ORDER : Vivek Agarwal, J. Petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal from service Annexure P/1 dated 10.12.2003 issued by the Commandant, 120 Bn. BSF, so also Annexure P/2 dated 23.6.2004 i.e. the order of the appellate authority confirming the order of dismissal passed by respondent No. 4/Commandant, 120 Bn. BSF. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed on the post of Constable, BSF, and he was allotted Constable No.94007758. On 21st March, 2003 the petitioner proceeded on 60 days sanctioned leave and in terms of the leave order, he was required to report back on 30th May, 2003, but according to the petitioner, on 22.5.2003 he had fallen sick, and therefore, applied for extension of leave by submitting medical certificates as are contained in Annexure P/4 (Coll). According to the petitioner, prior to his preparation to resume his duties, a criminal case was filed against him under the provisions contained in Sections 302 and 304-B inasmuch as there was an allegation that petitioner had killed his wife Smt. Pushpa Devi by torturing her for demand of dowry. It is also on record that said incident had taken place on 24.5.2003 and criminal case was registered in which petitioner was acquitted. 3. Petitioner submitted an application for reinstatement submitting that he was suffering from some ailment from 30.5.2003 to 7.10.2003 and thereafter on 8.10.2003 he was taken into custody and after facing criminal trial under Sections 304-B, 34 and 498-A of IPC, the petitioner was acquitted from the charges, and therefore, he should be permitted to join, but said representation was dismissed vide order dated 24th January, 2005. Prior to this, petitioner was sent a show-cause notice dated 31st October, 2003 asking him to show-cause as to why without sufficient cause he overstayed the leave w.e.f. 30.5.2003. Petitioner submitted reply to the said show-cause notice as is contained in Annexure P/7 and informed the authorities that he was on leave from 7.5.2003 to 20th June, 2003 and was required to report on 22.6.2003, but he had fallen sick before 24.6.2003 and had sent an application to Jammu Headquarters along with medical certificates. It is further mentioned that he continued to be sick from 23.5.2003 to 7.11.2003 and thereafter because of registration of criminal case, he is in judicial custody since 8.10.2003. It is further mentioned that he continued to be sick from 23.5.2003 to 7.11.2003 and thereafter because of registration of criminal case, he is in judicial custody since 8.10.2003. Therefore, prayed that his absence may be condoned and he may be allowed to continue in service, but this representation did not find favour with the authorities and petitioner was dismissed from service w.e.f. 10th December, 2003. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that dismissal order is in violation of the rules and the provisions of the Border Security Force Act, 1968, as no procedure was adopted and the appeal too has been dismissed by a non-speaking order. 5. Respondents have filed a detailed return and submitted that the statutory appeal which was filed by the petitioner has been rejected by the I.G., BSF R & G in June, 2004 and this petition has been filed in the year 2006 i.e. after almost two years of passing of the order by the appellate authority, therefore, petition deserves to be dismissed. It is also mentioned that petitioner has used false and fabricated medical certificates and actually he was absconding to elude arrest from the police, therefore, it cannot be said that petitioner was sick and could not attend his duties. It is also submitted that petitioner had not submitted any medical certificate till he had approached respondent No.4 by sending communication contained in Annexure R/1, which was received by respondent No.4 on 3rd July, 2004, enclosing medical certificate of leave from 23.5.2003 to 3.6.2003. In fact after issuance of this certificate, on 4.6.2003 fitness certificate was issued by some medical officer as is contained in Annexure R/3 declaring the petitioner to be fit to join. Petitioner has not explained that why he did not proceed to join after obtaining fitness certificate on 4.6.2003 and obtained another medical certificate dated 5.6.2003 requiring him to take rest from 5.6.2003 to 10.7.2003. In fact, respondents have filed a detailed communication dated 16th March, 2004 as is contained in Annexure R/10 seeking verification of medical documents and in response to the same, the Chief Medical and Health Officer, Bhind, categorically opined that the medical certificates, which were issued, were not supported by reports of investigation, follow up etc. causing doubt about the treatment allegedly taken by the petitioner. 6. causing doubt about the treatment allegedly taken by the petitioner. 6. Notwithstanding the authenticity or otherwise of the medical certificates as have been produced by the petitioner, the moot question which arises in this writ petition is whether the procedure as prescribed under the provisions of the Border Security Force Act, 1968 and the Border Security Force Rules, 1969 has been followed or not before passing the impugned order of termination and thereafter whether the appellate authority has taken into consideration the fact of procedure being followed or not as laid down in the Act or Rules. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to the provisions contained in Rule 20 of the 1969 Rules which provides for termination of service for misconduct. 8. Rule 20 (1), 22, 23 and 24 of the 1969 Rules provides as under : "20. Termination of service for misconduct (1)Where in the opinion of the Director-General a person subject to the Act has conducted himself in such manner, whether or not such conduct amounts to an offence, as would render his retention in service undesirable and his trial by Security Force Court inexpedient, the Director General may inform the person concerned accordingly." 