JUDGMENT Amrit Lal son of late Ram Badan is before this Court with the request to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay gratuity to him w.e.f. 1.10.2000 to 1.11.2011 along with 18% interest. 2. Record in question reflects that the petitioner, while holding the post of Assistant Election Officer, Gorakhpur, was placed under suspension on 13.5.2000. Thereafter he retired from service on 30.9.2000 on attaining the age of superannuation. His retiral dues were not settled on the ground that a criminal case under Sections 420, 406, 477A, 109, 120B IPC and Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was pending against him. He proceeded to file a Writ Petition No.24241 of 2000, which was finally disposed of by this Court on 12.2.2001 with direction to the authorities to conclude the enquiry within three months. In pursuance thereof, the District Magistrate, Bareilly sanctioned provisional pension to the petitioner with effect from January, 2003. However, the respondents withheld all retiral benefits of the petitioner including GPF, leave encashment, amount of insurance, gratuity etc due since 1.10.2000. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the aforesaid criminal case. The Special Judge (Anti Corruption), Gorakhpur, vide judgement dated 13.8.2009, acquitted the petitioner in Special Sessions Trial Case No. 5 of 2000 (State v. Pancham Lal & Ors) under Sections 420, 406, 477A, 109, 120B IPC and Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish that M/s Arjun Ji & sons (the contractor), who had supplied the furnitures, had submitted forged bills or that Shri Pancham Lal and Shri Amrit Lal (the petitioner) were paid any illegal gratification for clearing the bills. The said acquittal order had been assailed by the State Government by filing Government Appeal No.8414 of 2009, which was dismissed by this Court on 17.5.2012. It is also relevant to indicate here that meanwhile the petitioner had preferred Writ A No. 18322 of 2004 (Amrit Lal v. State of UP & ors), which was disposed of by this Court on 24.11.2010 with direction to the State Government for considering the matter with regard to payment of balance of the retiral dues to the petitioner after taking into account the judgment of acquittal and appeal. When the said order was not complied with, the petitioner had proceeded to file Contempt Petition No. 2866 of 2011. Thereafter the Additional Director (Treasury & Pension) Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur issued an order dated 27.9.2011 and released certain amount but withheld the amount of gratuity. On 15.10.2011 the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur passed an order on 15.10.2011 for payment of GPF amount. The said order had been assailed by the petitioner by means of Writ A No.19693 of 2013 and this Court vide order dated 1.8.2014 had proceeded to dispose of the writ petition with following observations: - "Amrit Lal, who retired as District Election Officer has filed this petition for quashing the order dated 27.7.2011 by which the Chief Election Officer has refused to release the gratuity amount subject to pendency of the Criminal Appeal No. 8414 of 2009. In respect to the charges as are mentioned in the impugned order the department did not proceed rather only a criminal case was lodged against the petitioner and against the order of acquittal the appeal i.e. appeal no. 8414 of 2009 was filed in this court. After hearing learned counsel for the parties there is no dispute about the fact that the aforesaid criminal appeal was dismissed vide order of this Court dated 17.5.2012, copy of which was shown during the course of arguments. In view of the aforesaid dismissal of the appeal now there is no hurdle in view of the impugned order for payment of the gratuity amount to the petitioner. Firstly the pendency of the Criminal Appeal filed by the State cannot be said to be a valid ground for non payment of gratuity amount and in any case after dismissal of the appeal on 17.5.2012, there can be further no justification for not paying the gratuity amount. In view of the aforesaid, this petition is allowed. Order passed by the Chief Election Officer dated 27.7.2011 is hereby quashed in so far it relates to denial of gratuity amount. The respondent no. 1 is directed to immediately get the gratuity amount finally calculated and pay the same to the petitioner along with interest @ 9% from 1.1.2011. Payment is to be made to the petitioner preferably within a period of two months from today. The respondent no. 1 is directed to immediately get the gratuity amount finally calculated and pay the same to the petitioner along with interest @ 9% from 1.1.2011. Payment is to be made to the petitioner preferably within a period of two months from today. Learned Standing Counsel is directed to communicate this order to the competent authority and at the same time the petitioner is also directed to file certified copy of this order along with an application before the respondent no. 1 with the request that compliance of this order be ensured in time." 4. In this background, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation on 30.9.2000 and since then the entire retiral benefits including gratuity has not been released by the respondents, even though this Court vide order dated 1.8.2014 had allowed the Writ A No. 19693 of 2012 with direction to the respondent no.1 to get the gratuity amount finally calculated and paid to the petitioner along with interest @ 9% from 1.1.2011. He submits that the petitioner is at present 74 years' old and is running from pillar to post and this Court must come for rescue and reprieve the petitioner. 5. In State of Jharkhand and others v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and another, (2013) 12 SCC 210 Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is an accepted position that gratuity and pension are not bounties. An employee earns these benefits by dint of his long, continuous, faithful and unblemished service. It is thus a hard earned benefit which accrues to an employee and is in the nature of "property". Relevant paras of the judgement reads as under: - "8. It is an accepted position that gratuity and pension are not the bounties. An employee earns these benefits by dint of his long, continuous, faithful and unblemished service. Conceptually it is so lucidly described in D.S. Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 by Justice D.A. Desai, who spoke for the Bench, in his inimitable style, in the following words: "18. The approach of the respondents raises a vital and none too easy of answer, question as to why pension is paid. And why was it required to be liberalised? Is the employer, which expression will include even the State, bound to pay pension? The approach of the respondents raises a vital and none too easy of answer, question as to why pension is paid. And why was it required to be liberalised? Is the employer, which expression will include even the State, bound to pay pension? Is there any obligation on the employer to provide for the erstwhile employee even after the contract of employment has come to an end and the employee has ceased to render service? 19. What is a pension? What are the goals of pension? What public interest or purpose, if any, it seeks to serve? If it does seek to serve some public purpose, is it thwarted by such artificial division of retirement pre and post a certain date? We need seek answer to these and incidental questions so as to render just justice between parties to this petition. 20. The antiquated notion of pension being a bounty a gratituous payment depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not claimable as a right and, therefore, no right to pension can be enforced through Court has been swept under the carpet by the decision of the Constitution Bench in Deoki Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors., 1971 SCR 634 wherein Supreme Court authoritatively ruled that pension is a right and the payment of it does not depend upon the discretion of the Government but is governed by the rules and a Government servant coming within those rules is entitled to claim pension. It was further held that the grant of pension does not depend upon any one's discretion. It is only for the purpose of quantifying the amount having regard to service and other allied matters that it may be necessary for the authority to pass an order to that effect but the right to receive pension flows to the officer not because of any such order but by virtue of the rules. This view was reaffirmed in State of Punjab and Anr. v. Iqbal Singh, 1976 2 LLJ 377 ". It is thus hard earned benefit which accrues to an employee and is in the nature of "property". This right to property cannot be taken away without the due process of law as per the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India." 6. v. Iqbal Singh, 1976 2 LLJ 377 ". It is thus hard earned benefit which accrues to an employee and is in the nature of "property". This right to property cannot be taken away without the due process of law as per the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India." 6. Right to receive pension was recognised as right to property by the Constitution Bench Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1971 2 SCC 330 , as is apparent from the following discussion: - "27. The last question to be considered, is, whether the right to receive pension by a Government servant is property, so as to attract Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. This question falls to be decided in order to consider whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 32. To this aspect, we have already adverted to earlier and we now proceed to consider the same. 28. According to the petitioner the right to receive pension is property and the respondents by an executive order dated June 12, 1968 have wrongfully withheld his pension. That order affects his fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. The respondents, as we have already indicated, do not dispute the right of the petitioner to get pension, but for the order passed on August 5, 1966. There is only a bald averment in the counter - affidavit that no question of any fundamental right arises for consideration. Mr. Jha, learned counsel for the respondents, was not prepared to take up the position that the right to receive pension cannot be considered to be property under any circumstances. According to him, in this case, no order has been passed by the State granting pension. We understood the learned counsel to urge that if the State had passed an order granting pension and later on resiles from that order, the latter order may be considered to affect the petitioner's right regarding property so as to attract Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. 29. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. By a reference to the material provisions in the Pension Rules, we have already indicated that the grant of pension does not depend upon an order being passed by the authorities to that effect. 29. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. By a reference to the material provisions in the Pension Rules, we have already indicated that the grant of pension does not depend upon an order being passed by the authorities to that effect. It may be that for the purposes of quantifying the amount having regard to the period of service and other allied matters, it may be necessary for the authorities to pass an order to that effect, but the right to receive pension flows to an officer not because of the said order but by virtue of the Rules. The Rules, we have already pointed out, clearly recognise the right of persons like the petitioner to receive pension under the circumstances mentioned therein. 30. The question whether the pension granted to a public servant is property attracting Article 31(1) came up for consideration before the Punjab High Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Union of India, 1962 AIR(P&H) 503 It was held that such a right constitutes "property" and any interference will be a breach of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. It was further held that the State cannot by an executive order curtail or abolish altogether the right of the public servant to receive pension. This decision was given by a learned Single Judge. This decision was taken up in Letters Patent Appeal by the Union of India. The Letters Patent Bench in its decision inUnion of India v. Bhagwant Singh, 1965 2 ILR(P&H) 1 approved the decision of the learned Single Judge. The Letters Patent Bench held that the pension granted to a public servant on his retirement is "property" within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Constitution and he could be deprived of the same only by an authority of law and that pension does not cease to be property on the mere denial or cancellation of it. It was further held that the character of pension as "property" cannot possibly undergo such mutation at the whim of a particular person or authority. 