non-observation of provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. 11.Now the question remains as to whether the order of reinstatement can be said to be proper order? Indisputably, the industrial Court exercises a discretionary jurisdiction but such discretion is required to be exercise judiciously. Relevant factor therefore, were required to be taken into consideration the nature of appointment, the period of appointment, the availability of job, etc. should weigh with the Court for determination of such an issue. As already discussed herein above regarding the earlier view of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of violation of provision of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 that was reinstatement with back wages but after taking into consideration various judgments pronounced in this regard by the Hon’ble Apex Court and placing reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of State of Karnataka Vrs. Uma Devi, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 and in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad Vrs. Employer I/R to Management of F.C.I., reported in AIR 2014 SC 1848 has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 as follows:- “17. Xxxxxxx Taking note of the judgments referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs and also few more cases in other portion of the said judgment, the legal position was summed up in the following manner. Employer I/R to Management of F.C.I., reported in AIR 2014 SC 1848 has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 as follows:- “17. Xxxxxxx Taking note of the judgments referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs and also few more cases in other portion of the said judgment, the legal position was summed up in the following manner. “It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid, judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatory required under Section 25-Fof the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization. Thus when he cannot claim regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come fist go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instated of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied”. The judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.S.N.L. Vrs. Bhurumal, reported in AIR 2014 Supreme Court 1188 wherein it has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court as to what would be the course if the daily wagers who have come in service earlier than those who have come later on, but the principle of last come first go if not followed and dealing with that situation it has been held in that judgment at paragraph 25 as follows:- “25. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come fist go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied.” We have examined the direction passed by the Labour Court in the award which is the order of reinstatement with lump sum compensation of Rs. 25,000/-. We have already discussed hereinabove, the position of law as on today with respect to the fact that in case of violation of provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947, the earlier view of the Hon’ble Apex Court was to reinstate the workman in service but subsequently , this view has been changed as would be evident from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (Supra), we have examined the order of the Labour Court as to whether it is coming under the exception as per the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Nanda Prasad(supra whereby and where under it has been held that only in case of disengagement of permanent/regular employee on ulterior motive or by way of unfair labour practice order of reinstatement should have been passed otherwise the order should have been passed by directing for making payment of retrenchment compensation and that ratio has been laid down taking into consideration the judgment rendered in the case of State of Karnataka vrs. Umadevi (3) (supra) as because if in case order of reinstatement has been passed, then the employer/management will again retrench the workman after making payment of retrenchment compensation. Hence, the order of compensation has been found just and proper in case of violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act as per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka vrs. Umadevi (3) (supra) and in the case of B.S.N.L. (supra) the principle of first come last go has been take into consideration. It is also settled that one stopgap arrangement cannot be substituted by another stopgap arrangement. Umadevi (3) (supra) and in the case of B.S.N.L. (supra) the principle of first come last go has been take into consideration. It is also settled that one stopgap arrangement cannot be substituted by another stopgap arrangement. Reference in this regard needs to be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Piara Singh, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118 wherein at paragraph 46 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “46. Secondly, an Advocates Appeared : hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another Advocates Appeared : hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regular selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.“ It is to be noted that the judgment rendered in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Piara Singh (supra) is regarding regularization, however, that part of the ratio concerning regularization has been over ruled by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi (3) (supra), but the other part remains same. 12.We have examined the fact of this case as to whether it is coming under the exception as has been laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) and B.S.N.L. (supra) and we find that an advertisement published in the daily newspaper ‘Samaj’ dtd. 11.3.2005 for fulfilling the vacancies in the management. New persons have been engaged in CESU which would be evident from Exhibits-6 and 7, Xerox copies of letter regarding reinstatement of services as N.M.R. and Ext. 6 is an appointment order of one Ajaya Kumar Mallick. Thus it is evident that the workmen who are working an N.M.R. have been retrenched and thereafter other persons have been engaged. Thus one stopgap arrangement has been replaced by another stopgap arrangement which is not permissible, hence the case of the workmen is not coming under the purview of the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) and B.S.N.L. (supra) since the workmen herein were not under regular establishment and also it is not his case that others have been regularized but although others have been engaged by virtue of advertisement dtd. 11.3.2005 as has been discussed in detail by the Labour Court in the Award, hence disallowing him to remain out of service when others have been engaged, although as N.M.R. but even then the workman cannot be thrown out of service applying the principle of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the principle of first come last go, otherwise same will lead to arbitrariness and unfair labour practice of the management and as such considering the fact that the management is in requirement of workers under N.M.R. capacity and also taking into consideration the intent of Industrial Disputes Act, which is purely a beneficial legislation, we thought it proper to affirm the award by which the order of reinstatement has been passed. Accordingly we find no merit in this writ petition, hence dismissed. Petition dismissed. `