22. Imposition of penalty - (1) After going through the allegations against the person intended to be dismissed or removed, his defence, and the proceedings of enquiry if any, the Director-General shall, if the case has been initiated by the Central Government, and, may, in other cases, make his recommendation to the Central Government and that Government may dismiss or remove such a person. (2) If the Central Government considers that the allegations are proved but dismissal or removal would be too severe a punishment, it may order: (i) the retirement of the officer; or (ii) imposition of the penalty of forfeiture of service for purposes of promotion or seniority; or (iii) may order the with holding of increments or any other punishment which would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. (3) The Director-General, an Inspector-General or a Deputy Inspector-General, before dismissing or removing from the service a person subject to the Act shall comply, as far as applicable, with the provisions of rules. Provided that a Deputy Inspector-General shall not dismiss or remove a Subordinate Officer of the rank of a Subedar (Inspector) 23. (3) The Director-General, an Inspector-General or a Deputy Inspector-General, before dismissing or removing from the service a person subject to the Act shall comply, as far as applicable, with the provisions of rules. Provided that a Deputy Inspector-General shall not dismiss or remove a Subordinate Officer of the rank of a Subedar (Inspector) 23. Dismissal or removal by Central Government Where the Central Government is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that- I. it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure laid down in the said rules, or II. it is not expedient, in the interests of the security of the State, to follow such procedure, it may order the dismissal, or removal from the Force of a person subject to the Act without following the procedure laid down in rules 20 and 21. "24. Retirement of subordinate officers and enrolled persons.- "A subordinate officer or an enrolled person shall on the fulfilment of the terms and conditions of service under which he was appointed or enrolled be eligible to retire." Thus, a complete procedure has been prescribed wherein the Director-General is required to furnish the particulars of allegations and the report of investigation including the statements of witnesses, if any recorded and copies of documents, if any intended to be used against the delinquent officer in cases where allegations have been investigated. Rule 20(4) provides that if it would not be in public interest to disclose the evidence or the documents, it shall be lawful for the Director General to with hold copies of such evidence or documents from the person concerned. In the present case, provisions of Rule 20(4) are not applicable. 9. The impugned order has been passed invoking authority under Rule 22 (1) of the 1969 Rules which provides as under: "22. Imposition of penalty (1) After going through the allegations against the person intended to be dismissed or removed, his defence, and the proceedings of enquiry if any, the Director-General shall, if the case has been initiated by the Central Government, and, may in other cases, make his recommendation to the Central Government and that Government may dismiss or remove such a person." 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the order of this Court dated 16.09.2014 passed in W.P. No. 994/2009 (Usman Ali v. Union of India & Ors.) wherein the delinquent officer had overstayed his leave, and therefore, he was dismissed from service. In this decision, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ramesh Chandra Tyagi v. Union of India and Others as reported in (1994) 2 SCC 416 in which the Supreme Court observed as under :- "We are pained to observe that entire proceedings do not leave very happy and satisfactory impression. It was vehemently argued that there was no procedural irregularity. But that is writ large on the face of it. No charge-sheet was served on the appellant. The Enquiry Officer himself stated that the notices sent were returned with endorsement "left without adders" and on other occasion, "on repeated visits people in the house that he has gone out and they do not disclose where he has gone. Therefore, it is being returned". May be that the appellant was avoiding it but avoidance does not mean that it gave a right to Enquiry Officer to proceed ex parte unless it was conclusively established that he deliberately and knowingly did not accept it. The endorsement on the envelope that it was refused, was not even proved by examining the postman or any other material to show that it was refusal by the appellant who denied on oath such a refusal. No effort was made to serve in any other manner known in law". 11. Similarly, reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of S.P. Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors., 2007 (1) JLJ 333 wherein the order of dismissal from service and order of appellate authority were quashed and set aside. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police Delhi and Ors. as reported in (2004) 4 SCC 560 , it was ordered that period during which the delinquent remained absent from duty and the period calculated up to the date on which he reported back on duty pursuant to the judgment of the Apex Court shall not be counted as a period spent on duty. 12. as reported in (2004) 4 SCC 560 , it was ordered that period during which the delinquent remained absent from duty and the period calculated up to the date on which he reported back on duty pursuant to the judgment of the Apex Court shall not be counted as a period spent on duty. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in case of Devi Prasad Tekam v. General Manager and Anr. as reported in 2014 (2) M.P.L.J. 336 wherein it has been held that termination of service for unauthorized absence of the petitioner from duty during which he was charged of criminal offence was passed without conducting departmental enquiry and set aside the same and the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated but without back wages or salary for the period of his absence. