JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard the petitioner in person and Mr. B.J. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the State as well as Mr. S. S. Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for the opposite party no.2. 2. The petitioner herein is the husband of the respondent no.2 and has sought for setting aside the FIR dated 26.3.2011 and all the subsequent proceedings thereof. According to the petitioner the aforesaid FIR was filed after four years of their marriage and about 2 years after the petitioner living separately from her. On the basis of the said FIR All Woman Police Station Case No.37/2011 under Section 498A/120(B) IPC was registered and finally submitted Charge-sheet against the petitioner under the aforesaid Sections of law and the case is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamrup, Guwahati vide G.R. Case No. 2568/2011. The learned Magistrate has already taken cognizance of the offence. 3. Earlier also the petitioner challenged the aforesaid FIR and all consequential proceedings by way of filing Criminal Petition No.81/2013 but the same was dismissed, hence the petitioner has come forward by the second criminal petition with the same prayer as was challenged under the aforesaid petition. It has been submitted that though the petitioner preferred Special Leave Petition No. 299/14 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the said judgment and order passed in Criminal Petition No.81/2013 dated 2.12.2013 and the Review Petition No. 414/2014 in the said SLP but the same was dismissed in limine with a non-speaking order. The Criminal Writ Petition B No. 18390/2014 preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution by the petitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the said FIR as violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner. The appeal preferred against the said judgment and order and review petition filed in the said appeal were dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court the curative petition 230/15 preferred in the review petition as also dismissed on 14.1.2016. 4. After exhausting all the remedies challenging the aforesaid FIR and proceedings thereof, the petitioner has come up with the instant criminal petition (second) with almost all the similar grounds that were taken in the earlier criminal petition no. 81/13. 5. The petitioner has narrated all details about their merital affairs since after their marriage and also about filing of two other criminal cases by the estranged wife/ respondent no.2 against him. 81/13. 5. The petitioner has narrated all details about their merital affairs since after their marriage and also about filing of two other criminal cases by the estranged wife/ respondent no.2 against him. Without referring all details of merital life of the parties, for the sake of brevity let us examine the grounds for filing the present petition afresh by the petitioner, which can be summed up as below: 6. According to the petitioner, the respondent voluntarily did not reside with him since 17.6.2009 and she filed two FIRs against the petitioner, first on 7.5.2009 which was registered in Trombay Police Station U/S 323/504 IPC and thereafter another FIR was filed as on 17.6.2009 referring the incident on 16.6.2009 which was registered U/S 323/ 504 IPC and since then the respondent no.2 is residing separately from petitioner residing in her parental house and has filed the 3rd FIR impugned FIR by suppressing earlier two FIRs so the same is bad in law and facts, there being no prima facie case made out about any illegal demand by the petitioner. It has also been challenged that in the said FIR as well as Charge-sheet, there are no dates etc. mentioned about the alleged dowry demand. The Criminal Proceeding is stated to be manifestly attended with malafide and maliciously instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance to the petitioner due to personal grudge. Accordingly, it has been challenged that the learned Court has no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and as such order dated 11.6.2012 taking cognizance of the offence on the aforesaid charge-sheet is not maintainable and liable to be set aside. Further it has been contended that the conduct of the trial Court who refuse to provide him the copies of the documents in English is not sustainable as it has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. 7. In his verbal as well as written argument the petitioner has contended that even in view of earlier rejection of his petition U/S 482 Cr.P.C. does not bar to exercise its power on the 2nd occasion as quashing of such case is neither a revision nor a review of his earlier decision but exercise of its inherent power keeping in view of the change circumstances. It has been contended that on earlier occasion this Court proceeded under circumstances which was not existed at the time and the Court preceded under mistaken belief that the investigation is in progress and the petitioner rushed to the Court to scuttle the investigation, whereas at that time investigation was already completed and Charge-sheet was also filed, which was on record. This piece of argument has been advanced on the basis of the observation of the learned Court while disposing the earlier criminal petition no.81/13 dated 2.12.2013, when the learned Single Judge has rejected the prayer of the petitioner for quashing and has directed the jurisdictional police station to proceed with the investigation in accordance with law and take the matter to its logical conclusion. 8. I have considered the aforesaid submissions of the petitioner and I am of the considered view that the aforesaid observations and findings of the Court can no way caused prejudice to the petitioner. While allowing the due investigation of the matter, rejecting the prayer for quashing the proceeding, the learned Court has necessarily indicated, for filing of Charge-sheet by using the word “logical conclusion”. In that event, even though the Court has not mentioned about filing of Charge-sheet it cannot occasion prejudice to the petitioner as he is aware that case is already charge-sheeted on the basis of the said FIR. When the very foundation of the case i.e. the FIR was sustained by the Court and consequent filing of Charge-sheet is the normal procedure and there cannot be any illegality in filing such Charge-sheet on the basis of such legally approved FIR. Mere omission on the part of the Court in its order about filing of Charge-sheet, which is within the knowledge of the petitioner cannot be a matter of prejudice. 