31. The matter again came up before a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in K.R. Erry v. The State of Punjab, 1967 ILR(P&H) 278. The High Court had to consider the nature of the right of an officer to get pension. 31. The matter again came up before a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in K.R. Erry v. The State of Punjab, 1967 ILR(P&H) 278. The High Court had to consider the nature of the right of an officer to get pension. The majority quoted with approval the principles laid down in the two earlier decisions of the same High Court, referred to above, and held that the pension is not to be treated as a bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and that the right to superannuation pension including its amount is a valuable right vesting in a Government servant. It was further held by the majority that even though an opportunity had already been afforded to the officer on an earlier occasion for showing cause against the imposition of penalty for lapse or misconduct on his part and he has been found guilty, nevertheless, when a cut is sought to be imposed in the quantum of pension payable to an officer on the basis of misconduct already proved against him, a further opportunity to show cause in that regard must be given to the officer. This view regarding the giving of further opportunity was expressed by the learned Judges on the basis of the relevant Punjab Civil Service Rules. But the learned Chief Justice in his dissenting judgment was not prepared to agree with the majority that under such circumstances a further opportunity should be given to an officer when a reduction in the amount of pension payable is made by the State. It is not necessary for us in the case on hand, to consider the question whether before taking action by way of reducing or denying the pension on the basis of disciplinary action already taken, a further notice to show cause should be given to an officer. That question does not arise for consideration before us. Nor are we concerned with the further question regarding the procedure, if any, to be adopted by the authorities before reducing or withholding the pension for the first time after the retirement of an officer. Hence we express no opinion regarding the views expressed by the majority and the minority Judges in the above Punjab High Court decision, on this aspect. Hence we express no opinion regarding the views expressed by the majority and the minority Judges in the above Punjab High Court decision, on this aspect. But we agree with the view of the majority when it has approved its earlier decision that pension is not a bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and that, on the other hand, the right to pension is a valuable right vesting in a Government servant. 32. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao Shinde and Anr., 1968 3 SCR 489 had to consider the question whether a "cash grant" is "property" within the meaning of that expression in Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. This Court held that it was property, observing "it is obvious that a right to sum of money is property". 33. Having due regard to the above decisions, we are of the opinion that the right of the petitioner to receive pension is property under Article 31(1) and by a mere executive order the State had no power to withhold the same. Similarly, the said claim is also property under Article 19(1)(f) and it is not saved by Sub-article (5) of Article 19. Therefore, it follows that the order dated June 12, 1968 denying the petitioner right to receive pension affects the fundamental right of the petitioner under Articles 19(1) (f) and 31(1)of the Constitution, and as such the writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable. It may be that under the Pension Act (Act 23 of 1871) there is a bar against a civil court entertaining any suit relating to the matters mentioned therein. That does not stand in the way of a Writ of Mandamus being issued to the State to properly consider the claim of the petitioner for payment of pension according to law". 7. In State of West Bengal v. Haresh C. Banerjee and Ors., 2006 7 SCC 651 , Apex Court recognised that even when, after the repeal of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 (1) of the Constitution vide Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 w.e.f. 20th June, 1979, the right to property was no longer remained a fundamental right, it was still a Constitutional right, as provided in Article 300A of the Constitution. Right to receive pension was treated as right to property. Right to receive pension was treated as right to property. Otherwise, challenge in that case was to the vires of Rule 10(1) of the West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971 which conferred the right upon the Governor to withhold or withdraw a pension or any part thereof under certain circumstances and the said challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court. 8. What we find from the record in question that the petitioner retired on 30.9.2000. His retiral dues were not paid on the ground that a criminal case was pending against him. He is receiving provisional pension with effect from January, 2003. On 13.8.2009 the petitioner was acquitted from the said criminal case. The said acquittal order was challenged in appeal which was dismissed on 17.5.2012. By the order dated 27.7.2011 the Additional Director (Treasury and Pension), Gorakhpur released certain amounts and withheld the gratuity in question. The District Magistrate, Gorakhpur issued an order dated 15.10.2011 for payment of provident fund. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order dated 27.7.2011 in Writ A No.19693 of 2013 and this Court vide order dated 1.8.2014 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 27.7.2011. The respondent no.1 was directed for payment of gratuity amount along with interest @ 9% from 1.1.2011. The respondents did not comply the said order and the petitioner has not been paid gratuity amount till date. 9. Accordingly, in view of the analysis and discussions made herein above, the writ petition is disposed of with direction to the respondents for payment of gratuity amount of the petitioner along with 9% interest with effect from 1.1.2011, as already directed by this Court vide order dated 1.8.2014 passed in Writ A No.19693 of 2012, within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of the order. Order accordingly.