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Ram Phal as reported in (1996) 7 SCC 546 wherein show-cause notice was issued to the delinquent officer, but the delinquent had not replied to the notice, and therefore, the Supreme Court held that issuance of show-cause notice satisfied the requirement of Rule 20 (1), (2), (3) and (6), and therefore, it was not necessary to appoint an enquiry officer to conduct an enquiry under Rule 20(1) before passing the dismissal order. Law has been laid down holding that an enquiry by the Security Force Court in terms of Section 11 (2) consequent upon continued absence from duty without leave does not unnecessarily makes holding an enquiry as a condition precedent before passing of the order of dismissal. 14. Section 11 of the Border Security Force Act 1968 provides for dismissal, removal or reduction by the Director-General and by other officers. Similarly, Section 19 provides that any person who commits offence of overstaying the leave granted to him without sufficient cause shall on conviction by a Security Force Court be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned. 15. Facts of the present case are slightly different inasmuch as petitioner was served with a show-cause notice dated 31.10.2003 as contained in Annexure P-6. 15. Facts of the present case are slightly different inasmuch as petitioner was served with a show-cause notice dated 31.10.2003 as contained in Annexure P-6. Petitioner had submitted reply to said show-cause notice as contained in Annexure P-7 and prayed to sanction his leave and continue him in service. In this reply, he had not suppressed the fact of his condition due to filing of criminal case on account of death of his wife. It is also true that petitioner has been acquitted of the charges on account of failure of the prosecution to establish the charges against the petitioner. Copy of such order of acquittal as passed by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhind in Sessions Case No. 177/2004 is also on record as Annexure P-5. Respondents in their return have specifically averred that petitioner had not requested for extension of his leave in this application. It is admitted that his application for grant of leave supported by medical certificates was received by respondent No.4 for extension/sanction of leave due to his illness till 03.07.2003. From all these facts that petitioner had sent medical certificates seeking leave, he was involved in a criminal case from which he has been given a clean acquittal and also the fact that no enquiry was conducted before passing the impugned order, Annexure P-1, It is apparent that ratio of law laid down in the case of Ram Pal (supra) is distinguishable under the facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the petitioner's case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Usman Ali (supra). 16. In the case of Usman Ali (supra) this Court has clearly held that it is established that there was no material to prove the guilt of the petitioner in absence of an enquiry being conducted in accordance with the Rules. Even the appellate authority has passed a cryptic non-speaking order devoid of any reasons. In this regard, law as laid down in the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, is important wherein the Apex Court has held as under:- "(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process". 17. In addition, in the case of Ram Chander v. Union of India and others as reported in (1986) 3 SCC 103 , the Apex Court emphasized the need for application of mind and passing of reasoned order by the appellate authority. Same view is followed by MP High Court in the case of Mohammad Idris v. Registrar General, MP. High Court, Jabalpur and another as reported in 2005 (2) MPLJ 51 . Recently the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others v. A. Masilamani as reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 has again taken the same view in. Thus, the appellate order is cryptic and liable to be set aside. 18. So far as the objection of the respondents regarding availability of revisional remedy is concerned, suffice it to say that the violation of principles of natural justice is established. In such cases, it is not compulsory to relegate the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy. Apart from this, the petition was admitted years ago and in the meantime limitation for alternative remedy is over. This Court by following the decision in the case of Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly AIR 1971 SC 33 opined in Chambal G.S.P. Samiti v. State of MP, 1995 MPLJ 969 that if the petition is entertained and during the pendency of petition, remedy for seeking alternative remedy expires, then the petition should be heard on merits and parties should not be relegated to avail the remedy under the statute. Thus, this objection stands overruled. 19. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the punishment order Annexure P/1 and the order of the appellate authority Annexure P/2 are set aside. Liberty is reserved to the respondents to serve the charge sheet to the petitioner and conduct it further from that stage in accordance with law. Thus, this objection stands overruled. 19. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the punishment order Annexure P/1 and the order of the appellate authority Annexure P/2 are set aside. Liberty is reserved to the respondents to serve the charge sheet to the petitioner and conduct it further from that stage in accordance with law. Petitioner be reinstated within 30 days, however, he shall not be entitled to any salary for the intervening period. After further enquiry, the respondents may pass order in accordance with law which must also deal with the intervening period.