9. The next submission of the petitioner that second criminal petition is maintainable in view of change in circumstances. But it is to be noted, except repeating all details that was prevailing since the earlier occasion and the present FIR, the petitioner failed to make out as to what is the ‘change in circumstances’ which has raised fresh cause of action in filing the case. The mere fact that the Court did not mention about filing of Charge-sheet in the order as mentioned above that does not itself resulting ‘change of circumstances’. The mere fact that the Court did not mention about filing of Charge-sheet in the order as mentioned above that does not itself resulting ‘change of circumstances’. I found no any substance in the submission of the petitioner that he was made to suffer and he has been subjected to prejudice because of the above order of the Court. No failure of justice has occasioned as has been challenged by the petitioner which may compel the petitioner to prefer the instant second application for quashing the aforesaid proceeding which has already been decided by the Court after going all details of the three consecutive FIRs filed by the respondent no.2. The submission of the petitioner that the order dated 2.12.2013 is a nullity as the Hon’ble Court failed to take account the copy of the Charge-sheet and hence the order is without jurisdiction and on that account it is seen that he has placed reliance in the case of M.L. Setty vs R.P. Kapoor, reported in (1972) SCC 2 427, which is wrongly placed and not sustainable. 10. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs W.B appellant vs Mohan Sing and ors., reported in AIR 1975 SC 1002 has been referred by the petitioner wherein it has been held that rejection of prior application for quashing criminal proceedings is no bar for filing a fresh petition. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision is mentioned below: “The earlier application which was rejected by the High Court was an application under Section 361A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceeding and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But thereafter the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and half years without any progress at all and it was in these circumstances that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under Section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application as to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier application. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application as to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The fact and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of respondent nos. 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution has failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one and 1 half years.” In the aforesaid decision the Hon’ble Apex Court has allowed for filing two petition for quashing, in view of subsequent event/evidence that has crept into after long pending investigation. 11. But the petitioner herein failed to establish the ‘change circumstances’ to entertain the second petition for quash proceeding. The petitioner has referred so many other case laws without having any bearing on the issue before the Court. 12. Mr. B.J. Dutta, learned Addl. P.P. and Mr. 11. But the petitioner herein failed to establish the ‘change circumstances’ to entertain the second petition for quash proceeding. The petitioner has referred so many other case laws without having any bearing on the issue before the Court. 12. Mr. B.J. Dutta, learned Addl. P.P. and Mr. S.S. Sarma, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.2 have submitted that there remains no any further scope for deliberation on the issue which has already been decided by this Court by its order dated 2.12.2013 in earlier Criminal Petition No. 81/2013 and this Court cannot reopen/ examine the same aspect which has already been adjudicated by another Court and has also been upheld by the Apex Court by refusing to entertain a S.L.P. and has declined to review petition against such order. It has been seriously contended that petitioner himself has abused the process of Court by initiating such unnecessary criminal petition only to obstruct the legal proceeding of Court of law just to harass the respondent no. 2. The order of this Court passed earlier has already attained the finality as soon as the Apex Court refused to entertain the SLP as well as Review petition, so the approach of the petitioner to challenge the same FIR and the proceeding thereof cannot at all be maintained. 13. The petitioner still try to persuade this Court and to justify his case by making a submission that order of refusing Special Leave to Appeal does not stand substituted in place of order under challenge. Petitioner has referred to the case of Kunhayammed and ors. vs State of Kerala and anr., reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 , wherein it has been held that an order of refusing Special Leave to Appeal made in a non-speaking order or a speaking order in either case, it does not attracts the doctrine of merger . 14. That apart the petitioner has advanced his argument that that filing of Charge-sheet pursuant to the impugned FIR gives the petitioner a fresh cause of action for which he has filed the present petition. Since the allegation in the impugned FIR does not disclosed the commission of offence even on the face value so the impugned Charge-sheet is liable to be quashed. Since the allegation in the impugned FIR does not disclosed the commission of offence even on the face value so the impugned Charge-sheet is liable to be quashed. Resultantly, the order of taking congnizance by the Court on the basis of charge-sheet pursuant to such vague FIR gave fresh cause of action to the petitioner and hence he filed the case afresh which is maintainable. It has been contended that on the aforesaid reasons the Charge-sheet, order of taking congnizance and the order dated 9.9.2015 whereby the Court has rejected the request of the petitioner to furnish documents in English version are liable to be quashed and set aside. 15. I have given due consideration of the submissions so made above before this Court and also gone through the documents annexed with the petitioner. 16. Referring to the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein the Apex Court has refused the SLP it has been submitted that the same cannot be treated as merger and the High Court has ample jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain 2nd petition to quash proceeding. The petitioner himself has referred the decision in Kunyammed (supra) in support of his contention. It is to be noted that the aforementioned decision the Bench comprising Justice K.P Thomas, Justice D.P. Mahapatra and Justice R.C. Lahoti have explained the doctrine of merger, wherein various judicial pronouncement on the doctrine has been examined and formulated various principles regarding the same. The Bench has also examined the effect of dismissal of SLP in limine and SLP on contest. Relevant observation of Full Bench decision is reproduced below: “The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognized. It is a common law doctrine principle of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. The appellate jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court is conferred by way of Article 132 to 136 of the Constitution. The Article 136 of the Constitution relates special jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court which is sweeping in nature. It is a residuary power in the sense that it confers an appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. subject to special leave being granted in such matters, which may not be covered by preceding articles. The Article 136 of the Constitution relates special jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court which is sweeping in nature. It is a residuary power in the sense that it confers an appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. subject to special leave being granted in such matters, which may not be covered by preceding articles. It is an untrammelled reservoir of power incapable of being confined to definitional bounce, the discretion conferred under Supreme Court being subjected to only one limitation, i.e. the wisdom and good sense or sense of justice of the Judges.” 17. It is not the policy of this Court to entertain Special Leave Petition and grant leave under Article 136 of the Constitution save in those cases where some substantial question of law of general or public importance is involved or there is manifest injustice resulting from impugned order or judgment. Following conclusions are summed up (relevant provision only quoted) (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one in either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e gives reason for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the apex court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. 18. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. 18. In view of above decision it is obvious that the Apex Court does not entertain Special Leave Petition unless some substantial question of law has been involved or there is a question of manifest injustice. In the given circumstances dismissal of SLP made by the petitioner even by non-speaking order indicates that there having no such ground to entertain such petition, SLP has been dismissed. Though it is not a case of merger but having regard to the matters on record while the Hon’ble Apex Court has also declined to entertain the review petition in SLP, it would be in the judicial discipline and propriety to hold that the decision so rendered on earlier occasion has not been interfered into. Consequently, the earlier order would prevail, there being no any review against such order filed by the petitioner immediately after the aforesaid order. 19. The petitioner herein has repeated all the assertions he made in his earlier criminal petition which is annexed with the record. Repeated challenge to the authenticity of the FIR, by referring to the strain relation between the petitioner and his wife, by narrating all details of the episode in their merital life is of no avail when this Court has already arrive at a conclusion that the cause of action of the present FIR is totally different to that of earlier two FIRs filed by the respondent no.2. It appears that the petitioner try to project that he is all along innocent so he should be relieved from such accusation by quashing the Criminal Proceeding. But point to be noted that time has not ripen yet to prove his innocence. The criteria under which the High Court exercised the inherent jurisdiction to invoke provisions U/S 482 Cr.P.C. is not to adjudge the innocence or guilt of a party but to find out if on the basis of prima facie accusation that has been made out in the FIR/Complaint, will justify the continuance of criminal proceedings. As has been referred by the petitioner, the case of State of Haryana and ors. As has been referred by the petitioner, the case of State of Haryana and ors. vs Bhajanlal and ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 if we consider the guideline spelt out in the case of Bhajanlal we found that present case does not come up within the purview of the aforesaid guideline so as to set aside the FIR as well as the Charge-sheet. There cannot be any challenge to the Charge-sheet filed on the basis of such FIRs, (which is the natural consequence) and the cognizance taken by the learned trial Court. 20. After considering all matters on record as well as the documents and the legal pronouncements of Hon’ble Apex Court, as discussed above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the approach of the petitioner for the second time to quash the FIR and the criminal proceeding pertaining to G.R. Case No. 2568/2011 is devoid of any merit and liable to be rejected. Accordingly, the Petition stands dismissed.